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Abstract 
 
 
Comparative analysis is crucial to academic studies of public administration because it 
provides understanding of the nature of different types of public service institution: in 
particular, it helps to show what they do and don’t have in common, what kinds of 
institution they are, and what kinds of problems they face. However, in order to 
effectively conduct comparative research of public service institutions it is important 
that some thought is given to how they can best be compared. Accordingly, it is argued 
in this study that the differences between public service institutions can be appropriately 
analysed by examining their respective risk control cultures.   
This study makes use of the grid and group cultural theory, as developed by 
Mary Douglas, Aaron Wildavsky and Christopher Hood, to analyse the risk control 
cultures of the English and Japanese prison services in regard to two specific types of 
risk, namely suicide and violence. The results show that particular patterns of 
organizational behaviour within the English and Japanese prison services can be 
identified with their respective risk control cultures. More specifically, the English 
prison service tends to try to control risk by using formal rules and granting strong 
leadership roles to governors. By contrast, the Japanese prison service tends to use 
informal rules and group pressures to control risk. Furthermore, the peculiar 
organizational patterns of risk control within both organizations are often not recognised 
by their members. As a result, the strengths and weaknesses of organizations can be 
identified by analysing the patterns of risk control behaviour within them.  
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Introduction 
 
 
The rationale of this thesis 
 
Comparative analysis of public services is a central part of studies of public 
administration. Comparison provides understanding of the nature of public service 
institutions: in particular, of what they have and don’t have in common, what kinds of 
institution they are, and what kinds of problems they face. In this way, comparative 
analysis helps to identify the strengths and weaknesses of public institutions and to 
provide external information which can be used to improve them.  
An effective method is needed to carry out comparative studies of different 
institutions. In this regard, it is particularly important to consider which facets of public 
institutions we compare and how. Although the method for comparative studies of 
public administration has been developed over several theories and case studies, a 
recurring problem is that each study tends to become preoccupied with the peculiar 
details of specific institutions rather than identifying common characteristics shared by 
all institutions. Finding comparable factors across institutions is a long term goal for 
comparative public analysis.  
 In response to this trend, Christopher Hood has made a comparative analysis of 
the internal cultures of public service institutions in his book, the Art of the State (1998).  
In this work he introduces the grid and group theory (henceforth g/g theory) as a means 
of comparing the ways in which control is created in public service institutions. 
Following the publication of this work, a number of researchers have considered the 
practical use of the g/g theory as a means of studying several public service domains: 
food regulation, groups of high-class civil servants, higher education institutions, and 
prison services. Nevertheless, the g/g theory is still not widely recognised as a 
comparative framework for studying culture and there is very little understanding of 
how it can be applied to real cases in public administration. Given the context outlined 
above, the purpose of this study is to develop existing discussions of the g/g theory by 
employing it to make a comparative study of an area of public administration, namely 
prison services. 
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Theories and case studies 
 
This study is intended to contribute towards existing discussions of the g/g theory which 
was established by Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky in the field of anthropology. 
Although it has many advantages over other cultural theories, the method for applying it 
to real cases is not yet fully established. This problem is well known in the social 
sciences. Therefore, this study focuses on developing an effective method for applying 
the g/g theory to real cases in public service domains.  
Measurement theory in the social sciences is referred to here in order to 
achieve the aims of this study. Additionally, some studies which make use of 
organizational, institutional, and classic leadership theories are taken into account. In 
this way, this study analyses the risk control cultures of the English and Japanese prison 
services, specifically by using the g/g framework to compare patterns of suicide and 
violence risk control. These case studies demonstrate the validity of the g/g theory as a 
means of making comparative studies of culture in public service domains. Finally, the 
results of this study are used to assess the effectiveness and appropriateness of this 
method.   
 
 
Overview of data sources 
 
The data gathered for the case studies came from both qualitative and quantitative 
sources. This study attempts to measure culture by transforming the qualitative data into 
quantitative ones.  
A variety of primary sources were used here including official government 
statistics and reports. First, primary sources on the English Prison Service include 
parliamentary acts and statutory instruments, annual and thematic reports conducted by 
HMPS and the Ministry of Justice (MOJ), HM Chief Inspectorate of Prisons (HMCIP) 
reports, and Independent Monitoring Boards (IMB) reports and Prison and Probation 
Ombudsman (PPO) reports. Meanwhile, primary sources on the Japanese prison service 
include parliamentary acts and statutory instruments, annual or thematic reports by the 
Correctional Bureau (C.B.) and the Japanese Ministry of Justice (JMOJ), and reports by 
Prison Service Visiting Committees (PSVC).  
Second, reference is also made in this study to supplementary data gathered 
from secondary sources. These sources range from academic studies in criminology and 
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public administration to literature written by retired prison staff and former prisoners.  
I used news sources such as Nexis UK and, for Japan, @Nifty News Search. With 
regard to news sources, @Nifty News Search is a substitute of Nexis which is not 
available in Japan. Additionally, I also referred to reports by major voluntary groups that 
work for penal reform or prisoners’ right: Howard League and the Prisons Organization 
UK (Prison. Org. UK) which work for prisoners in HMPS and the Centre for Prison 
Rights (CPR) and Amnesty International Japan (AIJ) for Japanese prisons.  
Third, original interview data was collected from Japanese and English prison 
staff. Semi-structural interviews were conducted with 15 staff members from the 
Japanese and English prison services between 2008 and 2010. Two of these interviews 
took place over the phone. Table i.1 shows a breakdown of the prison staff whom I 
interviewed.  
 
Table і.1: Breakdown of interviewees. 
 
 
Although the number of interviews is relatively small, gaining access to prison 
staff was extremely difficult in both Japan and England. Formal research requests were 
rejected in both countries because my research was considered to be for personal 
purposes. As a result, it was only possible to informally interview personal contacts. 
Due to this limited access, interviews were conducted with three UK prison governors 
who had retired within the past 10 years.    
It proved particularly difficult to gain access to prison officers. Although I tried 
to make contact with prison officers informally, my efforts were unsuccessful. However, 
a few of the prison staff members who I interviewed had previously worked as prison 
officers before getting their current positions (see Table i.2). Therefore, the data about 
prison officers are based on these interviewees.  
 
 
Break down list of Interviewees England Japan
Directors of the National HQs 0 1
Governing Governors 3 0
Governor Grades (Middle or high class Managers) 2 1
Prison Officers 0 0
Trainers (Workshop staff or teachers) 5 0
National HQ staff (including audit unit) 0 2
Members of independent monitoring groups (IMB, HMIP or PVC) 1 0
Total (N=) 11 4
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Table i.2: Interviewees with experiences of working as prison officers 
 
 
Interviews were semi-structural but focused on the theme of risk control in 
prisons. This theme ensured that useful information was gathered during all interviews.  
The interviews lasted between 30 and 60 minutes. It was agreed beforehand with 
interviewees that interview data would be kept confidential and that any quotes used in 
this study would be anonymous. Due to the sensitivity of the interview theme, most 
interviewees did not agree to be taped. Accordingly, quotes are based on my interview 
notes. Furthermore, the interviews with Japanese prison staff members were conducted 
in Japanese and quotes are based on my own translations of the original data. 
 
 
Research Questions 
 
This study is intended to answer four key research questions concerning the culture of 
public service organizations: 1. what is culture?; 2. why is the g/g theory better than 
other cultural theories?; 3. how can organizational culture in the English and Japanese 
prison services be observed in reality and how can the g/g theory be used to identify this 
kind of culture?; and 4. why should culture be analysed in the study of public 
administration?  
 
1. What is culture? 
Previous studies show that culture can be defined in two ways. In order to 
effectively analyse culture, it is necessary to discuss how culture can be defined 
in this study with reference to previous cultural studies. 
 
2. Why is the g/g theory better than other cultural theories? 
The second question relates to the selection of a cultural theory for the 
purposes of this study. More specifically, why is the g/g cultural theory better 
suited to the aims of this study than other cultural theories? Therefore, some 
consideration is given in this study to the methodological advantages of the g/g 
England Japan
Yes 2 3
No 7 1
Unknown 2 0
Total N= 11 4
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theory and why it should be adopted to identify cultures of risk control in 
public service analysis. 
 
3. How can organizational culture in the English and Japanese prison 
services be observed in reality and how can the g/g theory be used to 
identify this kind of culture? 
This question relates to the previous one in the respect that it is also concerned 
with methodology. Referring to previous studies which have tried to measure 
culture, it is argued here that culture can be best observed through aspects of 
more specific kinds of culture such as the risk control cultures of prison 
services. Thus, this study asks how can the risk control cultures of the English 
and Japanese prison services be identified using the g/g theory ?  In this way, 
it is argued that measuring culture is an effective technique for comparatively 
identifying culture in two similar institutions.  
 
4. Why should culture be analysed in the study of public administration? 
  The final question is concerned with the contribution that analysing culture 
makes to the study of public administration. By addressing the research 
questions outlined above both in the theoretical and empirical chapters, this 
study aims to identify what cultural analysis, as based on the g/g theory, can or 
cannot do for the study of public administration.  
 
 
Structure and Chapter plan  
 
This study consists of 8 chapters excluding this introduction and the conclusion. 
Chapter 1 reviews how culture has been discussed and analysed in previous studies.  
The ways in which culture has been defined in previous studies, as highlighted by the 
first research question cited above, are discussed in this chapter. Issues and theories 
relevant to the analysis of culture are also discussed in this chapter such as the 
relationship between risk and culture, measurement theory, and studies of organizational 
and institutional theories. 
Chapter 2 introduces the g/g theory. The first section of this chapter gives an 
overview of the theory and discusses the methodological advantages and issues raised 
by using it to measure culture. Next, based on the issues raised in the first section, the 
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second section reviews previous works in which the g/g theory has been used to analyse 
real cases. Taking account of the problems encountered by these previous studies, the 
third section discusses the most essential issue concerning the third research question: 
what variables and scales should be adopted for making measurements.  In the case of 
this study, the grid and group dimensions are selected as variables for measuring culture. 
Following these discussions, four aspects representing g/g dimensions in organizational 
risk control structures are defined: formalization, compliance, specialization (roles), and 
autonomy. Chapter 3 focuses on the method of measuring the risk control cultures of the 
English and Japanese prison services. The measurement process proceeds in five steps: 
1. setting the purpose of the measurements, the institutional level at which the prison 
service culture will be observed, and specific risk to be analysed in this study; 2. coding 
the four aspects suggested in chapter 2 to fit in with the cultures of risk control in the 
relevant prison services; 3. scoring these codes using the g/g scales; and 4. 
demonstrating the outcomes of the measurement process.  
Chapter 4 is the first empirical chapter. Based on the four aspects of risk 
control discussed in chapters 2 and 3, this chapter analyses the formalization of the rules 
which define the risk control system in the relevant prison services as the first grid 
aspect of prison risk control structures. Chapter 5 discusses the compliance level of 
local establishments in response to the rules discussed in chapter 4 as the first group 
aspect of prison risk control structures. Chapter 6 discusses the leadership roles of 
governors in local establishments in terms of the specialization of governors which 
corresponds to the second grid aspect of prison risk control structures. In response to the 
roles of governors, Chapter 7 discusses the autonomy of local establishments where 
governors exercise their roles in relation to specific risk control strategies 
Taking stock of these theoretical and empirical discussions, chapter 8 
summarises the overall risk control cultures of the English and Japanese prison services. 
The demonstration techniques discussed in chapter 3 are used in this chapter and 
consideration is given to the effectiveness of the g/g method as a means of measuring 
the cultures of risk control in the relevant prison services. Finally, the concluding 
section gives answers to the four research questions stated above and evaluates the 
outcomes of this study. Based on these findings, I would like to conclude this study by 
suggesting possible directions for future research.  
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Chapter 1 
Cultural Theories: Theoretical and Methodological 
Development of Cultural Analysis 
 
 
This chapter discusses the theoretical and methodological development of cultural 
analysis in previous studies. While this study is intended to compare the organizational 
cultures of the Japanese and English prison services, there are several approaches and 
analytical points of views which may be adopted to discuss culture. The history of 
cultural analysis is explored here in terms of the following issues: definitions of culture, 
the aims of cultural analysis, methodological development and difficulties in analysing 
culture, and the relationship between culture and risk. The first section discusses 
definitions of culture in the social sciences by referring to classic studies in the field. 
Then, based on these definitions, further consideration is given to studies of cultures 
since the 1960s. Taking account of the methodological issues raised by these works, the 
second section summarizes an agenda for effectively analysing culture. The following 
issues are mentioned in the discussion: the aims of cultural analysis; the units and size 
of analysis; theories of culture and organization; measuring culture and measurement 
theory in the social sciences; and culture in relation to risk.  
 
 
1.1: Cultural theories and methods 
 
In order to discuss the organizational culture of prison services, it is necessary to define 
“culture” in public service analysis. This section reviews the definition of culture in 
classic anthropology and the ways in which political and national cultures have been 
analysed in the social sciences.  
 
1.1.1: Definition of culture 
The definition of culture has been discussed in the relationship between the social group 
and individuals in the group. This conception began to be discussed by anthropologists 
in the 1950s. The classic definition of culture by Klockhohn is that “culture consists in 
patterned ways of thinking, feeling and reacting, acquired and transmitted mainly by 
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symbols, constituting the distinctive achievements of human groups, including their 
embodiments in art crafts; the essential core of culture consists of traditional ideas and 
especially their attached values” (Klockhohn, 1951).   
 Kluckhohn argued that culture is maintained by social groups in relation to 
individual values. He defined that the value is a conception a conception, explicit or 
implicit, distinctive of an individual, regarding the preference which influences the 
selection from available modes, means and ends of actions” (Kluckhohn, 1951 and 
1967). Hence Klockhohn defined that culture is patterns of overall behaviour shared 
among the social group, and it concerns with values of individuals. Later researchers 
also referred to his definition of culture in their works such as Geertz (1973) and 
Hofstede (2001). 
Furthermore, in response to this definition of culture, Kroeber and Parsons 
(1958) insisted on narrowing down the definition of culture to aid analysis of social 
groups which are more established and organized than those covered by traditional 
anthropological studies. They insisted that although the concept of culture in the 
anthropological tradition is useful, for the purposes of analysing social organizations 
and their systems it should be used to describe a specifically relational system of 
interaction among individuals and collectives (Kroeber and Parsons 1958). To illustrate 
this point, although anthropologists define an individual as a "member of a culture", in 
the social sciences this relationship should be expressed as "member of the society of 
culture X." These suggestions are useful in as far as they help us to think about how we 
may define culture in the field of public administration research. The crucial point of 
agreement is that cultures develop around formalised and established social 
organizations. Hence culture is defined as patterns of behaviour including thinking, 
feeling, and reacting to stimuli shared among members of social groups.  
  
1.1.2: Analysis of national culture 
Based on the definition of culture outlined above, this section considers how cultural 
analysis has been conducted on a large scale in the field of politics, particularly at the 
national level. The first major attempt at cultural analysis in political science was made 
by Almond and Verba in their classic study of national political culture, The Civic 
Culture (1963). 
Almond and Verba’s research was intended to analyse culture at the national 
level as an independent variable for political stability and change (Almond and Verba 
1963; and Welch, 1993). They explained that political culture consists of attitudes, 
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beliefs, values, and skills which are current in an entire population as well as the special 
tendencies and patterns which may be found within separate parts of that population, 
and its influences levels of political stabilities (Almond and Verba, 1963). In order to 
analyse culture, they used the typology of national civic culture (ibid.).        
 In spite of Almond and Verba’s ambitious analysis of national culture, their 
research and methodology were heavily criticised for two major reasons: 1. the typology 
they used is biased towards democratic values; and 2. their evidence is weak and the 
size of the survey is too small to prove the relationship between national culture and 
political change. Firstly, with regard to the typology of political culture, if political 
culture reflects the conditions which result indifferent forms of democracy in different 
nations, the typology should be value-free. Nevertheless, the typology of civic culture 
used by Almond and Verba was categorised according to developmental stages which 
lead to western styles of “stable democracy” (Welch 1993). As a result, the United 
States, Great Britain and other western democratic states were identified as the most 
ideal civic cultures while Mexico became identified as the least culturally civic nation 
out of the group of case studies (Almond and Verba, 1963).  
   Secondly, the amount of data collected was too small to support Almond and 
Verba’s hypothesis that insists political stabilities are caused by political culture. In 
response to this criticism, Almond himself admitted that the sample size of countries 
was too small to make generalizations about the influence of political power on 
democracy (Almond and Verba, 1963). In response to this problem, Welch (1993) has 
concluded that it is not possible to make purely statistical correlations between national 
culture and political stabilities, in which respect civic culture in the form proposed by 
Almond and Verba. The crucial point to take away from the second debate is that there 
is a strong relationship between the unit of analysis and evidence. Cultural analysis on a 
large scale requires a sufficiently large body of evidence to support it. Thus, Almond 
and Verba’s attempt to explain political change in terms of national culture failed for 
these reasons.  
 
1.1.3: National value and culture survey 
Almond and Verba’s work on civic culture receives severe critics discussed above. 
However, two main researches responded to the issue for measuring national culture 
between 1970 and 1990. Inglehart and Hofstede have attempted to make up for the 
insufficient amount of collected by Almond and Verba by conducting surveys across a 
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much broader range of countries. They both developed their methodologies to identify 
national cultures based on individual values.  
The first cultural study based on the large N (number) survey was conducted by 
Inglehart between 1970 and 1990 in his study of national value shifts. According to 
Inglehart (1990 and 1997), the study of political culture is based on the assumption that 
autonomous and reasonably enduring cross-cultural differences exist and that they have 
political consequences (ibid.). He hypothesized that mass value systems are changing in 
ways that have important economic, political, and social consequences (Inglehart, 1990 
and 1997). Inglehart explored this hypothesis through cross-level analysis based on data 
gained from a large number of societies that vary across the full economic and political 
spectra (Inglehart 1997). Between 1970 and 1990 he conducted two large surveys which 
covered twenty-six nations (Inglehart 1990 and 1997): namely, the Euro-Barometer 
surveys from 1970 through to 1986, and the World Values Survey from 1981 to 1990. 
The aim of these surveys was to measure a cultural shift from modernism to 
post-modernism then occurring between the younger and older generations. The size of 
these surveys was significant for Inglehart’s research. The World Value Survey covered 
70 percent of the world’s population at that time across 43 countries and 
societies(Inglehart 1997). The sizes of the samples of each survey were approximately 
90,000 cases in 1981 and 1990-1 for the Euro-Barometer and World Value Surveys 
respectively (ibid.). 
 Inglehart and his team designed the surveys based on ranking scales in order to 
measure changing values. For example, respondents were asked to choose the answer 
between one and four scales concerning values of work: “1. Very important, 2. Quite 
important, 3. Not very important, 4. Not at all important, and 0. Not ascertained 
(Inglehart 1997: p. 394). In this way, the surveys asked a broad range of questions about 
different facets of everyday life: religion, family, sexuality, economic and social status, 
work ethics, and satisfaction or well-being (Inglehart 1990). Respondents’ answers were 
assigned ranking scores based on the materialist and post-materialist value scales by 
categories of social values. Results were added up as national materialist and 
post-materialist scores for each country, and demonstrated through several statistical 
processes; such as calculating mean values or assigning weighing values for 
standardization (Inglehart 1990).  
Inglehart highlighted three main findings of his survey. First, each nation has 
specific values, attitudes, and thus a so-called political culture. Second, these values are 
changeable but normally the pace of change is very slow and political culture, expressed 
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as values, is more stable than economic factors. The value survey conducted between 
1973 and 1988 shows that the values of each nation state did not dramatically change 
over the targeted period (Inglehart, 1990: p.423). Third, throughout advanced industrial 
societies, mainly in Western Europe, the shift from materialist to post-materialist values 
depends significantly on younger generations. That is, young people in industrial 
societies are more likely to have post-materialist values than their elders (ibid.). 
Inglehart concluded that the responses to the surveys were influenced by durable 
cultural components in each society brought about by their distinctive historical 
experiences (ibid.).  
  In spite of the high level of planning, complexity, and scale of Inglehar’s 
research, several criticisms have been levelled at it. Firstly, with regard to culture as an 
independent variable, his hypothesis was not supported well enough by the survey. He 
admitted the influence of culture on social economic and political changes but he also 
warned that cultures are not necessarily enough in themselves to account for all of those 
changes (Inglehart, 1990). This problem showed that even though Inglehart’s survey 
covered a large number of variables in order to identify national cultures, it still 
struggled to explain specific outcomes as independent variables. He explained that it is 
due to the contingency of culture.  
Secondly, although culture is considered as contingent factors to explain 
specific changes as Inglehart evaluated, the design of his surveys also showed that the 
methodological issue.  In both World Value Survey and Euro-Barometer Survey the 
survey questions asked respondents about abstract and general values: for example, 
“how far do you approve or ecological movements or protecting nature, women’s 
movements, anti-apartheid movements?” (Inglehart, 1997: p.419). The independent 
variables formed by these questionnaires were considered too general to give an 
adequate explanation for specific social and political changes.  
 Thirdly, the appropriateness of the samples taken for both surveys is 
questioned in studies of Inglihart. The samples selected for some countries do not seem 
to properly represent their populations. For example, although 1,000 samples were 
collected from China for the 1990 survey, 90% of these came from highly educated 
urban people (Inglehart 1997). Inglehart mentioned that these samples were assigned 
weights to compensate for this bias (ibid.). However, if the economic and geographical 
diversity of China are taken into account, it seems doubtful that the sample effectively 
represents the values of Chinese citizens.  
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Finally, in terms of the definition of culture, Inglehart’s understanding of the 
relationship between culture and values is questionable. In his research, national culture 
is defined as the aggregation of individual values. In this respect he assumed that culture 
can be measured by gathering large enough amounts of data about individual values. 
This assumption requires careful consideration. In particular, we should ask whether 
culture as collective patterns of behaviour (i.e. including ways of thinking) is equal to 
the sum of the values held by individuals in social groups.  
The final question relates to the issue of the scales covered by survey questions.  
Randall (1998) has argued that in order to make cross-national comparisons, these 
scales must be consistent across national groups. Based on this understanding, he has 
examined the assumption that the scale used in the World Value Survey is a consistent 
cross-national measuring device. He did this by transforming answers to the survey into 
logarithm values using a log-linear model (the latent model) (ibid.). As a result, he 
found that the scale is biased by the common stratification variables of gender, 
education, age, and country. Figure 1.1 demonstrates how the logarithm model adjusts 
the scale for different countries.  
Given observed raw scale scores of 1 through to 4 for the United States, Japan, 
and Finland, it can be seen that the scale of 1 for some respondents in Finland is below 
those of the United States and Japan. Similarly, the score of four observed for some U.S. 
participants would be categorized as score three for Japanese and Finnish participants. 
These results suggest that post-materialist scales are not necessarily consistent 
measuring devices, at least in terms of the assumptions made by the log-linear model. 
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Figure 1.1: Scales continuum adjusted by the log-model. (Randall 1998) 
 
 
Randall’s critics have pointed out that the scales for measuring values are not 
necessarily equivalent with each other. Specifically, if a subjective or individual value is 
measured, the distance between these scales tends to differ according to the context of 
the sample. If the scale ranges differ between countries, they may also differ among 
individuals who share the same nationality. Hence, although Inglehart measured culture 
by the aggregation of individual values, these values were not necessarily measured on 
equal scales. This raises further questions about Inglehart’s research: in particular, 
whether his results are comparable or not, whether they can be measured on unequal 
scales, and whether they are addible.  
The second cultural study based on a value survey was led by Hofstede. Much 
like Ingrehart, Hofstede (1991; and 2001) also used a large number (N) survey to 
analyse national and organizational culture. He conducted the international employee 
attitude survey programme between 1967 and 1973 in the IBM Corporation. The survey 
was carried out in two stages during this period, and more than 116,000 questionnaires 
were returned in 20 languages from IBM employees in 72 countries (Hofstede , 1991 
and 2001). His survey was intended to help deal with differences in the ways in which 
people think, feel, and behave in cross-national organizations. Furthermore, he argued 
that so many solutions in economic, technological, medical, or biological cooperation 
do not work or cannot be implemented because they ignore the cultural differences 
which affect the ways in which partners from different social groups think and behave 
(Hofstede, 1991).  
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     Hofstede defined that culture is the mental human programming represented by 
widespread patterns of acting, feeling, and thinking shared within social groups.   
(Hofstede, 2001). He also asserted that culture is always a collective phenomenon and 
individual values are learnt from consists of shared patterns within the same social 
environment which are given to individuals to learn (ibid.). As he himself stated: 
“[culture] is the collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the members 
of one group or category of people from another” (Hofstede, 1991 and 2001).   
In terms of this culture as collective patterns of behaviour, Hofstede insisted 
that culture builds up in layers over society because everyone belongs to a number of 
different social groups and categories of people at the same time (Hofstede 2001). In his 
research, he focussed on two major levels of culture, national culture and organizational 
culture, which he tried to measure with uniform scales (Hofstede, 1991 and 2001). 
Hofstede’s concept of national culture was related to the idea of national character 
which had developed in the early twentieth century. However, he stressed that the 
concept of national culture carefully manages the deterministic stereotypes and biases 
about nation states of its predecessor (Hofstede, 2001). He defined the layers of culture 
as follows:  
 
1. A national level according to one’s country (or countries for people who 
migrated during their lifetime) 
2. A regional and ethnic and religious and linguistic affiliation level, as most 
nations are composed of culturally different regions and ethnic and religious and 
language groups 
3. A gender level which separates, for example, grandparents from grandparents 
from parents and parents from their children 
4. A social class level associated with educational opportunities and with a 
person’s occupation or professions 
5. A level for those who are employed at organizational or corporate levels   
( Hofstede, 1991: p. 10) 
          
 Unlike Inglehart, Hofstede’s IBM Survey was not necessarily intended to 
explain national or organizational changes in terms of culture. Hofstede insisted that the 
cultures of different social groups often conflict with each other thus making it difficult 
to predict new situations or changes (Hofstede, 2001). The purpose of his research was 
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to explore how national cultural patterns develop among major groups within human 
populations groups and how they gain stability over long periods of time (ibid.). 
In order to measure national culture as he defined it, Hofstede made use of the 
five dimensions of society identified by Inkeles and Levinson (1969) in their work on 
common problems in society: 1. relation to authority; 2. conception of self; 3. the 
relationship between the individual and society; 4. the individual’s concept of 
masculinity and femininity; and 5. ways of dealing with conflicts, including the control 
of aggression and the expression of feelings. Based on those five dimensions of society 
by Inkeles and Levinson, Hofstede suggested that national culture and cultural 
differences can be measured in terms of the attitudes of group members in response to 
five social aspects: 1. power distance; 2. individualism versus collectivism; 3. 
masculinity versus femininity; 4. long-term versus short-term orientation; and 5. 
uncertainty avoidance (Hofstede, 2001). 
 Hofstede’s survey asked questions about those five social aspects. As well as 
Inglehart, his survey was based on multiple choice questions which involved preference 
scales representing the intensity of each social aspect. For example, the questionnaire 
asked: “how often would you say your immediate manager is concerned about helping 
you get ahead?” Respondents were invited to answer this question with one of the five 
following responses: 1. always; 2. usually; 3. sometimes; 4. seldom; and 5. never 
(Hofstede, 2001 p. 469). In order to analyse the survey results, Hofstede (2001) 
calculated additions of responses he received from IBM employees in different 
countries and analysed them based on the mean, correlation and coefficient values 
(Hofstede 2001). In addition to comparing national cultures based on his IBM survey, 
Hofstede also discussed the differences between the organizational cultures of IBM in 
different countries.  
 Although the study of Hofstede developed the method for measuring culture 
discussed as above, it also involved several questions and issues. The first issue is the 
mixture of definitions of culture in his study. Hofstede designed his IBM survey with 
the intention of developing a typology of cultural analysis. He clarified the distinction 
between individual values and cultures shared by social groups. Moreover, his large N 
survey and its questions were based on his five social aspects. Accordingly, his surveys 
were also intended to identify a more coherent typology of culture based on these 
dimensions.  
Nevertheless, his analysis and the techniques used for it begged several 
questions in relation to definitions of culture. Although he emphasized differences 
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between individual values and collective patterns of behaviour in his definition of 
culture, the survey was designed to find values held by IBM employees rather than 
collective patterns of behaviour within the organization. The results of the survey were 
demonstrated by the aggregation of questionnaires which asked individual IBM 
employees about their values and then labelled the results as “culture”. As with 
Ingelhart’s study, this led to questions over whether individual values can extensively 
turn into culture; whether it is appropriate to add up all responses by countries ignoring 
the possible differences in ways of understanding scale units depending on respondents 
or countries (see Figure 1.1); and analyse results by relevant statistical techniques, such 
as mean values.  
Furthermore, even though Hofstede took the view that the results he received 
from the IBM Corporation were representative of national culture (Hofstede 2001), it is 
questioned how far they reflect the overlaps between different cultures and societies.  
He asserted that cultures are layered across social groups. Based on these social layers 
of culture, national cultures are considered not necessarily equal to organizational 
cultures in a straight way. In order to argue that the culture of IBM effectively 
represents national culture, he needed to carry out further research to prove that 
organizational culture can be extended to national culture 
Moreover, with regard to survey questions, although Hofstede’s IBM survey 
asked more specific questions than Ingelhart’s World Value Survey, it still tried to 
identify general values in relation to general situations. For example, the survey asked 
respondents how important they consider to “1. work with people who cooperate well 
with one another, 2. have training opportunities, and 3. have considerable freedom to 
adopt their own approach to the job in general” (Hofstede 2001: p. 468). Without 
specifying situations in which a question like this becomes relevant for respondents, it is 
hard to understand how they can give a realistic response to them. This sort of abstract 
questioning may be easily influenced by the contextual conditions in which respondents 
find themselves at the time of the survey. In order to gain more accurate responses 
concerning patterns of behaviour shared in the social group, survey questions need to be 
supported by contextual information which provides specific situations when the topic 
of the question becomes matter for responses.     
Therefore, three major criticisms can be made of Hofstede’s attempts to 
measure national culture. First, it is questioned to express culture as collective patterns 
of behaviour shared in the social group by adding up individual values by the social 
group. Second, he received a mismatch between what he wanted to know about 
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(national culture) and what he found out from the results of his survey. He designed the 
survey questions specifically for IBM employees with the aim of identifying national 
culture. Yet if the survey was intended to measure organizational culture, the questions 
should have been focused on organizational structure or, alternatively, if it was intended 
to measure national culture, the survey should not have focused solely on the IBM 
Corporation. Third, his survey questions were too abstract for respondents to give 
realistic answers to them.  
 
1.1.4: The findings and issues raised by cultural analysis in previous research 
The last section explored some previous attempts at cultural analysis in the social 
sciences. This section summarises the findings and issues raised by those studies and 
how they can help here with the development of a method for measuring culture.  
The first issue is the definition of culture. Almond and Verba, Inglehart, and 
Hofstede all defined culture as collective patterns of behaviour shared by social groups. 
However, their methods for identifying these patterns of behaviour are not necessarily 
linked with their recognition of culture. Inglehart (1990 and 1997) and Hofstede (1991 
and 2001), in particular, tried to identify culture through the addition of individual 
values. As I discussed above, there is no clear evidence to show that culture, defined as 
collective patterns of behaviour, is produced solely by the addition of individual values. 
Therefore, the distinction between individual values and culture collective patterns of 
behaviour needs to be made clearer.  
 The second issue is the function of cultural analysis. The research discussed 
above also raised questions about the purpose of cultural analysis: in particular, whether 
culture can be an independent variable to explain some outcomes. Almond and Verba 
and Inglehart tried to identify culture as an independent variable in order to explain the 
political stability in terms of national culture. Inglehart also suggests that culture is a 
highly contingent factor and thus does not work well as an independent variable capable 
of explaining the causality of some specific political, economic or social changes. In 
response to this issue, Hofstede intended to comparatively identify and demonstrate 
national culture rather than to explain the causality of specific changes. With regard to 
the purpose of cultural analysis, his research showed that it is possible to analyse culture 
apart from the causation of specific changes in institutions. Thus, based on those 
findings and approaches in previous cultural studies above, it should conclude that 
culture should not be analysed as an independent variable for the purpose of explaining 
specific outcomes in society due to its contingency.  
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The third issue is the appropriate institutional size and units for analysing 
culture. Previous cultural studies I discussed as above have focused on identifying 
national culture. Nevertheless, the outcomes of their works revealed several limits of 
identifying national culture as a unit of analysis. National culture is too contingent or 
too large to be identified as the unit of cultural analysis. Previous studies have 
highlighted two major reasons why national culture is difficult to measure: 1. there are a 
large number of variables involved in the identification of national culture; and 2. it is 
difficult to collect a sufficient number of samples to represent national culture.  
Firstly, with regard to the number of variables, Inglehart tried to identify 
national values in terms of broad social dimensions. Consequently, a large number of 
variables were involved in identifying these values. In spite of the large scale of the 
survey, its outcomes showed that values demonstrated by those variables are not 
sufficient to demonstrate the existence of national cultures. Secondly, the studies 
examined above suggest that it is technically difficult to gather a sample of respondents 
who are representative of their country of nationality. Almond and Verba (1963) were 
criticized because they did not collect enough data to prove the existence of about 
national culture. Likewise, Inglehart faced difficulties in collecting a sufficiently large 
sample for his World Value and Euro Barometer survey. Access to respondents may 
differ conditions in the countries where they live. As the case of China has shown (see 
p.28), it is extremely difficult to collect samples which fully represent a national 
population. Meanwhile, Hofstede only conducted his survey in the IBM Corporation 
across 22 nation states which is also not a sufficiently large sample to insist upon the 
existence of national culture.  
 In light of these problems, it may thus be argued that in order to effectively 
analyse culture, it is very important to consider the appropriate unit of analysis. The 
studies discussed above show that national culture is technically and conceptually 
difficult to analyse. The most commonly recognised reason for this problem is that 
national cultures are too large for it to be possible to define all variables within them. 
Meanwhile, Hofstede (2001) has noted that culture is represented by several social 
group units: organizational, regional, family, individual, etc. (ibid.). In terms of the 
social group unit, which was introduced in the first section of this chapter, Kroeber and 
Parsons (1958) emphasized the distinction between the cultures of socially established 
units and non-established units (see Sec. 1.1.1). Within the layer of culture, an 
organizational culture such as IBM is considered a socially established unit. In terms of 
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this organizational culture, Hofstede’s study showed significant differences between the 
branches of IBM across 22 countries.  
 Thus, in light of the work of Kroeber and Parsons (1968) and Hofstede (2001), 
it can be concluded that the level of socially established organizations is an appropriate 
unit of analysis. For the purposes of this study, the socially established organizations are 
prison services. However, this status could also be extended to public service 
institutions in general. Unlike non-established social group units, established 
organizations generally have visible organizational control structures. As far as culture 
is analysed in the socially established units which have clear organizational structures, 
culture can be better analysed with those structures of the organization. Hence, in order 
to analyse organizational culture, it is useful to involve approaches for structural 
organizational analysis from previous studies of organizational and institutional analysis 
(see Sec. 1.2.1)   
 The fourth issue is the method and techniques for analysing culture. Previous 
studies have shown that typologies of culture are the main method for identifying 
culture. As outlined above, Almond and Verba defined three types of civic culture, 
Inglehart identified pre- and post-materialistic value alongside more complex 
combinations of social dimensions, and Hofstede defined culture structurally in terms of 
five social dimensions. Each of these authors generally defined and named the specific 
characteristics of the cultural group. However, one essential question has never been 
asked by previous studies: what is the typology of culture and what does it mean in 
comparative cultural analysis? 
 An answer to this question is provided by measurement theory which helps us to 
understand the definition and function of those typologies. This theory discusses the 
typology as a measurement technique which is identified as one of four levels of 
measurement scales (Hoover and Donovan 2004). This theory also develops appropriate 
techniques to be used in response to the level of measurement (Becker 1999). Whereas 
the next section will explain details of this theory (see Sec. 1.2.2), it is useful to 
consider the meaning of typologies as a type of measurement in social science.  
In the process of applying types of culture to real cases, previous studies 
assigned analytical codes which indicated specific types of culture. This is another part 
of the method to analyse culture by typologies. For example, Almond and Verba’s basic 
typology involved codes in response to the cultural types. Meanwhile, Inglehart and 
Hofstede identified culture by coding variables and assigning rating scales to each code. 
Concerning the rating scales, I raised two issues in the previous section: 1. rating scales 
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are perceived differently from different subjective viewpoints; and 2. there is no 
evidence that group culture is equal to the aggregation of individual values (see Sec. 
1.1.3). In addition to the matter of typologies, it is important to consider how these 
issues can be managed in the coding process. This consideration forms part of the 
broader discussion of the method which needs to be developed for analysing 
organizational culture.  
 The fifth issue also relates to the method for analysing culture. It specifically 
relates to the appropriateness of value surveys in terms of abstract values of individuals. 
Inglehart and Hofstede both conducted large questionnaire-based surveys. Nevertheless, 
the design of their surveys raised the following question: can abstract survey questions 
effectively identify culture?  As I pointed out earlier when discussing the criticisms 
levelled at Inglehart’s and Hofstede’s studies, abstract questions are not necessarily 
effective for the purposes of identifying culture. In order to measure organizational 
culture, it is important to specify the situations in which patterns of organizational 
behaviour can be most effectively observed. 
 In regard to situations in which culture can be effectively observed, Douglas 
and Wildavsky have discussed the relationship between culture and risk in social group 
units (Douglas and Wildavsky 1983; see Sec. 1.2.3). Their work in this regard relates to 
how uncertainty is perceived and managed by social groups. They argued that the 
perception and acceptability of risk and the ways in which risk is controlled may differ 
depending on the group culture. Hofstede also identified the cultural contingency of risk 
management in his dimension of “uncertainty avoidance” (Hofstede 2001). However, he 
did not focus on the relationship between culture and risk in depth. Accordingly, it will 
be useful to consider the value of analysing culture in relation to the perception and 
management of risk in organizations.  
 
 
1.2: Measuring organizational culture 
 
The last section discussed previous cultural studies and the issues they raised. Based on 
these issues and conditions, this section will explore theories and methods which can 
help to analyse culture more effectively. Firstly, in order to shed light on the structural 
approach to organizational culture, I will discuss some studies in organizational theory.  
Secondly, I will introduce the measurement theory with reference to the typology and 
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coding scales. Thirdly, I will introduce the work of Wildavsky and Douglas on risk and 
culture. 
 
1.2.1: Organizational theories: Structures of the organization and cultural analysis 
The formal structural approach to understanding organizations, known as the structural 
contingency theory, was popular between the 1960s and 70s (Donaldson 1999). The 
theory proposes that organizations should adjust their structures to fit environmental 
contingencies.  
Pugh (1973) analysed the formal structures of organizations based on the 
functional approach. He defined 6 primary facets of organizational structure which 
control organizational behaviour while also referring to previous works on 
organizational structure: 
1. Specialization: the degree to which and organization’s activities are divided into 
specialized roles. 
2. Standardization: the degree to which an organization lays down standard rules 
and procedures. 
3. Standardization of employment practices: the degree to which an organization 
has standardized employment practices (e.g. a distinctive feature of personal 
career systems) 
4. Formalization: the degree to which instructions and procedures, etc., are written 
down. 
5. Centralization: the degree to which the authority to make certain decisions is 
located at the top of the management hierarchy. 
6. Configuration: the shape of the organization’s role structure: e.g. whether the 
management chain of command is long or short; whether superiors have limited 
spans of control; whether there are relatively few subordinates, or a relatively 
large number of subordinates, and whether they represent a large or small 
percentage of specialized or support personnel. (Pugh, 1973:p.18.)    
 
In addition to these facets of organizational structures, Pugh (1973) also pointed out the 
contextual factors which determine these structures in the organization: 1. Origin and 
history: experiences which are gained by the organization; 2. Ownership and control: 
the kind of ownership and whether it is concentrated in a few hands or divided among 
many; 3. Size: the number of employees, net assets, market position, etc.; 4. Charter: 
the number and range of goods and services. 5. Technology: the degree of integration 
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achieved in an organization’s work process; 6. Location: the number of geographically 
dispersed operating sites; 7. Interdependence: the extent to which an organization 
depends on customers, suppliers, trade unions, and any owning groups. (Pugh 1973: 
p.26) 
Although these factors help to provide understanding of the structure of 
organizations, those traditional understanding of organizational structures by Pugh was 
criticised for not including a notion of operations and performance in organizations. 
Later researchers insisted that organizational structures are determined not only those 
contextual factors, but also to fit performance and strategic choices by members in the 
organization (Donaldson 1999). In response to this understanding of organizational 
structures consisted of fixed and non-fixed factors, Tolbert and Zucker (1996) also 
analysed the informal process whereby new structures develop in organizations through 
the behaviour of their members.  
Therefore, organizations consist not only of formal structures, but also of 
informal processes enacted by members inside the organizations In order to understand 
the structure of organizations, the behaviour of their members and other informal 
processes should be taken into account in addition to their formal structures. Hence 
organizational culture, defined as shared collective patterns of behaviour, should be 
analysed in terms of the formal and informal aspects of the organization.  
  
 
1.2.2: Measurement theory in the social sciences 
Previous cultural studies have shown that making typologies with analytical coding is 
the common way of analysing culture. This section discusses the attributes of the 
typology in the measurement theory of the social sciences. The measurement theory is 
intended to evaluate the meaning of measurement techniques used in the social sciences 
and to develop appropriate analytical techniques. It provides a clear standard for 
quantitative analysis in the social sciences. 
In their book, The Element of Social Scientific Thinking (2004), Hoover and 
Donovan explain that the definition of measurement depends on the variable which 
determines what level of measurement can be attempted and also relates to what sort of 
hypothetical relationships can be formulated using the variable (Hoover and Donovan, 
2004: 94). Three things need to be considered when we select selecting variables for 
measuring specific cases in the social sciences: 1. their properties or characteristics; 2. 
the measurement technique appropriate to these properties or characteristics?; and 3. the 
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levels of measurement that are possible in view of the variable’s properties and the 
chosen measurement technique ( ibid.) . 
     In order to analyse specific cases, it is necessary to consider the characteristics 
and properties of variables which effectively measure those cases. The measurement 
techniques may differ according to the characteristics of variables. Thus, the concept of 
levels of measurement is needed to provide a framework for discussions of variables 
along these lines. The level of measurement defines four measurement techniques: 
classify order, set standard units of distance, and locate absolute zero (ibid.). By 
combining these components it is possible to make four levels of measurement: 
 
1. Nominal measurement only uses the classifying technique.  It can be applied to 
statistics concerned with the frequency of cases in each classification.  
2. Ordinal measurement uses classify and order. It allows statistics to describe the 
ways in which cases are ordered with respect to a variable. 
3. Interval measurement uses classify, order, and the set standard units of distance 
techniques. It permits comparisons to be made of quantitative differences among 
cases on a scale.  
4. Ratio measurement uses all four of the techniques listed above. It allows 
comparisons to be made of absolute distances between cases. 
  (Hoover and Donovan, 2004: p. 99). 
 
       The ordinal level of measurement gains the continuum order from the nominal 
level of measurement: that is, the highest height, the 2nd highest height, and the lowest 
(3rd) height. The comparability is higher in the ordinal level than in the nominal level. 
Meanwhile, if these heights are measured by the metric scales, the ordinal level 
becomes the interval level. Among the heights of 180, 160, and 140 cm, 180cm of 
height is 20cm higher than that of 160cm. 160cm is 20cm higher than that of 140cm, 
and 140cm is 40cm lower than 180cm. Hence the interval level of measurement 
provides equal units of distance between scales. As a result, it is enable to measure 
cases, providing standardized distances between cases, and the comparability of the 
interval measurement scales is higher than in the ordinal level of measurement. 
  The distinction between the interval and ratio levels of measurement is 
determined by how zero is understood. In the interval level of measurement, zero is just 
an arbitrary concept. Hoover and Donovan (2004) emphasize that in the interval level of 
measurement, zero does not mean “nothing happened before zero”. Zero is established 
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as a point from which it is possible to count backwards and forwards in order to define 
comparative degrees of two variables such as temperature or Biblical time (Hoover and 
Donovan, 2004). On the other hand, in the ratio level of measurement, zero means “true 
zero”.  Accordingly, before zero in the ratio scale means no distance at all hence “there 
cannot be less than zero” (ibid) for variables such as distance, weight, or age.    
It is essential to choose the appropriate level of measurement for each variable 
and to consider its characteristics before proceeding with any research. The available 
statistical and analytical techniques may differ in terms of their level of measurement. 
(Hoover and Donovan 2004; and Becker 1999; see Table 1.1). For example, if variables 
measure cases at the interval level of measurement, the statistical techniques based on 
mean values are available for analysis; such as mean, standard deviation, and 
correlation are based on this assumption (see Table 1.1). Those techniques are 
appropriate to be used because cases measured by the interval scales maintain equal 
units of distances between those cases. By contrast, it is not appropriate to use these 
techniques to analyse data in the ordinal level of measurement because it is based on a 
ranking order among cases without considering equal units of distance between those 
scales.  
 Based on the measurement theory, basic typologies of cultural analysis used in 
previous cultural studies primarily considered to be the nominal level of measurement 
because those is based on classification without any continuum scales between variables. 
For example, the typology of civic culture proposed by Almond and Verba (1963) 
should be viewed as being on this level of measurement. Although Almond and Verba’s 
cultural types were biased towards their understanding of western democracy, there are 
no continuum scales, such as order or rankings, between the three types of political 
culture posed in the civic culture typology.  
Meanwhile, the rating scale surveys conducted by Inglehart (1997) and 
Hofstede (2001) are usually considered as being on the interval level because scales are 
assigned numbers which seem to have equal units of distance between them: i.e. 1, 2, 3, 
and 4. Nevertheless, Randall (1998) criticised the work of Inglehart by pointing out that 
units of distance differ among nation states. As I discussed above, the units of distance 
among these rating scales may differ depending on the perception of respondents hence 
equal units of distance are not necessarily ensured between scales. Therefore, 
Inglehart’s and Hofstede’s studies and their surveys should be considered as being on 
the ordinal level of measurement.  
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Based on this understanding of level of measurement in surveys conducted by 
Ingelhart and Hofstede, it should be argued that their statistical techniques used for 
analysing results. Although Inglehart and Hofstede added up responses from surveys by 
countries, and analysed results based on mean values of those (see Sec. 1.1.2), those are 
considered as inappropriate techniques for their case studies measured by the ordinal 
scales in measurement theory (see table 1.1). Based on measurement theory, adding up 
variables measured by the ordinal level of measurement or producing mean values of 
those by countries does not show substantial statistical meanings in order to analyse 
results.  
Thus, although the previous section questioned studies of Inglehart and 
Hofstede in terms of the relationship between individual values and culture as collective 
patterns of behaviour, measurement theory also suggests that their research designs not 
necessarily appropriate based on the concept of levels of measurement and appropriate 
statistical techniques correspond to those levels. In conclusion, conducting the large N 
survey, which is intended to measure individual values in the organization, is not 
considered the best way of measuring culture as organizational patterns of behaviour. In 
order to avoid the methodological confusion as Hofstede and Ingelhart showed, the 
definition of culture should strictly distinguish culture as collective patterns of 
behaviour and individual values.   
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Table 1.1: Examples of appropriate statistics by levels of measurement  
 
This tables was referred to Becker, L. (1999)  
http://www.uccs.edu/~faculty/lbecker/SPSS/scalemeas.htm 
  
Level of Measurement Nominal Ordinal Interval Ratio
Permissible 
Arithmetic Operations Counting
Greater than or 
less then operations
Addition and 
Substraction of scale 
values
Multiplication 
and division of scale 
values
Cross Tabs
Chi square 
Spearman's Rank 
Order Correlation 
Phi Kendal's Tau-b
Cramer's V Somer's D
Contingengy 
Coefficient (CC) Gamma 
Lambda Mantel-Haenszel
Uncertainty 
Coefficient (UC)
Kappa ( k)
Non Parametric statistics
Goodman&
Kruskal tau (t) Kolmgorov-Smirnov.
Chi-square Sign
runs Wilcoxen
Binomial
Kendall Coefficient 
of Concordance (W)
Macnemar
Friedman
 two way ANOVA
Cochran (Q) Mann-Whiteney (U)
Wald-Wolfowitz
Kruskal-Wallis
Frequencies
Median (Mdn) Mean (M)
Coefficient of 
variation
, (CFVAR)
Interquartile range 
(IRQ) Stadnard deviation SFVAR=SD/M
Parson's product 
moment correlation (r)
t-test (t)
analysis of variance  
(ANOVA)
multivariate analysis of 
variance 
(MANOVA)
Factor analysis
Regression
Multiple correlation:R
Appripriate statistics
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1.2.3: Culture and risk 
Previous cultural studies have shown that measuring culture in de-contextualised 
general abstract situations is difficult. Additionally, those studies suggest that culture as 
collective patterns of behaviour should be distinguished from individual values. In light 
of this finding, this thesis argues that culture can be more effectively observed by 
specifying the situation for the organization.  
Douglas and Wildavsky (1983) analysed culture in terms of risk and how it is 
perceived and controlled in social groups. Even though they used the classic definition 
of culture, they strictly distinguished culture from individual values by assuming that 
culture is a particular guiding principle in a particular form of society which does not 
indicate individual private beliefs in the depths of people’s minds.  
They insisted that culture can be observed in the process by which social 
groups define how they accept and control whatever they perceive to be risk (Douglas 
and Wildavsky 1983). In this regard, risk is defined as the fear of possible changes 
which irreversibly and involuntary affect us (ibid.). They analysed how risk is selected 
and controlled by social groups through case studies of organizational fear. Specifically, 
their case studies were concerned with environmental issues linked to technological 
developments in North American communities. They insisted that every culture has 
biases towards highlighting certain risks as being serious threats while downplaying 
others.  
In order to identify culture through their studies of risk, Douglas and 
Wildavsky claimed that risk control behaviour involves two different tasks for social 
groups: 1. the estimation of risk based on objective scientific analysis; and 2. the 
acceptability of risk judged according to the level of risk which is acceptable for the 
social group organization determined by the institutional process of controlling risk in 
the social group. The process is consisted of two factors which relate to the specific 
risk: 1. knowledge about risk, which indicates the future, shared within the social group, 
and 2. consent between members of the social group which determines the approach 
against risk perspective to risk in the group (ibid.; see Figure 1.2).  
If the knowledge of risk is certain and consent for the approach against risk is 
completed in the social group, the problem is solved by calculating a programme which 
avoids the risk (see Figure 1.2). The issue mainly concerns whether the technology for 
the programme is available to the social group. If knowledge is certain, but the consent 
is incomplete, the solution is to get agreement between members. The issue is how a 
cohesive discussion may be built. If knowledge is uncertain, but consent is complete, 
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the problem becomes a matter of how information can be gained. In this case, the 
solution involves conducting research to fill gaps in the knowledge. If knowledge is 
uncertain and consent is incomplete, the problem becomes a matter of gaining both 
knowledge and consent. The solution to the dilemma requires fulfilment of both factors 
(ibid.). Douglas and Wildavsky explain these forms of risk control using a table 
consisting of four quadrants (see Figure 1.2). 
 
 
Figure1.2:  Risk and control in relation to knowledge and consensus 
  
Knowledge 
Certain                     Uncertain 
Problem: Technical 
 
Solution: Calculation 
Problem: Information 
 
Solution: Research 
Problem: (dis) Agreement 
Solution:  
Coercion or discussion 
Problem:  
Knowledge and Consent 
Solution: ? 
                        (Chart A, p.5; Douglas and Wildavsky, 1983) 
 
They argued that cultural analysis shows how consensuses are made in social 
groups. Beyond the case of North American communities, all social groups develop 
specific views about what kinds of risk they should avoid. They insist that those views 
tend to differ among social groups. Thus, Douglas and Wildavsky analysed culture by 
focussing on how attitudes towards risk developed in social groups. Furthermore, 
Douglas and Wildavsky developed a theory, based on their work on risk and culture, 
which typologically measures ways of behaviour commonly shared in the social group: 
namely, the grid and group cultural theory (i.e. the “g/g” theory). It is argued in this 
study that the grid and group theory provides a methodological solution to problems of 
cultural analysis discussed above (see Sec.1.1.4).  
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1.3: Conclusion 
 
This chapter reviewed issues of cultural analysis from previous cultural studies. Section 
1.1 showed that there are several issues in order to appropriately analyse culture: 
definitions of culture, units of analysis, contingency of culture and the contribution of 
cultural analysis, organizational structures and culture, the effectiveness of large N 
surveys, available statistical techniques based on measurement theory, and culture in 
relation to specific situations. In response to those issues, Section 1.2 discussed that 
organizational and institutional theories can provide structural facets for analysing 
organizational culture, and measurement theory provides the methodological criteria to 
understand how to measure organizational culture. Furthermore, studies of Douglas and 
Wildavsky suggested that culture is more effectively observed in relation to specific risk, 
and they developed the g/g theory for analysing risk control culture. This study asserts 
that the g/g theory meets the criteria for those issues stated above. The theory is enable 
to analyse culture as collective patterns of behaviour shared in the prison service 
organizational unit based on clear distinction of this culture from individual values; 
involving structures of organization and institutional theories; and providing a 
comparative framework with continuum scales. Accordingly, chapter 2 explains the 
advantages of using the g/g theory to measure culture, referring to points made in this 
chapter.   
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Chapter 2 
The Grid and Group Cultural Theory  
as a Solution to Measure Culture  
 
 
Chapter 1 discussed the methodological and conceptual difficulties inherent in analysing 
culture, referring to previous efforts to define and measure it. Earlier studies have 
shown that the size of the social group unit influences measurement variables and also 
that national culture is too large to measure culture. Instead, two important conclusions 
can be made from the outcomes of these studies. First, culture can be more effectively 
measured by focusing on small well-established social group units. Second, socially 
established organizations are more appropriate subjects for measuring culture than 
national cultures. 
In order to analyse culture in organizations, it was necessary in chapter 1 to 
examine measurement theory and studies which have used organizational and 
institutional theories. Organizational theories suggest that organizational culture should 
be discussed in terms of formal structures and the informal behaviour of members 
which helps to establish the aforesaid structures. The measurement theory discussed 
previously suggests that it is necessary to consider what kinds of measurement should 
be used for the purposes of comparing and analysing culture. With regard to the specific 
situations in which culture becomes a reality, Wildavsky and Douglas have insisted that 
culture is effectively observed in relation to risk control. Following these discussions, 
chapter 2 explains the g/g cultural theory which is the methodological framework 
around which the risk control culture in formally established organizations, including 
the Japanese and English prison services.  
The first section of this chapter gives an overview of the g/g theory. It 
continues to explain why the g/g theory is a suitable means of measuring culture, in 
places referring back to the methodological issues and criteria raised in chapter 1. 
Criticisms and issues raised about the g/g theory are also discussed in this section. In 
response to the issues raised in the first section, the second section reviews previous 
works in which the g/g theory has been used to analyse real cases. The third section 
discusses the properties of the variables in the g/g framework which are crucial to the 
application of the theory to real cases. Finally, this chapter offers a methodological 
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framework for using the g/g theory to measure the risk control cultures of the English 
and Japanese prison services.  
 
 
2.1: Grid and group cultural theory for measuring organizational risk 
control culture 
 
The g/g theory provides a comparative framework for analysing culture in different 
social group units. This section gives an overview of the theory and discusses its 
methodological advantages based on the issues raised in chapter 1.  
  
2.1.1: Overview of grid-group theory 
The g/g theory is a framework for cultural analysis developed by Douglas and 
Wildavsky. It defines culture qua social relations as patterns of interpersonal relations or, 
in different words, ways of life (Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky 1990). Douglas insisted 
that the behavioural choices available to individuals are constrained by their respective 
social contexts. This context can be structurally represented in terms of two dimensions 
of social reality: grid and group (Douglas, 1982).  
Group refers to the extent to which individuals are incorporated into social units. 
The more individuals are incorporated into social units, the more their choices are 
subject to group control (Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky 1990). The higher end of the 
group dimension indicates tighter control over admission into the group and higher 
boundaries of membership (ibid.). Grid denotes the degree to which an individual’s life 
is circumscribed by externally imposed rules. The more binding and extensive the rules 
are, the less life is open to individual negotiation (ibid.). The concept of grid is derived 
from Durkheim’s account of social regulation. Douglas has noted that the concept of 
grid refers to the image of “the cores-hatch of rules to which individuals are subject in 
the course of their interaction” (Douglas 1982).  
The theory proposes that these two dimensions of social reality come into 
orthogonal contact with each other. As a result, the g/g framework is divided into four 
quadrants, each of which represents a particular cultural type: namely, hierarchism, 
egalitarian, fatalist and individualist. Wildavsky and Douglas claim that every culture 
in the world can be placed on the continua made by combining the “grid” and “group” 
axes. Accordingly, the social reality represented by g/g variables is graphically 
described by the g/g theory. Figure 2.1 is a visual representation of the g/g theory.  
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 Although the four cultural types are essential to this theory, there are a few 
other possible types which can be used in the g/g framework: hermit and hybrid. 
“Hermit” is a social unit (usually lone individuals) which does not have any level of 
grid and group pressures (Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky 1990). Meanwhile, Hood 
(1998) has insisted that there can be hybrid types of control which involve combinations 
of the four basic cultural types. 
 
Figure 2.1: Visual map of the g/g theory  
 
Fatalist  Hierarchical 
Individualism  Egalitarian 
 
This g/g theory was introduced to public administration by Christopher Hood 
(Hood, 1998). He has claimed that the theory is increasingly being applied to 
institutional analyses in the social sciences beyond anthropology (ibid.). Hood takes the 
view that the g/g theory provides understanding of the diversity of human preferences as 
“ways of life” and of how those preferences relate to different styles of organization. 
For these reasons, he has argued that the g/g theory can contribute to our understanding 
of certain issues in public administration. In addition to the four traditional cultural 
types, Hood has also identified four types of control which each correspond to one of 
the cultural types oversight for hierarchism, mutual control for egalitarian, competition 
for individualism, and contrived randomness for fatalist (see Figure 2.2) . 
 
Figure 2.2: Visual map of the g/g theory including types of control (p. 7: Hood , 2004) 
 
Fatalist  
Control:  
Contrived Randomness 
Ex. Selection by lot 
Hierarchist 
Control: Oversight  
Ex. Audit and Inspection 
Individualism  
Control: Competition 
Ex. League tables of better 
and worse performers 
Egalitarian 
Control: Mutuality 
Ex. Paring police officers on 
patrol 
 
                             
KLJKJURXS
KLJKJULG
ORZJURXS
ORZJULG
high group 
  high grid 
low group 
low grid 
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The “oversight” way of control responds to hierarchist. According to Hood’s 
definition, it means “scrutiny and steering from some point above or outside the 
individuals in question” (Hood, 1998). In the field of public administration it is seen as 
reviewers, monitors inspectors or regulators that are to some degree detached from line 
management of the chain of command structure of organizations (Hood, 1998 and 2004). 
“Mutuality” responds to the egalitarian cultural type. It denotes “control of individuals 
by formal or informal group processes, whether by deliberate design or otherwise” 
(Hood, 1998). The institutional mechanism of mutual control requires individuals in the 
organization to accommodate the preferences of others (ibid.). “Competition” denotes 
control for individualism. It refers to the processes of rivalry in public institutions. As 
Hood points out, heads of government organizations “typically have to compete for 
good-quality recruits, budgetary allocations, valued office locations, major policy 
responsibilities, corporate awards, or league table rankings, reputations, prestige or 
position in the pecking order” in this type of control culture (ibid.). Finally, “contrived 
randomness” responds to the fatalist cultural type. It means controlling members of 
government organizations “by more or less deliberately making their lives 
unpredictable in some way”. For example, lotteries can be used to elect or select public 
officeholders (Hood, 1998 and 2004). 
     Thus, Hood has made the g/g theory more applicable to cases in public service 
analysis by providing a more concrete understanding of how control works in the four 
types of culture defined by the g/g theory. As well as the original g/g theory, this method 
helps us to avoid analysing culture in terms of abstract situations by defining specific 
types control within social groups.  
 
2.1.2: Methodological advantages of the grid-group theory   
This section explores the potential of the g/g theory as means of solving issues using the 
criteria set out in chapter 1 (See Sec. 1.1.4) .  
 
1) Defining culture and large N surveys of individual values 
The g/g theory is based on the definition of culture as collective shared patterns of 
behaviour in social groups. It proposes that the “ways of life” of all groups and people 
can be divided into four cultural types (Douglas 1999). In this respect, the g/g theory 
focuses on culture patterns of collective behaviour which can be observed in society.  
In terms of the relationship between individual values and collective behaviour, 
Douglas has stated that the theory focuses on analysing the extent to which individual 
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choices are constrained by shared ways of thinking. According to the g/g theory, this 
relationship can be reflected by the grid and group dimensions (Douglas 1982). 
Therefore, the g/g theory does not construe culture as merely an extension of the values 
and thoughts of individuals. Regardless of what individuals think or prefer in their 
minds, their behaviour (i.e. choice) is to greater or lesser degrees constrained by g/g 
dimensions, and this constraint modifies culture in the theory. Hence the g/g theory can 
clearly focus on culture as a collective phenomenon distinct from individual values.  
This distinction in the theory also suggests that large N surveys are not needed 
to operate it. If culture is not necessarily constructed from the individual values and 
mental processes of those individuals, large N surveys, which are supposed to analyse 
and aggregate individual values, are not required to apply the g/g theory to real cases. 
 
2) The unit of analysis  
The g/g theory analyses culture at the any level of the social group unit. Previous 
studies, which used the g/g theory, have not indicated that restrictions should apply to 
the level at which the g/g theory can be used. Accordingly, the theory is available to 
analyse any layer of culture where rules and group pressures exist. It could apply at a 
national or organizational level down to small groups of friends and families.  
 However, the theory is considered to be more applicable to certain types of 
institution than others. Publically recognized or established institutions have more 
visible structures consisting of rules (grid) and membership conditions (group). These 
institutions include authorised business corporations, schools, and hospitals. By contrast, 
it is difficult to observe the grid and group dimensions in more private institutions such 
as families, play groups, and some voluntary associations. In this case, public service 
institutions, including prison services, seem the most appropriate case studies for the g/g 
theory. This is because rules and membership conditions within such institutions tend to 
be highly formal and visible and can thus be observed easily.  
 
3) Organizational and Institutional approaches 
Chapter 1 explained some organizational and institutional theories which suggest that 
organizational culture should be analysed in terms of formal and informal structures in 
the organization. Donaldson, and Tolbert and Zucker (1999 and 1996 respectively) have 
explained that organizational theories are based on a tension between formal 
organizational structures and actions taken by individuals within organizations (ibid.: 
also see Sec. 1.2.1).  
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The g/g theory identifies culture by combining the “grid” variable which 
represents rules and the “group” variable which represents group pressures, both of 
which reflect institutional constraint that bind and restrict individual behaviour. Both 
dimensions can involve formal and informal aspects of organization. Rules exist 
formally or informally in the social group unit, and group pressures may be mostly 
observed in the informal aspects. The theory is potentially designed to manage the 
formal and informal aspects of organizational structure.  
 
4) Level of measurement: the continuity of the dimensions identifying culture in reality 
Much like other forms of cultural analysis, the g/g theory is based on the typology of 
ways of life. However, according to the measurement theory, the theoretical framework 
is at the ordinal rather than the nominal level of measurement because the degrees of 
grid and group dimensions in the organization determine those four cultural types.  
   The grid and group dimensions identify culture in the social group unit on 
continuous scales: from high to low orders. Thus, the four types of culture are also 
comparative continuous scales which are measured by the grid and group dimensions: 
hierarchism responds to high grid and high group measurements, egalitarian responds to 
low grid and high group measurements, individualist responds to low grid and low 
group measurements, and fatalist responds to high grid and low group measurements 
(see Figure 2.1). The visual map of the g/g theory shows that the four cultural types are 
labels for the four quadrants made by the intersection of the grid and group axes. Hence 
the relationships between the four cultural types are defined by the degrees of grid and 
group dimensions. According to the measurement theory, the g/g theory fits the ordinal 
level of measurement because there is a higher level of comparability between its scales 
and variables than those of normal cultural typologies.  
 
2.1.3: Criticisms and issues against the grid-group theory  
Although the g/g theory has the potential to measure culture, it also has its criticisms 
which have raised issues about how it can be applied to real cases. Accordingly, this 
section introduces some of the criticisms levelled at the g/g theory and some of the 
methodological issues that have hung over its application to a particular case study, 
namely the prison services. 
According to Douglas (1999), there are three major criticisms of the g/g theory: 
1. the model is static; 2. it is deterministic; and 3. there is not enough evidence to 
support it. Firstly, the theory binds all of the organizational features of social groups into 
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a static map. Questions have also been raised about why it is based on only four cultural 
types and two social dimensions (Douglas 1999). In response, Douglas has explained 
that there are four cultural types, not because there are only four possible types and two 
possible dimensions of culture, but rather because the g/g theory focuses on two 
dimensions of social reality which create patterns of behaviour that can be simplified 
into four organizational models (ibid.). The grid and group dimensions do not refer to 
all of the factors which contribute towards the development of culture in society. Instead, 
the g/g theory focuses on two key factors which effectively identify social culture. The 
validity of this assumption can be proven if the g/g theory is used to explore more case 
studies.  
In terms of the critics against the four cultural types, insisting those types are 
static, the question itself is questioned in considering the characteristics of the theory. 
Firstly, previous works have already pointed out that other types of culture are possible: 
for example, hermit and hybrid (Hood 1998). Moreover, the idea of hybrid cultures 
allows for the combination of cultural types thus increasing the number of cultures 
possible in the g/g theory. The key issue in this regard is how hybrid cultures may be 
coherently included alongside the original four cultural types. However, this is mostly a 
matter of how the g/g theory is used through research design. Additionally, if the g/g 
theory is explained in terms of measurement theory, it is not limited to only the four 
cultural types. As discussed in the last section, the g/g theory identifies culture based on 
the ordinal level of scales assigned by the degree of g/g dimensions. The ordinal level of 
scales include several ordering techniques; such as high/low, ranks 1, 2, 3…and 10. 
Although the g/g framework originally involves shows high or low scales, more 
complex ranking orders are possible in the ordinal level of measurement. If the g/g 
theory can develop these scales, the number of types of culture can increase beyond the 
standard four.  
The second criticism of the g/g theory highlighted by Douglas is that the g/g 
theory is deterministic, and cannot flexibly respond to institutional changes. This view 
relates to more general criticisms of cultural analysis. As well as other cultural theories, 
it is hard to explain how changes (outcomes) come about with the g/g theory. This 
invites an important question regarding the functioning of the g/g theory: can culture be 
an independent variable? In response to this criticism, Douglas has stressed that one of 
the major strengths of the g/g theory is that it allows us to trace economic and social 
problems which may develop in organizations due to their members’ patterns of 
behaviour (Douglas 1999). It is not appropriate to explain either of these problems as 
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independent variables. However, the theory can provide comparative plots of culture, 
showing how culture as collective patterns of behaviour may differ depending on 
organizations, and suggest potential strengths and weakness embedded in those patterns. 
I agree with Douglas’ view that previous cultural studies show that it is difficult for 
culture to be an independent variable which can explain the causality of changes as the 
dependent variable. Although the studies in question are mainly concerned with national 
culture, it can be seen from them that it is difficult to discuss culture as an independent 
variable because it is highly contingent. As Douglas has mentioned, the purpose of 
analysing culture with the g/g theory should be to comparatively identify the 
characteristics of social groups: in particular, their strengths and weaknesses in 
comparison with others.    
 The third criticism of the g/g theory is that there is a lack of evidence to 
support it (Douglas 1999). The other two criticisms of the g/g theory discussed above 
also ultimately draw upon this lack of evidence. It is the case that previous studies 
which have used the g/g theory to identify culture in real social organizations are not 
enough to fully demonstrate its appropriateness in the field of cultural analysis. Thus, it 
can be concluded at present that the method for applying the g/g theory to real cases is 
not yet properly established and that more case studies are needed to achieve this end. 
Therefore, in order to effectively measure the risk control cultures of the 
Japanese and English prison services, it is necessary to summarise the methodological 
issues raised by previous works. In particular, it is important to discuss how a method 
for measuring culture with the g/g framework can be developed without losing the 
advantages of the theory which were mentioned in the last section (see Sec.2.1.2). 
Hence Section 2.2 discusses methodological issues for applying the g/g theory to 
analyse culture in reality, reviewing previous studies used the theory.  
 
 
2.2: Previous studies using the grid-group theory to measure culture 
 
This section introduces three major studies which have used the g/g framework to 
measure organizational culture: 1. the work of Gross and Rayner in Measuring Culture 
(1985); 2. listorg by Mars (2005); and 3. Major study used the g/g theory in the field of 
public administration by Hood and his colleagues. In order to effectively review 
previous works, it is necessary to clarify the main methodological issues raised about 
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the g/g theory in relation to the general problems for analysing culture set out in chapter 
1 (see Sec. 1.1.4).  
 The first issue is the purpose of analysing culture in the g/g theory. As 
discussed above, I have argued that the g/g theory is not meant for clarifying causation 
of specific outcomes, but rather for identifying the characteristics of organizations in 
comparison with others. Therefore, I shall now clarify how analytical functions of the 
g/g theory have been understood in previous works used the theory.  
The second issue is units of analysis. Although the previous section discussed 
the g/g theory can be used to analyse any social institution in principle, it is still 
necessary to review the kinds of social units that have been examined by previous 
studies. The third issue is the way of discussing risk and culture. The g/g theory was 
originally intended to analyse culture in terms of risk control. Thus, it is important to 
know how the theory can be used to analyse the relationship between culture and risk.  
The forth issue is the way of involving institutional and organizational theories 
in order to gain in order to gain a structural understanding of culture? As discussed in 
chapter 1 (see Sec.1.1.4), those theories should be involved to structurally analyse 
organizational culture. Accordingly, it is important here to clarify how previous works 
have considered these factors and how they can be managed in the process of analysing 
culture by the g/g theory  
The fifth issue is choices of variables for analysing culture by the g/g theory. 
Although the g/g framework is explained in terms of the grid and group dimensions and 
the four cultural types, it is still worth reviewing what kinds of variables previous 
studies have used to measure culture. This issue also relates to the level of measurement.  
Thus, in light of the outcomes of previous studies, I would like here to select the best 
scales of variables for measuring the risk control cultures of the English and Japanese 
prison services.    
The final issue is analytical techniques used by previous studies. Although 
previous national culture studies have shown that coding is the common way of 
analysing culture, this finding still needs to be clarified in light of case studies which 
have used the g/g theory. I will also discuss here the appropriateness of using statistical 
techniques in response to the level of measurement adopted in the g/g analysis based on 
measurement theory. 
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2.2.1: Gross and Rayner: Coding grid and group variables and the EXACT model 
Rayner and Gross have attempted to measure culture quantitatively using the g/g theory 
in their book, Measuring Culture (1985). For the purposes of their study, Gross and 
Rayner tried to illustrate the different kinds of argumentations that might be applied to 
the four quadrants of the g/g map.  They tested the theory by applying it to a 
simulation of a hypothetical New England community called Lakemouth. This town 
was subject to a crisis in the form of an energy company planning to build a nuclear 
power plant nearby (Gross and Rayner 1985)  
The community consisted of five social units: 1. a Chamber of Commerce; 2. a 
fishermen’s trade union (Local 387); 3. a residents’ association for a seasonal 
condominium situated on the coast (Dune Dwellers); 4. an anti-nuclear power plant 
association formed by local residents (LANE); and 5. an alternative activist group 
formed by local residents (Scallopshell Caucus) (Gross and Rayner 1985). Each group 
had different purposes and approaches towards the planned nuclear power plant (ibid.). 
Gross and Rayner selected two variables to measure the cultures of each of these groups 
along the group and grid axes. They defined the properties of the g/g dimensions by 
considering all of their attributes. Firstly, for the group dimension they claimed that 
group pressure can be observed through the following five factors of members in the 
social group unit: proximity, transitivity, frequency, scope, and impermeability (ibid.).  
 
Gross and Rayner’s predicates for the group dimension (Gross and Rayner, 1985): 
1) Proximity: the closeness of members to each other measured by the 
average distance between them in the social unit. Smaller distances 
between members indicate a higher group level.  
2) Transitivity: The extent to which social interaction between members of 
a social unit is transitive: e.g. equality between members. If members 
are more transitive, the group level of the social unit becomes higher.  
3) Frequency: the proportion of members’ time which can be allocated to 
participating in certain activities with other members of the social unit. 
More frequent events with other members indicate a higher group level 
in the social unit.  
4) Scope: The diversity of the interactive involvement of members in the 
activities of a given unit relative to their interactive involvement in 
activities outside the unit. If the diversity of interactive involvement in 
the unit is high or, alternatively, if members have more interactive 
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involvement outside the unit, the group level of the social unit becomes 
lower.  
5) Impermeability: the likelihood that a non-member who satisfies the 
membership requirements of the social unit and wants to join it will 
actually attain membership. If it is difficult for non-members to gain 
membership, the group level of the social unit becomes higher.  
 
These aspects of the group variable show that Gross and Rayner considered group 
pressure to be exerted via two conditions of group membership  members group: 1. the 
physical and metaphysical distances separating members defined in Gross and Rayner’s 
terms as proximity, transitivity, frequency, and scope; and 2. the openness of the group 
to new members defined as impermeability.  
Meanwhile, Gross and Rayner stated that the grid level is observed through 
rules which assign “roles” to individuals in social units. Following this basic principle 
for grid variables, they set four analytical codes for the grid dimension:  
 
1) Specialization: the degree to which members are assigned specific 
roles in the social unit. High specialization indicates a high grid level in the 
social unit.  
2) Asymmetry: the degree of symmetrical interaction concerning the 
assigned roles of group members. For example, if the roles of the service 
taker and giver are constantly changing between members in the social unit, 
this indicates a low asymmetry level and a low grid level for the unit. 
Meanwhile, if these roles are fixed and cannot be exchanged between 
members, this indicates a high asymmetry level and a high grid level for the 
unit.   
3) Entitlement: whether titles are given by ascription or achievement. 
These two concepts are derived from Parsons (1970). If members are 
allocated more roles by ascription, this indicates a higher grid level for the 
social unit.  
4) Accountability: the immediate accountability of members. According 
to Gross and Raner (1985), accountability comes in two forms: coercive and 
non-coercive. To illustrate, the former type of accountability includes fines 
and sanctions while the latter includes disapproval and the application of 
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moral pressure. The more members are allowed to hold other members to 
account, the higher the grid level becomes.   
(Gross and Rayner, 1985; pp. 71-85) 
 
In order to measure their predicates for the grid and group dimensions, Gross 
and Rayner hypothesized that culture can be measured as the degree of social 
interaction between group members. They named their method of calculation the 
EXACT model. This model analyses the nine predicates with the following scales: 
persons (xi) in the social unit (X), activities (ai) of group members (xi), publicly 
recognized roles in activities assumed by group members (ci), eligible non-members 
who are excluded from membership (ei), and a time span in which typical distribution 
of activities occurs (T) (Gross and Rayner 1985).  
Following this model, Gross and Rayner (1985) defined nine formulae for 
calculating numerical scores for the nine predicates based on network analysis: prox, 
trans, freq., scope, and imper. for the group dimension and spec., asym., entitle., and 
accountability for the grid dimension. Furthermore, they calculated the mean scores for 
the grid and group dimensions. In order to justify the adoption of mean scores, they 
explained that if the predicates are equally important and structurally independent in the 
construction of the g/g levels, taking the average score of all predicate scores by each 
dimension is the best way of demonstrating results (ibid.). All g/g predicate scores were 
valued between a minimum of 0 and a maximum of1 (0<X<1, 0<Y<Y). As a result, all 
social units in the Lakemouth nuclear plant case were scored as follows (see Table. 2.1): 
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Table.2.1: Grid and group scores for each predicate of the social group units in the Lakemouth 
nuclear plant case 
  
  
Chamber 
of  
Commerce 
Local387 
Dunes  
Dwellers 
LANE 
Scallopshell 
 Caucus 
Prox 0.97 0.48 0.56 0.52 1 
Trans 0.9 0.88 0.16 0.48 1 
Freq 0.52 0.37 0.07 0.27 0.89 
Scope 0.72 0.94 0.2 0.41 0.91 
Imper 0.85 0.11 n/a 0 0.75 
GROUP 
(Mean 
Values) 
0.79 0.56 0.25 0.34 0.91 
*Group/Grid are calculated as the average of all predicate scores 
Spec 0.9 0.92 0 0.79 0.12 
Asym 0.88 0.89 0.14 0.88 0 
Entitle 0.97 0.26 0 0.82 0 
Acc 0.23 0.95 0 0.23 0 
GRID 0.75 0.76 0.035 0.68 0.03 
 
Finally, Gross and Rayner mapped the g/g scores for each social unit on the g/g 
map. They used a form of the g/g map in which the X (“group”) and Y (“grid”) axes 
cross orthogonally in the left bottom corner of the “individualism” quadrant.  
Consequently, the X and Y variables both move away from zero (see, Figure 2.3, and 
2.4).   

 
Figure 2.3: G/g map ( X=Group, Y=Grid) (Rayner and Gross, 1985) 
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Figure 2.4: Results for the social units in the Lakemouth nuclear plant case 
 
 
Then, I will evaluate the study by Gross and Rayner in respond to the 
methodological issues raised in the beginning of this section (see Sec.2.2). Firstly, the 
purpose of Gross and Rayner’s study was to demonstrate how different social groups 
with different ways of life respond to the same risks. Causality was not considered in 
their analysis. Secondly, their research focused on small social group units within the 
fictional town of Lakemouth. Each of these groups had different purposes and members 
and represented different interests. Some were more formal institutions than others and 
some were profitable while others were non-profit making organizations. Moreover, the 
wide range of social groups covered by Gross and Rayner’s study shows that the g/g 
theory is potentially applicable to social groups in general. Thirdly, Gross and Rayner’s 
research focused on a specific situation affecting a hypothetical town: namely, plans to 
build a nuclear energy plant. Their study demonstrated the different responses that 
various social groups might have to a particular crisis affecting their town and thereby 
also showed how different responses to the same risk can come about through the 
cultural differences between small social groups.  
Fourthly, in regard to structural analysis and organizational and institutional 
theories, in order to measure culture Gross and Rayner focused on the individual 
behaviour of members of social groups. Therefore, an analysis which focuses on 
organizational structure was not clearly observed in their work. Nevertheless, the g/g 
predicates raised in Gross and Rayner’s study partially reflect their own view of 
organizational structure. For example, the grid predicates are concerned with the roles 
played by members of social groups: specialization, accountability, and etc. (Gross and 
Rayner, 1985; see Sec. 2.2.1). Pugh (1973) also defined specialization as the degree to 
which the activities of organizations are divided into specialized roles in his study of 
organizations (see Sec. 1.2.1). The organizational and institutional factors discussed in 
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chapter 1 share some things in common with the g/g predicates used by Gross and 
Rayner. 
Fifthly, in terms of the variables to measure culture, Gross and Rayner adopted 
the grid and group dimensions as essential variables. The four cultural types are 
considered the consequences of those two variables. Gross and Rayner’s took the view 
that the group dimension is represented by the closeness of members and the openness 
of membership in the group while the grid dimension is represented by the roles 
assigned to members. This understanding of the grid and group dimensions provides 
useful information for considering what they represent in reality. Accordingly, based on 
their understanding of the reality of the g/g dimensions, Gross and Rayner assigned nine 
codes to them which allowed them to be analysed in detail. In different words, they used 
coding as a way of measuring culture based on g/g variables.  
In terms of level of measurement in their study, Gross and Rayner’s (1985) 
evaluated their outcomes based on the ordinal scales, which indicated whether a social 
unit has a greater or lesser degree of g/g predicates than other social units regardless of 
the number of units being ranked (Gross and Rayner, 1985). The understanding Gross 
and Rayner had of their predicates and the scale units they used to measure them invites 
questions about how appropriately they used statistical techniques in their research. 
They took the mean scores of nine predicate codes for the grid and group dimensions. 
However, if they measured g/g levels at the ordinal level of measurement; those mean 
scores do not indicate any effective meaning in measurement theory (see Sec. 1.2.2). 
The appropriateness of the statistical techniques they used can be questioned in the 
demonstration of the results in their method used the g/g theory. 
 
2.2.2: Listorg by Mars 
Gross and Rayner (1985) tried to qualitatively and quantitatively measure culture with 
the g/g framework. Although the appropriateness of their statistical technique has been 
questioned, they have provided a useful understanding of the properties of the g/g 
variables. The work of Mars (2005) on risk management in the building industry is also 
of value for understanding the properties of the g/g variables. Mars (2005) defines seven 
basic factors which should be coded as grid and group variables: namely, labour, 
information, space, time, objects, resources and group incorporation (he has coined the 
pneumonic, “Listorg”, to stand for them). He has assigned these factors to the grid and 
group dimensions as follows: 
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Listorg by Mars (2005) 
1. Labour (Grid): Are labour divided according to whether tasks are 
considered appropriate for people with different roles or ranks (high 
grid)? or are tasks undertaken flexibly in response to factors such as 
adaptability, availability, and urgency and are they multi-sourced (low 
grid)?  
2. Information (Grid): is information restricted on a need to know 
basis and validated only if derived from approved sources (high grid) 
or is it free-flowing and multi-sourced (low grid)? 
3. Space (Grid): is space primarily used to buttress rank and restricted 
or allocated to people in high office (high grid) or is it used adaptively 
to fit functional needs (low grid)? 
4. Time (Grid): is time used as a social organiser and source of control 
(high grid) or as a fluid resource that allows for personal autonomy 
(low grid)? 
5. Objects (Grid): are objects primarily allocated to rank irrespective 
of function (high grid) or according to functional needs (low grid)? 
6. Resources (Grid): are resources controlled from the centre (high 
grid) or allocated to specific functions as required (low grid)? 
7. Degree of group incorporation concerning following factors 
(Group): 
 (High group) 
 -Overlaps between work and leisure 
 - Shared tasks and decision-making 
 - Kinship 
 - Shared histories  
 - Residential propinquity  
(Low group) 
- General lack of these factors 
 
In response to the methodological issues raised in the beginning of this section (see sec. 
2.2), firstly, in terms of the aim of his study, much like Gross and Rayner (1985), Mars 
intended to use the g/g theory to demonstrate culture among groups of building workers. 
Causality was not taken account in his research. Secondly, the unit of analysis in Mars’ 
research is limited to groups of building workers active on specific building sites. 
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Thirdly, he applied listorg to case studies by focusing on the risk of incidents on 
building sites (Mars 2005). Fourthly, he did not directly involve the analytical 
perspective provided by organizational and institutional theories in his research. 
However, some factors on the grid axis (e.g. division of labour, information, and space) 
are seemed to show structural characteristics of culture in his analysis. Fifthly, in terms 
of variables to measure culture, Much like Gross and Rayner who used coding to 
measure g/g levels, Mars assigned analytical codes in response to g/g dimensions which 
represent the grid or group dimensions. The codes he assigned to the grid dimension 
provide a clearer image of what it represents in real cases. Meanwhile, in comparison 
with Gross and Rayner’s (1985) study, codes for the group dimension assigned by Mars 
is still abstract and provides little understanding of how group pressure is observed in 
the social group unit.  
 Additionally, as regards the analytical codes for the g/g variables, there is some 
dissonance between Mars and Gross and Rayner. Whereas Gross and Rayner (1985) 
understood that the “time” and “space” codes reflect group properties, Mars (2005) 
defined them as grid variables. Considering these similarities and differences, it is 
necessary to discuss the properties of the grid and group variables as they are defined in 
my method for measuring organizational risk control culture. Furthermore, Mars only 
used high / low scales to measure these codes for the grid and group dimensions. He 
does not discuss the summary and demonstration techniques in his work.   
 
2.2.3: Application of grid-group theory in public service analysis: Structural analysis 
of risk control using the four cultural types  
Following the introduction of the g/g theory into public administration research by 
Hood, some scholars applied the theory to cases in public service domains. After 
publishing The Art of the State (Hood 1998), Hood and his colleagues applied the g/g 
theory to analyse the NPM reforms and different types of control in public service 
institutions. First, Hood, Scott, James, Jones and Travers (henceforth Hood et al, 1999) 
analysed types of control in five public service domains in England and Wales: Central 
Government, local government, the prison service, state schools, and Eurocratic 
regulation (Hood and et al. 1999).   
The method and outcomes taken in their works of 1999 (Hood et al 1999) is 
further developed in the aforementioned study. Hood, James, Peters and Scott 
(henceforth Hood et al, 2004) went on to conduct a structural analysis of culture and 
control in three public service domains across the world: prison services, higher 
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education and universities, and high-ranking civil servants. Contributions were made to 
this study by several researchers from OECD countries, and their case studies are based 
on comparisons between 8 OECD countries: Australia, England, France, Germany, 
Japan, Norway, the Netherlands, and the U.S. These cross national inter-departmental 
empirical studies helped to apply the g/g theory to a much wider field of case studies.  
A number of methodological issues are raised by this study. First, the purpose 
of their study was to use the typology of the g/g theory to identify types and patterns of 
management influenced by New Public Management (NPM) (Hood 2004). Hood stated 
that the study was intended to go beyond “folklore” and the peculiarity of comparative 
public service analysis (ibid.). Second, with regard to the unit of analysis, Hood et al 
(2004) focused on three public service domains at the national level in each country: for 
example, control in the national prison service (ibid.). They were mainly concerned with 
formal control structures rather than the informal behaviour of members in the 
institution. Furthermore, it should be noted that Hood et al were not clear about what 
kinds of risk they were concerned with. Instead, they focused on providing an overview 
of control in the relevant institutions.  
Unlike previous works in sociology and anthropology, Hood et al (2004) rather 
concentrated on the structure of patterns of control in public service institutions (ibid.). 
Although they did not directly refer to the organizational theories or factors mentioned 
in chapter 1, the overall control structures and particular control techniques used in each 
institution were discussed (Hood et al, 2004). In terms of the control structures, Hood et 
al (2004) refereed to the framework of control systems defined in their previous works 
(Hood et al, 1999; and Hood, Rothstein, and Baldwin 2001: henceforth Hood et al, 
2001). In those previous works, Hood defined three analytic components of risk 
regulation systems in public service institutions: standard-setting, information gathering, 
and behaviour modification.     
 
Components of risk control systems 
(Hood et al,1999, pp.47-49; and ,2001,pp.21-27) 
• Information-gathering: gathering information when issues of 
probability and consequence are in question.  
• Standard setting: setting targets and guidelines  
• Behaviour-modification: control intended to modify 
organizational behaviour by coding compliance and deterrence 
standards.  
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In regard to the choice of variables, Hood (1998) and his later works with his 
colleagues (Hood et al, 1999, 2001, and 2004) took a different methodological path 
from previous studies. They analysed cases based on not g/g dimensions but four 
cultural types: hierarchy, egalitarian, individualist and fatalist. Later works also 
constantly analysed types control based on the four cultural types by highlighting 
examples which represent each of them (ibid.). Hood has consistently applied the theory 
to public institutions using the four cultural types.  
  
2.2.4: Summary of previous methods and the direction of the method for this study 
There are several methods for using the g/g theory to measure organizational culture.  
In response to the methodological criteria outlined in the beginning of section 2.2, I will 
now discuss these methods for measuring organizational culture based on the g/g theory.  
 
1) The purpose of analysing culture: units of analysis and specific risks 
Previous studies have shown that the g/g theory helps to identify patterns of behaviour 
within different social groups. It achieves this end by effectively demonstrating culture 
with a comparative framework rather than explaining the causality of specific outcomes. 
In terms of the unit of analysis, Gross and Rayner (1985) and Mars (2005) focused on 
small social group units, some of which were not established institutions. Moreover, 
they measured culture in relation to specific risks for the targeted social groups: 
building a nuclear power plant near a town, and incidents on building sites.    
 Meanwhile, studies in public administration have mainly focused on more 
formal or established public institutions. Although the unit size in public service 
domains is generally larger than those covered by Mars and Gross and Rayner, studies 
of public administration have shown that the g/g theory can provide a comparative 
framework for analysing culture. Moreover, the four cultural types were more clearly 
represented in the formalised structures of public institutions. It was noted in chapter 1 
that more significant results can be gained from analysing culture in established 
organizations rather than non-established ones (see Sec. 1.1.4).  
 
2) Structural analysis: how to combine organizational and institutional structure  
Mars (2005) involved a few structural perspectives in his g/g analysis of building 
workers (i.e. structure of providing or allocating information, objects, and resources in 
the building industry). Hood et al (1999 and 2001) also suggests three main components 
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of control structure in public service institutions (i.e. information gathering, behavioural 
modification and standard settings. In order to gain a structural understanding of culture 
in the method for measuring risk control culture in prison services by the g/g theory, it is 
necessary to summarise those factors raised by Mars (2005) and Hood et al (1999), 
taking account of structural and institutional factors discussed in chapter 1 (see Section 
1.2.1 ). How to coherently involve those factors raised by Mars (2005) and Hood et al 
(1999 and 2001) in the g/g theoretical framework, collating those with factors raised in 
organizational and institutional theories, should be considered in the process of 
establishing the method to measure culture.  
 
3) Choosing, coding variables and issues with scales  
All of the previous studies discussed so far have used analytical codes to evaluate their 
case studies. For the g/g theory, the problem is how codes are assigned in the g/g 
framework. Previous researchers have shown that there are two possible ways of coding 
variables based on either the g/g dimensions or the four cultural types. The former 
method was adopted by Rayner and Gross (1985) and Mars (2005), while the latter was 
adopted by Hood et al (2001). Although both approaches have advantages and 
disadvantages with regard to measuring culture, my method adopts grid and group 
dimensions as variables for measuring culture for two reasons, considering the level of 
measurement of the g/g theory.  
According to the measurement theory, the g/g dimensions are the ordinal level 
of measurement. Although the units of distance are not equal, there are continuum 
scales between variables: high and low g/g. Meanwhile, if culture is valued according to 
the four cultural types, it is hard to maintain the continuum orders. Thus, bearing in 
mind the comparability of the theory, I have adopted the g/g dimensions as variables for 
measuring culture with the g/g theory in this study. Properties of g/g dimensions were 
well developed by 9 predicates of Gross and Rayner (1985), and Mars (2005). In need 
of the structural cultural analysis, how to combine properties of g/g dimensions raised 
by Gross and Rayner, and Mars and factors raised in organizational and institutional 
theories discussed in issue 3) above should be developed in my method for measuring 
prison service risk control culture. However, in comparison with cultural types, 
measuring prison service culture with the g/g dimensions has some disadvantages.  
Firstly, most previous studies in public administration have used the theory 
based on the typology. More cases in public service institutions have already been 
analysed based on the four cultural types which provide concrete images of how they 
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can be coded for prison services: for example, what high/low grid and group scores 
indicate about public service institutions. Thus, even in the process of coding g/g 
variables, the understandings of high/low grid and group scores developed in previous 
studies should be referred to here in order to consider what high/low dimensions tell us 
about the relevant prison services.  
 Secondly, if culture is measured with the g/g dimensions, it is not clear how the 
idea of hybrid cultures can be considered. Previous studies which analysed culture by 
g/g dimensions was not considered the concept of hybrid. There is a lack of clarity 
about how hybrid cultures can be measured in the g/g framework. Hence how to define 
outcomes which are considered as hybrid as a result of measuring risk control culture by 
g/g dimensions should be developed in the process of the method for measuring prison 
service organizational risk control culture.  
  
4) Measurement techniques and levels of measurement 
The final issue is the level of measurement and the influence it has over the g/g visual 
map. The original g/g theory is considered to be the “ordinal” level of measurement 
because the grid and group dimensions and the four cultural typologies are defined in 
terms of high- or low- order. As well as assigning analytical codes to the g/g dimensions, 
it is also important to consider these scales to quantitatively measure culture by these 
dimensions based on measurement theory.. 
 The level of measurement also relates to issues of which appropriate statistical 
techniques can be used for analysis (see Table1.1). With the exception of Gross and 
Rayner (1985), most previous studies have not used quantitative analysis based on the 
g/g framework. By contrast, Gross and Rayner (1985) used mean scores of nine g/g 
predicates in order to demonstrate the g/g levels of social group units.  However, since 
these predicates were viewed as being measured on ordinal scales, average scores used 
by Gross and Rayner were questioned. Therefore, it can be concluded that in addition to 
considering the properties and scales of variables, it is also important to consider 
available statistical techniques in response to the level of measurement at the stage of 
demonstrating results in the method for measuring culture by the g/g theory. Taking this 
approach to the properties and scales of variables is crucial to the development of a 
method of measuring culture using the g/g theory. 
 
This summary shows that, within those four issues, issues 2), 3) and 4) should 
be developed in order to design the method measuring prison service risk control culture. 
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Moreover, within those three issues, the issue 3) defining properties (analytical codes) 
for g/g dimensions is the most essential part to be developed in my method; because 
issue 2) and 4) can be considered in the discussion to define properties of those basic 
g/g variables. Accordingly, the next section discusses the properties and scales of g/g 
variables in order to measure the organizational risk control cultures of the English and 
Japanese prison services.   
 
 
2.3: Properties and scales of grid and group variables 
 
The previous section showed that coding g/g variables is the most important to issue as 
regards measuring culture in real cases. In order to define analytical codes for 
measuring cultures of risk control in prison services using g/g variables, it is necessary 
to consider the following issues: what g/g represents in reality and how it is measured 
on the ordinal scale. Thus, the following sections respond to these two issues by 
discussing the properties and scales of g/g variables, taking account of previous works 
along the way.  
 
2.3.1: Properties for grid 
Theoretically speaking, grid represents rules which constrain individual choices 
(Douglas 1982; Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky 1990). Rules exist in every social unit 
either formally or informally. Thus, I would like to insist that the grid dimension can 
help to measure rules which define the risk control structures in the organizations. 
According to previous studies, two major aspects for analysing rules define the 
organizational risk control structures are considered: 1. rules define the system or the 
process of organizational risk control behaviour; and 2. rules specifically define roles 
and the specializations of members of organizations. 
 
1. Rules for risk control systems (excluding member roles) 
The first grid aspect for analysing organizational risk control structures is rules which 
define the risk control systems in the organization. According to previous studies above 
(see Sec. 2.2), these rules for risk control systems consist of three components; 1) rules 
relate to information in the organization, 2) rules which standardise behaviour of 
members in organizational risk control process, and 3) rules which enforce members of 
the organization to follow those rules.   
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Firstly, rules which relate to information are originally found in Risk and 
Culture by Douglas and Wildavsky (1983). They discussed information about risk as 
knowledge shared among members, which determines types of risk control in social 
groups (see Sec. 1.2.3). Following this, Mars (2005) raised ways of allocating or 
controlling information in the social group unit as a grid predicate in his listorg (Mars 
2005; see Sec. 2.2.2). Furthermore, Hood et al (1999 and 2001) raised 
information-gathering as part of control components in public services institutions (see 
Sec. 2.2.3). Hood focused on structures intended to gather information, and Mars 
focused on the structure to allocate it within organizations. Either way, rules concerning 
information can be considered an important factor in risk control systems.  
Secondly, rules which standardise behaviour of members in the organizational 
risk control process concerns with rules for unifying behaviour of members in the 
process of risk control; such as stating guidelines or targets of control in the 
organization. First, it corresponds to standard- setting by Hood et al (1999 and 2001; 
see p. 64 above). Second, Pugh (1973) also defined standardization as a factor of the 
formal structures of organizations discussed in previous chapter 1 (see Sec. 1.2.1). 
Standardization is the degree to which an organization lays down standard rules for 
organizational behaviour (Pugh 1973), and it is similar to the idea of standard-setting by 
Hood et al. Although the Pugh did not discuss this factor in relation to risk, it does 
provide an account of rules for the risk control systems in organizations. Third, although 
Mars did not directly discuss grid properties as rules for standardizing organizational 
behaviour, some factors in listorg suggest subjects for being controlled by this type of 
rules: objects and resources (Mars 2005; see Sec. 2.2.2). How far the organization 
standardises ways of allocating those objects and resources in relation to risk by rules 
can be discussed as part of the risk control system which standardise organizational 
behaviour. Mars (2005) took the view that if these objects and resources are allocated 
by central and standardized decisions, this indicates high grid characteristics for the 
organization in question. By contrast, if they are allocated by way of divisional and 
situational decisions, this indicates low grid characteristics. Hence those can be 
discussed as subjects of control in rules which standardise organizational behaviour. 
Thirdly, rules which enforce members of the organization to follow rules were 
originated in behaviour-modification by Hood and et al (1999 and 2001; see p. 64 
above). According to Hood and et al (1999 and 2001), it refers to rules that are intended 
to modify organizational behaviour through regulating compliance (see Sec. 2.2.3). In 
relation to other two types of rules, those rules which define the system in which 
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members are enforced to follow rules discussed as above should be involved as part of 
the risk control systems.  
Therefore, the first grid aspect, rules which define the risk control systems in 
organizations can effectively cover risk control and organizational factors raised in 
previous studies by Mars (2005), Hood et al (1999) and Pugh (1973). It provides 
structural understanding of risk control systems, which represent a grid property in the 
structure of risk control culture. Table 2.2 is summary of the discussion above. This 
table shows how previous studies by those researchers relate to each other in the 
category of the risk control systems.  
 
2. Rules define the roles of members in the risk control structure 
Another aspect of the grid dimension for analysing risk control structures is “rules 
define the roles of members” for controlling risk. This aspect of grid dimensions is 
based on understanding of grid properties by Gross and Rayner (1985). They have 
defined four aspects of the roles played by members of groups in order to measure the 
grid level of the social group unit: specialization, entitlement, asymmetry, and 
accountability (see Sec. 2.2.1)  
Specialization refers to the extent to which members are given specific roles to 
play in groups (Gross and Rayner 1985). In response to their idea, Pugh also has 
analysed specialization as the degree to which an organization’s activities are divided 
into special roles in his study of organizational structure (Pugh 1973; see Sec. 1.2.1). 
Furthermore, Mars (2005) has considered the division of labour as a grid variable (see p. 
62). He has analysed rules governing how roles are given to group members in terms of 
the division of labour in Listorg. More specifically, he has focused on whether specific 
tasks (labour) are assigned according to rank (high grid), or based on the criteria of 
performance, adaptability, availability, and urgency (low grid) (ibid.). As part of risk 
control structures, these ideas of specialization should be analysed in terms of what kind 
of roles are assigned to whom in order to control specific risks in the organizations.   
Entitlement analyses criteria for assigning roles to members in the social group 
unit, particularly in regard to whether selection processes are based on achievement or 
ascription (Gross and Rayner 1985). Gross and Rayner (1985) have analysed roles in 
this way by focusing on the processes and criteria whereby they are assigned within 
groups (see Sec. 2.2.1). Furthermore, Gross and Rayner analysed the flexibility of those 
roles between members by asymmetry (ibid.). This code analysed how far assigned roles 
are flexibly changeable between members in the social group unit. If these roles are 
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fixed and cannot be exchanged between members, this indicates a high asymmetry level 
and a high grid level for the unit (ibid.). Regarding those criteria for assigning roles to 
members, Pugh (1973) has also highlighted standardization of employment practices 
(ibid.; see Sec. 1.2.1) as a factor of the organizational structure. 
Moreover, Gross and Rayner (1985) have considered the relationship between 
roles and power in terms of accountability: that is, whether roles come with coercive or 
non-coercive power (see Sec. 2.2.1). In regard to this relationship, Pugh’s (1973) 
concept of configuration also takes account of how far members with high-profile roles 
have power over their subordinates (see sec. 1.2.1). Additionally, although these works 
mainly focus on powers to penalise subordinates which come with certain roles, it 
should be added that the allocation of blame when things go wrong is also an important 
consideration in this respect. Indeed, the allocation of blame is a key issue for the g/g 
theory (Thompson et al, 1990; Hood et al, 2001). Thus, it is important that this study 
considers how blame is assigned in relation to the roles of group members.  
Therefore, the second grid aspect of risk control structures, rules which define 
roles of members in the structure cover risk control and organizational factors raised in 
previous studies by Gross and Rayner (1985), Mars (2005), Pugh (1973), and Hood et al 
(1991 and 2001). Table 2.2 is summary of the discussion above. This table shows how 
previous studies by those researchers relate to each other in the category of the roles of 
members Thus, the properties for grid dimension in the risk control structure are defined 
according to two factors: 1. the risk control system; and 2. the roles assigned to 
members for controlling risk. The summary of predicates is as follows (see Table 2.2): 
 
Table: 2.2 Summary of properties for grid variables 
 
 
 
G/G theories P.A analysis Organizational theories
Information (Mars) Information Gathering ( Hood)
Object (Mars) Standard setting (Hood) Standardization (Pugh)
Behaviour modification (Hood)
Resource (Mars)
Specialization (Gross and Rayner) Specialization (Pugh)
Division of Labour (Mars) Configuration
Asymmetry (Gross and Rayner)
Entitlement (Gross and Rayner)
Standardization
for employment practices (Pugh)
Accountability (Gross and Rayner) (Blame)
Rules
define
control systems
Rules
define
roles of members
List of properties for grid variable
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The next issue for measuring the grid level of the organizations is the scales of 
grid variables. Based on these properties for the grid dimension discussed above, it is 
now necessary to define the measurement standards which indicate high or low grid 
levels for these aspects of the risk control structures. In terms of rules which define risk 
control systems, firstly, as a simple observation and comparison, institutions which set 
larger numbers of rules in terms of their risk control structure will score higher grid 
levels than institutions which set smaller numbers of rules.  
Secondly, referring to previous studies of the g/g theory and organizational 
structure theory, it should be noted that the grid level is determined by the flexibility and 
formality of rules. Mars (2005) defined that levels of grid are determined by how far 
subjects of control defined in listorg are flexibly (i.e. information and objects; see Sec. 
2.2.2). Furthermore, Pugh (1973) has analysed the degree to which rules are written 
down as formalization which is a factor of the organizational structure he defined (see 
Section 1.2.1). Those previous works suggest that grid levels can be defined by the 
flexibility of changing rules for members in organizations. In this respect, as Pugh 
(1973) suggested, formally written rules are less flexible than informal unwritten rules 
because they are less easily changed by group members. Hence formal and less flexible 
rules are considered as the higher grid level than informal and flexible ones. In the case 
of public service institutions, this flexibility and formality can also be measured in 
terms of how extensive institutional procedures are required for changing rules. For 
example, prison staff members can more flexibly change prison service ordinance 
issued inside of the service than parliamentary legislation issued for the prison service 
by the legislature according to the penal legal structures. Thus, for this criterion higher 
grid rules are rules which are less flexible and cannot be easily changed by members of 
the organization.   
This criterion is possibly criticised because it does not recognise that informal 
local habits can be inflexible and resistant to change sometimes. However, this scale 
focuses on the flexibility of rules according to the formally required procedures when it 
needs to be changed. Informal customs invariably exist in organizations, but, by virtue 
of them being informal, there is no need to establish formal procedures to change them. 
Although informal customs are easily changeable in legal terms, it can often be difficult 
to change them for a variety of other reasons such as group resistance. Therefore, as far 
as it concerns with a grid variable, formality is measured only in terms of the degree of 
flexibility for changing rules based on existing legal procedures within organizations. 
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Thus, when formality/flexibility determine the grid level, formality represents 
how easily or how much flexibility members of organizations have for changing 
relevant rules. Higher formality and inflexibility of rules means a higher grid level. In 
this respect, As regards the method developed here for measuring culture in prison 
services, the legal structures of the English and Japanese penal codes are taken into 
account in this study in order to determine how formal the rules are governing each 
body as well as whether rules are written or unwritten. 
Finally, in regard to scales for rules which define the roles of members, the grid 
level of roles of members is also measured by the similar standards to that of risk 
control systems: the number of roles and flexibility of those. According to previous 
works, three points need to be made in regard to this scale criterion particularly for rules 
for roles of members. The first point, the more roles organizations assign to their staff 
members in order to control risk, the higher their grid levels will be and vice versa if 
they assign fewer roles to their staff. The second point, the flexibility of assigned roles 
in relation to tasks and activities should be considered to determine the grid level of the 
organization. Gross and Rayner (1985) considered this issue by asymmetry (see Sec. 
2.2.1). If specific tasks or activities are only given to members who are assigned 
particular roles, this indicates a smaller degree of flexibility within the organization. The 
third point, the employment practice in terms of the process of assigning roles to 
different group members should be also considered to decide this flexibility in roles of 
members. Gross and Rayner further discussed how it relates to the grid level by 
entitlement (see Sec. 2.2.1). If roles that are only given to group members according to 
ascription based conditions which cannot be easily changed by candidates, such as 
gender, race, and seniority, are therefore less flexible. By contrast, if roles are given in 
regard to members’ achievements, such as good performance in business competition, 
they are more flexible because they can be gained through changeable behaviour. 
 
2.3.2: Properties for group   
Theoretically, the group dimension represents how far members are incorporated into 
groups (Thompson, Ellis and Wildaveky 1990). Douglas (1982) has argued that the 
group dimension measures the extent to which individual behavioural choices are 
constrained by group incorporation. The issue then is how group-imposed constraints on 
individual choices can be observed as a group attribute in reality. This section discusses 
the properties of the group variables based on group factors identified in previous 
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studies discussed in Section 2.2 above and organizational studies discussed by Pugh 
(1973) in Section 1.2.1 of Chapter 1. 
With regard to the issue that how properties for group are observed in reality, 
Gross and Rayner (1985) used the EXACT model. The model analysed the relationship 
between individual choices and group constraints in terms of time and space as 
environmental settings in organizations (see Sec. 2.2.1). Accordingly, they observed the 
ways in which members of social groups share time and space in order to measure the 
group level. In contrast to Gross and Rayner, Mars (2005) defined time and space as 
grid properties in listorg and focused on them as topics of control (provision of these in 
the organization). However, for the purposes of this study, I shall adopt Gross and 
Rayner’s view of the time and space variables. The group level of organizations can be 
coherently observed in terms of the choices their members make about how to use time 
and space. Even the group predicates raised by Mars (2005) become more coherently 
understood in the context of these time and space as defined by Gross and Rayner 
(1985). Therefore, the following discussion is intended to show that group pressures 
(incorporation) can be observed through variations of individual choices about 1. time 
and 2. space in the organizations. 
The first factor, “time” can be defined here in two ways: 1. it is the frequency 
with which members perform certain tasks; and 2. it is the proportion of time spent by 
members performing tasks in the social unit. These definitions respectively correspond 
to frequency (Gross and Rayner, 1985; see Sec. 2.2.1) and overlap of work and leisure 
in listorg by Mars (Mars 2005; see Sec. 2.2.2). If a majority of group members 
frequently participate in the same activities together, they spend more time with each 
other. To illustrate this point, in one prison all staff members worked equally more than 
14 hours per day. Additionally, outside of their work, they frequently spent leisure time 
together. In this situation, the choice of behaviour for these members is smaller than in 
other prisons where working hours vary depending on job status and staff members 
spend more of their leisure time apart. In the latter case, the overlap between work and 
leisure is smaller and staff members have more freedom of choice about how they spend 
their time.   
Another aspect of time is history. Mars (2005) has considered whether 
members of organizations maintain shared histories in order to measure the group level 
(see Sec. 2.2.2). One way of defining shared histories is as the extent to which members 
can choose to know or not know historical information. In a situation in which all 
members equally share historical information about their organization, individual 
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members will lack the option of not knowing. On the other hand, if members do not 
share information equally, this indicates that they have a greater degree of choice to not 
know about their organizations. In relate to organizational structures, Pugh (1973) has 
also highlighted origin and history as contexts of the organizational structure. He 
defined origin and history experiences which are gained by the organization (see Sec. 
1.2.1).  
The second factor which is observed the group level is space among members 
in the organization. Firstly, my definition of space refers to physical and metaphysical 
space in organizations. Physical space mainly concerns distance between group 
members. In regard to physical space, Gross and Rayner (1985) have measured 
“proximity” between group members while Mars (2005) has insisted that residential 
propinquity indicates high group characteristics within organizations. In this way, they 
all agree that less distance between members indicates a higher group level (see Sec. 
2.2.1 and 2.2.2). If I apply these factors, concerning physical distances between 
members raised by Gross and Rayner, to the behaviour of group members, those reflect 
to the choices they can make about how much distance they put between themselves and 
other members. If there are equally small distances between group members, this 
indicates that they have limited or no choices about keeping different distances between 
themselves.  
To illustrate this point, the Japanese prison service prepares staff residences 
adjacent to prisons (i.e. the workplace), and normally most staff members live in these 
residences (Hamai 2006). Hamai has explained that although there are no office codes 
restricting where prison staff live, there is group pressure between colleagues to live in 
staff residences (ibid.). In these circumstances, prison staff members have limited 
choices about how much distance they keep from each other. By contrast, if there is 
greater variation between the distances between prison staff members in and outside of 
their workplace, this suggests that they have more control over how much distance they 
keep from each other.   
Concerning physical space, Pugh (1973) also raised location and size as 
contextual factors determining organizational structure (see Sec. 1.2.1). For example, a 
Japanese prison officer whom I interviewed for this study explained that in the case of 
small prisons situated in rural areas, almost all staff members, including Governors, live 
in staff residences adjacent to the prisons. Meanwhile, in the case of large prisons 
situated in large urban areas, staff members have more choice about where they live. In 
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this way, location and size can be contextual factors which determine the distance 
between staff members.  
On the other hand, metaphysical space is concerned with a more abstract sense 
of “space” in organizations. For this study, it relates to the relationship with outsiders of 
the organization in terms of membership and relevant activities, and also to ways of 
having specific activities with other members inside of the organization. Firstly, in terms 
of the relationship with outsiders, Mars (2005) raised the issue of kinship in Listorg in 
order to identify the group level. According to him, if a majority of group members 
share kinship with other group members in the organization, the group level becomes 
high (ibid.). Therefore, if all members share kinship with other members,individuals 
outside the group who do not share kinship with any of its members cannot by 
themselves choose to become members and thus have few possibilities of gaining 
membership. Gross and Rayner (1985) also analysed this issue in terms of insiders and 
outsiders. They used the term “impearmeability” to analyse the openness of 
organizations to expanding their membership. If social units are closed to membership 
from outsiders, there tend to be fewer choices available for gaining membership than for 
units which are open to outsiders.  
Furthermore, scope concerns the extent to which group members are allowed to 
join in activities with outsiders (Gross and Rayner 1985: see Sec. 2.2.1). As with 
impermeability, when group members are allowed to do more activities with outsiders, 
the behavioural choices available to them increase. Thus, group members in this kind of 
position are not highly incorporated in their organizations (low group). Pugh (1973) also 
raised interdependence as a contextual factor which determines organizational structure 
in his study of organizational structures (see Sec. 1.2.1). Interdependence measures to 
what extent organizations are influenced by external factors such as customers, 
suppliers, trade unions and owners (Pugh 1973). It closely linked to Gross and Rayner’s 
concepts of group discussed above. Additionally, Hood (1998) has also mentioned the 
significance of the group level in relation to forms of oversight control. He showed that 
the group level of oversight control may differ according to whether the oversight 
control is given from outsiders or insiders (Hood 1998: p.54).   
Secondly, in regard to ways of having specific activities with other members 
inside the organization, Mars (2005) has analysed the range of behavioural choices 
available to group members in terms of shared tasks and decision making. If specific 
tasks and decision-making are shared more widely within organizations, substantial 
behavioural choices available to individual members get decreased. In turn, this kind of 
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situation indicates high group incorporation within organizations. Gross and Rayner 
(1985) analysed this issue in terms of transitivity and scope. First, transitivity is the 
extent to which group members are equally able to do specific activities. If an activity is 
equally shared among group members, this indicates fewer choices of behaviour among 
them. Meanwhile, in relation to behavioural choice of members in organizations, Pugh 
raised (1973) centralization as the degree to which the top end of the management 
hierarchy can control the direction of their organization (see Sec. 1.2.1). If the 
organization is centralised under the control of the top of the management, subordinates 
members do not have substantial choice of behaviour. They need to equally follow the  
direction of the top manager. Thus, it is involved as a metaphysical space issue. 
Thus, previous studies used the g/g theory and the study of organizational 
structures showed that group level is measured by variation in substantial choices of 
members in relation to ways of sharing time and space with other members and 
outsiders. In comparison with grid properties, properties of group dimension concerns 
with more informal aspects of organizational control structures. Additionally, this way 
of observing choices of members and their behaviour provide an effective method for 
observing institutionalising process in organizations (Donaldson, 1999; and Tolbert and 
Zuker,1996) discussed in Chapter1 (see Sec. 1.2.1). Group is considered as dimension 
which can involve informal process brought by substantial behaviour of members. Table 
2.3 is the summary of discussions concerning the group properties above.  
 
Table 2.3: Summary of properties for group variables 
 
 
The next issue for measuring the group level is the scales of group variables. In 
regard to the properties of group variables, it is necessary to define the standards which 
determine high/low group levels for the purposes of this study. Based on previous 
studies discussed above, I define that the group level can be measured in terms of the 
diversity of group members and their behaviour in relation to time and space discussed 
Organizational and Institutional factors
Time:
Histories: Shared histories (Mars) Origin and History (Pugh): Context
Frequency: Frequency (Gross and Rayner)
 Overlaps of work and leisure
(Mars)
Space:
Physical: Residential propinquity (Mars)
Proximity (Gross and Rayner) Size and location ( Pugh):context
Metaphysical Kinship (Mars) 
Shared tasks and
decision-making (Mars)
Impermeability (Gross and Rayner) Transitivity (Gross and Rayner) Interdependence (Pugh)
Scope (Gross and Rayner) Centralization (Pugh)
G/G theory
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above. The standard view is that the group level negatively correlates with the diversity 
or variation of members and their behaviour in the organization. Thus, more diversity 
indicates a lower group level for organizations while less diversity indicates a higher 
group level. For example, in regard to shared histories (time), if historical information is 
shared equally among members of organizations, the variation of members’ approaches 
in response to this information is small. The group level for those organizations will be 
higher than for organizations in which historical information is less well-shared among 
members. Similarly for space, organizations in which group members live equal 
distances apart will gain higher group scores than organizations whose members live 
more varied distances apart.   
The degree to which organizations are open to outsiders can also be measured 
through this diversity of members and their behaviour. Organizations that close their 
membership to outsiders are less diverse and thus gain a high group level. Meanwhile, 
organizations whose membership is open to outsiders allow a greater variety of 
membership and thus gain a low group level. In the study of public administration, 
Hood (1998) specifically stated that when organizations are overseen by insiders, the 
control shows low group differentiation within them. When they are overseen by 
outsiders, there is high group differentiation within the control (Hood 1998: p.54). His 
view is also met with the group scale measured by the diversity of members in the 
organization. If the organizational control does emphasise or allow differences of 
members and their behaviour in the control process, the diversity of members and their 
risk behaviour get increased. If the organizational control does NOT emphasise or allow 
those differences, the visible diversity of members get decreased. As he stated, 
insiders/outsiders are good indicator to measure whether the organizational control 
emphasises group differentiations in the organization or not. Hence the diversity of 
group members and their behaviour can be used to measure the group level of the 
organization, and the relationship between insiders and outsiders will help to measure 
this diversity.   
 
2.3.3: Properties of the g/g variables in prison service risk control structures 
This section discussed the properties and scales of the g/g variables as they relate to 
organizations. It suggested that the grid dimension is measured according to the 
formality/flexibility of rules, which define the risk control systems, and the speciality of 
roles given to members in order to control risk measured by the criteria of assigning 
roles to members in organizations. Meanwhile, the group dimension is measured in 
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terms of the diversity of members and their behaviour in relation to time and space 
assigned within organizations. In comparison with the grid dimension which measures 
the rules for risk control structures, the group dimension mainly analyses informal 
aspects of organizational control structures, observance substantial variation of 
members in organizations. Building on these methodological discussions, I would like 
to develop properties for the g/g variables more focused on measuring risk control 
structures within prison services.  
Firstly, the risk control systems operated by prison services are measured on 
the grid scale as part of overall prison service risk control structures. Based on three 
components of the risk control systems (see Sec. 2.3.1), I will analyse following three 
topics of prison risk control systems: rules which define information of risk in the 
prison service, rules which defines standards of  risk control behaviour in the prison 
service, and rules which enforce those rules to members in the prison service. 
Accordingly, the risk control systems operated by the English and Japanese prison 
services are analysed here in terms of these issues. I have named this aspect of risk 
control formalization (Y1) in my method.  
Secondly, the means by which specific roles are assigned to staff members as 
part of risk control structures operated by the relevant prison services is also measured 
here on the grid scale. Based on previous studies discussed in Sec. 2.3.1, this grid will 
analyse the degree to which the prison services assign roles to staff members in order to 
control specific operational risks, and criteria for gaining those roles. In my method this 
aspect of risk control structures is named specialization for risk control (Y2). Therefore, 
two grid aspects are defined in the risk control cultural analysis.  
Next, it is necessary to define the group aspects of prison service risk control 
analysis. As noted above, the factors for the group variable identified by previous 
studies have been somewhat abstract or topical. Hence, following the criteria discussed 
in the last section, it is necessary to focus on ways of measuring the group level of risk 
control culture in prison services which correspond to the two aspects of the grid 
variable discussed above.  
In response to the formalization (Y1) of risk control, the first group aspect of 
risk control structures will measure how members, as subordinate units of the prison 
service organization, are unified their behaviour in response to risk control relevant 
rules discussed in formalization. According to institutional approaches, the prison 
service risk control structures should be analysed both formally and informally. Hence 
this method mainly analyse the approach of members in response to rules defined in the 
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prison service as a group aspect which represents informal factors of risk control 
structures. With regard to the properties of the group dimension, the degree of 
compliance among members can be categorised in terms of the diversity of their 
behaviour in relation to the metaphysical space of their organization. If a majority of 
members follow rules defined by the risk control system equally, this indicates a high 
group level for their organization. By contrast, if there is more variation in how 
members or any subordinate units follow rules defined as the risk control system, this 
indicates a lower group level. In my method, this aspect of risk control structures is 
named compliance level of subordinate units (X1). 
 The second group aspect of risk control structures responds to specialization 
(Y2). This other group aspect measures the extent to which members are allowed to 
show variations of their risk control behaviour within the area where they exercise their 
assigned roles in the prison service. For example, some staff members are assigned the 
special roles for specific risk control tasks in a prison. If they show wider variations in 
the process of achieving their assigned tasks, this indicates that the risk control structure 
allows the members to freely behave in the risk control process, and the low group unity 
for the overall prison. By contrast, if staff members above do not have or show 
variations in the process of achieving their tasks, this indicates high group pressure 
within the prison. In my measurements this factor is named autonomy (X2).  
 
Table 2.4: Four Aspects of risk control analysis  
 
 
 
 
Risk
control
 structures
G/G
dimensions
Aspects
of risk control
structures
Key observations
Grid 1 (Y1) Formalization The number of rules and their formality
which define the risk control systems
Group1 (Y2) Compliance 
 The diversity of the compliance level
among members (subordinates)
in response to the rules defines the risk
control systems
Grid 2 (Y2) Specialization the roles assigned to staff members
 for risk control
Group 2(X2) Autonomy
the diversity of members and their
behaviour in the areas where they
perform their assigned roles
Risk
Control
Systems
Roles of
members
in risk
control
structures
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2.4: Conclusion  
 
This chapter has discussed various methods of measuring culture using the g/g theory.  
It has made several key points which can be listed here. First, the g/g theory analyses 
culture in terms of collective forms of behaviour in organizations. Second, the purpose 
of measuring culture with the g/g theory should be to comparatively demonstrate its 
existence in different organizations Third, the g/g theory provides a more effective 
means for analysing established organizations than it does for unstructured and 
un-established organizations. Finally, in regard to organizational structure, the g/g 
theory is strongly linked to organizational and institutional studies. 
In order to measure risk control culture in the English and Japanese prison 
services, I have discussed the issues of how to select risks, variables which can be 
applied to the g/g framework, and those properties of those variables. Firstly, in order to 
measure culture, risks should be specified within the organizations of interest. The 
official aims of public service institutions can help us to select risks that are relevant to 
them and which describe their cultures effectively. Secondly, in view of the 
measurement theory, g/g dimensions were selected as variables for measuring culture.  
Previous studies have shown that the grid dimension is represented by rules for risk 
control systems and roles assigned to members. Meanwhile, the group dimension is 
represented by the diversity of members as subordinate units of organizations in relation 
to how time and space are assigned within organizations. Finally, based on this 
framework I defined four aspects of organizational risk control structures: formalization 
(Y1), compliance (X1), specialization (Y2) and autonomy (X2). These aspects will be 
used to measure risk control cultures of the English and Japanese prison services. 
Chapter 3 further develops the method discussed in this chapter for measuring risk 
control culture with more details.  

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Chapter 3  
Methodology 
How can the Grid and Group Theory be used to Identify Prison 
Service Risk Control? 
 
 
This chapter explains the details of the methodological procedures, as discussed in 
chapter 2 (see Sec. 2.3.3), which are used in this study to measure the risk control 
cultures of the English and Japanese prison services. This method proceeds in four 
stages: 1. setting the purpose of the measurements, the level at which the prison service 
culture will be observed, and specific risk to be analysed; 2. coding g/g aspects of prison 
risk control structures; 3. assigning numerical scores for those codes; and 4. mapping 
and demonstrating results. The first section of this chapter sets out the purpose of 
measuring prison service risk control culture in this study, the unit of observation and 
selection of risk in prison operation in order to measure g/g levels. Based on those 
settings for measuring culture, the second section explains the coding processes. The 
third section explains the scoring process in response to those codes. Finally, the fourth 
section explains the ways of demonstrating results.   
  
 
3.1: Setting the purpose of measuring culture and the levels of 
observation and risk 
The first step to be taken here is to define the purpose of measuring culture and the unit 
of observation, and to specify risk in the relevant organizations. Dealing with these 
issues helps to clarify why and what I will measure in the English and Japanese prison 
services.  
 
3.1.1 Political backgrounds of the English and Japanese prison services  
 
In order to measure prison risk control culture, this section gives a preliminary 
discussion of the political context of the Japanese and English prison services. The 
World Prison Brief, published by the International Centre for Prison Studies (ICPS) 
based at King’s College London, has reported that the rate of imprisonment in England 
82
and Wales as 156 per 100,000 of the national population1, and for Japan that the rate of 
imprisonment is 58 per 100,000 of the national population2 (ICPS 2011).  These 
figures show that the rate of imprisonment is much lower in Japan than in England and 
Wales.  
In both England and Japan, the purpose of imprisonment is to punish and 
rehabilitate persons who commit crimes according to judgements handed down by 
courts (Coyle, 2005; HMPS 2011a; and C.B. 2008).  The English penal system uses 
imprisonment in cases where criminals habitually reoffend or commit serious crimes 
thus taking away some of their liberties (Coyle, 2005). The Japanese penal system is 
based on a similar principle. Criminals are sent to prisons when the courts judge that 
they habitually commit serious crimes (JMOJ 2008).  Furthermore, Japanese penal 
institutions and their policies are deeply related to the control of traditional Japanese 
criminal gangs called yakuza [る?る?る?] or boryokudan [暴?務?団?] (JMOJ 2009a).  Due 
to the highly organized and serious nature of criminality linked to these groups, the 
courts tend to have a strict policy of sending criminals who are members to prison.  
According to the Japanese prison service, approximately 20% of the total prison 
population were reported as being members of criminal gangs at the times when they 
committed the crimes leading to their prison sentences (C.B. 2007, 2008a, and 2009). 
In regard to the operational standards of the English and Japanese prison 
services, HMPS has been strongly affected by the standards of International Human 
Rights since the 1970s (Coyle, 2005).  Accordingly, HMPS is under constant pressure 
from human rights activist groups to provide humanitarian-focused service provision 
towards its inmates (ibid.).  Moreover, as with other public institutions in England and 
Wales, HMPS has been subject to private competition since 1991 (Hood et al 1999): 
eleven local establishments are currently run by private contractors (HMPS 2011d).  
By contrast, the Japanese prison service has been described as “semi-hidden 
world” since very little was known about its institutional practices in the public sphere 
until very recently (Nishio, 2004).  Crucially, in 2003 The Prison Law and basic 
regime underwent their first reforms since 1908 (C.B. 2008).  In the intervening period, 
the standards of the Japanese prison service system were occasionally criticised in 
parliament as being antiquated and failing to meet International Human Rights 
standards (Nishio 2004; and C.B. 2008).  However, these criticisms did not have any 


The rate is based on an estimated national population of 55.85 million at beginning of December 2011. 
  
2
 The rate is based on an estimated national population of 127.9 million at mid-2010. 
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substantial impact on the operational standards of the Japanese prison service until 2003. 
The current penal system is based on the reforms instituted in 2003. These reforms 
included the introduction of privately run prisons.  At present, four local 
establishments are operated by private contractors (C.B. 2008).  Although the reforms 
brought these structural changes to the Japanese prison service, it continues to be 
criticised for not fully conforming to International Human Rights standards (AIJ 2011). 
 In this way, it can be seen that although the English and Japanese prison 
services share the similar institutional purpose, they have developed in very different 
ways.  The purpose of this study is thus to use the grid-group framework to measure 
how these differences are reflected in the risk control cultures of each prison service.  
 
3.1.2: The aims and utility of measuring prison culture 
It is important to clarify the functions and aims of measuring risk control culture in 
prison services using the method I have developed in this study. As discussed in 
chapters 1 and 2, culture is a highly contingent factor and too complex to be explained 
simply in terms of the relationship between independent and dependent variables. 
Accordingly, this study is not intended to clarify the causal mechanism of culture for 
specific organizational changes. Rather, it is aimed at measuring the patterns of risk 
control behaviour in the English and Japanese prison services using the g/g framework.  
Following Douglas’ understanding of the g/g theory (Douglas 1999), I assume 
that measuring prison risk control culture, using the g/g theory, can contribute to 
identify the weaknesses and strengths of the aforesaid prison services in terms of risk 
and thereby contribute towards improving their risk control regimes.  Hence this thesis 
will measure how grid and group forms of control work in the risk control structures of 
the English and Japanese prison services. As mentioned by Douglas (Douglas 1999: see 
p. 53), it will identify patterns of risk control behaviour observed within the grid and 
group comparative framework and thus clarify the strengths and weaknesses of prison 
risk control structures. Crucially, it will provide understanding of issues linked to risk 
control in prison service institutions and point towards improvements that can be made 
therein in the cases of the English and Japanese prison services. 
 
 
3.1.3: Setting units for observing culture in the prison services 
Previous studies have shown that organizational culture should be measured by g/g 
variables. Chapter 2 discussed that grid level for the organization is measured by the 
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extent to which rules for risk control systems are formally defined, and the extent to 
which organizations assign special roles to members in order to control risk. Meanwhile, 
the group level is measured by the diversity of staff members and their behaviour within 
time and space assigned inside of the organization.  
 These g/g scales are all relative, and the results may differ according to the unit 
in which culture is observed in the organization. To illustrate, the grid level is measured 
by the formality of rules according to how easily members can change them, while the 
group level is measured by the diversity of members and their behaviour in the 
organization. On both the g/g scales, relevant key factors for measuring g/g levels can 
differ depending on the unit of observation: easiness of changing rules, membership, 
time and apace. In the case of the English and Japanese prison services, if I measure 
culture in a local prison establishment, membership, time, and space are defined within 
that prison. In this unit, if I measure the grid level of risk control systems, the easiness 
of changing rules is only discussed in members in the local establishment. On the other 
hand, if I measure these factors as they apply to national prison services as total 
institutions, they become wider and more diverse than in local prison levels. If I 
measure the grid levels of their risk control systems, the easiness of changing rules is 
discussed in relation to overall prison service staff members can change Therefore, 
setting a fixed area (unit) of the organization in which g/g levels are observed is highly 
important.  
In regard to this issue, Hood et al (2004) have provided an overview of the 
general character of national prison services based on their studies of different countries. 
According to them, firstly, prison services are the total institutions. The internal control 
structure is defined by the relationship between central government (National Head 
Quarters) and local prison establishments. Secondly, these internal systems are 
controlled by external or independent performance assessment bodies. Furthermore, 
some prison services install regional offices and directors between national HQs and 
local prisons as means of exerting more control over local establishments (Nishio, 2004; 
and James, 2004).    
In the case of England, firstly, Her Majesty’s Prison Service (HMPS) currently 
consists of three internal layers of service delivery units: the HMPS HQ offices, 11 area 
offices, and 134 local establishments (HMPS, 2010a). Secondly, subject to monitoring 
by multiple external performance assessment bodies: HM Inspectorate of Prisons 
(HMIP), the Independent Monitoring Board (IMB), and the Prison and Probation 
Ombudsman (Hood and et al., 1999; and Bennett, 2007). The current system in England 
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was established in the 1990s, prior to which prisons were run locally under the control 
of magistrates (Coyle, 2005). The prison system underwent modernization between 
1914 and 1970 in response to this decentralised prison management style (ibid.). 
Centralization advanced further after a riot in HMP Strangeways in 1990. Thus, by the 
early 1990s local establishments and governors became subject to centralized policies 
and internal regulations such as Prison Service Ordinance (Coyle, 2005). Currently, 
HMPS is embedded in the National Offender Management Service (NOMS) which is an 
executive agency of the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) and the probation service (HMPS 
2010b).   
Meanwhile, the Japanese prison service has a similar institutional structure to 
HMPS. The basic structure can be summarized in terms of the relationship between The 
Correction Bureau (C.B) of the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) and local penal intuitions 
(prisons) (Nishio 2004). In between these two control bodies, there are regional offices. 
The service currently has 187 penal institutions and 8 regional offices (C.B 2008). This 
traditional prison service structure was established by The Prison Law and Penal Code 
in 1908 which still provides the basis of the current prison system (JMOJ 2011). The 
traditional system and its laws were not modernized until 2003. Although the out-dated 
prison system was often raised as an issued for reform in the Japanese parliament, these 
motions never became drivers for essential penal reform (C.B 2008). Reform was 
ultimately brought about by wide criticisms of the public against death incidents of 
prisoners in Nagoya prisons and injuries to prisoners in Nagoya prison between 2000 
and 2003 (ibid.). In response to severe criticism from the public and media, the JMOJ 
established the Correctional Administration Reform Committee (CARC) in December 
2003 in order to modernize the prison service.  
In the Committee, revising the Prison Law and Penal Code was the main issue 
for this body. As a result, a new prison service act, named the Act of the Penal 
Institutions and the Treatment of Sentenced Inmates (shortened as the Penal institution 
Act), was approved by parliament in 2006. At present, prison operation in Japan is 
based on this law (Nishio 2004: C.B 2008: and JMOJ 2011).Even under the new penal 
system, the performance of local establishments is not actively controlled by external 
performance assessment regimes. Currently,, only one independent external monitoring 
body, the Penal Institution Visiting Committees (PIVC), is authorised monitoring local 
establishments in the Japanese prison service. (JMOJ 2007).  
These overviews of the English and Japanese prison services suggest that 
modern prison services have three main organizational units: local establishment levels, 
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regional level, and national prison service level, including all of those. The first unit is 
to measure g/g levels at local establishments. At this level, culture can be measured 
within single or multiple prisons in England and Japan. Comparing single prisons in 
England and Japan could contribute to analysing the details of each prison. Nevertheless, 
this approach seems too focused to make generalisations about the risk control cultures 
of the English and Japanese prison services. By contrast, comparing multiple prisons 
could provide a better overview of risk control in the English and Japanese prison 
services. That is, if more prisons are analysed, the results can be taken to reflect the 
overall cultures of the English and Japanese prison services. Nevertheless, as I 
explained in the introduction to this study, gaining access to local prison establishments 
in either case has proven very difficult. Although I submitted official research 
applications requesting that I conduct my study in local prison establishments in 
England and Japan, I was not granted access to any local establishments. In order to 
measure g/g levels at local establishments, it is necessary to get detailed data about them.  
Hence for these reasons it was technically difficult to measure the g/g levels of local 
establishment in England and Japan.  
The second choice for units of observation is measuring risk control culture at 
regional level. This unit allows comparisons of g/g levels to be between single or 
multiple regional areas of the English and Japanese prison services. In both English and 
Japanese prison services, regional offices are in charge of local establishments 
following the national prison service policy. By analysing these units of control, it is 
possible to gain a structural perspective of risk control culture in both prison services. 
However, taking account of the national structures and histories of the English and 
Japanese prison services, there is no particular need or reason to compare their cultures 
at the level of their regional offices. These offices are generally highly involved in 
central control. In HMPS prisons are currently divided into 11 areas, but area managers 
are based in the central HQs (Coyle, 2005). The area or regional offices and managers 
should be seen as parts of the national control structure.  
The third choice is measuring g/g levels at the national prison service level, 
involving all levels discussed above. Considering the issues posed by setting the units of 
observation for the other two levels, the national prison service is the best unit for 
measuring g/g levels. As Hood et al (2004) have found, prison services are generally 
totally centralised institutions. Thus, their risk control structures may be effectively 
observed in entire prison service institutions. The influence of local prison 
establishments and regional offices can be discussed as subordinate units in the overall 
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structures of the national prison services: for example, the procedures by which national 
HQs or area managers can intervene in local establishments. Accordingly, I will 
measure the g/g levels of the national prison service risk control structures in place in 
England and Japan (see Figure 3.1) .  
 
 
Figure 3.1: Units of observation for measuring grid and group levels 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1.4 Setting specific prison risks: suicide and violence 
This section discusses the specific risks within the prison services which are measured 
in this study. Institutional risks can be identified from officially stated aims or objectives. 
HMPS and the Japanese prison service define their official aims as follows.  
 
 
Objectives (HMPS 2011a) 
 
To protect the public and provide what commissioners want to purchase by:  
• Holding prisoners securely  
• Reducing the risk of prisoners re-offending  
• Providing safe and well-ordered establishments in which we treat 
prisoners humanely, decently and lawfully. 
Central HQ &
Regional
offices
Local 
establishment
Local 
establishment
Local 
establishment
National prison service level: 
g/g levels of overall prison risk control structures 
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Objectives of the Japanese prison service (C.B 2011) 
• Security and safety (hoan keibi:保?安?護?備?) 
• Correctional Treatment (bunrui hogo: 分?類?保?護?) 
• Prison workshop (sagyou:保類業?) 
• Education and training (kyouiku 教?育?) 
• Health and Hygiene (Iryou eisei:医?療?衛?生?)
 
These objectives show that the Japanese and English prison services do not share 
exactly the same stated aims. However, both prison services identify maintaining 
security and safety in prisons, and reducing re-offending rates through correctional 
treatment, as key objectives. Of these two objectives, it is more difficult to define the 
risk of re-offending in relation to the prison services’ control structures than it is to 
define the risks of security and safety. Therefore, I will analyse the cultures of safety 
and security in both prison services.  
 Although safety and security may vary as risks in each prison service, the 
official security incident reports they both maintain provide relatively clear ideas of 
what these risks are.  The Japanese prison service keeps annual records of safety and 
security incidents. These records distinguish between five types of incident: escape, 
serious assault, fire, suicide, and riot (JMOJ 2009; see Table. 3.1). Meanwhile, HMPS 
and the National Offender Management Service (NOMS), which is the executive 
agency of HMPS, publishes “Safety in Custody Statistics”. According to this report, 
MOJ and HMPS monitor three types of incidents as indicators of overall safety in 
prisons: deaths, including suicide, self-harm, and assaults by prisoners (MOJ 2010; see 
Table 3.2).  
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Table 3.1: Security and safety incidents in Japanese prisons 
 
 
 
Table 3.2: HMPS Safety incidents statistics. 
 
[from Table 1: Summary statistics, England and Wales. MOJ (2010)] 
 
 By comparing the security incident categories on both tables, it can be seen that 
violent behaviour, including assault and serious assault, is commonly held to be a risk to 
Security and safety Incident in Japanese prisons
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Prison Population*1 75286 77932 80335 80684 78533
Escape 3 1 0 1 0
Fire 0 0 1 0 1
Riot 0 0 0 0 0
Serious Assault 
on staff*2
0 1 2 4 -
Serious Assault 
on inmates*3
10 15 25 12 8
Suicide 20 15 18 21 25
*1 MoJ Kyosei Tokei: http://www.e-stat.go.jp/SG1/estat/List.do?lid=000001065806
*2 CB (2008) Penal Institution in Japan.
*3 CB (2008) Kyosei no genjo . 
England and Wales
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Prison Population1 64,602 66,301 70,778 73,038 74,657 75,979 78,127 80,216 82,572 83,461
Deaths in prison custody2 147 142 164 183 208 174 153 185 165 168
Self-inflicted 81 73 95 95 95 78 67 92 60 60
Natural Causes 62 68 66 86 102 88 83 91 99 105
Other non-natural 1 1 3 1 9 5 3 0 3 3
Homicide 3 0 0 1 2 3 0 2 3 0
Self-harm incidents3 - - - - 19,550 23,776 23,395 22,875 24,686 -
Assault incidents4 9,423 10,695 11,515 11,835 12,558 14,406 15,054 15,231 15,847 -
(1) Population statistics are derived from the Ministry of Justice- Offender Management Caseload Statistics.  The prison
population figure shown for 2009 is provisional.
(2) Deaths in prison custody statistics are derived  from the National Offender Management Service (NOMS) deaths in
the custody database which contains details of all deaths in prison custody for England and Wales from 1978.
(3) Self-harm statistics are derived from the NOMS incident reporting system.  A new system for monitoring self-harm
(4) Assault statistics are also derived from the NOMS incident reporting system. As with self-harm, the final assault
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security and safety by the English and Japanese prison services. Suicide and 
“self-inflicted deaths” (tom use HMPS terminology) are also identified as hazards of 
prison operation by both prison services. Accordingly, suicide and violence among 
prisoners are considered here as suitable risks for measuring culture in the English and 
Japanese prison services.  
 Additionally, Safety in Custody Statistics of HMPS suggests that self-harm is a 
major safety risk in prisons and should thus be taken into account here (MOJ 2010 and 
2010a). The continuity between self-harm and suicide has been critically discussed in 
criminology (Liebling, 1992). HMPS also recognises self-harm as an important 
indicator of the risk of suicide and thus provides extra care for prisoners who self-harm 
(HMPS, 2011b). By contrast, the Japanese prison service punishes self-harming 
behaviour for the reason that it is considered a breach of safety in prisons (Art. 74, 
Penal Institutions Acts). Thus, institutional approaches to self-harm should be 
considered as part of the process of measuring risk control culture in the English and 
Japanese prison services. Finally, this study classifies safety risks in terms of either 
suicide including self-harm or violence including serious assaults committed by 
prisoners. The relevant prison services’ risk control cultures are measured in terms of 
these risks.  
 
 
3.2: Coding suicide and violence risk control with g/g variables  
 
It was decided in the previous section that the g/g levels for the national prison services 
will be measured in terms of suicide and violence control. Based on these settings, this 
section provides analytical sub-codes in response to four aspects of risk control defined 
in Chapter 2 (see Sec. 2.3.3): formalization, compliance, specialization and autonomy .  
   
3.2.1: Risk control system: Grid1: formalization (Y1)  
The first code concerns formalization in terms of suicide and violence control. 
Accordingly, this code focuses on whether the English and Japanese prison services 
define rules for the relevant risk control systems, and to what extent these rules are 
formalised in legal terms linked to prisons. As I discussed in chapter 2, formalization 
measures the rules of the risk control systems consisting of three components (see Sec. 
2.3.1).Based on those basic components, in order to measure the suicide and violence 
risk control systems of the relevant prison services, I have assigned 5 sub-codes to 
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them: 1. discipline and order in prisons; 2. definitions of risky behaviour; 3. the uses of 
punishment and reward for prisoners; 4. key national guidelines which cover overall 
risk control processes in prisons; and 5. guidelines for incident recording systems. In 
order to reduce coders’ bias, these sub-codes will simply analyse whether there are any 
rules covered by the sub-codes just mentioned.  
 
Sub-code 1: discipline and order in prisons 
The first sub-code concerns with rules which define behaviour of prisoners in prisons. 
In order to study hazardous behaviour in prisons, it is necessary to know the general 
rules which govern prison life. According to King (2008) “Order refers to a relatively 
stable set of relationships which most participants of prisons find acceptable and worth 
maintaining” (King, 2008). Risk is recognised as unacceptable behaviour in response to 
discipline and order in prisons.  This sub-code analyses whether and how the prison 
service defines discipline and order in prisons.  
 
Sub-code 2: definitions of risk behaviour 
The second sub-code concerns with rules define information about risk. It analyses the 
formality of the rules defining suicide and violence in the prison services. Whereas 
Douglas and Wildavsky (1983) discussed forms of risk control in terms of knowledge 
and information, risk must be defined according to whether knowledge and information 
about hazardous behaviour among prisoners are defined by the rules maintained by the 
prison services.   
 
Sub-code 3: the uses of punishment and reward for prisoners 
The third sub-code concerns with rules which define the use of punishment and reward 
for prisoners. Hood et al define rules for behaviour-modification that modify members’ 
behaviour (Hood, 1999 and 2001; see Sec. 2.3.1). In the case of the prison service, the 
punishment and reward system is considered as rules which enforce prisoners to 
maintain order and discipline defined in prisons. Accordingly, this sub-code analyses 
whether the prison services uses punishment and reward systems for prisoners in 
response to hazardous behaviour among prisoners.   
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Sub-code 4: key national guidelines which cover overall risk control processes in 
prisons 
The fourth sub-code relates to key national guidelines for controlling risk. Pugh (1973) 
has analysed standardization in order to measure the extent to which organizations 
standardize specific behavioural processes among their members. Hood et al (1999 and 
2001) also raised standard-setting as a component of control which refers to the 
guidelines or targets that organizations set for themselves (see Sec. 2.3.1). In light of 
these studies, this sub-code analyses whether the prison services have national 
guidelines which standardize risk control behaviour: for example, pre-and post-incident 
procedures to be followed in cases of suicide and violence in local establishments. In 
different words, this sub-code analyses whether the overall guidelines for controlling the 
risks of suicide or violence are defined by rules kept within the prison services.  
 
Sub-code 5: risk related information record system.  
The fifth sub-code for formalization concerns the systems operated by the relevant 
prison services for recording and documenting information. Hood et al (1999 and 2001) 
have drawn attention to information gathering as a facet of risk control regimes (see Sec. 
2.3.1). This sub-code is applied to the systems maintained by each prison service for 
recording and documenting information about suicide and violence control. It covers 
pre- and post-incident information gathering, risk monitoring records, incident report 
systems, and any forms of documentation required to make reports about risk control. 
The ways in which the prison services ask local establishments to record information 
about suicide and violence control, including whether the information is defined by 
formal or informal rules, are also analysed by this sub-code.  
 
3.2.2: Risk control system: Group1: Compliance (X1)  
The second aspect code is the “compliance” level of the prison service which 
corresponds to the formalization codes (Y1) on the grid axis. Whereas the formalization 
code measures the formality of rules defining suicide and violence risk control 
behaviour along the grid axis, the compliance code (group 1) measures how far these 
rules are upheld by local establishments and their staff members.  
 Ideally, it is good to measure the level of this code in relation to individual staff 
members in the prison service. However, since it is extremely difficult to know the 
attitudes of all staff members, I have measured this code in terms of local 
establishments which are subordinate units of the national prison services.  
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Accordingly, diversity in the approaches of local establishments to maintaining these 
rules is measured by this code. Based on the earlier discussion of group properties in 
chapter 2, my measurements show that group control within prison services becomes 
weaker if more variation is observed among local establishments in their ways of 
complying with relevant risk control rules. 
  
Sub-code 1: order and discipline 
The first sub-code measures diversity in the behaviour of individual prisoners in 
response to order and discipline. Although “order” refers to stability in prisons, this 
sub-code analyses the extent to which order unifies the behaviour of prisoners. If 
stability in prisons is a maximum priority, heavy constraints are placed on the individual 
behaviour of prisoners. By contrast, if order and discipline are moderated according to 
the particular needs of individual prisoners, their behaviour may vary more widely 
inside the prison. Hence the extent to which order and discipline constrain the individual 
behaviour of prisoners is analysed by this sub-code.  
 
Sub-code 2: ways of identifying risk  
The second sub-code concerns the ways in which risk is identified by local 
establishments. Whereas the formalization sub-codes cover the formality of definitions 
or risk followed in local establishments, this sub-code analyses how local 
establishments identify risk based formal definitions thereof and to what extent their 
ways of identifying risk are unified in response to the rules defined risk in the prison 
service. If the ways of identifying risk are standardised among a majority of local 
establishments based on the rules defined risk, this indicates a high degree of group 
unity within the prison service. On the other hand, if there is a high level of variation in 
how local establishments identify risk, this indicates a lower group level for the prison 
service. Therefore, this sub-code measures diversity in how local establishments 
identify risk. 
 
Sub-code 3: appropriate use of punishment and reward  
The third sub-code analyses whether punishment and reward are used appropriately by 
local establishments in line with national rules. Whereas the formalization sub-codes 
analyse whether systems of punishment and reward are defined in the prison rules, this 
sub-code considers how they are operated in local establishments. If majority of local 
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establishments appropriately conduct punishment or reward systems, it indicates the 
high group level for the prison service, and vice-versa.  
 
Sub-code 4: implementation of key national guidelines in local establishments 
The formalization sub-codes discuss whether the prison services have key national 
guidelines which cover the overall processes of suicide and violence control. In 
response, the present sub-code analyses to what extent local prisons implement these 
guidelines appropriately for the purposes of risk control. If a majority of establishments 
enforce these guidelines, this indicates a high standardization (high group) level for the 
national prison service.    
 
Sub-code 5: accountability for recording and documenting risk related information  
The final sub-code for compliance analyses the accountability of prison record keeping 
systems concerning suicide and violence. In particular, it considers how far the 
recording system is accountable in local establishments. If the systems of 
record-keeping and documentation in local establishments are adequate according to 
national standards / guidelines, this indicates, this indicates high compliance and group 
levels for the prison service. If the quality of documentation and information recording 
varies between local establishments, this indicates lower group and compliance levels.  
 
3.2.3: Leadership: Grid 2: The roles of governors (Y2) 
The second category code for the grid dimension concerns the roles played by 
governors in local risk control strategies. As noted in chapter 2, specialization of staff 
members is the second grid aspect. In this study, I will focus on how governors 
specialize in relation to local suicide and violence risk control strategies. As I discussed 
in chapter 1, it is difficult to measure culture in relation to abstract situations (see Sec. 
1.1.4). Thus, by focusing on the specific roles played by specific staff members in 
prisons, it is possible to make a more concrete study of how specialization influences 
suicide and violence control in local prison establishments. Moreover, governors are 
leaders of local establishments, in which respect analysing their roles in the risk control 
structure can help to clarify how their roles as leaders are viewed by the prison service.  
 Those roles of governors as leaders in local establishments can be discussed as 
leadership of governors in the prison risk control structures, being discussed with their 
autonomy within local prison establishments. Although the concept of leadership varies 
among different researchers, it is worth bearing in mind Stogdill’s classic definition: 
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“leadership may be considered as the process (act) of influencing the activities of an 
organized group in its efforts toward goal setting and goal achievement” (Stogdill, 1950, 
p. 4). Leadership in these terms can be measured with a pair of grid and group variables: 
roles of governors (Y2) and autonomy (X2) in local risk control strategies. The former 
variable measures the roles assigned to governors on the grid axis while the latter 
measures how governors behave (act) in the areas where they exercise their roles in 
local suicide and violence control strategies on the group axis. In this way, the 
leadership process can be discussed in terms of the g/g dimensions. 
  Accordingly, the specialization code measures the roles played by governors as 
leaders of local establishments in suicide and violence risk control strategies and how 
these roles reflect the relationship between local establishments and central HQs.  
Based on previous studies which have defined the roles of leaders, the roles of 
governors are analysed here according to the following five sub-codes.  
 
Sub-code 1: specialization of general staff members  
The first sub-code concerned with roles of governors is the general approach of the 
prison service for assigning special roles to staff members in order to control risk. 
Section 2.3.1 in Chapter 2 discussed that specialisation is measured by the extent to 
which the organizations assign special roles to staff members for controlling risk. Hence 
I analyse the general attitude of the prison service in use of specialization of staff 
members in risk control structure as the context of analysing roles of governors. If the 
prison service specialised roles to staff members in local establishments in order to 
control suicide and violence risk, this indicates a high level of speciality (high grid) in 
the prison service. By contrast, if specialised roles in risk control are not given to 
specific staff members, this indicates a low level of speciality (grid) in controlling risk.  
 
Sub-code 2: promotion criteria for governors 
The second sub-code analyses the selection criteria for governors. Sec. 2.3.1 in Chapter 
2 discussed that the grid level for the aspect of specialization is determined by the 
flexibility of criteria for assigning the roles to members in the organization. Hence the 
promotion criteria to be governors should be considered as part of specialization of 
governors. Referring to Parsons (1970) and Gross and Rayner (1985), this sub-code 
analyses whether the career system for appointing governors is based on achievement 
(high grid) or ascription (low grid). If governors are appointed through ascription (e.g. 
gender, seniority, length of joining the service), this indicates a high grid level for the 
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prison service. Meanwhile, if they are appointed because of their achievements, this 
indicates a lower grid level.   
 
 
Sub-code 3: interpersonal roles of governors.   
In regard to the leadership roles of governors, the method developed in this study 
measures the number of leadership roles assigned to governors in suicide and violence 
risk control structures. The more roles assigned to governors, the higher the grid level 
will be for the relevant risk control structure.  Mintzberg’s (1973) classic definition of 
executive roles provides a clear and distinctive image of leaders. He pointed out that 
executives in organizations tend to assume three types of managerial roles: 
interpersonal, informational and decisional. The present sub-code analyses the first of 
these roles, namely interpersonal roles. According to Mintzberg, the interpersonal roles 
are consisted for following three roles: 1. figurehead; 2. leaders; and 3. liaison. 
Figurehead refers to the executive’s role as a symbolic head who is obliged to perform a 
number of routine duties of a socio-legal nature (Mintzberg, 1973).  In prison service 
institutions, these duties correspond to the tasks assigned to governors by the rules and 
regulatory codes of their prison services.  
 The second interpersonal role, leader, refers to the responsibility of executives 
for motivating and activating subordinates through their duties. (Mintzberg, 1973). For 
the purposes of this study, I will consider the extent to which governors are formally 
required to be in charge of this role as part of local risk control strategies. The third 
interpersonal role, liaison, refers to the activity of leaders to maintain or develop own 
networks with outsiders of the organization, providing them with favours and 
information (Mintzberg, 1973).In relation to the aims of this study, this factor analyses 
whether governors are required to maintain the external networks in relation to local 
suicide and violence control strategies.  
   
Sub-code 4: informational roles  
The fourth sub-code, informational roles, is understood here in terms of the second 
leadership roles proposed by Mintzberg (1973). Hood et al (1999) and Douglas and 
Wildavsky (1983) all considered information to be a key element of risk control 
structures. Accordingly, this sub-code analyses the kinds of roles that are assigned to 
governors in response to information about risk control.  
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In addition to sub-code 3, “interpersonal roles”, this sub-code also measures the 
number of informational roles assigned to governors in the prison risk control structure. 
The more roles assigned to governors, the higher the grid level will be for the risk 
control structure in question.  According to Mintzberg (1973), informational roles 
consist of three roles of leaders in relation to their management activities: 1. monitor; 2. 
disseminator; and 3. Spokesperson. Monitor describes the activity whereby leaders seek 
and receive special information in order to develop a thorough understanding of their 
organization and its environment. This role forms the nerve centre where internal and 
external information is gathered / exchanged within organizations (Mintzberg, 1973). 
For the purposes of this study, “internals” refers to subordinate staff members within 
local establishments. Meanwhile, “externals” refers to officials or bodies outside of 
local establishments: for example, central HQs, area managers, other local 
establishments, or independent inspectorate bodies. Hence this monitoring activity is 
analysed here in terms of the extent to which governors are in charge of seeking 
relevant information throughout internals/externals in the process of local suicide and 
violence control strategies.  
The second activity, disseminator, transmit information gained from 
externals/internals to internals/externals of the organisations (Mintzberg, 1973). This 
includes factual or interpreted information (ibid.). In regard to the prison services, this 
activity is analysed in terms of the extent to which governors are required to disseminate 
information about local suicide and violence control in their establishments to external 
officials or bodies, and information about national suicide and violence policy to 
subordinate staff members in their local establishments. The third activity, spokesperson, 
refers to how executives communicate information about their organisations to outsiders, 
such as plans, policies, actions, and results. They represent the organizations as a first 
expert on the industries in which their organizations are involved (ibid.). In the case of 
prison governors, this activity should be considered in terms of the extent to which they 
are in charge of conveying information about suicide and violence control in their local 
establishments to outsiders. 
 
Sub-code 5: decisional roles 
The final type of roles played by leaders can be labelled as decisional.  According to 
Mintzberg (1973), there are four kinds of decisional role: 1. entrepreneur; 2. 
disturbance handler; 3. resource allocator; and 4. negotiator. Further to sub-codes 3 
and 4 concerning the leadership roles of governors (Y2), this sub-code measures the 
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number of decisional roles assigned to governors by prison risk control structures.  The 
more decisional roles governors are assigned, the higher the grid level will be for the 
stated risk control structure. 
Firstly, entrepreneur involves searching within organizations and in their 
environments for opportunities to set in motion “improvement projects” which can 
bring about positive changes: (Mintzberg, 1973; and Finkelstein etal, 2009).  
Accordingly, this study measures whether governors are in charge of this activity in 
relation to local suicide and violence control strategies. Secondly, disturbance handler 
involves taking responsibility for corrective actions when organizations are faced with 
important or unexpected disturbances (ibid.). For prison governors, this activity 
becomes necessary when acts of suicide or violence occur in their areas of responsibility.  
This activity also relates to the role of accepting blame which was discussed in chapter 
2. Thus, the extent to which governors are in charge of handling disturbances and 
accepting blame thereof should be analysed according to this sub-code.  
Thirdly, resource allocator is the activity whereby leaders assume 
responsibility for directly allocating, or granting approval for the allocation of, 
organizational resources (ibid.). This activity is analysed here in terms of whether 
governors have the authority to allocate or approve the allocation of resources to suicide 
and violence risk control strategies at a local level. This activity is considered not only 
as regards goods or budgets, but also human resources within local establishments. 
Fourthly, negotiator is the activity whereby leaders represent their organizations on 
major occasions such as negotiating with externals. Regarding this activity, “internals” 
and “externals” are defined in the same ways as they are for the informational role (see 
p. 97 above). This category takes account of whether governors are assigned the role of 
representing their local establishments in major negotiations with external bodies, 
including area offices, other local establishments, and national HQs.  
 
3.2.4 Leadership: Group2: Autonomy in local risk control strategies (X2) 
The second category code for the group dimension is the autonomy of local 
establishments in terms of local suicide and violence control strategies. It was explained 
in the previous section that this aspect measures the autonomy of local establishments as 
a part of leadership in the prison services.  
As chapter 2 discussed, autonomy analyses the extent to which local 
establishments have the freedom to modify risk control behaviour in response to the 
roles assigned to their staff members. Since my method focuses on the roles played by 
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governors, for the purposes of this study autonomy relates to the discretion of governors 
in local suicide and violence control strategies. As I discussed in chapter 2 (see Sec. 
2.3.3), autonomy is measured here in terms of the diversity of members’ risk control 
behaviour in the area where they perform assigned roles. Accordingly, in the case of 
governors, it is measured by the degree of variation of local risk control strategic 
process in local establishments where governors exercise their leadership roles 
discussed in roles of governors (Y2; see Sec. 3.2.4 above).  
If local establishments as subordinate units of the national prison service 
showed large diversity in the process of local suicide and violence control strategies, it 
indicates lower group unity for the national prison service. Five sub-codes have been set 
for measuring autonomy (X2): 1. the proportion of governors who are promoted from 
outside of the prison service; 2. the participation of external performance assessment 
bodies; 3. the existence and influence of prison officers’ trade unions; 4. internal 
performance competition and main performance assessment indicators; and 5. key 
strategies for risk control and their diversity between local establishments. 
   
Sub-code 1: the proportion of governors who are promoted from outside of the prison 
service 
The first sub-code for autonomy concerns membership in local establishments. It was 
mentioned in chapter 2 that Gross and Rayner have drawn attention to the relationship 
between the openness of group members and group unity (Gross and Rayner 1985). For 
example, their concept of impermeability (Gross and Rayner, 1985; see Sec. 2.2.1) 
indicates that organizations that are closed to outside participation tend to exhibit high 
group characteristics.  
 In regard to the relationship between local strategies and the recruitment of 
governors, James et al (2010) have noted that the previous managerial experiences of 
executives are coloured by whether they have been promoted from the inside or outside 
of organizations. This factor, in turn, affects their managerial strategies and performance.  
Therefore, this sub-code analyses, first, whether the prison services in question recruit 
governors from outside of themselves and, second, the influence of the balance between 
insider and outsider governors on the diversity of local risk control strategies. If a prison 
service accepts more outsider governors, it is considered to be more strategically diverse 
which in turn indicates lower group unity within it.  
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Sub-code 2: the participation of external performance assessment bodies 
The second sub-code for autonomy concerns the participation of external performance 
assessment bodies in monitoring local establishments as part of the national prison 
service suicide and violence performance control structure. Hood (1998) considered this 
performance assessment as to be a type of oversight, in regard to which he has also 
mentioned the impact of insider and outsider differentiation on the group dimension. 
Hood took the view that if organizational performance is assessed by an external body, 
this indicates a lower group level (ibid.). Following this idea, the current sub-code 
measures whether the prison services in question accept having the performance of local 
establishments on violence and suicide control assessed by external bodies. If more 
external bodies get involved in the control of specific risks, the diversity of group 
members concerned with those risks will increase and the group unity will decrease. 
Accordingly, this sub-code considers the variety of risk performance controllers as a 
factor influencing local risk control strategies in the prison services. 
   
Sub-code 3: the existence and influence of trade unions  
The third sub-code analyses the existence and influence of trade unions. Pugh (1973) 
has highlighted the influence of trade unions as an example of interdependence which 
determines the structure of organizations (see p.78). Discussions of the influence of 
trade unions in the context of prisons vary widely in relation to several aspects of prison 
service control structures.  The present sub-code focuses on whether prison staff trade 
unions exist in the relevant prison services, and to what extent they can influence local 
suicide and violence control strategies as part of the autonomy (X2) of local 
establishments. If trade unions exist, and if they affect local and national suicide and 
violence control strategies through actions such as striking or criticising weak 
performance, these factors indicate low group unity within the prison service. 
Furthermore, if the approaches taken by governors to trade unions vary among local 
establishments, this reflects a greater degree of diversity between local risk control 
strategies and thus indicates lower group unity within the prison service.   
 
Sub-code 4: internal performance competition between local establishments and 
assessments and main performance assessment indicators 
The fourth sub-code analyses internal performance competition between local 
establishments and the indicators used to measure performance. Hood (1998) originally 
explained that the performance control based on competition is taken account of 
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individualism which relate to both low grid and low group (Hood 1998). Surely, 
competition generally occurs in the circumstance where fewer rules exist.  
However, if I focus on the impact of internal performance competition in the 
prison risk control structure, the use of competition rather affects for the diversity of 
local establishments risk control behaviour in the national prison risk control structures. 
For example, if local prison establishments compete against each other in terms of their 
local risk control performances, they are and thereby emphasized differences according 
to their levels of performances; such as “good”, “bad” and “ok” prisons. Accordingly, 
the diversity of local establishments is increased by the internal performance 
competition, and the group unity of the national prison service gets decreased. 
Emphasizing this impact of competition on the prison service risk control structure, my 
method used here analyses internal performance competition as a group predicate. 
According to Hood (1998), forms of competition can mainly be categorised in 
two ways: 1. orthodox market competition; and 2. quasi-market limited competition 
inside organizations. In the case of suicide and violence control in prison services, 
attention should fall on the latter of these categories. Internal performance competition 
means competition between local establishments within a particular prison service.  
How far the relevant prison services use this kind of competition is analysed by this 
sub-code. Firstly, in order to measure the diversity of the prison services in terms of 
suicide and violence control, this study analyses whether they use performance 
competition between local establishments. As I explained above, this kind of 
competition emphasize differences between local establishments. Hence if the national 
prison service use internal performance competition between local establishments as 
part of suicide and violence control, the group level of the national prison service is 
lower than the prison service where does not use any internal performance competition. 
 Secondly, if the prison services use internal competition between local 
establishments, the indicators they use to measure performance, especially in regard to 
suicide and violence control, need to be taken into account in the group level. My 
method defines two types of these performance indicators: process oriented and 
outcome oriented. If the indicators assess the appropriateness of local suicide and 
violence risk control processes, this suggests that those processes are unified under the 
direction of the national prison service. These indicators are intended to standardise risk 
control behaviour and thus to limit the autonomy of governors in regard to local 
strategies. This kind of arrangement indicates higher group unity for the prison service. 
By contrast, if the indicators only assess the achievements or outcomes of local risk 
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control strategies, this shows that the prison service grants greater freedom to local 
establishments to design their own strategies for achieving targeted outcomes. Local 
establishments are thereby allowed to take a wider variety of actions in order to achieve 
better outcomes, and thus their autonomy is increased. This kind of situation indicates 
lower group unity for the prison service.  
 
Sub-code 5: diversity of key local strategies 
The final sub-code for autonomy concerns diversity among key local risk control 
strategies. Whereas the other sub-codes focus on factors of the control structures which 
increase the autonomy and discretion of local strategies, this sub-code analyses the 
extent to which local strategies vary between prisons in reality. More specifically, it 
analyses two particular things: whether any key strategies are held in common for 
controlling suicide and violence in local establishments, and how differently they are 
operated in local establishments.      
 
 
3.3: Scoring and calculation of total risk control scores  
 
My method examines the four category codes and the 20 sub-codes discussed above by 
assigning numerical scores to them. Concerning the general rules of the scoring process, 
firstly, scores are given on the ordinal scale based on the attributes of the g/g dimensions. 
The construction of ranking orders for these scores is discussed in this section in regard 
to four aspects of risk and the sub-codes (see Sec. 3.2). Secondly, these scores are given 
on the ordinal scales. Unlike interval and ratio scales, measurement theory did not 
discussed the necessity of defining zero in the ordinal scales. However, I would like to 
define the score of 0 as the lowest possible grid and group points for each sub-code.   
The g/g ranking orders and scores are assigned in relation to these hypothetical 
situations which indicate that no rules and no group pressures exist in prison service risk 
control. Hence all scores for the g/g aspects and sub-codes are assigned above 0. Based 
on these two general rules, the next section outlines how risk control system scores 
consisted of formalization (Y1) scores and compliance (X1) scores are assigned in my 
method. Meanwhile, leadership scores based on the roles of governors (Y2) scores and 
autonomy(X2) scores are discussed in the later section.   
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3.3.1: Risk control system scores: Formalization (Y1) and Compliance (X1) scores 
Formalization score (Y1)  
It was noted in chapter 2 that the grid scale is associated with the number and formality 
of rules (see Sec. 2.3.1: pp.74-75). Firstly, if more rules, which define topics discussed 
in the sub-codes for formalization, are found in the prison service, a higher grid score is 
assigned to it.  
 Secondly, as discussed in chapter 2, the formality is measured according to how 
easily members are able to change rules through legal procedures within their 
organizations. This factor is measured here in reference to the legal structures of the 
English and Japanese prison services. It is of fundamental importance that everybody 
inside prisons, including staff members and visitors, are entitled to the protection of the 
law (Coyle 2005). For example, if the prisoner kills other prisoners in prisons, the 
Criminal Law is applied to this murder case. Nevertheless, the aspect of formalization 
specifically focuses on the rules defined for prison services in this study. As with other 
public service organizations, prison services are normally subject to chief pieces of 
parliamentary legislation. For example, HMPS is committed to following The Human 
Rights Act 1998 and The Prison Act 1952 (Payne, 2008), while the Japanese prison 
service is committed to following the Act of the Penal Institutions and the Treatment of 
Sentenced Inmates [Keijishisetu oyobi Hishyuyosha no Shogu nikansuru Horitsu: 務?令?
施?設?命?る?被?命?少?者?る?務務達?る?関?る?る?法?律?]. 
In order to define the day to day administration of prisons under the authority 
of major pieces of legislation, statutory instruments are issued by the relevant parental 
ministries (e.g. Ministry of Justice) because the parliamentary legislation only gives 
general overviews of prisons (Louks, 2008). For HMPS, these statutory instruments 
correspond to The Prison Rules 1999 and Young Offender Institutions (YOI) Rules 
(ibid.). Meanwhile, for the Japanese prison service the relevant statutory instruments are  
The Rules of the Penal Institutions and the Treatment of Sentenced Inmates 
[Keijishisetu oyobi Hishyuyosha no Shogu nikansuru Kisoku: 務?令?施?設?命?る?被?命?少?者?
る?務務達?る?関?る?る?設?務?] and The Rules of Organizational structures in Prisons, Juvenile 
Prisons and Remand Centre [Keimusho, shonen keimusho oyobi Kouchisho Soshiki 
Kisoku: 務?務?拘?る?少?年?務?務?拘?命?る?拘?者?拘?織依織?設?務?].  
These statutory instruments are followed by further detailed operational codes 
called prison service ordinances which are long-term or permanent directives 
concerning the day-to-day operation of prisons (Louks, 2008). In HMPS these 
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ordinances are called Prison Service Orders (PSOs). Additionally, although The 
National Security Framework informs governors of how they should interpret the prison 
rules, it is not generally available to the public (ibid.).  The ordinances are called 
kunrei [設?令?] in the Japanese prison service. Furthermore, in both cases ordinances are 
supplemented by short-term directives called instructions: specifically, Prison Service 
Instruction (PSIs) or Agency Instruction (AIs) for HMPS (Louks, 2008: HMPS 2011a) 
and tsutatsu [通?達織], imei-tsutatu [依?命?通?達織], or tsuchi [通?知?] for the Japanese prison 
service.  
In order to determine the formality of these rules in prisons based on these 
penal legal structures, it is necessary to consider their legal status and how easily they 
can be changed. Firstly, as regards the relationship between the parliamentary 
legislation and statutory codes, the chief legislation is considered more formal than the 
statutory codes. Whereas the parliamentary legislation needs to be passed through the 
legislature, the statutory codes are issued by the relevant ministry (Louks, 2008). 
Moreover, it is harder for members of the prison service to change the primary 
legislation than it is for them to change the statutory codes. Therefore, parliamentary 
legislation should be understood as setting the most formal rules for prison services. 
Secondly, among the statutory codes, the prison rules should be considered the 
second most formal. These rules define the general procedures of prison operation, and 
provide specific guidelines about subordinate rules. Ordinances can be less formal than 
prison rules but more formal than instructions and other lower regulatory codes.  This 
is because ordinances are defined as long-term operational guidelines and instructions 
whereas other forms of advice are considered to be more short-term. Therefore, the 
former should be understood to be less flexible for members of the prison service to 
change than the latter. 
In addition to statutory codes, the prison services publish guidebooks for 
prisoners and staff. These guidebooks are less formal than the statutory codes because 
legal procedures are generally not required to change their content. In HMPS, pocket 
guides on approaches to suicide control (HMPS 2011b) or prisoners’ information books 
(HMPS 2011c) can be categorised as this type of document. They are edited by central 
HQs and issued to local establishments. In this way, other nationally edited non-legal 
documents which provide guidelines on risk control are ranked lower in terms of 
formality than statutory codes. 
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Furthermore, written rules which are defined by local establishments should be 
considered parts of the overall rule structure of the prison services. The Japanese prison 
service has prepared guidebooks and rulebooks for prisoners at different local 
establishments. The contents of these books are similar throughout the Japanese prison 
service. However, they are still edited locally within different establishments. (Fuchu 
Prison, 2006). In comparison with the HMPS guidebooks, the Japanese prison 
guidebooks are less formal because they are edited and distributed locally. By contrast, 
the HMPS guidebooks are edited national HQ standards. In this situation, the rules 
maintained by HMPS are less flexible than those of the Japanese prison service. Local 
establishments can edit the contents of their guidebooks without taking any formal legal 
procedures (JMOJ, 2003).  
 Finally, unwritten informal rules and beliefs should be taken into account when 
considering the overall formality of rule structures.  Sometimes informal rules can 
strongly affect the behaviour of staff members. For example, a majority of Japanese 
prison officers share some informal maxims: “no fire, no escape, non-natural causes of 
death in custody” [yakuna-nigasuna-korosuna] (Hamai, 2006) or “five minutes before 
spirit” [go fun mae seishin].3 Informal maxims such as these considerably affect 
patterns of risk control behaviour among Japanese prison staff hence it is worth 
examining them in this study. Legal procedures are not required to change these maxims 
or other informal rules. If enough staff members in the prison service agree to change 
them, they are easily changed. Therefore, they are ranked as the least formal rules on the 
grid level. The formality of prison rules is ranked as stated in the above discussion, a 
summary of which is shown on Table 3.3:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 


Original interview data. 
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Table 3.3: Formality of prison service regulations 
 
 
 The formalization scores follow the structure of prison legal sources. The 
highest formality rank is represented by the highest grid level and vice versa for the 
lowest formality rank. Subordinate laws are plotted along this scale depending on their 
level of formality. The scores for formalization respond positively to this grid rank. If a 
rule exists at any level of prison regulations which relates to the formalization sub-codes, 
as discussed above (see Sec. 3.2.1), the formalization (Y1) score given for that rule will 
correspond to the formality rank (see Table 3.3). Detailed texts and legal expressions 
relating to any such rules (e.g. legal terms used to describe enforcement) are not 
considered in these measurements. If there are no rules which define subjects of those 
sub-codes for controlling risk, the score given will be zero (0). Informal rules and 
customs are given the lowest score (+1) since formality means flexibility for changing 
rules based on the formal institutional process. By contrast, parliamentary legislation is 
assigned the highest grid level and scores (+7) according to the formality rakings of 
Formality Penal legal sources England Japan
High Parliamentary Legislation
Human Right Act 1998
Prison Act 1952
 The Act of Penal Institutions
and the Treatment of Sentenced
Inmates ( 2006-)
(Statutory Instruments)
Secondary Legislation
Prison Rules
YOI rules
The Rules of Penal Institutions
and the treatment of Sentenced
Inmates (2006-)
The Rules of Organizational
Structures in Prison, Juvenile Prison
and Remand Centre.
Ordinance
Prison Service Orders
Ministerial Ordinance (Kunrei)
Instruction 
Prison Service
 Instructions (PSIs)
Agency Instructions ( AIs)
Ministerial Instructions:
Tsutatsu, Imei-tsutatsu, and Tsuchi
Written Advice and Manuals
Prison performance Manuals
(nationally edited )Prisoner's
Information book
Ministerial Advice
Local written ru les and manualsrules set by local establishments
rules set by local establishments
(e.g. local prisoners 'guidebook and
rule book)
Informal unwritten ru les:
rituals,
habits
lowest 
Rules do NOT def ine
re levant subjects of the
risk control
Informal unwritten belief or guidelines shared among prison staff members
Local informal manuals
No rules exist in terms of the subject
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penal regulation (see Table 3.3 and Appendix 1). In the scoring process, if different 
levels of rules define the same things, the highest ranking scores among them will be 
selected. Scores are given in response to each code based on these scoring criteria. 
Appendix 1 provides a summary of the grid scores for formalization (Y1) (see Appendix 
1). 
 
Compliance Score (X1)  
The scoring of the compliance level (X1), as the group aspect of risk control system 
scores, reflects diversity among local establishments in implementing the suicide and 
violence regulations analysed by the formalization (Y1) code (see Sec. 2.3.3). If most 
local establishments implement these regulations appropriately, this indicates a high 
group level for the national prison service.  
 Due to the limited access I was able to gain to prison establishments for this 
study, it is difficult here to accurately analyse the compliance levels of all local 
establishments in the English and Japanese prison services. Therefore, the compliance 
level is analysed here in terms of whether there is reliable evidence available in both 
countries, which suggest the relevant risk control regulations are inappropriately 
operated across local establishments. Specifically, in cases where the national prison 
service officially insists that local establishments generally comply with the relevant 
rules, it is necessary to make certain assumptions. Thus, if no reliable data is available 
indicating that local establishments implement rules inappropriately, it is assumed that 
majority of local establishments appropriately comply with those rules as claimed by the 
national prison services. .  
The first sub-code, “discipline and order”, is scored by the extent to which risk 
control regulations restrict the individual behaviour of prisoners in local establishments. 
As the previous section explained, discipline and order are defined as maintaining group 
stability in prisons. There are four basic types of scenario which reflect the influence of 
discipline and order on local risk control operational process as they have just been 
defined.: 1. acceptable individual behaviour among prisoners is generally minimised in 
order to maintain group stability within prisons; 2. acceptable individual behaviour 
among prisoners is constrained in order to maintain group stability, but restrictions are 
imposed on a case-by-case basis; 3. acceptable individual behaviour among prisoners is 
maximised and group stability is minimised; 4. there is no sense of group stability 
within the prison and there are no restrictions on prisoners’ behaviour with regard to 
group stability. 
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Among those 4 types of situations, the fourth of these types can be given the 
lowest compliance and group rank and scored 0 because it reflects a total lack (“zero”) 
of discipline and order as defined here. The diversity of prisoners’ behaviour is 
maximised in this situation which indicates the lowest compliance and group level. 
Meanwhile, type 3 can be given the second lowest compliance and group level and 
assigned a score of +1. Type 2 can be ranked as the second highest compliance and 
group level and assigned a score of +2. Finally, type 1 can be given the highest 
compliance and group rank and assigned a score of +3 (see Appendix 2).         
The second sub-code, "ways of identifying risk”, takes account of whether 
hazardous behaviour is identified in local establishments using the rule which define 
risk. In this regard, I define four basic types of situation which reflect different 
compliance levels: 1. ways of identifying risk are uniformly standardised among all 
local establishments; 2. ways of identifying risk are commonly shared among a majority 
of local establishments; 3. ways of identifying risk vary widely among local 
establishments; and 4. ways of identifying risk do not exist at all in local establishments. 
Group ranking scores are assigned to these four basic types of compliance level.   
Firstly, type 4 can be given the lowest compliance level and group ranks for the 
prison service and group level, and assigned a score of zero because it reflects a total 
lack of means for identifying risk. Alternatively, it can be stated that if definitions of 
risk do not exist, it is not possible to measure the compliance level. Type 3 can be given 
the second lowest compliance and group level and assigned a score of +1. Type 2 is 
ranked as the second highest compliance and group level and assigned a score of +2.  
Finally, although it can rarely happen in reality, type 1 is ranked as the highest 
compliance and group level and assigned a score of +3 (see Appendix 2). 
The third sub-code, “punishment and reward”, is ranked and scored by the 
extent to which local establishments use punishment and reward to control the risks of 
suicide and violence. If a high proportion of local establishments use these control 
mechanisms appropriately, a higher compliance score is given to the total prison service 
institution. Punishment and reward are scored separately using the same standard units 
of ranking and scoring. The final sub-code score is produced by adding up the results 
gained for each factor. Four basic types of situation are possible in regard to if and how 
punishment and reward are used by prison services: 1. all local establishments use 
punishment (reward) appropriately; 2. a majority of local establishments use 
punishment (reward) appropriately; 3. the appropriateness of how punishment (reward) 
are used in local establishments varies widely; and 4. punishment (reward) are not used 
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for controlling risk, and the sub-code is not applicable, or all local establishments 
inappropriately conduct punishment (reward). Group ranking scores for punishment and 
reward are assigned in relation to these four types of compliance level.   
Firstly, type 4 represents the lowest compliance and group rank, and is assigned 
a score of 0 because punishment and reward are not used appropriately in any local 
establishments. Alternatively, if punishment and reward are not used at all to control 
risk in local establishments, it is not possible to measure the compliance level. Type 3 is 
the second lowest compliance and group level for punishment and reward, and is 
assigned a score of +1. Type 2 is ranked as the second highest compliance and group 
level, and assigned a score of +2. Lastly, type 1 is the highest compliance and group 
level, and is assigned a score of +3. The scores for this sub-code are produced through 
the addition of the group scores assigned by punishment and reward based on four types 
of compliance situations in local establishments discussed above. Hence a maximum 
score of 6 and a minimum score of 0 are possible for this sub-code (see Appendix 2).  
The fourth sub-code, “implementation level of key national guidelines”, is 
ranked and scored by the extent to which local establishments implement key national 
guidelines adequately. If a high proportion of local establishments do implement these 
guidelines adequately, high ranks and scores for the compliance code and group 
dimension are assigned to the relevant prison service. Five types of situation are defined 
here concerning the implementation level of local establishments and the understanding 
of their members: 1. all local establishments fully implement key national guidelines; 2. 
a majority of local establishments fully implement key national guidelines; 3. a majority 
of local establishments implement key national guidelines, but the quality varies 
between them; 4. the implementation and quality of key national guidelines varies 
widely among local establishments; and 5. no local establishments implement key 
national guidelines. 
Of these types of situation, type 5 can be given the lowest compliance rank and 
assigned a score of 0, because in this situation key national guidelines do not affect any 
local establishments. Next, type 4 can be given the second lowest compliance rank and 
assigned a score of +1. Type 3 is ranked as the second highest compliance level and 
assigned a score of +2. Type 2 is given the third highest compliance rank and assigned a 
score of +3. Finally, type 1 can be considered the highest compliance level and assigned 
a score of +4 (see Appendix 2).  
The fifth sub-code, “accountability of information recording and 
documentation”, is scored and ranked according to the extent to which information 
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about suicide and violence risk control is recorded and documented by the prison 
services in question. If a high proportion of local establishments keep accountable 
records and documentation about suicide and violence, high group ranks and scores are 
assigned to the relevant prison service. The compliance level is divided into four 
situations: 1. all local establishments keep accountable records and documentation about 
risk; 2. accountable records and documentation about risk are kept by a majority of local 
establishments; 3. the quality of accountable records and documentation about risk 
varies widely among local establishments; and 4. no local establishments keep records 
and documentation about risk.  
Among these types of situation, type 4 can be given the lowest compliance rank 
and assigned a score of 0. Type 3 can be given the second lowest compliance rank and 
assigned a score of +1. Type 2 is ranked as the second highest compliance level, and 
assigned a score of +2. Finally, type 1 has the highest compliance rank, and is assigned 
a score of +3. The compliance level (X1) is ranked and scored in the ways discussed 
above. Appendix 2 provides a summary of compliance ranks and group scores for the 
prison services (see Appendix 2).   
 
3.3.2: Leadership of governors: Scores for the roles of governors (Y2) and autonomy 
(X2) 
The second set of g/g codes analyse the leadership of governors in the national prison 
service risk control structures. Scores for the grid codes, roles of governors (Y2) and 
group as autonomy (X2) in local risk control strategies, are assigned as follows.  
 
Roles of governors (Y2)  
The second grid aspect concerns the roles of governors. As I discussed in chapter 2, this 
grid level reflects specialization in the roles played by governors, and is measured in 
terms of the number of roles assigned to individual staff members, and the 
formality/flexibility of assigned roles measured by the flexibility of those roles in 
relation to the selection process and tasks assigned to those roles (see Sec. 2.3.1: p. 75).  
The scores for the first sub-code reflect the extent to which staff members are 
assigned special roles as part of suicide and violence control measures in local 
establishments. Concerning specialization among staff members in local establishments, 
three basic types of situation are defined here: 1. the prison service allocates special 
roles or entitlements to prison staff for controlling the risks of suicide and violence in 
local establishments; 2. the prison service does not generally allocate specialized roles 
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to staff members for controlling the risks of suicide and violence; however, they are 
assigned specific roles for more general purposes; and 3. the prison service does not 
allocate any positions or entitlements for prison staff. Grid ranking scores are assigned 
in relation to these three types of situation. First, type 3 indicates situations in which 
there are no rules concerning the roles of prison staff hence it is assigned a score of 0. 
Next, type 2 is assigned a score of +1 because it suggests a higher specialization level 
than is the case for type 3. Lastly, type 1 is plotted as the highest grid rank and assigned 
a score of +2 (see Appendix 3).  
The second sub-code concerns how flexible the criteria for appointing 
governors are. Three basic types of situation linked to two basic types of promotion 
situations are raised here: 1. governors are mainly appointed according to 
ascription-based criteria (e.g. length of service, gender, or age); 2. governors are 
appointed in light of their achievements (i.e. their performance as prison staff) as well as 
ascription-based criteria; and 3. governors are mainly appointed in light of their 
achievements. Finally there is a fourth possible situation which is that none of these 
criteria apply.  
In terms of grid ranking and scores, ascription-based criteria should be 
understood as the least flexible conditions for the appointment of candidates because 
they only reflect who people are as opposed to what they have done. Accordingly, 
ascription-based criteria are assigned the highest grid level. By contrast, 
achievement-based appointment systems are more flexible because they select 
candidates in light of what they have done. Therefore, these criteria are assigned the 
lowest grid level. The grid scores for specialization are assigned in relation to these four 
types of situation. Type 4 is assigned the lowest grid level for the reason that it marks a 
total absence of the promotion criteria raised above, and is thus given a score of 0. Type 
3 has the second lowest grid level because it reflects a high degree of flexibility in the 
promotion of group members, and is given a score of +1. Type 2 is assigned the second 
highest grid level and a score of +2. Finally, type 1 is assigned the highest grid level and 
given a score of +3 (see Appendix 3). 
The third sub-code concerning the interpersonal roles is ranked and scored 
according to how many roles governors are required to be played for local suicide and 
violence control strategies in regard to three types of interpersonal roles defined by 
Mintzberg (see Sec. 3.2.3). Representing those interpersonal roles are drawn upon here 
to define five basic types of situation involving governors and informational roles: 1. 
governors are required to be in charge of all three roles; 2. governors are required to be 
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in charge of two of these roles; 3. governors are required to be in charge of one of these 
roles; 4. governors are required to be in charge of some of these roles, but those roles 
are very weak; and 5. governors are not in charge of any of these roles. Scores are 
assigned in response to these situations. Firstly, type 5 is considered to have the lowest 
grid level since in this case prison services do not require governors to take part in any 
of the relevant activities. Thus, it is assigned a score of 0. Next, type 4 is ranked as the 
second lowest grid level and assigned a score of +1. Type 3 is ranked as the third lowest 
grid level and assigned a score of +2. Type 2 is ranked as the second highest grid level 
and assigned a score of +3. Lastly, type 1 is ranked as the highest grid level and 
assigned a score of +4 because governors are required to take part in all three activities 
(see Appendix 3).  
The fourth sub-code concerning the informational roles of governors is also 
ranked and scored on the grid level in the same way as the third sub-code. If governors 
are not required to be in charge of any of the three roles defined as the informational 
roles (see pp.97-98), the prison service is assigned a score of 0. If governors are 
required to be in charge of some of these roles, but they play those roles very weakly the 
prison service is assigned a score of +1. If governors are in charge of one activity out of 
the three, the prison service is assigned a score of +2 score. If governors are in charge of 
two of these activities, the prison service is assigned a score of +3. Finally, if governors 
are required to be responsible for all three activities representing the informational role, 
the prison service is ranked at the highest grid level and assigned a score of +4. 
Finally, the fifth code, concerning the decisional role played by governors, is 
also scored according to the number of roles defined by Mintzberg (1973). Mintzberg 
(1973) has defined four types of decisional roles of leaders (see p.99 of this chapter). 
Thus, if governors are assigned all four of these activities, the prison service is ranked 
as the highest grid level and assigned a score of +5. If governors are required to be 
responsible for three of these activities, the prison service is ranked as the second 
highest grid level and assigned a score of +4. If governors are in charge of two of these 
activities, the prison service is assigned a score of +3. If they are in charge of only one 
of these activities, the prison service is assigned a score of +2. If governors are required 
to take charge of some of decisional roles but they play these very weakly. The prison 
service is assigned a score of +1. Lastly, if governors are not responsible for any of 
these activities, a score of 0 is given to the prison service. In summary, the grid score 
table for the roles of governors is shown in Appendix 3. 
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Autonomy and discretion score (X2) 
The final aspect of the prison risk control structure concerns the autonomy of local 
establishments in the prison service. As with compliance, the key scale of this code is 
the diversity level of organizational behaviour within local establishments in regard to 
each sub-code. A greater degree of diversity is considered here to reflect a higher degree 
of autonomy within local establishments and to indicate a lower group ranks and scores 
for the total prison service institution. 
The first sub-code responds to the proportion of governors who were recruited 
from inside and outside of the prison service institution. If a higher proportion of 
governors are appointed from the outside, there is an increase in the diversity of 
members while the group unity of the total prison service institution decreases. There 
are three basic types of situation in this regard: 1. all governors are insiders and the 
prison service does not promote any governors from outside of itself; 2. governorships 
are open to outsiders, but a majority of governors are insiders; 3. governorships are open 
to outsiders and the proportion of insider and outsider governors is approximately equal; 
4. a majority of governors are outsiders; and 5. all governors are promoted from outside 
of the prison service. In regard to providing group scores and ranks for these types, type 
5 should be given the lowest group rank and assigned a score of 0 for the prison service. 
In this situation, only outsiders are appointed to governorships and the diversity of 
members is maximised while the group unity of the prison service institution is 
minimized. Meanwhile, type 4 is ranked as the second lowest group level and assigned a 
score of +1. Type 3 is ranked as the third highest group level and assigned a score of +2. 
Type 2 is ranked as the second highest group level and assigned a score of +3. Lastly, 
type 1 is given the highest group level and assigned a score of +4 (see Appendix 4).  
The second sub-code, “participation of external performance assessment 
bodies”, is also ranked and scored by the openness of the prison service to external 
performance assessment bodies. The more prison services allow external performance 
assessment bodies to check the strategies and performance of local establishments, the 
lower the group level for the national prison service will be. This sub-code analyses the 
existence of external performance assessment bodies, and also the number of major 
assessment bodies and how much influence they have over the risk control strategies of 
local establishments. 
There are five basic types of situation relevant to this sub-code: 1. external 
participation is closed and external performance assessment bodies do not exist; 2. 
There are a few external performance assessment bodies but they lack influence over 
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local risk control strategies and performance; 3. there are multiple external performance 
assessment bodies, some of those have substantial influences over local performance 
and risk control strategies; 4. there is a large number of external performance 
assessment bodies which are highly influential for local performance and risk control 
strategies; 5. anybody from outside the prison service can participate in assessments of 
local performance and all of their activities are highly influential for prisons. 
Of these situations, type 5 should be identified as having the lowest group rank 
and assigned a score of 0.  If any external body can participate in assessments of the 
performance of local establishments, the diversity of members involved in local suicide 
and violence control strategies is maximised while the control of the central HQ is 
diminished. Next, type 4 is ranked as the second lowest group level and assigned a score 
of +1. Type 3 is ranked as the third highest group level and assigned a score of +2. Type 
2 is ranked as the second highest group level and assigned a score of +3. Type 1 is 
ranked as the highest group level and assigned a score of +4 (see Appendix 4). 
The third sub-code, “the existence and influence of trade unions”, is ranked and 
scored according to whether prison staff trade unions exist and how influential they are.  
Five basic types of situation are relevant to this sub-code: 1. trade unions do not exist at 
all; 2. trade unions exist but their activities do not hold much influence over local 
performance and risk control strategies; 3. trade unions exist and their activities 
influence the performance and operation of risk control strategies in some local 
establishments; 4. trade unions exist and their activities are highly influential over the 
performance and operation of a majority of local establishments; and 5. trade unions 
exist and have total control over the operation and performance of local establishments. 
Among these types of situation, type 5 is ranked as the lowest group level and 
a score of 0 is assigned for the prison service. The reason for this is that if all local 
establishments are run according to the interests and activities of trade unions, the group 
unity of local establishments and the prison service is minimised. Following this, type 4 
is ranked as the second lowest group level and assigned a score of +1. Type 3 is ranked 
as the third lowest group level and assigned a score of +2. Finally, type 2 is ranked the 
second highest group level and scored +3 points and type 1 is given the highest group 
level and scored +4 points (see Appendix 4). 
The fourth sub-code, “performance competition and main indicators”, is 
ranked and scored in relation to four basic types of situations: 1. internal performance 
competition does not exist; 2. internal performance competition exists, but performance 
is measured by process-oriented indicators; 3. internal performance competition exists 
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and local performance is measured by outcome-oriented indicators; and 4. pure market 
competition exists in the prison service. Among these circumstances, type 4 is ranked as 
the lowest group level.  This is because if the prison service is open to pure market 
competition, the diversity of local establishments is maximised depending on their 
performance and the group unity for the total prison service institution is minimized. 
Meanwhile, between the other three types of internal competition, type 3 is ranked as 
the second lowest group level and assigned a score of +1. Type 2 is ranked as the second 
highest group level and assigned a score of +2. Finally, if there is no competition, local 
establishments do not show any differentiation hence type 1 is ranked as the highest 
group level and assigned a score of +3 (see Appendix 4). 
The fifth sub-code, “diversity of key local strategies”, is scored and ranked in 
regard to the following five basic types of situation which reflect either diversity or 
uniformity between key approaches and strategies to controlling specific risks: 1. key 
local strategies to risk control are identical between all local establishments; 2. there are 
common key strategies for controlling the risks which are followed by a majority of 
local establishments; 3.there are common key strategies, but approaches in those 
strategies vary by local establishments; 4. common key strategies towards the control of 
specific risks do not exist, strategies widely vary by local establishments; and 5. risk 
control strategies cannot be observed at either local or national levels. 
Among these situations, type 5 is considered to represent the lowest group 
level and is assigned a score of 0. The reason for this scoring is that strategies for 
controlling suicide or violence vary between individual prison staff, in which case the 
diversity of risk control strategies is maximised and the group unity for the total prison 
service institution is minimised. Next, type 4 is ranked as the second lowest group level 
and assigned a score of +1. Type 3 is ranked as the third highest group level and 
assigned a score of +2. Type 2 is ranked as the second highest group level and assigned 
a score of +3. Last of all, type 1 is ranked as the highest group level and assigned a 
score of +4 (see Appendix 4). 

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3.4: Total category and institutional risk control scores: demonstrating 
the outcomes 
 
It is now necessary to discuss how the outcomes of the coding and scoring processes for 
the sub-codes discussed above can be demonstrated. Scores are assigned to each 
sub-code according to the ranking orders by types of situations in each sub-code 
discussed in the previous section (see Sec. 3.3; and Appendix 1-4.). According to the 
measurement theory, the addition of scores based on ranking orders does not show exact 
statistical meaning for analysing results because the units of distance between scales of 
scores are not equal (Hoover and Donovan, 2004; also see Sec.1.2.2) .  
The key strength of the g/g theory is that it provides a coherent visual image of 
all cultural types on the g/g map. Therefore, bearing in mind the limitations of ordinal 
measurement scales and the need for effective ways of demonstrating results, three 
ways of displaying results are now considered: 1. instead of adding up the scores for 
each sub-code, the results of all scores assigned to all sub-codes are displayed by the 
different kinds of institutional risk in each country; 2. Those risk control scores are 
standardized and the results are displayed on a radar chart; and 3. scores are added up 
and standardized in terms of different aspects of risk control and g/g dimensions with 
the assumption that the units of distances between scales are equal across all sub-codes. 
The results are then displayed as they relate to the English and Japanese prison services 
on the g/g map.  
 
3.4.1: Demonstration technique 1: the table representing all scores for sub-codes  
Instead of adding up the scores for each sub-code, the first demonstration technique 
involves simply displaying all outcomes of g/g scores by 20 sub-codes on one table. 
This table has four columns which display results for the suicide and violence control 
structures in the English and Japanese prison services, and twenty rows which display 
20 sub-codes assigned by this study.  
 
 
Demonstration technique 1: simple display of outcomes by a table  
Xnia= group scores for sub-codes 
Ynia= grid scores for sub-codes. 
x=group, y=grid, n=code.no., i=country, a= type of risk 
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Table 3.4: Grid-group scores for the English and Japanese prison services  
 
 
 
3.4.2: Demonstration technique 2: standardization of scores and radar charts 
The second demonstration technique involves standardizing the scores for each 
sub-code and placing them on radar charts. This standardization process is not 
considered the substantial impact of each sub-code on forming risk control culture in the 
prison service. As I explained that culture is contingent factors, and it is difficult to 
assign weights to scores in response to sub-codes, by the degree of impact on the 
formation of culture.   
 Thus, setting this issue aside, I have simply standardized the scores for each 
sub-code between a range of 0 and 10. Loads were calculated in terms of the proportion 
between the raw score range and the standardized score range (i.e. min. 0; max. 10). 
Details of loads and scores are as follows (see Table. 3.5). These standardized scores 
can be further demonstrated on radar charts. To illustrate, when the sub-codes are 
assigned g/g scores between the minimum 0 and maximum 10 values, the outcomes of 
this process for all 20 sub-codes can be displayed as follows (see Figure 3. 2).  
  
England Japan England Japan
y1 Order y1es y1js y1ev y1jv
y2 Definition of Risk y2es y2js y2ev y2jv
y3 punishment and reward y3es y3js y3ev y3jv
y4 Key national guidelines y4es y4js y4ev y4jv
y5  Information record and documentation system y5es y5js y5ev y5jv
x1 Order x1es x1js x1ev x1jv
x2 Definition of Risk x2es x2js x2ev x2jv
x3 Punishment and Reward x3es x3js x3ev x3jv
x4 Implementation of national guidelines x4es x4js x4ev x4jv
x5 Accountability of risk related information record and documentationx5es x5js x5ev x5jv
y6 Specialization of staff members y6es y6js y6ev Y6jv
y7 Selection criteria to be Governors y7es y7js y7ev y7jv
y8 Interpersonal roles y8es y8js y8ev y8jv
y9 Informational roles y9es y9js y9ev y9jv
y10 Decisional roles y10es y10js y10ev y10jv
x6 Proportion of outsider leaders (governors) x6es x6js x6ev x6jv
x7 Participation of external performance bodies x7es x7js x7ev x7jv
x8 Existence and influence of trade unions x8es x8js x8ev x8jv
x9 performance competition and main indicators x9es x9js x9ev x9jv
x10 Diversity of local strategies x10es x10js x10ev x10jv
Group.2 Autonomy
Grid.1 Formalization
Group.1 Compliance
Grid.2 Roles
of Governors
Grid/group Aspects No. Sub-codes.
Suicide Violence
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Table 3.5: Standardized scores with loads for aspects and sub-codes 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Sample g/g radar chart in which values between 1 and 10 are assigned to the 20 
sub-codes. 
 
Raw scores Standardized scores
sub-codes Min. Max. Max, Loads.
y1 Order 0 7 10 1.43
y2 Definition of Risk 0 7 10 1.43
y3 Use of punishment and reward 0 14 10 0.71
y4 Key national guidelines 0 7 10 1.43
y5  Information record and documentation system 0 7 10 1.43
x1 Order 0 3 10 3.33
x2 Definition of Risk 0 3 10 3.33
x3 Punishment and Reward 0 6 10 1.67
x4 Implementation of national guidelines 0 4 10 2.50
x5 Accountability of risk related information record and documentation0 3 10 3.33
y6 Specialization of staff members 0 2 10 5.00
y7 Selection criteria 0 3 10 3.33
y8 Interpersonal roles 0 4 10 2.50
y9 Informational roles 0 4 10 2.50
y10 Decisional roles 0 5 10 2.00
x6 Proportion of outsider leaders (governors) 0 4 10 2.50
x7 Participation of external performance bodies 0 5 10 2.00
x8 Existence and influence of trade unions 0 4 10 2.50
x9 performance competition and main indicators 0 3 10 3.33
x10 Diversity of local strategies 0 4 10 2.50
Grid.2 Roles
of Governors
Group.2 Autonomy
No.Grid/group Aspects
Grid.1 Formalization
Group.1 Compliance
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 It is necessary to consider what the results shown by this kind of radar chart 
mean in relation to the g/g framework. As discussed in the previous section (see Sec. 
3.3), the lowest grid and group levels are assigned scores of 0. Although the highest g/g 
scores vary between the different sub-codes as a result of the standardization process, 
the highest possible g/g level for any sub-code is indicated by a score of +10. When I 
transfer these scale and score ranges to the g/g map, the four corners of the map 
represent the highest (+10) and lowest (0) grid and group levels. Thus, the highest grid 
and group scores (10, 10) represent the most hierarchist culture possible in relation to 
prison service risk control. The highest grid and lowest group scores (10, 0) represent 
the most fatalist culture possible.  The lowest grid and highest group scores (0, 10) 
represent the most egalitarian culture possible.  Finally, the lowest group and grid 
scores (0, 0) represent the most individualist culture possible in terms of prison service 
risk control (see Fig. 3.3). 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Cultural types according to the g/g scales for each sub-code 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Based on these understandings of the g/g scores and cultural types, I will 
demonstrate the sample results using the radar chart shown above. Thus, Figure 3.4 is a 
radar chart showing the most hierarchist culture possible (highest g/g) within the g/g 
framework. Each slice of the chart is fully shaded and the balance between the g/g 
sub-codes is maintained. This model represents the most extreme case of the hierarchist 
cultural type. Likewise, if most of standardized scores results come close to the edge of 
the circle, this indicates a largely hierarchist culture (see Figure 3.4). The next chart 
Highest grid/lowest group: 
(Xn, Yn)= (10, 0) 

Fatalist Hierarchist  
Individualist Egalitarian 
          Group (Xn)             
G
rid
 
(Y
n
) 
highest grid/ group: 
(Xn, Yn)= (10, 10) 
 (Xn, Yn)= (10, 0) 
Lowest grid/  
highest group: 
 
 (Xn, Yn)= (0, 0) 
lowest grid/group 
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represents the most individualist culture possible (lowest g/g) within the g/g framework 
(Figure 3.5). It shows a situation in which the scores for every sub-code fall on the zero 
point. The g/g scores are spread evenly across this chart. If the results mostly come 
close to zero, this indicates a largely individualist culture. The chart for the most 
egalitarian culture (lowest grid and highest group) shows the highest scores for the 
group (x) variables clustered together (Figure. 3.6). Results clustered in this way 
indicate an egalitarian culture as regards prison service risk control. Meanwhile, the 
chart for the most fatalist culture (highest grid and lowest group) shows the highest 
scores for the grid (y) variables clustered together (Figure 3.7) in a manner diametrically 
opposite to that of the chart representing the most egalitarian model. Results are similar 
to those displayed on Figure 3.6 indicate a fatalist culture.  
 
Hybrid cultures involving mixtures of the four basic cultural types   
 In chapter 2 I discussed how the idea of hybrid cultures can be used to help 
measure culture on the g/g dimensions (see Issue No. 4 in Sec. 2.2.4). The models of the 
four cultural types demonstrated below with radar charts provide a way of doing so. As 
I explained, these models can represent the four cultural types in terms of the twenty 
sub-codes defined in this chapter. Bearing this all in mind, hybrid cultures can thus be 
defined as results which display a mixture of the aforesaid models. For example, a 
hybrid individualist and hiearchist culture could be displayed on the radar chart as a 
relatively small but evenly dispersed circle. A hybrid hierarchist and egalitarian culture 
could be displayed as a circle skewed towards the group variables: or alternatively, a 
hybrid hierarchist and fatalist culture could be displayed as a circle skewed towards the 
grid variables. Thus, hybrid cultures are explained in this study using the radar chart.  
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Figure 3.4: a model of the most hierarchist culture 
 
 
Figure 3.5: a model of the most individualist culture  
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Figure 3.6: a model of the most egalitarian culture 
 
 
 
Figure 3.7: a model of the most fatalist culture 
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3.4.3: Demonstration technique 3: standardization, additions, and plotting the total 
risk control scores 
Having established the standardized scores, the third demonstration technique calculates 
total risk control scores by adding up the scores for each sub-code based on the 
assumption that the units of the scales are equal. Next, the results of this method are 
charted on the g/g map. For the purposes of this study, my method examines three sets 
of results as follows: 1. risk control systems: formalization (Y1) and compliance (X1); 2. 
leadership of governors in risk control: roles of governors (Y2) and autonomy (X2); and 
3. total g/g risk control structure scores for the English and Japanese prison services.  
 The first set of results concerning risk control systems relates to the codes for 
formalization (Y1) and compliance (X1). By adding up the standardized scores, the 
maximum score for each aspect code is 50 and the minimum score is 0. The risk control 
system scores for the English and Japanese prison services (X1, Y1) are demonstrated in 
terms of suicide and violence risk control. The details of the formulae used for 
calculating the g/g scores are as follows (see Table 3.6). 
 
 
Table 3.6: Total scores for formalization (Y1) and compliance (X1) 
 
 
 
1. The risk control systems formulae  
1.1) Formalization scores 
Y1ai= Formalization score for risk (a) control in the prison service (i) 
Y1ai= 1.43y1ai+1.43 y2ai+0.71 y3ai+1.43 y3ai+1.43 y5ai 
0 <Y1ai<50 
 
Raw scores Standardized scores Total Scores
sub-codes Min. Max. Max, Loads. Min. Max.
y1 Order 0 7 10 1.43 0 50
y2 Definition of Risk 0 7 10 1.43
y3 Use of punishment and reward 0 14 10 0.71
y4 Key national guidelines 0 7 10 1.43
y5  Information record system 0 7 10 1.43
x1 Order 0 3 10 3.33 0 50
x2 Definition of Risk 0 3 10 3.33
x3 Punishment and Reward 0 6 10 1.67
x4 Implementation of national guidelines 0 4 10 2.50
x5 Accountability of information record 0 3 10 3.33
Group.1 Compliance
Grid/group Aspects No.
Grid.1 Formalization
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1.2) Compliance scores  
X1ai= Compliance (X1) score for risk (a) in the prison service(i) 
X1ai=3.33 x1ai+ 3.33 x2ai+1.67 x3ai+2.50 x4ai+3.33 x5ai 
0<X1ai<50 
 
The second set of results concerns the leadership of governors and consists of the codes 
for the roles of governors (Y2) and autonomy (X2). Once again, as a result of adding up 
the standardized scores, the maximum score for each aspect code is 50 and the 
minimum score is 0. The leadership scores for the English and Japanese prison services 
are demonstrated (X1, Y1) in terms of suicide and violence risk control. The details of 
the formulae used for calculating the g/g scores are as follows (Table 3.7). 
 
Table 3.7: Total scores for roles of governors (Y2) and autonomy (X2) :  
 
 
2. Formulae for the leadership scores  
2.1) Roles of Governors scores 
Y2ai= Roles of Governors (Y2) for risk(a) in the prison service(i)  
Y2ai= 5.00 y6ai+3.33 y7ai+ 2.50y8ai+2.50 y9ai+2.00 y10ai 
 
2.2) Autonomy scores 
X2ai= Autonomy (X2) for risk(a) in the prison service(i)  
X2ai=2.50x6ai+2.00x7ai+2.50x8ai+3.33x9ai+2.50x10ai 
 
Raw scores Standardized scoresTotal Scores
sub-codes Min. Max. Max, Loads. Min. Max.
y6 Specialization of staff members 0 2 10 5.00 0 50
y7 Selection criteria 0 3 10 3.33
y8 Interpersonal roles 0 4 10 2.50
y9 Informational roles 0 4 10 2.50
y10 Decisional roles 0 5 10 2.00
x6 Proportion of outsider governors 0 4 10 2.50 0 50
x7
Participation of
external performance bodies
0 5 10 2.00
x8
Existence and influence of
trade unions
0 4 10 2.50
x9
performance competition
 and main indicators
0 3 10 3.33
x10 Diversity of local strategies 0 4 10 2.50
No.
Grid.2 Roles
of Governors
Group.2 Autonomy
Grid/group Aspects
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The final set of results relates to the total g/g scores for risk control in the prison 
services.  It is calculated by the addition of the previous two sets of g/g scores: 
formalization (Y1) and roles of governors (Y2) for the grid dimension, and compliance 
(X1) and autonomy(X2) for the group dimension.  As a result, the prison service risk 
control scores for each dimension can go up to a maximum of 100 or down to a  
minimum of 100 (0<X<100, 0<Y<100).  
 
3. Total g/g risk control scores for the prison services 
3.1) Total risk (a) control Grid (Y) score for the prison services (i) 
Yai=Y1ai+Y2ai  (0<Yai<100) 
 
3.2) Total risk (a) control Grid (Y) score for the prison services (i) 
 Xai=X1ai+X2ai ( 0<Xai<100) 
 
These scores are then placed on the g/g map.  In regard to the g/g map, since scores are 
assigned based on the meaning of zero in the ranking order, the zero point is placed at 
the bottom left corner of the map (0, 0). Accordingly, all of the results for the grid and 
group variables are positive (+X, +Y). The risk control system (formalization and 
compliance) and leadership (roles of Governors and autonomy) scores are plotted on the 
map and assigned scores of between 0 and 50 (Figure 3.8). Meanwhile, the total g/g risk 
control scores are plotted on the map and assigned scores of between 0 and 100 (Figure 
3.9). 
 
 
Figure 3.8: The map for the risk control system and leadership scores 
 
50 
 
 
0 
Y (Grid) 
  X (Group) 
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Figure 3.9: The map for plotting the total risk control scores 
 
   
 
 
 
Hybrid: centre of the map 
In addition to the radar charts, I would also like to define hybrid cultures using 
the current model. Figures 3.8 and 3.9 show that the corners of the g/g map express 
extreme cultural types according to the minima and maxima score ranges of 0-50 and 
0-100: that is, the most hierarchist, individualist, fatalist, and egalitarian cultures 
possible. In other words, the further away results are from each of these corners, the less 
pure they are in terms of the four cultural types as defined by the g/g theory. Therefore, 
results that are closer to the centre of the map are more indicative of hybrid 
characteristics. The outcomes measured by the methods discussed in previous sections 
of this chapter are demonstrated in the three following ways: 1. The score table; 2. 
scores are standardized and displayed on the radar chart; 3. standardised scores for each 
g/g dimension are added up (assuming the units of distance between all scales are equal) 
and placed on the g/g map. 
 
 
3.5: Conclusion  
 
This chapter has discussed the details of the method which is used in this study to 
measure the risk control cultures of the Japanese and English prison services based on 
discussions in chapter 1 and 2. To conclude, it is briefly worth revisiting the main points 
covered in this chapter. Firstly, this study measures prison culture at the national prison 
service level, in relation to which local establishments are considered subordinate units.  
Evidence for local establishments is discussed here in relation to the impact it has on the 
g/g levels for the national prison service organizations.   
0 
Y(Grid) 


(100, 100) 
100 
 X (Group) 
100 
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 Secondly, this study measures prison culture in terms of suicide and violence 
risk control. In particular, four aspects of risk control are covered: the formalization of 
rules (Y1), the compliance level of subordinate units in response to those rules (X1), the 
roles and specialization of governors (Y2), and autonomy in local risk control strategies 
(X2). The formalization and compliance codes analyse the risk control systems 
maintained by the relevant prison services. Meanwhile, the roles of governors and 
autonomy codes analyse the leadership of governors in local risk control strategies and 
their influence on national risk control structures. Twenty analytical sub-codes have 
been assigned to these codes, the details of which have been discussed throughout this 
chapter. These sub-codes are examined further in each of the empirical chapters that 
follow.  
 Finally, my method assigns numerical scores in response to the aforesaid 
sub-codes. These scores are assigned according to the ranking order of g/g levels in 
each sub-code, and they are considered to be the ordinal level of measurement. They are 
demonstrated in three ways: 1. displaying raw scores by risks in the relevant prison 
services on the table; 2. by displaying standardized scores on radar charts; and 3. by 
adding up the standardized scores for the g/g dimensions, assuming the units of 
distances between all scales are equal, and placing them on the g/g map. Having 
established the method used throughout this study, the following chapter discusses the 
empirical case studies of suicide and violence risk control in the English and Japanese 
prison services.  
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Chapter 4  
Risk Control System1:  
Formalization of Suicide and Violence Control (Grid 1) 
 
 
Chapter 4 is the first empirical chapter of this study. Based on the method discussed in 
chapter 3, this chapter analyses the formalization (Y1) of the suicide and violence risk 
control systems operated by the English and Japanese prison services. Formalization 
(Y1) is one aspect of the grid dimension for measuring prison risk control structures. 
Furthermore, the formalization level is analysed here in terms of five sub-codes. Section 
one of the chapter analyses the formalization level of order and discipline; section two 
of the chapter analyses that of definitions of risk; section three analyses that use of 
punishment and reward; section four analyses that of key national guidelines; and 
section five analyses that of risk-related information and documentation systems.  
 
 
4.1: Order and discipline in prisons 
 
As discussed in chapter 3, the terms, order and discipline, are used here to refer to the 
degree of stability and safety in local prison establishments (see p. 94). In this respect, 
they are taken to reflect how well risks such as suicide and violence are managed at a 
local level. Accordingly, this section discusses how formally order and discipline are 
defined within the legal structures of the English and Japanese prison services.  
 
England 
The highest statutory codes for HMPS, namely The Prison Rules 1999, provide 
definitions of order and discipline. Rule 6 of the Prison Rules 1999 defines order and 
discipline. According to these rules, order and discipline should be firmly upheld as part 
of well-ordered community life in prisons, but not in ways that endanger the safety of 
individual prisoners. Furthermore, they stress the importance of encouraging 
self-respect and personal responsibility among individual prisoners as a means of 
maintaining order and discipline.   
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Maintenance of order and discipline: Rule 6 of the Prison Rule 1999 
(1) Order and discipline shall be maintained with firmness, but 
with no more restriction than is required for safe custody and 
well-ordered community life. 
   (2) In the control of prisoners, officers shall seek to influence them 
through their own example and leadership, and to enlist their willing 
co-operation. 
   (3) At all times the treatment of prisoners shall be such as to 
encourage their self-respect and a sense of personal responsibility, 
but a prisoner shall not be employed in any disciplinary capacity. 
 
 This relationship between communal life and issues affecting individual 
prisoners is also reflected in the less formal rules of the prison service. The Prisoners’ 
Information Book informs prisoners about the information and services available to 
them in prison life (HMPS, 2008). The main aim of this book is to guarantee the 
informed consent of prisoners living within the prison community. The book clarifies 
for prisoners why they are sentenced and what kinds of rights they have as inmates. 
Less formal guidelines for prisoners, such as these, can be considered institutional 
responses to self-respect and individual responsibility among prisoners, as defined in 
Rule 6 cited above (The Prison Rules 1999). Thus, in light of the grid rank and score 
table proposed in chapter 3(see Appendix 1), The Prison Rule is ranked the second 
highest grid rank, and assigned a score of +6 for this sub-code.. 
 
Japan  
In the Japanese prison service, order and discipline are defined by Article 73 of The Act 
of the Penal Institutions and the Treatment of Sentenced Inmates Act (The Penal 
Institutions Act hereafter) as issued by the Japanese parliament. In brief, the penal 
institution act defines order and discipline in the Japanese prison service as follows:  
 
(Discipline and Order in Penal Institutions) 
Article 73 The discipline and order in the penal institution shall be 
maintained appropriately. 
(2) Measures taken in order to achieve the purpose set forth in the 
preceding paragraph shall not exceed the limit necessary for securing 
the custody of inmates and maintaining both adequate conditions for 
the treatment of inmates and a safe and peaceful community life there 
of the prison. 
 
(The Penal Institutions Act, 2005)  
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Much like The Prison Rule 6 for HMPS, Article 73 formally declares that discipline and 
order should be maintained in prisons, and prisons should not be operated in ways that 
risk the safety of prisoners and peaceful community life. Moreover, this article is 
followed by Article 86 of The Penal Institutions Act that emphasises the principle of 
group treatment of prisoners in necessity for the effective implementation of 
correctional programmes (Section1 of Article 86, The Penal Institution Act). This article 
shows that the Japanese prison service group more strongly emphasise order and 
discipline based on the collective life than HMPS.  
This basic principle of prison service provision by Art. 86 is also emphasised 
by less formal rules. To illustrate, each local prison establishment in Japan edits the rule 
books which it issues to its prisoners. These rule books can be considered equivalent to 
the Prisoners’ Information Book in HMPS (HMPS 2008). However, unlike HMPS, the 
Japanese version of the local information book for prisoners mainly defines disciplinary 
rules which apply in prison life. For example, Fuchu (府?令?) Prison situated in a 
suburban area of Tokyo is the one of the biggest prisons in Japan. The first page of the 
local rule book for prisoners is written thus: “1. Since the prison life is the communal 
life, abandon your own way, and behave appropriately as a member of the prisoners’ 
group.” [my translation] (Fuchu Prison: Shonai Seikatsu no Tebiki, 2006, p.3). This 
passage demands that prisoners abandon the lifestyles they had outside of prison. Unlike 
HMPS, self-respect and other individual rights of prisoners are not mentioned in this 
rule book. In the rules of local establishments, greater emphasis is placed on communal 
order and discipline than the individual well-being of prisoners.  
Thus, in order to understand how order and discipline are defined in the 
Japanese prison service it is necessary to consider not only Art. 73, but also 86 which 
stresses that group-based service provision in prisons. According to the formalization 
rank and score table (see Appendix 1), these articles of The Penal Institutions Act are 
considered the highest grid rank, and the Japanese prison service is assigned a score of 
+ 7 for this sub-code. 
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4.2: Defining risk 
 
The second sub-code concerns how risk is defined. In order to identify the risks of 
suicide and violence in prisons, this section discusses the extent to which the prison 
services in question formally define hazardous behaviour. 
 
4.2.1: Suicide  
England 
HMPS defines self-harm and suicide by written statutory codes. Firstly, self-harm is 
defined by Prison Service Order (PSO hereafter) 2700 (Suicide and Self-harm 
Prevention) as “any act where a prisoner deliberately harms themselves irrespective of 
the method, intent or severity of any injury” (Chap. 3 in PSO 2700). 
Secondly, HMPS describes death as a result of suicide as self-inflicted death.  
Furthermore, self-inflicted death is defined as “any death of a person who has 
apparently taken his or her own life irrespective of intent” (MOJ, 2010). This definition 
can be found in the Safety in Custody Statistics 2009 (MOJ, 2010), and it was originally 
recorded in PSO 1400 (Incident Reporting System). PSO 1400 is not accessible to the 
public for security reasons hence I could not confirm exactly how self-inflicted death is 
defined in the original statutory code.  
Nevertheless, PSO 2700 defines self-harm, and the Safety in Custody Statistics 
2008/09 show that a written definition of self-inflicted death does exist in HMPS as 
above (MOJ 2010). It can be seen from these documents that HMPS defines self-harm 
and suicide in peculiar ways. That is, the words self-harm and suicide are not used in 
such careful ways in everyday life as they are within HMPS. In response to these 
peculiarities, PSO 2700 declares that its purpose is to identify prisoners at risk of 
suicide and self-harm, and to provide subsequent care and support for them. That is, 
self-harm and suicide are defined as above in order to identify and control risk, for 
which reasons it is useful that they are distinguished from the terms we use in daily life.  
As I discussed in chapter 3, when different levels of rules define the subject of 
sub-code, the measurers for the sub-code will be based on the most formal rules (see 
Sec. 3.3.1: p. 107). Hence, according to the formalization ranks and scores table 
(Appendix 1), taking account of PSO 2700 which defines self-harm, HMPS can be 
ranked at the third highest grid level and assigned a score of + 5 for this sub-code.  
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Japan 
For the Japanese prison service, self-harm and suicide are defined by Ordinance 
[kurnrei] 332 which sets guidelines for correctional statistics (Homusho Shishikun 332 
go Daijin Kunrei:注?務?省?号?号?訓?332 大 自?訓?令?). This ordinance lists categories of 
prison incidents and types of anti-disciplinary behaviour for the purposes of producing 
the national correctional statistics. Suicide and self-harm are also listed in this 
ordinance.  
However, unlike HMPS’ PSOs, this ordinance does not give any particular 
definitions of behaviour which count as suicide and self-harm. These two words are 
listed in Ordinance 332 without any specific explanation of behaviour applied to suicide 
and self-harm in Japanese prisons. In comparison with definitions of suicide and 
violence in HMPS, the Japanese prison service has not adopted any unusual definitions 
of self-harm and suicide. It suggests that, instead, they are used in much the same ways 
as they are outside of prisons. Although formal written definitions of self-harm and 
suicide do not usually apply to daily life, people are able to understand what these 
words mean through common understanding within social groups. These “common 
sense” unwritten rules are informally shared in society. Thus, the lack of specific 
definitions of suicide and self-harm listed in kunrei 332 can be seen to informally 
follow conventional understandings of those words in Japanese society.  
According to the formalization rank and score table (see Appendix 1), the 
definitions of self-harm and suicide provided in the Japanese prison service correspond 
with the second lowest grid level (risk is informally defined), and thus the Japanese 
prison service is assigned a score of +1 for this sub-code.  
  
4.2.2: Violence 
England 
Highly formal definitions of violence and serious assault are maintained by HMPS.  
PSO 2750 defines violence as ‘Any incident in which a person is, abused, threatened, 
or assaulted.  This includes an explicit or implicit challenge to their safety, well-being 
or health. The resulting harm may be physical, emotional or psychological’ (Chap. 4 in 
PSO 2750). Moreover, PSO 2750 notes several types of violence and also provides a 
brief definition of vulnerable prisoners:  
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Bullying: ‘Conduct motivated by a desire to hurt, threaten or frighten 
someone.  It can be physical, verbal, psychological, emotional or 
economical and often very subtle.  It is usually repeated behaviour, 
unprovoked and intended to cause fear or harm to the victim.’  
Bullying cannot be mutual: it always involves a power imbalance.  
This distinguishes bullying from fights and assaults. 
 
Anti-social behaviour: ‘Acting in a manner that causes or is likely to 
cause harassment, alarm or distress to one or more persons’. 
Racist Incident: ‘A racist incident is defined as any incident that is 
perceived to be racist by the victim or any other person.’  Link to 
PSO 2800 
Vulnerable prisoners: In this context vulnerable can be used to 
describe anyone who has difficulty coping with the prison 
environment and/or likely to be a target of abuse/victimisation     
(PSO 2750 Violence Reduction)  
 
Furthermore, the Safety in Custody Statistics (MOJ, 2010) classifies serious 
assault as any incident resulting in serious injury to victims. PSO 2750 explains that 
different types of serious assault are defined in PSO 1400 (Incident Reporting System). 
As discussed earlier in regard to self-inflicted death, PSO 1400 is not disclosed to the 
general public. Nevertheless, according to the Safety in Custody Statistics 2009 (MOJ 
2010), it provides the following classifications of assault: 
 
   An assault is classified as serious if:  
• it is a sexual assault  
• it results in detention in outside hospital as an in-patient  
• it requires medical treatment for concussion or internal 
injuries   
• the injury is a fracture, scald or burn, stabbing, crushing, 
extensive or multiple bruising, black eye, broken nose, lost or broken 
tooth, cuts requiring suturing, bites or temporary or permanent 
blindness. 
 
When an assault results in one of these types of injury it is classified 
as serious even if the actual damage was superficial.  
                                         (MOJ, 2010) 
 
Thus, as with self-harm and suicide, HMPS provides careful definitions of violence 
which cover a wide range of hazard behaviour relevant to prison life. Referring to the 
formalization rank and score table (see Appendix 1), PSO 2750 can be ranked at the 
third highest formality level and HMPS can be assigned a score of +5 for this sub-code. 
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Japan  
As with suicide and self-harm, the Japanese prison service has not set out formal 
regulations concerning the terminology of violence. Ordinance 332 lists violence and 
serious assault as matters that should be reported for the national correctional statistics. 
More general rules for identifying violence and assault in the Japanese prison service 
are set out by Article 74 of The Penal Institutions Act. Specifically, this article suggests 
that definitions of these terms in prisons should follow those laid down in The Japanese 
Criminal Acts. Thus, the Japanese prison service does not maintain its own formal and 
original definitions of violence and assault risk.  
However, unlike in the case of suicide control, informal criteria are available to 
Japanese prison staff for assessing the risk of violence in prisons. For example, 
Tomiyama (2005) has explained that experienced prison officers assess security risks by 
monitoring unusual daily behaviour among prisoners. For example, these officers 
claimed that subtle changes in prisoners’ cells are signs for anti-disciplinary incidents; 
such as their ways of hanging up dust-cloths in cells (ibid.). They consider subtle 
differences in the behaviour of prisoners to be suitable means of monitoring their safety 
while they are in custody.  
Therefore, although the Japanese prison service does not does not maintain 
formal definitions of violence and assault, but have informal unwritten agreements 
about how risk can be identified exist among staff members in local prison 
establishments. In light of these details, according to the formalization rank and scores 
table ( see Appendix 1), the Japanese prison service can be ranked at the second lowest 
grid level and assigned a score of +1.  
  
 
4.3: Use of punishment and reward 
 
The third sub-code, “the use of punishment or reward for prisoners and staff members”, 
analyses whether punishment and reward are used to control suicide and violence and if 
so, which level of rules define those punishment and reward systems.  
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4.3.1: Suicide 
England 
PSO 2000 (Adjudication) states that self-harming behaviour, including committing 
suicide, should not be categorised as anti-disciplinary behaviour and not subject to 
punishment. HMPS takes the view that it has a duty of care to prisoners at risk in 
self-harm and suicide.  Furthermore, PSO 2000 states that punishment should not be 
used as a strategy for controlling suicidal or self-harming behaviour. Thus, in the 
balance between maintaining order and safety in prisons and dealing with prisoners’ 
individual needs, suicide is considered a target of care.  
In exceptional cases where self-harming behaviour is intentionally used to 
bring about serious safety issues, it is possible for prisoners to be penalised: for example, 
in cases involving fire or resulting in serious damage to property (PSO 2000). PSO 2000 
specifies a limited number of situations involving self-harm in which penalties are 
authorised. In such circumstances, order and discipline of prisons are prioritised over 
the individual issues affecting prisoners. However, it should be noted that HMPS does 
not generally use punishment to control suicide and self-harm.  
 
“Disciplinary charges should not normally be brought either in respect of 
deliberate self-harm or of preparations for this. This applies equally to 
repetitive acts of self-harm. The Prison Service's response to self-harm or 
attempted self-harm must be to look to the care of the individual prisoner as 
its priority….The threat of punishment should not form part of the strategy 
for dealing with such behaviour.  
      Exceptionally a disciplinary charge may be brought in respect of 
endangering the health and safety of others arising from attempting 
self-harm, (for example, by setting a fire). The person managing the incident 
should decide whether it is likely that the prisoner intended to cause injury 
to others or was reckless as to this. If s/he is satisfied about intention or 
recklessness, a charge may be brought (see Annex O.19 for interpretations 
of “intentionally or recklessly”).”          
 (2.19: PSO 2000 Adjudication) 
 
Likewise, HMPS does not sanction the use of rewards to control suicide.  
Rule 8 of The Prison Rules (1999) states that a system of privileges can be granted to 
prisoners if they reach and maintain specified standards of conduct and performance. 
Details of operating incentives for prisoners are defined by PSO 4000 (Incentives and 
Earned Privileges (IEP)). PSO 4000 asserts that some items defined as privileges 
should be given to prisoners deemed to be at risk of suicide or self-harm irrespective of 
their achievements in prison. These cases are exceptional within the IEP system.  
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Thus, HMPS does not use punishment and reward systems to control the risks 
of suicide and self-harm among prisoners. Instead, they define duties of care for 
managing those risks. According to the formalization rank and score table (see 
Appendix 1), HMPS can be given the lowest grid rank (HMPS does not use of 
punishment and reward systems for controlling suicide and self-harm), and it is assigned 
a score of 0 for this sub-code. 
 
Japan  
In the Japanese prison service, acts of attempted suicide or self-harm are only punished 
with the authorization of prison governors. Circumstances in which prison staff may 
punish acts of suicide and self-harm are formally defined in parliamentary legislation. 
Articles 74, and 150 of The Penal Institutions Act. According to Article 74, self-harm is 
prohibited by prison rules with which all prisoners should comply. The priority given to 
order and discipline in prisons, as discussed in the first sub-code (see Sec.4.1), can 
affect whether self-harm and suicide are defined as anti-disciplinary behaviour or not. In 
cases where communal order comes before individual well-being, self-harming 
behaviour is considered a disruption of collective stability within prisons.  
 
(Compliance Rules) 
Article 74 The warden of the penal institution shall determine the 
rules to be complied with by inmates (hereinafter referred to as 
"compliance rules" in this Chapter). 
(2) The compliance rules shall stipulate in a specific manner such 
matters as are set out under the following items in accordance with 
respective status as an inmate: 
(i) Prohibition against criminal acts; 
(ii) Prohibition against any behaviour or statement in a rude or 
outrageous manner, or any act imposing trouble on the others; 
(iii) Prohibition against self-injurious activities; 
  
(Conditions of Disciplinary Punishments) 
Article 150 In cases where an inmate refused to comply with either 
the compliance rules or the special compliance rules …the warden 
(Governors) of the penal institution may impose disciplinary 
punishments to the inmate.  [My underlinings] 
 
Thus, these articles define circumstances in which penalties may be imposed 
against prisoners who have injured themselves. According to the formalization ranks 
and score table (see Appendix 1), The Penal Institutions Act can be ranked at the 
highest grid level and the Japanese prison service can be assigned a score of +7 in 
regard to the use of punishment to control self-harm and suicide.  
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 Meanwhile, in regard to rewards, the Japanese prison service grants privileges 
to well-behaved prisoners. These privileges may include relaxing restrictions on the 
behaviour of prisoners, increasing the number of outside phone calls they can make, or 
allowing them greater freedom to buy snacks at their own expense. The current 
Incentives and Earned Privilege system came into place following reforms in 2003 
(JMOJ, 2003). These reforms were mainly concerned with the content of privileges, 
since the old privileges were out of date and did not provide effective incentives for 
prisoners (ibid.).  
Although the primary legislation covers the general definition of the reward 
system, substantial operational criteria are set out by Ordinance [kunrei：?訓?令?] 3323, 
and supplemented by temporary instructions containing further details [tsutatsu: 通?達?]. 
According to Ordinance3323, prisoners are divided into five tiers: 1. prisoners whose 
behaviour is distinctively good; 2. prisoners whose behaviour is good; 3. prisoners 
whose behaviour is competent; 4. prisoners whose behaviour is occasionally 
inappropriate; and 5. prisoners whose behaviour is consistently inappropriate 
(Ordinance 3323). Additionally, art. 6 of this ordinance states that privileges are 
decided in relation to the following issues: 1. the overall attitudes of the prisoner in 
daily prison life; 2. record of punishment; 3. participation and achievement in the prison 
workshop; 4. performance in the correctional programme; and 5. achievement in terms 
of skills and qualifications (ibid.). For example, if any given prisoner has a record of 
being punished for self-harming behaviour or attempted suicide, this record will affect 
what privileges s/he can gain.  
Thus, the Japanese prison service defines rewards for controlling suicide and 
self-harm according to these standards. In regard to the formality level of these rules for 
applying punishment and reward to cases of self-harm and suicide, kunrei 3323 can be 
placed on the third highest level while the prison service can be assigned a score of +5 
(See Appendix 1). As a result of summarizing this score for the reward system and the 
score for the punishment system discussed above (+7), the Japanese prison service is 
assigned a total score of + 12 for this sub-code. 
 
4.3.2: Violence 
England 
In HMPS violence is considered an offence against discipline. Cases of assault are 
punished through the authorization of prison governors. Different types of violence are 
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defined by Rules 51 and 55 of The Prison Rules (1999). Rule 51 defines 25 types of 
anti-disciplinary behaviour, of which assault and particularly racially aggravate assault 
are listed as the most severe. According to the formality ranks and score table, these 
rules can be ranked at the second the second highest formality level while a score of +6 
can be assigned to HMPS in consideration of how it punishes instances of violence. 
 
 (Offences against discipline) 
51.  A prisoner is guilty of an offence against discipline if he— 
(1) Commits any assault; 
(1A) commits any racially aggravated assault. 
(2) detains any person against his will; 
... . (Prison Rule 51) 
         
(Governor’s punishments) 
55.—(1) If he finds a prisoner guilty of an offence against discipline 
the governor may, subject to paragraph (2) and to rule 57, impose one 
or more of the following punishments: 
(a) caution; 
(b) forfeiture for a period not exceeding 42 days of any of the 
privileges under rule 8; 
…. 
(g) in the case of a prisoner otherwise entitled to them, forfeiture for 
any period of the right, under rule 43(1), to have the articles there 
mentioned.     
(Rule 55 of The Prison Rules 1999) 
 
In regard to the reward system for controlling violence, the essential details of 
the IEP system for controlling the risk of violence are defined by PSO 4000. In 
particular, PSO 4000 asserts that the IEP scheme should be operated on at least three 
tiers: basic, standard, and enhanced. Prisons can operate systems using more than these 
three tiers with the agreement of their respective area managers (Paragraph 2.1: PSO 
4000). Thus, prisoners can be given several privileges defined by PSO 4000 and local 
criteria. The basic privileges are: 1. extra and improved visits; 2. eligibility to earn 
higher rates of pay for works; 3. access to in-cell television; 4. opportunities to wear 
own clothes, 5. access to private cash; and 6. time outside of cell for socialization (PSO 
4000). The criteria for gaining and loosing privileges relate to the behaviour of 
prisoners (ibid.). For example, prisoners who commit assault are likely to lose their 
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privileges and to have their IEP class down-graded (Para.2.20: PSO 4000).  It can be 
seen from these rules that HMPS uses a system of rewards to control the risk of 
violence in local establishments.  
Although Prison Rule 8 provides the original legal grounds for the reward 
system operated by HMPS, the specific details of how it should be used to control 
violence are defined by PSO 4000. Once again, according to the formality ranks and 
score table (see Appendix 1), PSO 4000 can be ranked at the third highest formality 
rank, and HMPS is assigned a score of +5. As a result of summarising scores for reward 
(+5) and punishment (+6) systems, HMPS is assigned a total score of +11 for this 
sub-code.  
 
Japan  
As with suicide control, the Japanese prison service also uses punishment to control the 
risk of violence. Article 74 of The Penal Institutions Act prohibits criminal acts in 
prisons (Section і-2, Art. 74; see p. 136 above), including violence and assault. 
Furthermore, Article 150 states that violent behaviour can be punished with the 
authorization of governors. Accordingly, it can be seen that appropriate ways of using 
punishment to control violence in Japanese prisons are defined by highly formal rules. 
According to the formalization ranks and score table (see Appendix 1). The Japanese 
prison service is placed in the highest level, and assigned the score of +7 in the use of 
the punishment system for controlling violence risk.   
In terms of the reward system, as noted above, Art. 6 of Ordinance [kunrei] 
3323 states that records of punishment affect prisoners’ privilege levels (see Sec.4.3.1). 
Similarly in the case of violence control, the privileges available to prisoners are 
affected by whether they have records of punishment as a result of violence or assault. 
According to the formalization rank and score table (see Appendix 1), kunrei 3323 can 
be placed on the third highest level and a score of +5 can be assigned to the Japanese 
prison service for the reward system. As a result of summarizing scores given for the 
reward (+5) and punishment (+7) systems, the Japanese prison service is assigned a 
total score of +12 for this sub-code. 
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4.4: Key national guidelines: standardization of risk control procedures 
 
The fourth sub-code for formality concerns the existence of key national guidelines.  
This sub-code analyses whether the prison services in question provide overall 
guidelines which define pre- and post-incident procedures for controlling violence and 
suicide and, if so, their level of formality.  
 
4.4.1: Suicide  
England  
The methods for controlling the risks of suicide and self-harm in HMPS are defined by 
PSO 2700 (Suicide and self-harm Management). This order provides a huge volume of 
strategic guidelines about self-harm and suicide management in local establishments. 
PSO 2700 consists of 15 Chapters with 95 Annexes. It is intended to standardize suicide 
and self-harm control procedures across HMPS. Local establishments are requested to 
develop local suicide control strategies based on this guideline. The overall process laid 
out by PSO 2700 is named the Assessment Care in Custody Teamwork (ACCT) 
procedure, which requires all prison staff members to contribute towards caring for 
prisoners at risk of suicide or self-harm (PSO 2700).  
PSO 2700 defines the details of procedural flows within the timeline of incidents 
of self-harm and suicide. All members of staff are required to be trained in the ACCT 
guidelines so that they can operate the corresponding procedures (Chap. 12, PSO 2700). 
When prison staff members find prisoners at risk, they must open the ACCT plan 
document for their prison. Local establishments must review cases of self-harm and 
suicide within 24 hours of opening their ACCT plans, which involve enable care plans 
for the prisoner, called CAREMAP (Annex 8G, PSO 2700). The first and subsequent 
case reviews are required to follow all care actions defined in PSO 2700 (ibid.). While 
the ACCT document is open, any prisoners at risk must be monitored and given 
appropriate care or treatment: this may include being transferred to another prison, kept 
under surveillance, or provided with extra medical care.  
The ACCT document can only be closed once all of these actions planned in 
care plans actions have been completed, and the ACCT Case Review Team in the prison 
judges that it is safe to do so (ibid.). PSO 2700 defines several restriction criteria which 
should be taken into account before closing the plan. For example, ACCT Plans should 
not be closed within the 72 hours leading up to the transfer of a prisoner to another 
establishment (ibid.). Local prison establishments can close their plans when all of these 
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criteria have been met. Figure 4.1 illustrates the procedures of the ACCT plan as 
explained above.  
 
Figure 4.1: Flow chart of ACCT procedures for prisoners at risk of suicide and self-harm (Annex 8G, 
PSO 2700) 
 
PSO 2700 also provides instructions and advice on ways of managing the risks 
of suicide and self-harm among individual prisoners in local establishments. It fully 
covers all stages of custody in prisons, from “pre-prison and time at court” (Chap. 3, 
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PSO 2700) to “discharge and resettlement” (Chap. 15, PSO 2700). All relevant 
regulatory codes defining techniques for preventing suicide are integrated in this PSO; 
for example, risk assessments of cell sharing, placing prisoners in segregation and 
protection cell units, using force, and transferring pioneers at risk of suicide and 
self-harm. 
In terms of cell sharing risk assessment, cell sharing is considered a factor 
which increases the risk of suicide (6.4:Chap. 8, PSO 2700). Hence PSO 2700 
recommends that local establishments place prisoners at risk of suicide in single cells 
where any materials with which they may easily harm themselves have been removed 
(Chaps 8 and 10, PSO 2700). If local establishments cannot provide single cells to the 
prisoners at risk in suicide and self-harm, they have to assess the risk based on 
Cell-Sharing Risk Assessment (CSRA) scheme (ibid.). Furthermore, PSO 2700 requests 
that local establishments place prisoners in single cells under 24 hour daily observation 
by staff members, mainly using CCTV (7.3: Chap. 8, PSO 2700).  
In terms of segregating prisoners in local establishments, PSO 2700 notes that 
prisoners who are at risk of suicide or self-harm must not be routinely held in the 
segregation units since isolated environments can increase the risk of suicide. In 
exceptional cases, however, segregation is considered appropriate under PSO 2700:  
 
If no other suitable location is appropriate; or if where all other options have 
been tried, but considered inappropriate, and only where it is possible to 
provide the degree of continual care identified as necessary in the prisoners’ 
care plan.  
(PSO 2700).  
 
PSO 2700 also places restrictions on confining prisoners considered to be at risk 
of suicide and self-harm to special unfurnished cells, the latter procedure being defined 
by PSOs 1600 (Use of Force) and 1700 (Segregation) (4.1.3.2: PSO 2700). With the 
important exception of prisoners who are also identified as being violent, local 
establishments must not place prisoners at risk of suicide and self-harm in these special 
cells (ibid). These restrictions against use of force and segregation shows that placing 
prisoners in isolated circumstances is considered an inappropriate way of managing 
suicide and self-harm in HMPS. Alternatively, PSO 2700 also sanctions permanent 
transfers of prisoners considered to be risks to themselves to more appropriate 
establishments. PSO 2700 defines such transfers as “an integral part of the support plan” 
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for prisoners at risk of self-harm or suicide (4.3: PSO 2700). This measure may involve 
locating prisoners closer to home where they can receive stronger family support.  
 PSO 2700 also defines procedures to be followed in the event of incidences of 
self-harm and suicide in local establishments. These procedures cover immediate 
actions that should be taken (13.2: Chap. 13, PSO 2700), follow-up actions and care for 
prisoners who have self-harmed (13.3, ibid.), how serious cases should be investigated 
(13.4, ibid.) and reported (13.5, ibid.), and post-incident support which should be given 
to staff and other prisoners (13.6, ibid.). In regard to post-incident support and care for 
staff and other prisoners, PSO 2700 refers to PSO 2710 (Follow up to Deaths in 
Custody) and PSO 8150 (Post Incident Care for Staff). In this way, PSO 2700 is 
integrated with other prison regulatory codes which are relevant to the control of suicide 
and self-harm in local establishments.  
 It can be seen from the above discussion that HMPS has overall guidelines in 
place which stipulate in considerable detail how self-harm and suicide should be 
managed in local prisons both before and after the event. PSO 2700 integrates all 
relevant techniques and regulatory codes concerning suicide and self-harm control 
procedures in local establishments. For their part, local establishments are required to 
implement the guidelines set out in PSO 2700. According to the formalization rank and 
scores table (see Appendix 1), PSO 2700 counts as an ordinance in the penal legal 
structure, in which respect it is ranked at the third highest grid level and scored +5 for 
this sub-code. 
 
Japan 
The Japanese prison service does not have any written key national strategic guidelines 
which define overall suicide control procedures in local establishments. Although some 
formal rules define relevant procedures for controlling suicide and self-harm, unlike in 
HMPS, they are not integrated into a single set of national guidelines. Accordingly, this 
section introduces the rules which relate to suicide risk control in local establishments 
of the Japanese prison service.  
Firstly, the Japanese prison service issued Prison Instruction [tsutatsu: 通?達?] 
61, (reminder for suicide prevention), in 1960. It recommends that local establishments 
prevent suicide incidents, but does not provide any specific procedural guidelines 
stating how. Instruction 770, issued in 1973, implemented a Suicide Risk Assessment 
Sheet [Jisatsu Yochuisha Hanteihyou:自?殺?訓?注?意?者?務?定 表?] which defines twelve 
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behavioural criteria that prison staff should monitor in prisoners considered to be at risk 
of suicide.  
Another relevant technique for controlling suicide in Japanese prisons is to 
transfer prisoners at risk to the special protection cell. Article 76 of the Penal Institution 
defines segregation of prisoners. According to the article, when the prisoner’s behaviour 
is considered to disrupt discipline and order of prisons, governors can segregate the 
prisoner from other inmates (Art. 76 of the Penal Institution Acts). As I discussed in 
Section 4.3.1 above, committing suicide and self-harming behaviour are considered to 
harm the collective discipline and order in the Japanese prison service. Hence 
segregation is considered to be used for prisoners at risk of suicide and self-harm. In 
relation to segregation, Art. 79 of The Penal Institutions Act authorises the use of 
special protection rooms in cases where an inmate is likely to commit self-injurious acts. 
As with Art. 76, local establishments are allowed to segregate prisoners at risk of 
suicide and self-harm in these protection cells. These protection rooms are designed to 
be as safe as possible for self-harming prisoners: for example, they do not contain any 
hard furniture or other items which prisoners can use to hurt themselves. Prisoners in 
protection cells must be monitored through CCTV 24 hours a day (Instruction [tsutatsu] 
3405).  
Meanwhile, unlike in HMPS, prisoners in Japan are only transferred to other 
establishments once they have changed their correctional programmes (tsutatsu 3315). 
Hence the Japanese prison service does not transfer prisoners between prisons in order 
to control suicide and self-harm. With regard to the use of force, in order to control the 
risk of suicide among prisoners, Article 78 of The Penal Institutions Act declares that 
prison officers may use arresting ropes, leather handcuffs, or strait jackets in cases 
where prisoners are likely to commit self-injurious behaviour (Art. 78, The Penal 
Institution Act). Section 15 of kunrei 33258 states that prison officers must record 
whether they have used any restraining equipment in the assigned report form 
(Ordinance 33528)  
  In regard to post-incident procedures, disciplinary charges can be given to 
prisoners in response to suicidal behaviour and self-harm.  Furthermore, it is stated in 
Article 155 of The Penal Institution Act that each local establishment’s adjudication 
committee can decide whether prisoners should be punished for committing such 
offences. If it is decided that a prisoner should be punished, the governor of the relevant 
penal institution must still authorise the punishment and give notice of it to the prisoner 
in question (Article 154, The Penal Institution Act). If a prisoner dies as a result of 
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committing suicide, the local establishment must follow procedures concerning deaths 
in prisons defined by the relevant ordinances [kunrei] and instructions [tsutatsu]. Firstly, 
Ordinance 3379 requests that governors investigate cases of suicide. The cause of death 
should be clarified and, if necessary, a medical doctor should be included in the 
investigation (ibid.). Secondly, if an investigation confirms that a death was the result of 
suicide, tsutasu 210 requires the local establishment involved to announce the case to 
the public through the media.  
 These regulatory codes show that the Japanese prison service maintains several 
formal procedures concerning suicide control, and it varies across all stages of suicide 
and self-harm control process. However, bearing in mind that the sub-code covered by 
this chapter is intended to analyse overall guidelines, it should be noted that the 
Japanese prison service does not maintain any overall guidelines on suicide control in 
written form. When asked about this fact, the Japanese prison staff with whom I 
conducted interviews explained that although the Japanese prison service does not have 
any formal guidelines defining the overall procedural flow for controlling suicide in 
local establishments, there are some informal guidelines in place.  
 
About the suicide prevention and post-incident control, I just followed 
assigned procedures as a prison officer. 
 
[In regard to the flow of these procedures] we do not have details of 
them, but it [the informal procedure] works based on common sense 
[joshiki:府?警?] [in the prison service and society].  
                                                                        
(Original interview data) 
 
Thus, with regard to this sub-code, the Japanese prison service is considered to have 
informal unwritten guidelines such as Joshiki. According to the formalization rank and 
scores table (see Appendix 1), the Japanese prison service is assigned the second lowest 
formality rank and a score of +1 for this sub-code.  
 
4.4.2: Violence 
England 
In addition to suicide prevention, HMPS also maintains strategic and procedural 
national guidelines for controlling violence and serious assault in local establishments.  
PSO 2750 (Violence Reduction) defines the national violence reduction guidelines for 
local risk control strategies. 
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 Firstly, chapter 2 of PSO 2750 declares that governors of local establishments 
are responsible for designing and maintaining local violence reduction strategies. 
Chapter 9 of PSO 2750 defines the standard criteria for the development of local 
violence reduction strategies. Specifically, they must cover the following issues: 1. the 
definition of violence for the Prison Service, A policy statement reflecting the national 
safer custody principle, 2. Systematic collection of information and intelligence about 
all fights and assaults, 3. Regular analysis of this information highlighting the problem 
areas and an action plan to improve safety, and 4. robust monitoring and evaluation 
procedures to measure progress of local violence control strategies (Chap. 9, PSO 
2750). Accordingly, local establishments should design strategies which meet these 
criteria.   
Secondly, in order to prevent violence in prisons, PSO 2750 requires local 
establishments to review cases of violence and identify trends in violence and assault in 
different local establishments. These procedures may include investigating gang 
involvement in violence and profiling vulnerable prisoners who tend to be victims 
(Chap. 3, PSO 2750). PSO 2750 also recommends using the Cell-Sharing Risk 
Assessment (CSRA) scheme as a means of assessing trends in violence (Chap. 5, PSO 
2750). PSO 2750 also defines the details of the post-incident procedures which should 
be followed in local establishments where cases of violence and assault have occurred. 
Chapter 4, in particular, states that local establishments must clearly record and 
investigate any incidences or patterns of unacceptable behaviour on each prisoner’s 
history sheet. It also defines how the needs of victimised prisoners should be met, 
following the guidance given in Annex C of PSO 2750 (ibid.). Relevant actions may 
include monitoring victims with the ACCT plan, and keeping them under observation. 
Thirdly, in addition to PSO 2700 (Suicide and Self-harm prevention), PSO 
2750 integrates all relevant regulatory codes which define techniques and processes for 
controlling violence in local establishments. To illustrate, local establishments must 
report incidents following the guidelines set out in PSO 1400 (Incident Reporting 
System). If incidents are racially motivated, local establishments must report them based 
on the guidelines provided by PSO 2800 (Race Equality). Furthermore, referring to PSO 
1700 (Segregation), PSO 2750 states that local establishments should effectively and 
appropriately make use of prisoner transfers, especially for prisoners whose behaviour is 
highly difficult, as part of local violence control strategies (Chapter 7, PSO 2750).  For 
example, if a prisoner is frequently bullied in a local establishment, permanently 
transferring him/her to another establishment may be considered an appropriate course 
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of action. Similarly, if the prisoner has serious behavioural issues, permanent transfer to 
a local establishment which has a special behavioural management programme may be 
considered appropriate.  
Thus, HMPS has in place overall guidelines for controlling violence in local 
establishments. According to the formalization rank and scores table (see Appendix 1),  
PSO 2750 is an ordinance, in which regard it is ranked at the third highest grid level and 
a score of+5 is assigned to HMPS for this sub-code.  
 
Japan  
The Japanese prison service does not provide formal national guidelines which 
standardise overall violence control strategies in local prison establishments. Although 
some guidance about controlling violence in local establishments is provided by 
relevant kunrei and tsutasu, there is no integrated set of formal guidelines covering this 
issue.  
Firstly, where HMPS requires local establishments to identify the backgrounds 
of prisoners as part of local risk control strategies, the Japanese prison service takes a 
similar but more informal approach. According to Hamai (2006), identifying Japanese 
prisoners who are members of Japanese gangs [yakuza や?や?や?; or boryokudan: 杖?務?
団?] is a basic strategy for maintaining safety and security in local establishments. Hamai 
(2006) has explained that prisoners who belong to gangs are one of the main targets of 
violence control because they bring gang culture into prisons. Persistent problems in 
this regard include gang rivalry and attempt to bribe both other prisoners and prison 
staff. In order to control gang members in prison, local establishments have a custom of 
placing the letter “G” on the records of prisoners who belong to gangs (Hamai, 2006). 
This strategy is used in most local establishments (Hamai, 2006). However, it is not 
defined in any written rules hence it can be considered an informal rule.  
Secondly, the Japanese prison service defines segregation as a technique for 
controlling suicide. Article 76 of The Penal Institutions Act states that segregation is 
authorised in cases where contact between certain prisoners is considered to be a risk to 
discipline and order in local establishments (Section 2: Art.76, The Penal Institutions 
Act). Furthermore, in relation to this segregation, Article 79 of The Penal Institutions 
Act states that local establishments can use special protection cells in cases where 
inmates are likely to inflict injuries on others (ii-b: Article 79 of The Penal Institutions 
Act). Alternatively the Japanese prison service also allows prisoner transfers as a means 
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of controlling violence. Instruction [tsutatsu] 3316 defines the procedures for 
transferring prisoners belonging to Japanese gangs who are deemed to pose a threat to, 
or be at threat from, other prisoners. This tsutasu shows that the Japanese prison service 
considers controlling prisoners who have backgrounds in Japanese gangs an essential 
part of maintaining safety in prisons.  
Thirdly, with regard to how force may be used to control violent prisoners, 
Article 77 of The Penal Institutions Act asserts that prison staff can use defence tools in 
cases where prisoners have inflicted injuries on other prisoners or staff. These defence 
tools are listed by kunrei 33258. There are several types of authorised defence tools: 
truncheons (keibou:警?棒?, and keijo:警?杖?), man-catcher (sasumata:や?や?や?や?), shields, 
tear gas, and tear gas bombs. In addition to suicide control, Article 78 of The Penal 
Institutions Act sanctions the use of arresting ropes, leather handcuffs, and strait jackets 
in cases where prisoners are likely to injure others (Art. 78, The Penal Institutions Act). 
In the Japanese prison service rules, defence tools and restraining devices are 
distinguished from weapons. Additionally, the appropriate uses of weapons are defined 
separately from defence tools in the Japanese prison service. Article 80 of The Penal 
Institutions Act authorises the use of hand guns in the following cases: where an inmate 
or group of inmates have instigated a riot or are about to do so; where an inmate has 
inflicted serious injuries on others or is about to do so; where an inmate maintains 
possession of a dangerous weapon in spite of being ordered to surrender it by a prison 
officer (Art. 80, The Penal Institutions Act). Only hand guns are used as weapons 
against prisoners in Japanese prisons.  
 Thus, in addition to suicide control, the Japanese prison service defines 
relevant techniques and procedures for controlling violence in local establishments. 
Nevertheless, there are no key national guidelines which formally integrate the flow of 
violence control measures in written rules. As Hamai (2005) has shown in regard to 
pre-incident control, certain informal rules are shared in local establishments. According 
to the formalization rank and score table (see Appendix 1), the Japanese prison service 
is ranked at the second lowest grid level for the violence sub-code and assigned a score 
of +1.  
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4.5: Information recording and documentation systems 
 
The fifth sub-code concerns the formalization of the rules stipulating how information 
about the risks of suicide and violence should be recorded and documented in the 
English and Japanese prison services.   
 
4.5.1: Suicide  
England 
PSO 2700 states that local establishments need to record ACCT plans for prisoners who 
are at risk of suicide or self-harm as soon those risks have been identified (Chap. 8, PSO 
2700). This record must include a Suicide/Self-harm Warning Form and the prisoner’s 
clinical records and history form of the prisoner (Chap4, PSO 2700). Chapter 4 of PSO 
2700 provides details about these forms including their style and colour. Overall, all 
relevant documents defined in PSO 2700 are called ACCT documents (PSO 2700). 
In regard to post-incident recording requirements, all incidences of suicide and 
self-harm must be recorded in the Security Information Reports (SIRs). PSO 2700 refers 
to PSO 1400 (Incident Reporting System) on this matter. Although PSO 1400 is not 
open for the public, it is stated in chapter 13 of PSO 2700 that all cases of self-harm 
must be recorded on the SIRs. The same chapter also specifies the forms and styles of 
documents for reporting incidents (Chap. 13, PSO 2700) and declares that any serious 
incidents in which prisoners need to be resuscitated or transferred to external hospitals as 
a result of self-harm must be reported to National Operational Units by telephone (ibid.). 
Hence it can be seen that the post-incident information recording and documentation 
system maintained by HMPS is defined by a highly detailed formal set of written rules.  
In regard to their formality level, these rules are defined by PSOs. Based on the 
score criteria discussed in chapter 3, they can be ranked at the third highest formality level 
and a score of +5 can be assigned to HMPS for this sub-code.  
  
Japan 
The Japanese prison service does not have detailed guidelines about recording risk 
related information which is equivalent as ACCT documents in HMPS. However, some 
rules do exist for controlling post incident documentation on suicide and self-harm. 
These rules were put in place following a discussion in the penal reform led by the 
Correctional Administration Reform Committee (CARC) in 2003. In relation to 
reporting cases of suicide and self-harm, the poor and inconsistent quality of 
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adjudication and incident statistics reports in local establishments became an main issue 
in the CARC 2003 (JMOJ 2003). 
As a result, in addition to existing Ordinance 332 (the guidelines for the 
correctional statistics), Instruction 542 (enactment of the correctional statistics 
guideline) was issued on 23rd May2006. This instruction provides standard formats of 
reporting relevant correctional statistics about local prison operational incidents to the 
national HQs, including incidents of self-harm and suicide. Moreover Ordinance 3351 
supplements these ordinance and instruction by defining reporting forms of adjudication. 
The Japanese prison service issues punishments in response to incidences of self-harm 
As I discussed in Section 4.3.1, suicide attempts are punished as interdisciplinary 
behaviour. Hence this ordinance also concerns with documentation for suicide and 
self-harm control. Additionally, Instruction [tsutatsu] 3346 states that prison staff must 
record whether prisoners at risk of suicide and self-harm have been placed in 
segregation or protection cells, when such measures were taken, and for how long. This 
process must be repeated if these measures are later renewed for the same prisoners 
( kyosei 3346 kysei kyokucho imei-tsutatsu). In regard to the use of protection cells, 
tsutatsu 3405 states that prison staff  must record the start and finish of periods spent 
in protection cells on the utilization record of protection cells (Chap. 3, tsutatsu 3405). 
Thus, it can be seen that the Japanese prison service has a system in place for 
recording and documenting relevant information about prisoners at risk of suicide and 
self-harm. Most of this system is defined by kunrei and tsutatsu. In terms of the 
formality level, it was pointed out in Chapter 3 that the more formal rules are adopted 
when different levels of rules define the same subject (see Sec. 3.3.1: p. 107). Thus, 
taking kunrei (i.e. ordinances) as rules defining the topic of this sub-code, according to 
the formalization rank and scores table (see Appendix 1), they can be ranked at the third 
highest formality level and a score of +5 can be assigned to the Japanese prison service. 
 
4.5.2: Violence 
England 
PSO 2750 asks local establishments to record information about violence relevant to 
themselves. Furthermore, it stresses that maintaining accurate and clear information is 
important for controlling violence effectively (PSO 2750). Key documents in this regard 
are use of force report forms, adjudication and disciplinary charge records, and incident 
records.  
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  The use of force for managing violent behaviour among prisoners should be 
recorded, as stated by PSO 2750, in line with guidance given about keeping records of 
what kinds of force have been used to quell violence in PSO 1600 (Use of Force). In 
terms of the segregation and transfer of bullied or violent prisoners, PSO 1600 refers to 
the reporting requirements defined in PSO 1700 (Segregation). All report forms used 
for these procedures are attached to PSO 1700. If a prisoner who has assaulted other 
prisoners is punished, the relevant information for the adjudication process must be 
recorded in line with the rules set out by PSO 2000 (Adjudications Manual) . In addition 
to suicide and self-harm, incidences of violence and serious assault are recorded using 
the SIRs (PSO 1400).  
Thus, the rules maintained by HMPS for recording and documenting 
information about violence are defined by PSOs. These rules, they can be ranked at the 
third highest formality level and a score of +5 can be assigned to HMPS for this 
sub-code.  
 
Japan 
The procedures for recording and documenting information about violence are also 
defined by written rules in the Japanese prison service. As well as suicide control, the 
poor and inconsistent quality of adjudication and incident reports in local establishments 
became a main issue in the CARC 2003, including these relates to assault and violence 
incidents (JMOJ 2003). 
In response to this issue, Ordinance [kunrei] 332 (The Guidelines for 
Correctional Statistics) and Instruction [tsutasu 542] (Enactment of the Correctional 
Statistics) request that local establishments periodically submit statistics about 
incidences and adjudications of violence and serious assault to the national HQ using 
specific forms (ibid.). Additionally, kunrei 3351 states that adjudications linked to 
violence should be recorded on appointed adjudication record forms (Chap. 4 and 
Annexes 1 and 9, kunrei 3351). Cases in which violent prisoners have been segregated 
from others must also be recorded according to prison instructions. Specifically, 
Ordinance [tsutatsu] 3346 states that prison staff should record the dates at which every 
period of segregation starts and finishes on prisoners’ observation forms.  
When prisoners belonging to gangs are transferred to other establishments, the 
governor of the prison from which the prisoner is being transferred must submit a 
prescribed transfer request form to the area manager and the governor of the prison to 
which the prisoner is being transferred. In turn, the latter governor must accept the 
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prisoner into his establishment. These procedures are all defined by Instruction 
[imei-tsutatsu] 3316 (Transferring Prisoners). In regard to the use of force, kunrei 33258 
defines the forms required for recording the use of defence tools, such as handcuffs and 
strait jackets, in local establishments.  In particular, article 14 of kunrei 33258 states 
that the use of defence tools must be recorded on prisoners’ observation records.  
Meanwhile, the use of handcuffs and strait jackets must also be recorded on the list of 
usage of those implements.  
Hence the Japanese prison service clearly has a system in place clarifying how 
information about violence in local establishments should be recorded and documented.  
Most of the relevant procedures in this regard are defined by kunrei and tsutatsu. Again, 
in terms of the formality level, chapter 3 stated that more formal rules are adopted when 
different levels of rules define the subject (see Sec. 3.3.1: p.107). Thus, taking 
ordinances as the rules defining the topic of this sub-code, the rules discussed in this 
section can be ranked at the third highest grid level and a score of +5 can be given to the 
Japanese prison service for this sub-code.  
 
 
4.6 : Conclusion  
 
This chapter discussed the formalization of the suicide and violence risk control systems 
operated by the English and Japanese prison services according to 5 sub-codes. The 
above discussion shows, firstly, that both prison services have highly formal sets of 
rules defining order and discipline. However, the ways in which order and discipline are 
defined by the English and Japanese prison services suggest that the relationship 
between communal stability in prisons and issues affecting individual prisoners is 
understood differently in each institution.   
 Secondly, HMPS defines the risks of suicide and violence by PSOs with the 
key intention of identifying targets of control. It is noteworthy that both definitions of 
suicide and violence are highly disconnected from everyday usage of that word outside 
of prisons. By contrast, the Japanese prison service does not have any formal detailed 
definitions of relevant behaviour comparable to those observed by HMPS. Moreover, 
suicide is recognised that the term is defined by the Japanese prison service in much the 
same way as it is outside of prisons. Although the Japanese prison service does not 
formally define violence, the views of prison staff members indicate that they follow 
informal routines for identifying the risk of violence among prisons. Thus, the 
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testimony of Japanese prison staff shows that peculiar ways of understanding violent 
behaviour do exist in Japanese prisons as part of risk control procedures; however it 
exists in informal way as well as suicide.  
 Thirdly, HMPS does not use punishment or reward to control the risk of 
suicide. Therefore, the punishment and reward sub-code is not applicable to HMPS in 
the case of suicide control. In other words, there are no rules in HMPS sanctioning the 
use of punishment and reward for suicide control. Based on the formalization ranks and 
scores table discussed in chapter 3, HMPS should be given the lowest grid rank and 
assigned a score of 0 for the use of punishment and reward in suicide control. 
Meanwhile, punishments are issued for acts of violence in HMPS in line with Rule 51 
of The Prison Rules 1999, thus indicating the second highest grid level on the scales 
being used here. HMPS also uses the IEP system, as defined in PSO 4000, for 
controlling violence. By contrast, the Japanese prison service uses both punishment and 
reward systems to control suicide and violence. The appropriate uses of punishment, in 
particular, are defined by a parliament act, in which respect the Japanese prison 
service’s rules for issuing punishments can be ranked at the highest formality level. 
Meanwhile, details of rewards which may be granted to prisoners are given by 
Ordinance [kunrei].  
Fourthly, HMPS’ overall strategic guidelines for controlling the risks of 
violence and suicide are set out by PSOs. These orders stipulate the risk control 
procedures and processes that must be followed in local establishments, thereby 
integrating all relevant rules. Likewise, the Japanese prison service also defines all 
relevant techniques and processes for controlling the risks of suicide and violence in 
written rules. Nevertheless, these rules are and not integrated through overall written 
guidelines as is the case for HMPS. The Japanese prison service does not have national 
strategic guidelines in the form of written rules. In response to this lack of written 
guidelines, my interview data and Hamai (2006) suggest that prison officers follow 
informal but consistent risk control routines at a local level. One officer used the 
expression, “common sense” [joshiki] to describe the risk control routines as he 
understood them and suggested that although they are not written down, they are shared 
informally throughout the prison service.  
Finally, HMPS has several forms and systems in place, as implemented by 
PSOs, for recording and reporting incidences of suicide and violence which cover a 
wide range of pre- and post-incident procedures. The styles of the aforesaid forms are 
defined in considerable detail. The Japanese prison service also defines the procedures 
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for reporting and documenting cases of suicide and violence with kunrei and tsutatsu. 
Particular attention is given in this regard to how punishments and periods of 
segregation issued to prisoners should be recorded. One peculiarity of the Japanese 
system for recording information about violence control is the rule that the letter “G” is 
placed on the records of prisoners who have backgrounds in Japanese gang culture. 
However, this routine is not found in written rules hence it may be considered an 
informal rule. Among the various rules active in Japanese prisons, the most formal are 
the kunrei. 
 Following these discussions, I have assigned numerical ranking scores for each 
institution according to the topic of every sub-code. The results are displayed on Tables 
4.1 and 4.2. Table 4.1 is a visual map of the results for the formalization (Y1) scores.  
The five columns represent the sub-codes discussed in this chapter. Moreover, two sets 
of scores are given for the third sub-code in relation to punishment and reward.  The 
positions of the shaded blocks reflect the grid level of the English and Japanese prison 
services in the case of each sub-code. The letter “S” represents suicide risk control 
while “V” represents violence risk control. Meanwhile, Table 4.2 shows the 
formalization (Y1) score results as numbers. The five sub-codes are listed twice in the 
left-hand column and two sets of figures are given for each: the first are raw scores and 
the second are standardized scores as discussed in chapter 3 (see Table 3.5, p. 118). The 
four columns to the right show the results for the English and Japanese prison services 
in the cases of suicide and violence.  
 Results show that the most formal rules are used by the Japanese prison service 
to define order and punishment: that is, parliamentary rules. By contrast, HMPS uses 
statutory codes to define all of these rules: specifically The Prison Rules 1999 or PSOs. 
With the exception of the order and punishment sub-code, the formality level of the 
Japanese prison service’s risk control regulation is generally lower than that of HMPS. 
Whereas HMPS defines risk and national risk control strategic guidelines according to 
PSOs, the Japanese prison service does not use written rules to define either of them.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
155 
Table 4.1: Summary of formalization grid scores for suicide and violence control in the English and 
Japanese Prison Services 
 
(S): suicide control. (V): violence control. 
 
Table 4.2: Formalization scores for suicide and violence control  
  
 
In summary, this chapter has discussed the formalization level of suicide and 
violence risk control in the English and Japanese prison services, and indicated that 
although both prison services’ risk control systems are defined by rules, the formality 
levels of those rules differ for each prison service and in relation to their topic. The 
Japanese prison service showed the highest formality level in regard to discipline and 
punishment, but its definitions of suicide and violence were less formal than recognised 
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by the English prison service. Furthermore, the risk control systems maintained by the 
English prison service are generally defined by statutory codes. In response to these 
findings, chapter 5 discusses the compliance level of local establishments in terms of 
how they implement relevant risk control strategies relative to national guidelines. Then, 
taken as a set, the results of chapters 4 and 5 are used to analyse both prison services’ 
risk control systems using the g/g framework. 
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Chapter 5 
Risk Control Systems 2: 
Compliance Level of Local Establishments (Group1)   
 
 
This chapter discusses the compliance level (X1) of the rules which control risk in the 
English and Japanese prison services by focusing on the extent to which those rules are 
followed by staff members in local establishments. The compliance level of the prison 
services is measured, with reference to five sub-codes, in terms of how far the aforesaid 
rules are operated appropriately in local establishments. This is in contrast to chapter 4 
which discussed rules concerning suicide and violence control systems. Section one 
analyses the compliance level of order and discipline in local establishments; section 
two analyses that of ways of identifying risk in local establishments; section three 
analyses that of punishment and reward systems; section four analyses that of national 
guidelines, and section five analyses that of risk related information records and 
documentation system.   
 As I discussed in chapter 3, the compliance level is analysed here in terms of 
the extent to which relevant risk control regulations are appropriately followed in local 
establishments in England and Japan. Bearing in mind the difficulties involved in 
accessing local data. Measurements are made in this chapter in light of official evidence 
showing how far national rules and guidelines are followed at a local level as discussed 
in chapter 3 (see p.107). Specifically, in cases where the national prison service 
officially insists that local establishments generally comply with the relevant rules, it is 
necessary to make certain assumptions. Thus, if no reliable data is available indicating 
that local establishments implement rules inappropriately, it is assumed that majority of 
local establishments appropriately comply with those rules as claimed by the national 
prison services. 
 
 
5.1: Order and discipline 
 
This section identifies the compliance level of local establishments in response to order 
and discipline by analysing how far the individual interests and activities of prisoners 
are constrained for the purposes of maintaining order and discipline. As discussed in 
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chapter 4, the order and discipline sub-code reflects the relationship between group 
stability and individual freedom in prisons. Therefore, the group dimension of order and 
discipline is examined here in terms of constraints on the behaviour of prisoners. 
   
England 
Order and discipline in HMPS is based both on the collective stability of the prison 
group and the individual well-being of prisoners. It is widely recognised in local 
establishments that maintaining safety and good order in prisons should be built on a 
positive relationship between prisoners and staff members (HMIP, 2009a).  
Prison staff members interpret this positive relationship as decency of prisons, 
which means humanization or normalisation of prisons and prisoners (Bennett, 2007). 
Prison staff with whom I conducted interviews expressed how important it is for them 
to treat prisoners as normally as prison staff members can while they are in the prison. 
For example, a prison governor recalled from his own experiences that prisons can be 
well-ordered and safe places when prisoners and staff members watch football matches 
together in a relaxed atmosphere. In this kind of environment, prisoners are treated as 
individuals with respect, and their needs and concerns are accepted as far as they do not 
disrupt the safety and security of prisons. Prisoners can expect to be treated as 
individuals and afforded privileges such as daily showers, clean clothes and bedding for 
maintaining their health and hygiene, and being able to buy snacks in prison canteens 
(HMIP 2009a). 
Hence the services provided to prisoners by local establishments in HMPS 
depend upon the balance between collective stability and the level of decency with 
which individual prisoners are treated. According to the compliance ranks and scores 
table (see Appendix 2), the approach of HMPS to order and discipline can be ranked at 
the second highest group level, (acceptable behaviour among prisoners is constrained 
but restrictions are imposed on a case-by-case basis), and assigned a score of +2.  
  
Japan 
Chapter 4 showed that the Japanese prison service mainly defines order and discipline 
in terms of group stability in prisons (see Sec. 4.1). As a result, prisoners are required 
place collective rules above individual issues and respect. This way of controlling 
prisoners is widely observed in local establishments in the Japanese prison service.  
 Unlike in HMPS, decency within prison life or normalization is not actively 
considered to be the base of Japanese prison control. In 2003 a former prisoner 
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explained to the Correctional Administration Reform Committee (CARC) that Japanese 
prisons traditionally control prisoners by depriving them of all freedom of behaviour 
when they first arrive. Individual freedoms are then gradually restored by prison staff if 
they are not considered to threaten prison order (JMOJ 2003). The same prisoner stated 
that he was only allowed to do two things when he first arrived in prison: breathing and 
dreaming (ibid.). 
 In these circumstances, prisoners must follow group order. Behavioural 
restrictions vary widely in all aspects of day-to-day life. Prisoners have a daily duty of 
meditating with other prisons. They are prohibited from exchanging catered food among 
themselves. While they are in the training workshop prisoners cannot look away from 
their tasks or talk to each other (ibid.). Prison officers inspect prisoners’ diaries and the 
seating list in cells requires prisoners to sit in the seats assigned to them (JMOJ, 2003).  
 It is understood by prison staff that the wide range of restrictions placed upon 
prisoners is necessary to maintain order and discipline. Prison officers who testified to 
the CARC in 2003 stressed that prison life is based on group life. They emphasized that 
restrictions prevent prisoners from bullying or fighting with each other. For example, 
reflecting on a prison rule stating that prisoners should march in ranks outside of their 
cells, a prison officer explained that if prisoners can walk freely, the more aggressive 
ones among them would start conflicts with each other (JMOJ 2003). The prison staff 
also insisted that detailed rules regarding the daily movements of prisoners help them to 
identify unusual situations efficiently with only a limited number of staff. For example, 
during cell inspections during the day and at night prisoners have to sit in the Japanese 
seiza position [正座], meaning that they sit upright on the floor with their legs folded 
back under themselves (JMOJ, 2003). This way of sitting prevents prisoners from 
attacking prison officers while cells inspections are taking place. Officers leave cell 
doors open during inspections (ibid.).  
 Thus, in the Japanese prison service, order and discipline are prioritized in 
terms of collective stability within prisons. Acceptable behaviour among prisoners is 
minimised, and staff members fully understand why prisoners should be controlled in 
this manner. According to the compliance ranks and scores table (see Appendix 2), the 
Japanese prison service can be ranked at the highest group level; (acceptable behaviour 
of individual prisoners among prisoners is generally minimised), and given a score of 
+3 for this sub-code.   
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5.2: Ways of identifying risk  
Chapter 4 discussed how formally risk is defined by each of the relevant prison services. 
This section analyses how local establishments identify risk according to formal 
definitions in reality, and to what extent these definitions are unified.  
 
5.2.1: Suicide 
England 
HMPS defines self-harm as, “any act where a prisoner deliberately harms themselves 
irrespective of the method, intent or severity of any injury”, and suicide as, “any death 
of a person who has apparently taken his or her own life irrespective of intent” (MOJ 
2010 and 2010a). These definitions are very peculiar terminologies for controlling risk; 
however these also involve broad hazardous behaviour of prisoners. Hence local 
establishments need to develop ways of identifying risk based not just on these 
definitions, but also on local experiences. However, according to HMCIP reports, the 
extent and quality of such developments in local establishments varies widely. 
 Some local establishments were reported to have successfully developed their 
own ways of identifying prisoners at risk of suicide and self-harm. For example, HMP 
Kirkham (HMCIP, 2009i) had found some situations where prisoners tended to commit 
suicide and self-harm such as on their first day in the prison. This information was 
well-received by staff members and actively used for identifying prisoners at risk. Other 
prisons highlighted several issues relevant to the effective identification of the risks of 
suicide and self-harm at a local level. Reading through HMCIP reports, four main issues 
were found in this regard: 1. collecting information on incidences of self-harm and 
suicide; 2. analysing trends and patterns of suicide and self-harm in local 
establishments; 3. developing definitions of suicide and self-harm relevant for each 
establishment; 4. sharing new information among staff members. A number of 
establishments have been criticised for not addressing these issues sufficiently.  
 Table 5.1 offers a summary of ways of identifying suicide risk by local 
establishments mentioned in HMCIP reports (see p. 162).  The first column from the 
left displays the types of issues in local establishments raised above, while the second 
and third left columns show the names of prisons and the years in which HMCIP 
inspections took place.  The details of issues raised for different establishments are 
summarised in the last column.  In regard to the first issue, HMP Haverigg was 
reported that the prison did not collecting enough monitoring data which can help to 
identify trends and patterns in suicide and self-harming behaviour among prisoners 
 161 
 
(HMCIP, 2009g). Similar issues have also been flagged up with HMP East Sutton Park 
(HMCIP, 2006c: see Table. 5.1). A lack of information can prevent local establishments 
from developing their own ways of identifying the risks of suicide and self-harm. As the 
cases of the second issue, HMPs Full Sutton and Wellingborough were criticised for not 
sufficiently analysing information indicating trends and patterns in self-harm and 
suicide among their prisoners (HMCIP, 2007e; and 2008h respectively). As a result, the 
ways in which prisoners at risk were identified were inadequate in both institutions (see 
Table 5.1).  
 As the case of the third issue, HMP Peterborough was found that the prison has 
not developed clear definitions of suicide and self-harm based on local experiences 
(HMCIP, 2006e). Prison establishments need to define suicide and self-harm in 
response to information and experiences of those risks gathered within them. However, 
HMP Peterborough did not cover near-fatal incidents as a result of self-harm in its 
definitions of suicide and self-harm. As a result, investigations into near-fatal incidents 
at Peterborough were inadequate because they missed out information which could 
provide understanding of patterns of self-harm (ibid.: see Table 5.1 ).  
 Lastly, HMPs Liverpool and Pentonville were criticised for not sufficiently 
sharing information among staff members in order to identifying prisoners at risk of 
self-harm and suicide. Firstly, in regard to HMP Liverpool it was reported that even 
though prisoners at increased risk were enrolled in suicide prevention meetings, more 
than half of them did not regularly attend the meetings (HMCIP, 2009j; see Table 5.1). 
Secondly, in regard to HMP Pentonville it was reported that although there was 
awareness of the heightened risks of suicide and self-harm in the early days of custody, 
managers did not pay enough attention to vulnerable prisoners during this time thus 
leading to some of them self-harming (HMCIP, 2009m). Furthermore, various mixtures 
of these issues were flagged up in other local establishments. For example, it was 
reported that HMP Frankland (HMCIP 2008d) did not conduct sufficient analyses of 
information collected about incidences of suicide and self-harm and also did not share 
this information adequately among staff members. Thus, the case of HMP Frankland 
reflects a mixture of the second and fourth issues noted above (see Table 5.1).  
 Hence, the quality of definitions of the risks of suicide and self-harm vary 
between local establishments. While some establishments are able to develop effective 
definitions of these risks based on their own local experiences, others are less so. Some 
establishments do not collect enough information for developing these definitions and 
some do not analyse the data they have collected adequately. Finally, some 
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establishments do not share up-to-date information among staff members properly. Thus, 
according to the compliance level and score table (see Appendix 2), HMPS can be 
ranked at second lowest group level, (ways of identifying risk vary widely among local 
establishments, and assigned a score of +1 for this sub-code.  
 
Table 5.1: Case studies: ways of identifying suicide risk and related issues in local establishments  
  
Issues Prisons
Years
of
inspections
Reviews
East Sutton
 Park
2006
Rarely any incidents of self-harm were reported from the
prison.
Profiling of incidents was insufficient.
Haverigg 2009
The prison started to produce monitoring data for suicide
prevention committee meetings.
However, these statistics remained basic and did not cover
all useful indicators
Full Sutton 2007
Little use of historical information to identify,
 trends or patterns of self-harming or suicidal behaviour
Wellingborough 2008
Investigations were carried out following self-harm
incidents.
They identified lessons learned but were not always of good
quality.
3. Insufficient definition of risk
Peterborough 2006
There was no clear definition of near-death incidents
as a result of self-harm.
Liverpool 2009
The suicide prevention meeting, chaired by the head of
safer custody, met monthly.
Fewer than half the members attended regularly.
Little acknowledgement that recalled prisoners were at
increased risk.
Pentonville 2009
There was awareness of the risk of suicide and self-harm in
the early days of custody; however, managers neglected
vulnerable prisoners at risk at this time and which led to
self-harm.
5. Mixture of those issues above
Frankland 2008
Information collected monthly was not analysed for trends
and patterns.
Management checks did not include effective assessments
of quality.
Research shows that violent prisoners are more at risk of
suicide than non-violent prisoners and rates of self-harm
were high…, but there had been no shared learning from
this.
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Japan 
As chapter 4 explained, the Japanese prison service does not have formal definitions of 
suicide and self-harm, but it does have informal ones. Due to the limited access to local 
establishments in Japan, it was difficult to identify how information about suicide and 
self-harm is gathered within them. However, the issue discussed in the CARC 2003 
suggests that local establishments do not have particular ways of identifying suicide and 
self-harm risk.  
When the issue of deaths in custody was discussed by the CARC in 2003, the 
testimony given to the committee showed that many local establishments categorised 
the causes of deaths in custody, including self-inflicted deaths, inappropriately (JMOJ, 
2003). According to the report made by the representative of the Centre of Prisoners’ 
Right (CPR) on the CARC 2003, in most cases local establishments listed the cause of 
deaths in custody as cardiac insufficiency (i.e. heart failure). In the terminology of 
Japanese autopsy reports, this label only indicates that the heart stopped beating. This is 
recognised as an unacceptable explanation of deaths in medicine (JMOJ, 2003). 
Many unexplained deaths in custody are thought to be caused by suicide. For 
example, one prisoner who died within a day of being transferred into a protection cell 
had begged a prison officer to be transferred into the cell in Osaka prison in the 1990s 
(JMOJ, 2003). If effective ways of identifying risk had been established in the prison, 
the possibility that the prisoner would commit suicide should have been investigated in 
this case. Moreover, if prison officers had shared relevant information about ways of 
identifying prisoners at risk of suicide, the prison officer involved in the case just cited 
should not have sent the prisoner into the protection cell. Accordingly, this case 
indicates that staff in Osaka prison could not effectively identify suicidal behaviour 
among prisoners around the time that the incident in question took place.  
Other cases also show a lack of understanding among local Japanese prison 
staff of trends and patterns of suicide and self-harm among inmates. The most 
significant example concerns the management of prisoners who are suffering from 
eating disorders or mental depression. According to the representative of the CPR 
testified on the CARC 2003, prisoners tend to suffer from eating disorders or depression 
when they are confined to single cells (JMOJ, 2003). However, this information was not 
shared in a majority of local establishments. The representative of the CPR reported that 
20 deaths, all considered to have been self-inflicted as a result of refusing food, were 
reported from local establishments across the country in 2003. As I mentioned above, 
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the cause of death in most of these cases was reported as cardiac arrest (JMOJ, 2003). 
These deaths were not investigated or reviewed by local establishments or the national 
prison service HQs in order to assess trends and patterns in self-inflicted deaths among 
prisoners.  
Those cases of deaths in custody discussed above suggest that local prison 
establishments in Japan do not generally develop ways of identifying the risks of suicide 
and self-harm based on local experiences. At least from available official data, their 
ways of identifying risk was not observed. According to the compliance ranks and 
scores table (see Appendix 2), the Japanese prison service can be given the lowest group 
rank meaning (ways of identifying risk do not exist at all local establishments), and 
assigned a score of 0 for this sub-code.  
 
5.2.2: Violence 
England 
Chapter 4 explained that HMPS defines violence and serious assault by PSO 2750: 
“Any incident in which a person is abused, threatened, or assaulted. This includes an 
explicit or implicit challenge to their safety, well-being or health. The resulting harm 
may be physical, emotional or psychological.” In addition to this general definition of 
violence and assault, PSO 2750 also gives details of the relevant categories of violent 
behaviour: bullying, anti-social behaviour, and racist incidents.   
Recent HMCIP reports have reported how well local establishments have 
developed ways of identifying these risks based on the definitions provided by PSO 
2750. According to these reports, some local establishments were reported that they 
develop the effective ways of assessing the risk of violence. For example, it was 
reported that HMP Hewell had developed a scale for measuring the stages of bullying in 
the prison based on the experiences of its staff members (HMCIP, 2009h). This scale 
helped staff members to identify the risk of bullying more effectively.  
However, the quality of local methods for identifying the violent risks 
generally varies widely among local establishments. Majority of local establishments 
showed some issues in ways of identifying risks of violence in their local establishments. 
Reading through HMCIP reports, three issues were found in this regard: 1. collecting 
sufficient information for identifying violence; 2. redefining violence and assault to fit 
the realities of local establishments; and 3. sharing relevant information among prison 
staff members.  
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Table 5.2 is a summary of ways of identifying violence risk by local 
establishments reviewed in HMCIP reports.  As with Table 5.1, the first column from 
the left displays types of issues in local establishments raised above. The second and 
third left columns show the names of prisons and the years in which HMCIP inspections 
took place.  The details of issues raised for different establishments are summarised in 
the last column. In regard to the first issue listed above, the case of HMP Gartree 
showed that daily observation records on bullying kept by staff at HMP Gartree were 
unsatisfactory (HMCIP, 2009f). Most officers just wrote “No bullying today” (ibid.). 
Thus, in this case frontline staff was failing to collect a sufficient amount of information 
about bullying to help them develop ways of identifying that risk in their establishment. 
A similar case was also seen in HMP Durham (HMCIP 2006b) where it was found that 
violent incidents were apparently being underreported. This conclusion was reached 
because a high number of prisoners felt unsafe even though reports of bullying in the 
prison were significantly lower than the national average. HMCIP reported that the 
prison was missing trends in bullying among its prisoners who were frequently hiding 
the fact that they were being bullied (ibid.). Hence it can be seen that HMP Durham was 
not collecting enough information to properly identify the risk of bullying.  
With regard to the second issue, the case of HMP Dartmoor shows that the risk 
of bullying was identified only through either single complaint forms submitted by 
prisoners or reports made by individual officers. As a result, the standard for assessing 
incidences of bullying varied from case to case (HMCIP, 2008c). Therefore, in this case 
HMP Dartmoor could not develop a coherent definition of bullying, as part of 
violence,which could be applied to all cases in the prison (see Table 5.2).  
In terms of the third issue, the case of HMP Buckley Hall shows that 
information was poorly shared among its staff members. According to HMIP, problems 
with bullying and anti-social behaviour in HMP Buckley Hall were deeply linked to 
drug-related issues among the prisoners. However, staff members were not much aware 
of these issues and thus investigations of bullying and anti-social behaviour were poor 
(HMCIP, 2007b). This case shows that information which can help to identify the risk 
of violence should be effectively shared between prison staff.  
Therefore, the quality of local methods for identifying risk varies (see Table 
5.2). Most establishments have problems with identifying the risk of violence, but these 
problems are different for each prison. According to the compliance ranks and scores 
table (see Appendix 2), HMPS can be given the second lowest group rank (ways of 
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identifying related hazard behaviour vary depending on local establishments) and 
assigned a score of +1 for this sub-code.  
 
 
Table 5.2: Case studies in which issues were raised about how risk is identified in local 
establishments  
 
 
 
Japan 
The Japanese prison service does not have any formal written definitions of violence. 
Instead, there are some informal techniques for identifying the risk of violence shared 
between prison staff. Unlike in the cases of suicide and self-harm, Japanese prison staff 
showed a good understanding of how behaviour indicative of the risks of violence or 
serious assault can be spotted among prisoners in local establishments.  
 One of these informal methods for assessing the risk of violence was noted in 
chapter 4: that is, the ways in which prisoners hang up dust cloths in their cells 
(Tomiyama, 2005; see Sec. 4.2.2). Although they had worked as prison staff in different 
local establishments, most members of Japanese prison staff with whom I conducted 
Types of
errors
Prisons
Years
of
Inspections
Reviews
Durham 2009
The reported rate of bullying were surprisingly low.
It suggested under-reporting; because,
1.  relatively high number of prisoners reported that they
had felt unsafe at some point during their time at Durham,
and
2. A survey on bullying had been carried out in October
2005.
One of the findings was that victims tend to hide the fact
they bullied rather than seek help from others.
This was an area that required further investigation.
Gartree 2006
Officers recorded daily comments on the dossier.
The most commonly repeated entry was ‘no evidence of
bullying today’.
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The identification of bullying or potential bullying was
determined by a complaint from a prisoner or an officer.
This meant that there were inconsistencies across the
prison.
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2007
The extent and nature of bullying and anti-social behaviour
in Buckley Hall appeared closely linked with the prevalence
of illegal drugs…
 but staff awareness was poor, application inconsistent, and
there were few investigations into allegations of bullying.
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interviews were aware of this way of identifying the risk of violence. One interviewee 
explained that inexperienced prison officers learned this and other techniques from 
senior colleagues.  
 Additionally, I found from the interviews I conducted that this kind of informal 
information is frequently shared between prison staff outside of the workplace. 
Interviewees explained that most Japanese prisons have seasonal parties where staff 
members from all ranks participate including governors. How often these parties are 
held varies between local establishments. However, official parties take place at least 
four times a year to mark each season (i.e. spring, summer, autumn, and winter).  
These parties are considered by prison staff to provide opportunities to exchange the 
latest information about human relations in the prisons where they work: for example, 
which prisoners are vulnerable and to what or whom. In this way, these events help 
prison staff to identify the risk of violence and bullying. It could be noted that one 
member of prison staff I interviewed gave a very negative impression of this kind of 
informal information sharing among his colleagues: but even so, he still accepted its 
importance of those parties in order to share risk relate information, and maintain close 
relationship between colleagues.  
 Those data I collected show that although the Japanese prison service does not 
have formal definitions of violence and serious assault, its staff members in local 
establishments seem to share some standardized ideas of what these terms mean. 
Furthermore, knowledge and information for identifying the risk of violence is passed 
on from senior to junior prison officers. According to the compliance ranks and scores 
table (see Appendix 2), these results are applicable to the third lowest group rank (ways 
of identifying risk are commonly shared among a majority of local establishments) and 
thus the Japanese prison service can be assigned a score of +2 for this sub-code.    
 
 
5.3: Appropriate use of punishment and reward  
 
The third sub-code concerns the compliance levels of the English and Japanese prison 
services in terms of their systems for punishing and rewarding prisoners. This section 
analyses how appropriately these control measures are used in local establishments.  
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5.3.1: Suicide 
England 
HMPS uses neither punishment nor reward to control suicidal behaviour hence its 
compliance level in this regard cannot be measured. In brief, this sub-code is not 
applicable to suicide control in HMPS. For this reason, HMPS is assigned score and 
gains a score of 0 for this sub-code, (the punishment is not used for controlling suicide 
in prisons), according to the compliance ranks and scores table (see Appendix 2). 
 
Japan 
As chapter 4 discussed, the Japanese prison service uses punishment and reward to 
control the risks of suicide and self-harm. Nevertheless, it is difficult to investigate how 
appropriately these measures are used in each prison because the Japanese prison 
service does not grant access to the relevant information to the public, concerning each 
establishment. Hence this section considers the appropriateness of these measures from 
the available national and official data. 
 
Punishment: 
The appropriateness of punishments meted out to prisoners was investigated by the 
prison reform led by the CARC in 2003. Tomiyama, the chief investigator on the CARC 
2003 insisted that his investigations had shown that most prisons used disciplinary 
charges against prisoners appropriately following the assigned legal procedures (JMOJ, 
2003).  
The national correctional statistics show that the number of punishments issued 
for acts of self-harm is much higher than the annual number of self-inflicted deaths(C.B. 
2009; JMOJ, 2007, 2008, and 2009) (see Table 5.3). This discrepancy suggests that 
punishment may be overused to control the risk of suicide in local establishments.  
However, self-harm generally includes a broader range of behaviour, most of which 
does not lead to death. Accordingly, it is uncertain whether punishment is overused in 
relation to suicide control from this data. 
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Table 5.3: National statistics: N of self-inflicted deaths and punishments issued against self-harm in 
the Japanese prison service between 2002 and 2008 
 
*1Table 12, p.52 in C.B (2009). *2 Table 34 in JMOJ (2007, 2008 and 2009) 
 
More recently, the Penal Institution Visiting Committees (PIVCs) have 
reported that punishment is used inappropriately in some local establishments (C.B 
2010). These Committees were established in 2006 as a result of the penal reform led by 
CARC 2003 (JMOJ, 2003: also see Sec. 7.2.1). Each committee consists of between 4 
and 10 members, and is responsible for one prison. Committee members are 
professionals and citizens who are selected from outside of the prison service (JMOJ, 
2006). A report of the committees’ investigations is published annually by the Ministry 
of Justice.  
According to PIVC members, 10 local establishments out of 164 across the 
county were reported as having issues in regard to the operation of punishment: 
Miyazaki (宮崎), Kobe (神戸), Kyoto(京都), Ichihara (市原), Morioka (盛岡), Nagoya 
(名古屋),  Kumamoto (熊本), Tochigi (栃木), Wakayama (和歌山),and Yamagata（山
形）  (JMOJ 2010; Table. 5.4). The main issues reported by prisoners in these 
establishments were sorted into two categories: 1. complaints from prisoners about 
punishments they had received; and 2. the appropriateness of adjudication procedures. 
However, none of the reports mention the details of complaints: in particular, how many 
prisoners complained about each of these issues and what kinds of disciplinary charges 
they had received. Thus, it is uncertain how far these issues are concerned with suicide 
and self-harm control. Moreover, the number of local establishments reported to have 
issues with the use of punishment was small compared with the number for which no 
problems were reported. Therefore, the available evidence does not cover enough of the 
Japanese prison service for me to draw general conclusions about how appropriately 
punishment is used in local establishments.  
 
 
 
 
Years 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Self-inflicted deaths*1 18 15 20 15 18 21 25
Punishment
against self-harm*2
684 744 1000 1070 1010 1349 1441
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Table.5.4: Issues raised about the use of punishment in Japanese prisons (JMOJ 2010) 
 
  
 Thus, available reliable data did not particularly suggests that punishment is 
inappropriately issued in local establishments. In the absence of clear evidence from 
other sources, this sub-code follows the measurement criteria discussed in chapter 3, (in 
cases where the national prison service officially insists that local establishments 
generally comply with the relevant rules; if no reliable data is available indicating that 
local establishments implement rules inappropriately, it is assumed that majority of 
local establishments appropriately comply with those rules) (see p. 107). As a result of 
accepting Tomiyama in the CARC discussed in the beginning of this section (JMOJ, 
2003) that a majority of Japanese prisons punish their inmates in an appropriate manner, 
according to the compliance rank and scores table (see Appendix 2) the Japanese prison 
service should be ranked at the second highest group level, (majority of local 
establishments appropriately conduct punishment), and assigned a score of +2 for this 
sub-code.  
 
 
 
 
Prisons Issues about  punishment
Ichihara 1. Overuse of punishment
Kobe
1. overuse of punishment
2. Appropriateness of adjudication procedures
Kumamoto 2. Appropriateness of adjudication procedures
Kyoto
1. Overuse of punishment
2. Appropriateness of adjudication procedures
Miyazaki
1. Over use of punishment
2. Appropriateness of adjudication procedures
Moriok YOI 2. Appropriateness of adjudication procedures
Nagoya 2. Appropriateness of adjudication procedures
Tochigi 2. Appropriateness of adjudication procedures
Wakayama 2. Appropriateness of adjudication procedures
Yamagata 2. Appropriateness of adjudication procedures
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Reward: 
In regard to the reward system, as chapter 4 explained, the Japanese prison service 
maintains an Incentives and Earned Privileges (IEP) system for prisoners. PIVCs 
reported issues with six local establishments concerning the operation of the IEP system 
in 2010: Hachioji, Ichihara, Matsumoto YOI, Sasebo, Toyama and Wakayama Prisons 
(C.B. 2010). The reports sorted these issues into three categories: 1. the fairness of IEP 
provision; 2. inappropriate measures taken in decisions about the IEP level; and 3. the 
contents of privilege. However, according to the PIVC reports, none of these issues 
were strongly related to suicide control (see Table 5.5).   
Hence, in regard to the reward system, the issues raised in the PIVC reports do 
not indicate that the IEP system was widely misused in Japanese prisons for controlling 
suicide and self-harm. Thus, it can be concluded that a majority of local establishments 
used the IEP system appropriately. Therefore, in regard to the use it makes of reward to 
control the risks of suicide and violence, the Japanese service can be ranked at the 
second highest group level and assigned a score of +2, (majority of local establishments 
appropriately conduct reward). (see Appendix 2). By combining this score with the one 
for punishment, the Japanese prison service can be assigned a total score of +4 for this 
sub-code. 
 
Table 5.5: Issues raised about the IEP system in PIVC reports in 2010 (JMOJ 2010) 
 
Prisons Issues raised for the IEP system in local establishments
Hachioji
1. Equality of the IEP system
If prisoners change their training programmes from the normal training
workshop to the occupational therapy, they are dropped their privilege
from tier.3 to tier.4. Some prisoners complained about this.
Ichihara
1. Equality of the IEP system
The IEP is not considered in the decision of the parole　release.
Although some prisoners have penalty records, they get the parole
release. Other prisoners who are ranked tier.1 without any adjudication
records, could not get the parole.
Matsumoto
YOI
3. Contents of privileges
The IEP should be the privilege for purchasing variety of snacks
Sasebo
3. Contents of privileges
The prison should provide the privilege for purchasing snacks in the
prison
Toyama
2. Inappropriate measures for the IEP
In order to decide the IEP levels for prisoners, the prison forces
prisoners to record the time they went to the toilet during the prison
workshop. It is considered as the violation of prisoners' human right.
(The record was abolished in 2011)
Wakayama
3. Contents of privileges
The prison should install air conditioners or electric fans in all cells
irrespective of the IEP level, considering the  high temperatures and
humidity of the area where the prison is situated.
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5.3.2: Violence 
England 
Punishment:  
HMPS gives prisoners disciplinary charges in response to violent behaviour. The 
compliance level of HMPS regarding the operation of punishment and reward systems 
is measured here in terms of the performance ratings provided by HMCIP reports into 
local prisons.   
 HMIP assesses the appropriateness of the adjudication procedures for issuing 
punishments according to four criteria: 1. fairness; 2. reasonableness; 3. informed 
consent for prisoners; and 4. sufficiency of procedures (HMIP, 2009a). Following these 
criteria, it was reported that the systems in place for issuing punishments, including the 
nature of the punishments and adjudication records, are satisfactory in most local 
establishments. I overviewed the latest HMCIP full inspection reports for 74 local 
establishments, of which only one, HMP Brixton, was seriously criticised for the ways 
in which it disciplined prisoners. In particular, it was found that prisoners were being 
punished informally and that adjudication procedures were inadequate (HMCIP 2008b).  
 A few minor issues were also raised about the use of punishment in some local 
establishments. HMCIP suggested that some prisons should use alternative control 
methods. For example, it was reported of HMP Pentonville (HMCIP, 2009m) that 
although the disciplinary procedures were generally appropriate, prisoners were being 
confined to their cells too regularly as a form of punishment. Alternative or more 
effective forms of punishment were recommended by the inspector. It was found that 
formal adjudication procedures were being used in HMP Cookhamwood in cases where 
problems could be solved through an informal minor caution to prisoners. Nevertheless, 
it was still reported that disciplinary procedures were conducted fairly at the prison 
(HMCIP, 2009d). Similarly, it was suggested that HMP Isle of Wight (HMCIP, 2010f) 
should use the IEP system instead of issuing punishments as a way of controlling 
certain types of anti-disciplinary behaviour. Thus, it can be seen that the report made 
suggestions to some local establishments about alternative ways of disciplining 
prisoners. This type of action should be considered part of efforts to improve 
disciplinary procedures in HM prisons rather than evidence of those procedures being 
misused. 
 Therefore, it can be concluded that a majority of local establishments in HMPS 
operated their adjudication systems appropriately. According to the compliance rank 
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and scores (see Appendix 2), HMPS can be ranked at the second highest group level 
and given a score of +2 for this sub-code.  
 
Reward:   
It was noted in chapter 4 that HMPS used the IEP system for controlling violence in 
local establishments. According to HMCIP reports, the appropriateness in use of the 
IEP varies among local establishments. Reading through HMCIP reports, mainly three 
issues were found in relation to the appropriateness of operating the IEP system in local 
establishments: 1. poor understanding of the IEP system among staff members and 
prisoners in local establishments, 2.unfair or inappropriate procedures and assessments 
for prisoners in operating the IEP; and 3. contents of privileges do not motivate 
prisoners. Most local establishments showed one or more those issues.  
 Table 5.6 is a summary of ways of operating the IEP systems by local 
establishments mentioned HMCIP reports.  Again, the first left column displays types 
issues in local establishments raised above, and the second and third left columns 
display names of prisons and the years in which inspections took place.  Details of 
issues corresponding to each establishment are summarised in the last column (see 
p.175). In regard to the first issue, I refer to the cases of HMPs Bristol (HMCIP, 2010d), 
Wandsworth (HMCIP, 2009p), Style (HMCIP, 2008f), Peterborough (HMCIP, 2006e) 
and Stocken (HMCIP, 2010g). It was reported that neither prisoners nor prison staff 
understood the IEP system in any of these establishments. Moreover, staff members in 
HMPs Style and Wandsworth used the IEP system as a negative means of warning 
prisoners whose behaviour was not good (HMCIP, 2008f and 2009p: see Table 5.6). 
These cases also suggest that prison staff bends the IEP system in negative ways in 
some establishments. 
 In regard to the second issue, I refer to the cases of HMPs Pentonville (HMCIP, 
2009m), Preston (HMCIP, 2009n), Ryehill (HMCIP, 2007g), Whatton (HMCIP, 2007h), 
and Brixton (HMCIP, 2008b). It was reported that the IEP system was being used in 
these establishments in ways that did not reflect prisoners’ behaviour, or that the 
procedures were inconsistent (see Table 5.6). For example, HMP Preston was criticised 
for inconsistencies in how it operated the IEP procedures. The IEP levels of prisoners in 
the prison were determined by a monthly behavioural rating system. However, this 
system was not monitored well by managers, and prisoners could not get high enough 
ratings to gain privileges (HMCIP, 2009n). Inappropriate ways of using the IEP system 
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were also found in the other prisons noted above. (see Table 5.6). IEP procedures were 
misused by prison staff in all of these establishments.  
Lastly in regard to the third issue, I refer to cases reported about HMPs 
Cookhamwood (HMCIP, 2009d) and Risely (HMCIP, 2006f). Firstly, it was reported 
that prisoners in HMP Cookhamwood did not view the IEP system as motivational 
because the rewards on offer were not attractive to them (HMCIP, 2009d). Similarly, it 
was found that the IEP system operated by HMP Risely did not work sufficiently 
towards the end of modifying prisoners’ behaviour (HMCIP, 2006f) (see Table 5.6). All 
of these local establishments showed that the IEP system is not appropriately used as 
the system is originally intended to. 
Thus, the appropriateness of the IEP scheme varies between local 
establishments. For this reason, according to the compliance ranks and scores table (see 
Appendix 2), HMPS can be ranked at the second lowest group level and assigned a 
score of +1 for the use of reward. Combining the scores for punishment (+2) and reward, 
HMPS can be given a total score of +3 for this sub-code. 
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Bristol 2010
The IEP is clear but not always consistently applied.
Prisoners were not always set improvement targets or routinely
invited to attend review boards
Wandsworth 2009
Staff and prisoners generally perceived the IEP scheme
as a system of warnings with sanctions attached.
Style 2008
The IEPpolicy was not fully understood by all staff .
Peterborough 2006
The IEP policy was up to date and thorough but complicated by
too many forms, most of which were unused.
Stocken 2010
The IEP  was generally understood by staff but prisoners were
unsure how it worked, other than in a punitive way.
Pentonville 2009
Most prisoners had little engagement with the IEP scheme.
-Prisoners had to wait too long to apply for the enhanced level.
-Some prisoners were downgraded a level after being charged
with offences against prison rules even before the charge was
heard.
- monitoring was inadequate and other than ethnic monitoring
there was no general monitoring of the fairness or operation of
the scheme.
Preston 2009
A monthly behavioural rating system for all prisoners was not
sufficiently consistent, nor adequately supported and checked by
managers.There was some evidence that minority groups may
have been disadvantaged  in the application of the IEP scheme.
Ryehill 2007
The (IEP) scheme was not an effective means of managing
behaviour and too many prisoners remained inappropriately on one
of the two enhanced levels.
Whatton 2007
The recently revised IEP scheme was applied inconsistently across
the prison.
Brixton 2008
The lowest level of the scheme was overly punitive and there
were insufficient monitoring and safeguards to ensure each
prisoner’s welfare.
Cookhamwood 2009
None of the young people that we spoke to felt there was
sufficient differential between the levels to provide incentive for
them.
Risely 2006
The IEP scheme was not being used sufficiently to help encourage
and control prisoner behaviour
Reviews
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Table 5.6: Case Studies: issues raised about the operation of the IEP scheme in local establishments 
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Japan 
In addition to suicide control, the Japanese prison service uses punishment and reward 
to control violence in prisons. Unlike HMPS, it is difficult to investigate the 
appropriateness of the disciplinary and incentive systems operated in each prison 
because the Japanese prison service does not make information available on each 
establishment. Therefore, this section uses the available national prison service data to 
analyse how appropriately punishment and reward are used to control violence in local 
establishments.  
 
Punishment: 
As I mentioned in the previous section on suicide control (see Sec. 5.3.1), the Japanese 
prison service insists that punishments are issued strictly in line with the appropriate 
adjudication procedures in most prisons (JMOJ, 2003). Nevertheless, the available data 
suggests that prisons generally overuse punishment as a means of controlling violence. 
  Firstly, Amnesty International Japan (AIJ) (1998) has reported that Japanese 
prisons generally use punishment as a way of warning other prisoners rather than 
penalising the aggressive behaviour of individual prisoners. For example, some 
prisoners were punished for slightly anti-social behaviour by being confined to 
segregation cells (ibid.). The AIJ was supported by evidence given by an anonymous 
prison officer about his experiences working in Japanese prisons. This officer claimed 
to have sent many prisoners to segregation units as a punishment for anti-social 
behaviour even though most of them were not seriously violent (ibid.). Hence 
punishment is overused in Japanese prisons as a way of making examples of prisoners 
who have committed even minor offences with the aim of maintaining control over the 
behaviour of all prisoners.  
This issue was raised by the CARC in 2003, and a representative of AIJ 
provided supporting testimony (JMOJ, 2003). Nevertheless, statistical data show that 
punishment continues to be overused following the 2003 reforms. Table 5.7 compares 
the number of punishments conducted against incidences of violence and serious assault 
based on national correctional statistics of the number of reported assaults and 
punishments issued thereof between 2002 to 2007 (C.B., 2009; JMOJ, 2007, 2008, and 
2009). The table shows that the number of punishments issued for violent behaviour is 
significantly higher than the number of recorded assaults over the same period. Table 
5.7 also shows the relationship between the number of self-inflicted deaths and 
punishments issued for self-harm over the 2002-8 period. By comparing these figures, it 
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can be seen that the number of punishments issued for violence is excessively high in 
relation to the number of assaults.  This tendency has not changed since the penal 
reform in 2003.  
 
Table 5.7: National statistics: N of assaults and punishments issued for violent behaviour between 
2002 and 2008 in the Japanese prison service 
 
*C.B（2009）Kyosei no Gen jo. Tokyo, C.B 
 *1 JMoJ（2007 2008, 2009, and 2010）Kyosei Tokei Nenpo. 2006,2007, 2008, and 2009 
 
Table 5.8: National statistics: N of assaults and punishments issued for violent behaviour between 
2004 and 2008 in HMPS1 
 
 
 Additionally, Table 5.8 shows the national statistics concerning the number of 
serious assaults and punishments issued against violent behaviour in HMPS between 
2004 and 2008. In comparison with the Japanese prison service, the balance between the 
numbers of reported incidents and punishments issued are consistently close. This may 
be taken as a further indicator that Japanese prisons generally make excessive use of 
disciplinary measures to control violence. As AIJ reported, these statistics may include 
                                                 
1
 Data gained from Table. 9.3 of Home Office( 2005 and 2006) Offender Management Caseload 
Statistics 2004 and 2005 ; and MOJ (2008,2009, and 2010b) Offender Management Caseload Statistics 
2007, 2008 and 2009  
Years 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
N of
Assault inc idents*
9 7 10 15 25 12 8
N of Punishment given to
Violent behaviour*1
7119 7607 7639 7391 7559 6997 5132
N of Self-inflicted deaths incidents*1 18 15 20 15 18 21 25
Punishment to self-harm*1 684 744 1000 1070 1010 1349 1441
Total N of Punishment* 1
 given to all anti-disciplinary behaviour
42313 45759 50149 56182 62306 70436 71450
Prison Population*1 67354 71889 75289 77932 80335 80684 78533
HMPS* 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
N of Assault incidents 12613 14411 15057 15272 15959
N of Punishment against
violent behaviour
17040 18134 - 17677 18788
POPULATION 74657 75979 78127 80216 82572
 178 
 
cases in which punishment was used to make examples of individual prisons for minor 
offences.   
 It can thus be concluded that Japanese prisons generally overuse punishment to 
control prisoners’ behaviour. This situation suggests that disciplinary procedures are not 
standardized throughout the prison service and that there is variation in local 
decision-making about how punishments should be issued (for example, as way of 
warning other prisoners against committing certain offences). Accordingly, the Japanese 
prison service can be ranked at the second lowest group level (“the appropriateness of 
punishment varies between local establishments”) and assigned a score of +1 for this 
sub-code.  
 
Reward: 
In regard to reward systems, PIVC reports show that there is no strong evidence to 
indicate that the IEP system is used inappropriately in Japanese prisons to control the 
risks of suicide (see Sec. 5.3.1 and Table 5.4). Meanwhile, as I mentioned above, it was 
difficult to collect information about how the IEP system is used in all local 
establishments in the Japanese prison service. In cases of violence control, the PIVC 
reports did not raise any issues of the IEP system within local establishments in relation 
to local violence control (see Table. 5.5). Hence, as with suicide control, it can be 
concluded here that a majority of local establishments in Japan make appropriate use of 
the IEP system for the purposes of violence control. In terms of the compliance rank 
and scores table, this result can be ranked at the second highest group level and a score 
of +2 can be assigned to the Japanese prison service. Next, by adding this result with the 
score given for punishment, the Japanese prison service can be assigned a total score of 
+ 3 for this sub-code.  
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5.4: Implementation of key national guidelines in local establishments 
 
The fourth code concerns the compliance level of the English and Japanese prison 
services in regard to key strategic national guidelines on suicide and violence control.  
 
5.4.1: Suicide 
England 
It was noted in chapter 4 that the key strategic guidelines for suicide control are defined 
in PSO 2700 (Self-harm and Suicide Prevention). According to HMCIP reports, all 
local establishments must follow the first requirement of PSO 2700. All local 
establishments define local suicide control strategies following the guidelines set out in 
PSO 2700 and the ACCT approach. No exception was found among local 
establishments in this first stage.   
Although local establishments mainly follow the national guidelines, the 
quality of the local strategies they develop for controlling suicide based on the 
guidelines set out in PSO 2700 varies between them. Reading through HMCIP reports, 
four main issues were found concerning the development of adequate local suicide and 
self-harm strategies: 1. collecting and analysing a sufficient amount of information for 
ACCT and cases of suicide and self-harm; 2. updating and developing adequate and 
coherent strategies based on local experiences; 3. providing sufficient training for staff 
members; and 4. Ensuring that prison staff understand and participate in local suicide 
strategies. HMCIP reports reported that most local establishments failed to achieve at 
least of one of these standards.   
Table 5.9 provides a summary of data gathered from HMCIP reports about the 
ways in which different local establishments implement national suicide control 
guidelines.  The first column from the left displays the types of issues raised above. 
The second and third columns show the names of prisons and the years in which 
inspections took place.  Details of issues corresponding to each establishment are 
summarised in the last column.  In regard to the first issue, I refer to the cases of 
HMPs Altcourse (HMCIP, 2010), Birmingham (HMCIP, 2007a), Stoke Heath (HMCIP, 
2010g), and Wandsworth (HMCIP, 2009p). It was reported of these local 
establishments that the procedures for collecting and analysing data about cases of 
suicide and self-harm were inadequate (see Table 5.9). In regard to the second issue, I 
refer to the cases of HMPs Ashfield (HMCIP, 2010a), Ashwell (HMCIP, 2010b), 
Blantyre House (HMCIP, 2010c), and New Hall (HMCIP, 2008). The HMCIP reports 
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state that the suicide and self-harm control strategies operated by these establishments 
were inadequate or inconsistent. Of these prisons, HMPs Ashfield, Ashwell, and New 
Hall showed some common problems which meant they fell short of the guidelines on 
suicide control provided by PSO 2700 and the ACCT scheme (HMCIP, 2010a, 2010b, 
and 2008e). By contrast, HMP Blantyre House’s suicide control strategy was evaluated 
as too complex and not coherent for staff members (HMCIP, 2010c). In all these cases, 
the suicide control strategies were not considered to meet the quality of local suicide 
control strategies is not adequate in response to standards set out in PSO 2700 (see 
Table 5.9)..    
 The third issue concerns whether prison staff are given sufficient training to 
implement the ACCT guidelines effectively. PSO 2700 requires local establishments to 
provide their staff with adequate training for the ACCT scheme. However, it was 
reported of HM Preston that too few staff had received the relevant ACCT training 
(HMCIP, 2009n). In order to fully implement PSO 2700 and the ACCT approach, local 
establishments must fulfil the necessary training requirements. As well as insufficiency 
of ACCT training for staff members, poor understanding and participation of ACCT 
procedures, as the fourth issue, were also reported of many local establishments. For 
example, staff at HMP Aylesbury was reported to be poorly engaged in the local suicide 
control policy (HMCIP, 2009). Meanwhile, poor staff attendance at necessary meetings 
and a lack of understanding of local suicide control strategies were flagged up as issues 
for HMPs Acklington and Buckley Hall (HMCIP, 2006 and 2007b: see Table 5.9). 
Poor understanding of ACCT procedures was also highlighted among staff at 
HMP Brixton. In response to the suicide prevention strategy based on PSO 2700, some 
staff members commented as follows: “only recently staff have started to see one to one 
on ACCTs. Doing it by the book all of a sudden but it won't last at all for the 
inspection.”, and “I was told to clear my own blood up (for self-harm and suicide 
control). It’s just a box ticking exercise with ACCT and they just don't bother with you” 
(HMCIP, 2008b). These remarks suggest that staff members do not only have a poor 
understanding of suicide control strategies based on the national guidelines, but also 
tend to take a negative view of them. Moreover, some of the governors with whom I 
conducted interviews showed similar ways of thinking about national suicide control 
guidelines. In particular, they considered PSO 2700 and the ACCT guidelines to be too 
complex, ignoring the realities of local establishments, and too difficult for anybody 
except key staff members specialised for ACCT to understand. This evidence suggests 
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that PSO 2700 does not effectively modify how staff members think about local suicide 
control strategies.  
 Finally, several of the problems raised above were found with some local 
suicide control strategies. For example, HMP Mount was found not to be providing 
sufficient training for a majority of its staff members and the quality of ACCT 
documents was not inadequate but the quality was varied (HMIP, 2009k). In this case a 
insufficient data collection was combined with a lack of staff training. Meanwhile, 
HMP Wymott was found not to analysing trends of suicide and self-harm, and their 
local suicide control strategy was inadequate level (HMCIP 2008h; see Table 5.9). 
Hence the quality of the approaches taken by local establishments to suicide control in 
response to strategic national guidelines varies from prison to prison.  
Thus, in terms of the compliance level, although all local establishments 
establish local suicide control strategies, following PSO, the quality and approaches 
varies by local establishments. According to the compliance rank and scores table (see 
Appendix 2), these circumstances can be ranked at the second lowest group level; (a 
majority of local establishments implement key national guidelines. But the quality 
varies between them), and HMPS can be assigned a score of + 2 in terms of suicide 
control for this sub-code. 
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Prisons
Years
of
Inspec.
Reviews
Altcourse 2010
Action plans from previous deaths in custody were not
reviewed periodically.
Birmingham 2007
the quality of entries and of some reviews was frequently poor
and the focus was on process rather than quality.
Stoke Heath 2010
The level of self-harm was relatively high,
but there was little analysis of
trends or patterns.
Wandsworth 2009 No investigations were carried out into near-death incidents.
Ashfield 2010
There were inconsistencies in the  (ACCT) process
as part of the general management of vulnerable young people.
Ashwell 2010
there were no protocols to support Listeners,
who did not have sufficient freedom of movement within the
prison.
Blantyre
 House
2010 The self-harm and suicide policy was over-detailed.
New Hall 2008
ACCT procedures did not sufficiently include other disciplines
or harness.
3. Staff members were not trained for the ACCT scheme. 
Preston 2009 Too few staff were ACCT trained.
Acklington 2006
The suicide prevention coordinator had not attended regularly,
although he provided a monthly statistical report.
Aylesbury 2009
There was a multidisciplinary approach to caring for those at
risk, but also examples of poor practice and lack of staff
engagement in self-harm monitoring documents
Buckley Hall 2007
The last four meetings of the suicide prevention team had
been chaired by different senior managers;
Attendance at team meetings by some departments was poor.
Brixton 2008
Prison Officers' views:
‘Only recently staff have started to see one to one on
ACCTs. Doing it by the book all of a sudden but it won't last as
all for the inspection.’
‘Self-harm is shocking; I was told to clear my own blood up.
It’s just a box ticking exercise with ACCT and they just don't
bother with you.’
Mount 2009
Too few staff had been trained in ACCT procedures.
The quality of ACCT documents varied.
Wymott 2008
Identification and analysis of safer custody data were
underdeveloped.
The safer custody strategy was too long and inaccessible.
Attendance at the safer custody meeting was generally good,
but health services staff often did not attend .
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Table 5.9: Case studies of the implementation of local suicide control strategies 
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Japan 
Unlike HMPS, the Japanese prison service does not have any formal strategic guidelines 
concerning the control of suicide and self-harm, but have formal ordinance [kunrei] and 
instructions [tsutatsu] which define relevant techniques to control suicide in prisons. 
Chapter 4 concluded that it is considered to have informal agreement which integrate all 
relevant rules (kunrei and tsutatsu) (see Sec. 4.4.1). Based on this discussion in chapter 
4, this section analyses and measures the compliance level of local establishments in 
response to those relevant regulatory codes relating to suicide and self-harm control as 
introduced in chapter 4. 
Firstly, Instruction [tsutatsu] 61 (reminder of suicide prevention) reminds local 
establishments to take measures to prevent prisoners from committing suicide. This 
instruction is only a general reminder to local establishments that they should manage 
suicide and self-harm. It does not place any specific requirements on them hence it is 
not suitable for measuring their compliance level. Secondly, a “suicide risk assessment 
sheet” has been introduced by Instruction [tsutatsu] 770 in order to assess prisoners at 
risk of committing suicide. Although there is no official data to indicate the overall 
compliance level of local establishments in regard to the risk assessment sheet, 
according to staff in the national HQs with whom I conducted interviews the frequency 
with which it is used varies from prison to prison. 
 Thirdly, in regard to the compliance level of segregating prisoners at risk of 
suicide and self-harm, and the use protection cells (Art. 76 and 79, the Penal Institutions 
Act; and tsutatsu 3405), JMOJ and National Police Agency (NPA) published The 
Report of the Status of Enforcement of The Penal Institutions Act [Keijishisetu oyobi 
Hishyuyoshato no Shogu ni Kansuru Horitsu no Shikojokyo ni tsuite] in order to assess 
the impact of the penal reform and new primarily legislation issued in 2006 (JMOJ and 
NPA, 2011)2. In this report, the national N of reported segregation and use of protection 
cells between 2006 and 2010 are published (see Table 5.10 and 11). Table 5.10 shows 
that the number of recorded cases of segregation dramatically decreased between 2007 
and 2009. Meanwhile, Table 5.11 shows that the use of protection cells is not fluctuated 
after the Penal Institutions Act was issued in 2006. 
 In terms of the appropriate use of segregation protection cells, JMOJ and NPA 
reported that most local establishments generally have generally used segregation and 
protection cells appropriately over the recent 5 years (JMOJ and NPA, 2011). This 
                                                 
2
 In regard to the background of the new primarily legislation (Penal Institutions Act), see pp. 87-88, 
Chapter 3.  
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evaluation does not necessarily guarantee that protection cells are used properly in local 
establishments. However, other data available on this matter do not show any 
widespread abuse of protection cells. Hence, following the general assumption which 
measure the compliance level discussed in chapter 3, (in cases where the national prison 
service officially insists that local establishments generally comply with the relevant 
rules; if no reliable data is available indicating that local establishments implement rules 
inappropriately, it is assumed that majority of local establishments appropriately comply 
with those rules.) (see p. 107). Additionally, in regard to the use of force (Art. 78, The 
Penal Institutions Act, and Ordinance 33528), JOMJ and NPO have also published 
national statistics on the use of handcuffs and straitjackets to control the risks of suicide 
and self-harm (JMOJ and NPA, 2011: see Table. 5.12). However it is not clear to what 
extent this equipment was considered to have been used appropriately in local 
establishments. 
 
Table 5.10: National statistics on the reported number of cases of segregation between 2006 and 10 
(JMOJ and NPA, 2011) 
 
  
Table 5.11: National statistics on the reported N of uses of protection cells (JMOJ and NPA 2011) 
 
 
Table 5.12: National record of how often handcuffs and straitjackets were used to control the risks of 
suicide and self-harm between 2006 and 2010 (JMOJ and NPA 2011) 
 
 
In regard to post-incident procedures, firstly, kunrei 3379 requests serving 
governors to investigate deaths in prisons. The available data did not show how well 
this rule was followed in local establishments. Meanwhile, Instruction [tsutasu] 210 
defines to announce self-inflicted deaths to the public through media. The prison service 
did not particularly mention about how far local establishments follow this instruction 
when suicide incident occurs. @Nifty News Search brings up 131 articles on suicide in 
Years 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
N of segregation 100 95 35 37 22
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
N of reported use of
protection cells
(National statistics)
9778 10769 10023 10109 9828
Years 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
handcuffs 326 308 250 297 264
straitjackets 10 12 1 9 12
Total 336 320 251 306 276
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Japanese prisons published in the major national newspapers in Japan between March 
2007 and April 2008 (@Nifty 20113). As a result of excluding articles covering the 
same incidents and totally irrelevant ones, 25 cases of suicide incidents were reported 
from 16 relevant local establishments. Those reported incidents throughout the media 
met the number of suicide incidents reported by the Japanese prison service in 2008 (see 
Table 5.3). Hence tsutatsu 210 is considered to be followed by the most relevant 
establishments.  
Overall, the compliance level of the Japanese prison service in regard to 
relevant rules concerned with local suicide control strategies varies depending on which 
rules should be followed. Instruction 770 showed that the compliance of local 
establishments varies. On the contrary, segregation and the use of protection cells are 
assumed that majority of local establishments adequately use protection cells according 
to the report by JMOJ and NPA. Also, media reports suggested that Instruction 210 was 
complied with relevant local establishments. Meanwhile, the compliance level of use of 
force was uncertain according to accessible data. These results do not fully fit the 
compliance ranks and scoring criteria outlined in chapter 3 (see Appendix 2). 
Nevertheless, by emphasizing variations in the compliance level depending on which 
rules are relevant, I have provisionally assigned the second lowest group level (the 
implementation of key national guidelines varies widely among local establishments ) 
and a score of + 1 to the Japanese prison service for this sub-code.  
 
5.4.2: Violence 
England 
HMPS sets out guidelines for controlling violence in PSO 2750 (Violence Reduction). 
As well as suicide guidelines, PSO 2750 requests that local establishments set local 
violence control strategies, suggesting several possible criteria for doing so. All 
establishments are expected to follow these guidelines to some extent in establishing 
their local violence control strategies.   
However, as with suicide control strategies, the quality of those local violence 
control strategies varies between local establishments. Reading through HMCIP reports,  
five main issues were found concerning the development of adequate local suicide and 
self-harm strategies: 1. information collection and analysis: monitoring or reviewing 
data; 2 development of coherent and sufficient violence reduction strategies based on 
                                                 
3
 Keywords used for the search: Suicide [自殺] and Prisons [刑務所]. 
Period: 01/04/2007 and 31/03/2008 (This period is based on the Japanese business and financial calendar 
year).  
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local experiences; 3. appropriate use of force and segregation units; 4. involvement of 
relevant staff teams and participation of staff members and prisoners; 5. Histories and 
contexts of local establishments in relation to violence . 
Table 5.13 summarizes data gathered from HMCIP reports about how different 
local establishments operate violence control guidelines.  The first column from the 
left displays the types of issues raised above. The second and third columns show the 
names of prisons and the years in which inspections took place.  Details of issues by 
establishments are summarised in the last column. In regard to the first issue, I refer to 
cases in HMPs Castington, Exeter, Lancaster Castle, and Usk (HMCIP, 2009c, 2009e, 
2007f, and 2010h). It was reported that information collection and analysis were 
insufficient in all of these prisons. HMPs Exeter and Usk monitored cases of violence 
poorly (HMCIP, 2009e and 2010h). Meanwhile, HMPs Castington and Lancaster Castle 
did not assess trends in violence and bullying based on local experiences of those 
problems (HMCIP, 2009c and 2007f) (see Table 5.13).  
In regard to the second issue, I refer to cases in HMPs Bristol (HMCIP, 2010d), 
Brixton (HMCIP, 2009b), and East Sutton Park (HMCIP, 2006c). It was reported that 
although local violence control strategies did exist in these prisons, they were not 
sufficiently coherent. In particular, the staff guidelines provided by HMP Bristol were 
reported to be overly detailed (HMCIP 20010d). Meanwhile, the violence control 
strategies operated by HMPs Brixton and East Sutton Park were found to be 
underdeveloped and not to reflect issues in those prisons (see Table 5.13).  
In regard to the third issue, I refer to the case of HMP Chelmsford.  
Importantly, PSO 2750 (Violence Reduction) refers to PSO 1700 (Use of Force), stating 
that local violence control strategies should not rely on excessive use of force.  HMP 
Chelmsford was reported to be overusing force to prevent violence. Specifically, the use 
of body belts to control prisoners was considered to be excessive (HMCIP, 2007d).  
In regard to the fourth issue, I refer to cases in HMPs Lowdham Grange 
(HMCIP, 2006d) and Warren Hill (HMCIP, 2009q). It was reported that there was not 
sufficient involvement of staff members and prisoners in violence control strategies in 
these prisons. For example, staff members at HMP Lowdham Grange were found to be 
poorly trained in a newly launched local anti-bullying strategy (HMCIP, 2006d).  
Meanwhile, at HMP Warren Hill it was reported that prisoners did not understand the 
violence reduction strategies (HMCIP, 2009q). As with suicide control, in order to 
appropriately implement local violence control strategies based on the national 
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guidelines, it is necessary to make sure staff members understand the relevant policies 
in local prisons.  
Lastly, the fifth issue concerns the effects and outcomes of local violence 
control strategies. Prison inspectors have found that some local establishments have 
difficulty demonstrating the effects of their violence control strategies. Although the 
strategies in question were basically adequate in terms of the four issues raised above, 
the prisons could not effectively reduce violence. For example, HMP Brinsford was 
found to have its own well-established anti-bullying strategy, yet the level of violence 
and bullying in the prison was still high (HMCIP, 2009a). Similarly, it was reported of 
HMP Pentonville that many prisoners felt unsafe in spite of a formal violence control 
strategy launched by the prison (HMCIP 2009m).  
 When asked about the ineffectiveness of violence reduction strategies, one 
governor whom I interviewed explained that their success depends on the characteristics 
and historical contexts of different prisons. According to him, some prisons have 
long-term issues with violence whereas others do not. For example, the Howard League 
has reported that HM Pentonville has been performing poorly in the implementation of 
a range of violence reduction measures for a long time (Howard League, 2007). The 
causes of these failures are complicated and reflect different circumstances in the 
prison: for example, drug culture among prisoners and poor morale among staff 
members (ibid.). This case showed that the success of formal strategies based on 
national guidelines depends on the contexts of different prisons.  
The final issue concerning local violence reduction strategies is that they often 
underperform in more than one of the criteria discussed above. Indeed, some prisons 
have failed to meet more than two of these criteria. For example, a violence reduction 
strategy operated by HMP Liverpool was not well developed, but predominant culture 
in particular units of prisons made prisoners difficult to believe local violence control 
procedures protect them, and it made governor more difficult to effectively develop 
local violence strategies (HMCIP 2009j). In these respects, HMP Liverpool had 
complex problems with issue 2 (development of coherent and sufficient violence 
reduction strategies based on local experiences), issue 4 (involvement of relevant staff 
teams and participation of staff members and prisoners), and issue 5 (histories and 
context). Other relevant cases are listed in Table 5.13 including those in which multiple 
problems were found.   
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Table 5.13 Case studies: issues raised about violence reduction strategies in local establishments 
 
Prisons
Years of
inspection
Reviews
Castington 2009
The opportunity to understand
the extent of violence and bullying was not fully used.
Exeter 2009
Systems that had been introduced to monitor bullying and
violence reduction were not being used.
There was insufficient investigation of safety issues,
Lancaster
Castle
2007
There was a low incidence of bullying.
The low number of violent incidents suggested that there was
some under-recording.
Usk 2010
The monthly safer prisons meeting did not sufficiently address
patterns and trends, and the policy needed to be updated and
more widely publicised
Bristol 2010 Some guidance for staff was over-complicated.
Brixton 2008
Anti-bullying and violence reduction procedures were
underdeveloped.
Gang culture and violence were not addressed effectively.
There was no central register for indicators of violence.
East
Sutton Park
2006
 
The strategy and policies did not reflect the specific issues in
an open prison environment. Staff rarely resorted to formal
bullying procedures but addressed problems early and resolved
them effectively through mediation.
Chelmsford 2007
The use of force by staff was high, and did not always appear
justified:
There had been four uses of the body belt in the six months
before the inspection.
Lowdham
Grange
2006
Anti-bullying procedures were improving and prisoners reported
low levels of bullying.
But the formal procedures were under used and staff were not
sufficiently trained.
Warren Hill 2009
A new anti-bullying policy had been introduced very recently,
but there was already evidence that it was not being
implemented properly.
Staff did not understand the basis of the policy and had not
been adequately trained.
Brinsford 2009
 The number of violent incidents was high.
Although anti-bullying measures were well established, many
prisoners reported that bullying was a problem.
Pentonville 2009
Many prisoners felt unsafe. Violent incidents associated with
trading in drugs and mobile telephones had been identified as a
concern and efforts were being made to address this.
the formal strategy for responding to bullying and violent
behaviour was not used effectively.
Liverpool 2009
Governance of the violence reduction committee and tackling
anti-social behaviour meeting needed improvement.
The strategy to address anti-social behaviour and bullying was
ineffective and not robustly managed.
The predominant culture in residential areas did not give
prisoners confidence that procedures would protect them.
Northallerton 2005
Too little facility time was provided for safer custody work.
The standard of investigation into alleged incidents was mixed.
One-to-one support was not always available to victims and
there was no intervention programme for bullies
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3. Inappropriate use of force
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These cases studies show that although all local establishments generally 
follow the relevant national guidelines, the quality of local violence reduction strategies 
varies between them. The issue of effectiveness, in particular, indicates that some 
prisons have difficulties controlling violence using formal strategies based on the 
national guidelines. Therefore, according to the compliance rank and scores chart, 
HMPS can be given the second lowest group rank and assigned a score of +2 for this 
sub-code.  
 
Japan 
Unlike HMPS, the Japanese prison service does not have formal national guideline 
concerning local violence control strategies. Thus, this section analyses the compliance 
level of local establishments in response to subordinate regulatory codes (i.e. kunrei and 
tsutasu) on violence control. As well as suicide control, the local level of information 
was not available in the Japanese prison service. Hence I analyse the compliance level 
according to the national level of data.    
 Firstly, informal strategies for controlling prisoners who have histories of 
belonging to Japanese gangs (Hamai, 2006) were introduced in chapter 4 (see p.147). 
As I explained, local establishments put the letter “G” on the records of these prisoners. 
According to Hamai (2006), the standard way of recognising prisoners as gang 
members varies between local establishments. Some prisons mark prisoners’ records 
with “G” only if they are currently gang members. Meanwhile, other prisons recognise 
prisoners as gang members only if they have belonged to gangs within the past 10 years. 
Thus, this rule is operated differently according to the standards of each local 
establishment.   
 Secondly, in terms of the compliance level of local prisons in regard to the 
segregation of violent prisoners and the use of protection cells (Arts 76 and 79, The 
Penal Institutions Act), JMOJ and NPA reported that that most local establishments 
generally have generally used segregation and protection cells appropriately over the 
past 5 years (JMOJ and NPA, 2011) as discussed in Section 5.4.1 above. Since other 
data available on this matter, it should follow the general assumption rules which 
measure the compliance level, (it is assumed that majority of local establishments 
appropriately comply with the relevant rules in cases where the national prison service 
officially insists that local establishments generally comply with the relevant rules, if no 
reliable data is available indicating that local establishments implement rules 
inappropriately,). 
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Thirdly, in terms of the use of force, Articles 77 and 78 of The Penal 
Institutions Act have defined how tools, including handcuffs defence, should be used in 
prisons. Also, Article 80 defines how light weapons should be used. In regard to use of 
the force, JMOJ and NPA published national record of the number of cases in which 
defence tools and light weapons were used between 2006 and 2010 (JMOJ and NPA, 
2011). Table 5.14 displays these figures according to the types of weapons involved 
over the 2006-10 period: Figure 5.1 shows these statistics in the form of a line graph.  
 
Table 5.14: Record of types of defence tools used between 2006 and 2010 (JMOJ amd NPA 2011) 
 
 
Figure.5.1: Trends in the use of defence tools 
 
 
Table 5.14 shows that the total number of incidents in which force was used increased 
between 2006 and 2010. Figure 5.1 shows that whereas the use of handcuffs decreased, 
the use of tear gas increased from 5 to 86 between 2007 and 2008. In response to these 
figures, the Japanese prison service has only stated that they will make further efforts to 
ensure that force is used appropriately without analysing trends in local establishments 
(JMOJ, 2011). Accordingly, the extent to which force was used appropriately in the 
incidents covered by the 2006-10 statistics is not clear.  
years 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
tear gas 0 5 86 142 164
tear gas bombs 0 0 0 1 0
handcuffs 326 308 250 297 264
other weapons 0 0 0 0 0
Total 326 313 336 440 428
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 Thus, the compliance level of local establishments in response to relevant 
violence control rules varies depending on those rules. Firstly, the way of marking 
prisoners who have histories of belonging to gangs across the Japanese prison service 
varies among local establishments. Secondly, the report published by JMOJ and NPA 
show that the rules defining the procedures for segregating prisoners and the use of 
protection cells are complied with majority of local establishments. Thirdly, the 
compliance level of local establishments in regard to the use of force is uncertain 
because no detailed information has been made available about how appropriately force 
is used to control prisoners in them.  
 These results do not fully fit with the criteria for the compliance rank and 
scores table (see Appendix 2). However, the results discussed above show that the 
compliance level varies depending on which rules it covers. Thus, in response to the 
variations between the results for the relevant violence control rules discussed above, I 
have provisionally assigned the second lowest group level (the implementation of the 
suicide control strategy varies between local establishments) and a score of + 1 to the 
Japanese prison service for this sub-code. 
 
 
5.5: Accountability in information recording and documentation systems  
 
The final sub-code concerns the profiling level of the relevant information recording 
and documentation systems. In response to the rules defining those issues, this section 
measures the accountability of how information is recorded and documented in local 
establishments. 
 
5.5.1: Suicide 
England 
PSO 2700 requires local establishments to maintain self-harm control strategies; 
recording ACCT documents and incident records based on SIRs (see Sec. 4.5.1). 
According to HMCIP reports, the accountability of documentation of these relating to 
PSO 2700 and ACCT is generally adequate in a majority of local establishments. 
Although a few problems were raised in most prisons, standards were still considered to 
be at an acceptable level.  
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In order to assess the accountability of documentation in local establishments, I 
reviewed HMCIP full inspection reports on 74 local establishments out of a total of 134 
HM prisons. The standard of documentation was reported to be inadequate in only 7 of 
these prisons: namely HMPs Birmingham (HMCIP, 2007a), Doncaster (HMCIP, 2010e), 
East Sutton Park (2006c), Rislye (HMCIP, 2006f), Rye Hill (HMCIP, 2007g) 
Wandsworth (HMCIP, 2009p), and Winchester (HMCIP, 2007i). Those establishments 
were mainly underreporting self-harm incidents, or keeping poor and inadequate quality 
of ACCT documents (HMCIP 2006c, 2006f, 2007a, 2007g, 2007i, 2009p, 2010e). 
Meanwhile other majority of local establishments were reported that the quality of 
relevant is reasonably consistent.  
 Hence, it is considered here that information recording and documentation 
were sufficiently accountable in a majority of local establishments according to the 
standards set out in PSO 2700. According to the compliance rank and scores table, 
HMPS can be ranked at the second highest group level and given a score of +2 for this 
sub-code. 
 
Japan 
It was difficult to identify accountability of information records and documentation 
within each local establishment in Japan because the Japanese prison service does not 
disclose data about local establishments. Therefore, the profile level is analysed here 
using the reported issues concerning the accountability of relevant information records 
and documentation in the CARC 2003 and the latest national correctional statistical 
reports. 
In relation to reporting cases of suicide and self-harm, the poor and inconsistent 
quality of adjudication and incident statistics reports in local establishments became an 
main issue in the CARC 2003 (JMOJ 2003). In response, the Japanese prison service 
issued the standardized guidelines and document formats for the relevant reports above 
by Ordinance 332 and 3351 with Instruction 542 since 2006 (see Sec. 4.5.1). In 
response to those guidelines, the correctional caseload statistics between 2002 and 2007 
(JMOJ, 2008) show a slight improvement in terms of reporting punishments issued for 
acts of self-harm and suicide attempts. Although there was very little change in the 
number of self-inflicted deaths reported during this period, there were sharp increases in 
the number of reported punishments issued for self-harm in 2004 and 2007 (see Table 
5.15 and Figure 5.2). Evidently, these statistics reflect the facts that 2004 was the first 
financial year after the CARC published its findings and 2007 was the first financial 
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year after Instruction 542 was issued. These figures indicate that the information 
recording and documentation systems operated by local establishments changed to some 
extent. Nevertheless, it is still not clear how far these records are accountable across 
local establishments in the Japanese prison service. 
On the other hand, the accountability of local records on the use of segregation 
units and protection cells, as defined by Instructions 3346 and 3405, is not known by 
each local establishment. As I mentioned in Section 5.4.1, Table 10 and 11 showed the 
national statistics of recorded segregation and the use of protection cells (see Table 10 
and 11). Although Table 10 suggests that the number of reported segregation was 
dramatically decreased between 2004 and 2007, it was not clear the influence of the 
relevant instruction over the compliance level of local establishments. The number of 
reported use of the protection cells did not show particular changes during the period 
(see Table 5.11). Additionally, JMOJ and NPA (2011) did not particularly mention how 
far local establishments keep accountable records of those procedures in the report. 
Accordingly, the compliance level of these rules is not certain. 
 
Table 5.15: Annual national prison statistics: N of adjudications and self-inflicted deaths 
 
 
Figure 5.2 Trends of N of recorded adjudications and self-inflicted deaths 
 
 
Overall, the results are mixed. The CARC had reported that the quality of 
adjudication and incident records varies among local establishments in 2003. In 
response to this, latest national statistics regarding those records showed that local 
Years 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Self-inflicted deaths 18 15 20 15 18 21 25
Punishment
against self-harm
684 744 1000 1070 1010 1349 1441
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establishments clearly responded positively to guidelines for incident and adjudication. 
Nevertheless, it is still unclear how far the quality and accountability of incident and 
adjudication reports had been improved across local establishments since 2003. 
Additionally, the compliance level of local establishments regarding segregation and 
protection cells is uncertain from available data.  
Thus, it should be understood that although some improvements have been 
observed since 2003, the accountability of information recording and documentation 
still varies between local establishments. Thus, according to the compliance rank and 
scores table (see Appendix 2), this situation can be ranked at the second lowest 
compliance level, (the quality of accountable records and documentation about risk 
varies widely among local establishments), and the Japanese prison service can be 
assigned a score of +1 for this sub-code.  
 
5.5.2: Violence 
England 
PSO 2700 requires large quantities of paperwork to be completed by prison staff about 
cases of violence and adjudication records where punishments have been issued.  
Furthermore, it requires databases to be kept on incidences of violence and bullying and 
the use of force and segregation.  
The accountability of records of adjudication proceedings and punishments 
issued thereof were discussed in this chapter in section 5.3.2, specifically in regard to 
the appropriateness procedures of issuing punishment. This earlier discussion indicated 
that a majority of local establishments kept adequate records in this regard. Accordingly, 
this section focuses on the quality of the information recorded about the use of force and 
segregation to control prisoners (PSO 1700) and SIRs (PSO 1400). 
 According to HMCIP reports, a majority of local establishments kept adequate 
records on the use of force and segregation and incident reports. Again, I reviewed the 
most recent HMCIP full inspection reports for 74 local establishments. Only four of 
these prisons were reported to be keeping poor or insufficiently accountable records of 
the use of force, segregation and incident records which were not adequate for assessing 
trends in violence: namely HMPs Brixton (HMCIP, 2008b), Lancaster Castle (HMCIP 
2007f), Risley (HMCIP, 2006f) and Rye Hill (HMCIP, 2007g). More specifically, it 
was reported of these establishments that report forms were either thoroughly 
incomplete or lacked details of incidents (HMCIP, 2008b, 2006f, and 2007g). 
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Alternatively, some cases of slight bullying, which were not causes of injuries for 
victims, were under-reported in the local establishment (HMCIP 2007f).   
Nevertheless, a majority of local establishments were found to be keeping 
generally accountable documentation and information records during HM inspections. 
Hence, according to HMCIP reports, a majority of local establishments managed 
records and documentation properly. In regard to the compliance rank and scores table, 
these circumstances can be ranked at the second highest group level (accountable 
records and documentation about risk are kept by a majority of local establishments) 
and a score of +2 can be assigned to HMPS for this sub-code.   
 
Japan 
As explained in chapter 4, the Japanese prison service has a number of rules concerning 
violence-related information recording and documentation systems: incident and 
adjudication reports for the purpose of correctional statistics (Ordinance 332, Instruction 
542 and 3351); segregation records (Instruction 3346 and 3405); records for transferring 
prisoners (Instruction 3316), and records for use of force (Ordinance 33258) (see Sec. 
4.5.2). 
 Firstly, in regard to the compliance level of incidents and adjudication reports, 
the CARC was reported that the quality of relevant documentation was varied across 
local establishments in 2003 (JMOJ 2003). The prison service issued the relevant 
regulatory codes shown above in order to improve this problem in 2006 (see Sec. 4.5.1 
and 4.5.2) In relation to the violence control, Table 5.7 (National statistics: N of assaults 
and punishments issued for violent behaviour between 2002 and 2008 in the Japanese 
prison service) and Figure 5.3 showed trends of incident and adjudication reports 
between 2002 and 2008. Figure 5.3 showed that the number of serious assaults and 
punishments showed no fluctuation since the new statistical guidelines were published 
in 2006. Additionally, as I mentioned in Sec. 5.3.2, the number of reported adjudication 
is constantly high than that of reported serious assault. Hence, it is not clear to what 
extent local establishments comply with these rules, or whether they had improved the 
quality of relevant documents since 2003.  
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Figure 5.3: N of assaults and punishments issued for violent behaviour between 2002 and 2008 in 
the Japanese prison service. (This graph is made of data in Table 5.7) 
 
  
 Secondly, in terms of the accountability of local records on the use of 
segregation units and protection cells is not known by each local establishment as I 
discussed in Section 5.5.1 above. JMOJ and NPA (2011) do not particularly mention 
how far local establishments keep accountable records of those procedures in the report. 
Thirdly, records of prisoner transfers were not accessible to the public so it is not clear 
whether these documents are accountable or not. Finally, in regard to records for the use 
of force, Table 5.14 and Figure 5.1 show, there was a national increase in the number of 
reported incidents in which force was used against prisoners between 2006 and 2010. 
However, it is not clear whether these reports are accountable in local establishments 
because the Japanese prison service does not make information available about 
individual prisons.  
 Thus, in terms of violence control, the available data showed mixed results. 
Firstly, in regard to incidents and adjudication records, the CARC 2003 showed that the 
quality of relevant documents were varied in local establishments, and latest data did 
not show this situation was improved after the new instructions were issued. Secondly, 
accountability of documentation for segregation, transfers and use of force in local 
establishments in local establishments was uncertain according to the available data. 
Therefore, bearing in mind the situation raised in the CARC 2003, it should be 
understood that the accountability of relevant information recording and documentation 
still varies between local establishments. According to the compliance rank and scores 
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table (see Appendix 2), this case can be ranked at the second lowest group level and a 
score of +1 can be assigned to the Japanese prison service.  
 
 
5.6: Conclusion 
 
This chapter has discussed the compliance levels of local establishments in England and 
Japan in response to suicide and violence control regulations by analysing the extent to 
which local establishments operate the risk control systems defined by those rules 
appropriately and sufficiently.  
The findings of this chapter are as follows. Firstly, in terms of discipline and 
order, HMPS showed that the normalization and decency of prisoners are as important 
as discipline and order in local establishments. By contrast, the Japanese prison service 
showed that prison staff members in local establishments view collective order and 
stability as more important than the interests of individual prisoners. Accordingly, 
tighter restrictions are placed on individual prisoners in Japan than in England. In terms 
of group levels, HMPS accepts a wider variety of behaviour than the Japanese prison 
service which takes the view that prisoners’ behaviour should be unified through tight 
controls and discipline.  
 Secondly, in terms of ways of identifying risk in local establishments, HMPS’ 
showed that ways of identifying risk of suicide and self-harm varies among local 
establishments in response to suicide and self-harm defined by PSOs. Case studies 
showed several problems in the process of identifying risk were observed, and risk 
identification is not unified under the formal definition of risks discussed in chapter 4. 
Meanwhile, the Japanese prison service does not provide formal definitions of suicide 
and self-harm in order to identify them as risks, and collected data also suggests that 
there is no clear consensus among prison staff about how these risks should be defined. 
In brief, local establishments did not show any particular ways of identifying the risks 
of suicide and self-harm.   
In regard to violence control, HMPS showed that ways of identifying violence 
risk varies among local establishments. As well as suicide control, each local 
establishment showed different issues in regard to identifying risk of violence. Those 
problems also vary depending on local establishments. Meanwhile, although chapter 4 
showed that the Japanese prison service does not have formal definitions of violence 
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and serious assault for the purposes of controlling them as risks, prison officers do share 
some informal ways of identifying these risks among themselves.  
 Thirdly, with regard to the appropriateness of punishment and reward systems, 
suicide and self-harm control in HMPS are not applicable to this sub-code because 
punishment and reward are not used to control them. In the Japanese prison service, the 
prison service insists that there is no inappropriate use of punishment in local 
establishments. In response to this, alternative sources suggest that local establishments 
generally overuse punishment; however, this evidence was not specific enough to 
support this tendency in controlling suicide and self-harm. Similarly, available data did 
not show the inappropriate use of reward system among local establishments in the 
Japanese prison service. According to the rule for measuring the compliance rank 
discussed in chapter 3, it can be concluded that the appropriateness of punishments 
issued for cases of suicide and self-harm in the Japanese prison service varies between 
local establishments. 
 In regard to how punishment and reward are used to control the risk of violence, 
it was found that most local establishments in HMPS used punishment appropriately 
and with sufficient adjudication procedures. In comparison, there was more local 
variation in how well the IEP system was used. Meanwhile, the reports in the CARC 
2003 was found that some Japanese prisons traditionally overused punishment not for 
disciplining violent prisoners, but rather for deterring other prisoners from committing 
certain offences. The excessive number of punishments recorded in the national 
correctional statistics suggests that this tradition still continues in most local 
establishments. Therefore, it is concluded here that most local establishments in the 
Japanese prison service use disciplinary measures intended for violence control 
inappropriately. In regard to the reward system in the Japanese prison service, since 
there was no reliable evidence to insist that the IEP system is inappropriately operated 
in local establishments, it is assumed that majority of local establishments appropriately 
conducts the IEP according to the rule for measuring the compliance rank discussed 
above.   
 Fourthly, in response to the national risk control guidelines, it was found that 
all local establishments in HMPS had introduced suicide control strategies as required 
by PSO 2700. Nevertheless, the quality of these strategies varies between local 
establishments. Meanwhile, the Japanese prison service does not have any formal 
integrated guidelines for controlling suicide and self-harm. Accordingly, I measured the 
compliance level of the subordinate regulations (i.e. kunrei and tsutasu) covering these 
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issues. As a result, the compliance level of local establishments varies depending on 
which rules need to be followed. However, this conclusion took into account uncertain 
results.  
 All local establishments in HMPS have developed local violence control 
strategies following the guidelines set out in PSO 2750. Nevertheless, as with suicide 
and self-harm control, the quality and extent to which these strategies have been 
developed varies between local establishments. Most issues with the development of 
local strategies were similar to those raised about suicide control strategies.  
Meanwhile, peculiar issues were found with the violence control strategies operated by 
some local establishments. For example, the case of HMP Pentonville, discussed in 
section 5.4.2.above, shows that the contexts and histories of some prisons make 
violence control especially difficult. Formal strategies only following the national 
guidelines may not be enough to solve issues with violence in these prisons.  
Since the Japanese prison service does not have formal integrated guidelines 
concerning violence control, I assessed the compliance level of the relevant written 
regulations (i.e. kunrei and tsutasu). Additionally, data available to assess the 
compliance level was limited: specifically information on local establishments was not 
available. Therefore, given the limited availability of data, the compliance level of local 
establishments varies depending on which rules should be followed. 
 Finally, the information recording and documentation systems in place 
throughout HMPS were sufficiently accountable in a majority of local establishments 
for both suicide and violence control. In regard to the Japanese prison service, the 
CARC reported that the quality of relevant documentation for both suicide and violence 
control varied among local establishments. Relevant regulatory codes raised in chapter 4 
were issued for improving this problem in local establishments. Nevertheless, the 
available data suggests that the accountability of record-keeping and documentation at a 
local level has not particularly improved since 2003. Hence it was considered that the 
accountability of documentation still varies among local establishments.    
 Based on these findings, I assigned compliance ranks and scores to the English 
and Japanese prison services which reflect the extent to which local establishments 
follow the various risk control regulations discussed in chapter 4. Separate scores were 
assigned to each prison service for suicide and violence control. Table 5.16 displays 
these results and Table 5.17 gives a summary of the compliance group scores, including 
raw and standardised ones.  Table 5.16 offers a visual map of the results for the 
compliance (X1) scores. As with Table 4.1, each of the five columns represent the 
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sub-codes discussed in this chapter. The positions of the shaded blocks reflect the group 
level of the English and Japanese prison services for each sub-code, and “S” represents 
suicide risk control while “V” represents violence risk control. Meanwhile, Table 5.17 
shows the compliance (X1) score results as numbers. Again, the five sub-codes are 
listed twice in the left-hand column and two sets of figures are given for each: the first 
are raw scores and the second are standardized scores as discussed in chapter 3 (see 
Table 3.5, p. 118).  
  
Table 5.16: Compliance (X1) levels of the English and Japanese prison services for suicide and 
violence control 
 
 
(S): suicide, and (V):violence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sub-codes
Reward
high 4
3
Japan
low 0
Japan
(S)
England
 (S)
England
(S)
Japan(V)
Punishment
Ranks
Group
Scores
2
England
England
(S)&(V)
England
(V)
1
1.
Order
Japan
(S)
England
 (S) &(V)
Japan
(S) and
(V)
England
(S) & (V)
2.
Risk
Japan:
 (V)
4.
National
guidelines
5.
Information
record
3
Japan
 (S) &(V)
England
 (V)
Japan
(S)& (V)
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Table 5.17: Raw and standardized scores for the English and Japanese prison services in response to 
suicide and violence control 
 
  
In summary, these results show that the Japanese prison service has been given 
a higher group level than HMPS in response to: 1. order and discipline in prisons; 2. 
ways of identifying the risk of violence; and 3. the appropriateness of the punishment 
and reward system. In regard to the punishment and reward system, the violence and 
suicide scores for the Japanese prison service were assigned higher group scores than 
those of HMPS, because the available data did not indicate that the reward system was 
being used inappropriately in Japanese local establishments. However, in comparison 
with HMPS, detailed data was not made available by the Japanese prison service hence 
the score which I have given here should be considered as provisional. Finally, HMPS 
was given a score 0 for the use of punishment and reward to control suicide because 
these measures are not used to control suicide in local establishments. Overall, 
excluding order and discipline in the Japanese prison service, the English and Japanese 
prison services both received moderate group levels reflecting the extent to which local 
establishments complied with the rules discussed in chapter 4.  
 
Compliance Score (X1) 
Sub-codes England Japan England Japan
1 Order 2 3 2 3
2 Identifying risk 1 0 1 2
3 Punishment and Reward 0 4 3 3
4 National guideline 2 1 2 1
5 Information record 2 1 2 1
1 Order 6.7 10.0 6.7 10.0
2 Identifying risk 3.3 0.0 3.3 6.7
3 Punishment and Reward 0.0 6.7 5.0 5.0
4 National guideline 5.0 2.5 5.0 2.5
5 Information record 6.7 3.3 6.7 3.3
Raw Scores
Standardized score
Suicide Violence
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Chapter 6 
Leadership 1: Roles of Governors 
in Local Risk Control Strategies (Grid 2)  
 
 
This chapter discusses the specialization (Y2) of governors in local risk control 
strategies. As was noted in chapter 3, for the purposes of this study I have focused only 
on the roles played by governors in local risk control strategies within the broader 
context of the national risk control structures. To what extent governors are in charge of 
leadership roles within local risk control strategies in the national risk control structures 
and how those roles are assigned to them are discussed as the grid aspect of risk control 
structure in this chapter. This aspect of risk control is discussed here in terms of five 
sub-codes. Section one of this chapter analyses specialization of staff for controlling 
risk; section two analyses criteria for selecting governors; section three analyses 
interpersonal roles of governors in local suicide and violence control strategies; section 
four analyses informational roles of governors in local suicide and violence strategies; 
and section five analyses decisional roles of governors.  
 
 
6.1: Specialization of staff members  
 
The first sub-code analyses the general approach of the English and Japanese prison 
services to the specialization of staff members in local establishments. In particular, it 
considers to what extent each prison service assigns special roles to staff members in 
order to control the risks of suicide and violence. This general approach provides 
contextual understanding of the specialized risk management roles played by prison 
governors at a local level, and of the extent to which these roles are assigned to them by 
the national prison services. 
 
6.1.1: Suicide  
England  
HMPS employs a variety of staff members: prison officers, workshop trainers, 
healthcare specialists, psychologists, and security officers among others. A national list 
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of prison staff compiled in 2005 shows that about half of staff members at that time 
were either prison officers or governor grade officers (i.e. including serving governors): 
the remainder were all non-officer staff members (HMPS 2006: see Table 6.1).  
 
Table 6.1: Breakdown of HMPS staff according to job titles (HMPS, 2006) 
 
 
A similarly high level of specialization among HMPS staff can also be 
observed in specific risk control process in local establishments. For example, PSO 
2700 (Suicide Reduction) defines jobs and teams specialising in local suicide and 
self-harm control: the Safer Custody Team (SCT), SCT leaders, Suicide Prevention 
Co-ordinators (SPC), and ACCT Trainers (2.7.5, PSO 2700). The SCT leader is 
responsible for ensuring that the local suicide prevention strategy is fully integrated and 
compatible with the local violence reduction strategy. Moreover, they are also 
responsible for the development of a self-harm management strategy  and for making 
sure that all other local policies, procedures, and strategies reflect the holistic nature of 
the wider safer custody strategy (Annex1-8, PSO 2700). This post is normally filled by 
governors. Suicide Prevention Co-ordinators (SPCs) are responsible for co-ordinating 
the overall suicide prevention and self-harm management procedures of their local 
establishments. Lastly, ACCT trainers are required to develop a training strategy in 
agreement with their governors (ibid.). As was discussed in chapter 4 and 5, staff 
members need to have special training in order to operate the ACCT monitoring scheme 
(see Sec. 4.4.1 and 5.4.1). Accordingly, ACCT trainers are responsible for directing and 
refreshing these training programmes for all the staff in their establishments who work 
with prisoners.  
HMPS assigns specialised roles to its staff members for controlling suicide in 
these ways. Thus, according to the specialisation rank and scores table (see Appendix 3), 
the suicide prevention roles defined by PSO 2700 can be ranked at the highest grid level 
Job titles Proportion (%)
Prison Officers (non-Governors grade) 50
Governors grade officers 2.8
Operational support staff 15.2
Administration staff 15.3
Healthcare 2.2
Chaplaincy 0.6
Psychology staff 1.9
industrial staff (trainers) 7
other civil staff 4
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(the prison service allocates special roles prison staff for controlling the risks of suicide 
in local establishments) and a score of +2 can be assigned to HMPS for this sub-code.  
 
Japan 
In comparison with HMPS, the degree of specialization among Japanese prison staff is 
significantly lower. A majority of staff members are prison officers who specialise in 
security. According to a breakdown of Japanese prison staff in 2007, more than 95% 
were security officers. The other 5% were listed as either healthcare staff or 
administrators (JMOJ, 2007: see Table 6.2). Additionally, the employment of private 
citizens in Japanese prisons is significantly limited, even among trainers and teachers 
(JMOJ, 2007). 
 
Table 6.2: Breakdown of Japanese prison staff 2006/07  
 
 
Although a majority of Japanese prison staff are security officers, they are not 
assigned special roles for controlling specific risks. In terms of suicide and self-harm, 
prison staff are not usually given specialised job titles or assigned to teams relevant to 
these risks in local establishments. Instead, the Japanese prison service has traditionally 
controlled these risks with general-purpose officers, known as tanto (担当) officers, 
who are in charge of the overall care of prisoners. The Japanese word, tanto, refers to 
anybody who is in charge of performing set duties. The tanto system is intended to 
control prisoners by keeping them in small groups while they are in different areas of 
prisons such as workshops and group cells (JMOJ, 2003a). Tanto officers are normally 
not high ranking operational managers, but non-grade low ranking officers. Each tanto 
officer is normally in charge of groups of between 60 and 80 prisoners (ibid.). Each 
group of prisoners is usually controlled by two tanto officers who work together in a 
shift pattern: one works a day shift while the other works a night shift (JMOJ, 2003a).  
The tanto system is not grounded in any formal legal sources concerning 
prisons. Instead, it is built on the informal customs which have developed throughout 
the history of Japanese prisons (Ozawa, 2007). Tanto officers are responsible for 
Job titles population proportion (%)
6HFXULW\RIILFHUV 17934 95.3%
Administration officers 208 1.1%
Administration support 55 0.3%
Healthcare 614 3.3%
total 18811
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covering all day-to-day issues concerning prisoners: that is, from security and safety 
issues to the emotional care of prisoners (Ozawa, 2007). Due to the close but 
paternalistic relationship they have with prisoners, tanto officers are informally called 
“oyaji” [father] or “tanto-san” [Mr. tanto] by prisoners (Ozawa, 2007; and Nishio, 
2004). In this context, the control and care of prisoners at risk of suicide and self-harm 
are informally recognised as the responsibilities of tanto officers. If a case of self-harm 
or suicide occurs, healthcare staff and governors are in charge of post-incident care and 
procedures. However, the main strategies for preventing and following up incidences of 
self-harm and suicide largely rely upon tanto officers (JMOJ, 2003a).  
 According to the specialization rankand scores table (see Appendix 3), the 
tanto officer system can be ranked at the second lowest grid level (staff members are 
assigned specific roles for more general purposes) and the Japanese prison service can 
be assigned a score of +1 for this sub-code. 
 
6.1.2: Violence  
England 
HMPS uses the power of governors and specialised staff to control the risk of violence. 
PSO 2750 states that governors are responsible for implementing and maintaining their 
local violence reduction strategies. It also requires governors to chair special monthly 
meetings, called The Violence Reduction Meeting, in their local establishments (PSO 
2750).  
PSO 2750 defines specialised staff roles and teams for controlling violence in 
local establishments. In addition to its role in suicide control, as mentioned by PSO 
2700, The Safer Custody Team (SCT) is also defined by PSO 2750 as an essential part 
of the violence control strategies operated by local establishments. As members of the 
SCT, governors need to appoint Violence Reduction Co-ordinators (VRC) and Safer 
Custody Officers for their local establishments. Thus, as with suicide control, HMPS 
relies on specialised staff members, each of whom is given a particular job title and 
description, to implement violence control strategies in local establishments.  
According to the specialization rank and scores table (see Appendix 3), HMPS 
can be ranked at the highest grid level (the prison service allocates special roles prison 
staff for controlling the risks of violence in local establishments) and assigned a score of 
+2 for this sub-code. 
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Japan 
The Japanese prison service does not assign specialised jobs to prison staff in order to 
control the risk of violence in local establishments. Instead, tanto officers are largely 
relied upon to control violence. In comparison with suicide control, tanto officers 
generally believe that violence control is one of their main tasks: in contrast, they do not 
usually take this view with suicide control. This is probably a result of their original 
speciality since, as the 2007 breakdown of prison staff shows the majority of prison 
staff are security officers (see Table 6.2). Most of the Japanese prison staff with whom I 
conducted interviews had worked previously as tanto officers. According to these 
interviewees, maintaining a non-violent environment in prison was one of the main 
demands placed upon them as tanto officers. The importance placed on violence control 
was also observed in the testimonies given by prison officers to the CARC 2003 (JMOJ, 
2003a). These testimonies focused on how individual tanto officers manage to maintain 
control over 50-60 prisoners, avoiding any conflicts, assaults, or cases of bullying 
between them. 
 Thus, in comparison with suicide control, the Japanese prison service shows a 
high degree of specialization in using tanto officers to control violence. According to 
the specialisation rank and scores table (see Appendix 3), the tanto officer system, when 
applied to violence control, can be ranked at the highest grid level (the prison service 
allocates special roles prison staff for controlling the risks of violence in local 
establishments) and a score of +2 can be assigned to the Japanese prison service for this 
sub-code. 
 
 
6.2: Promotion criteria for governors: ascription or achievement 
 
As Gross and Rayner (1985) have shown with their EXACT model, the grid level of 
organizations is indicated by how their members gain entitlements within them: 
specifically, whether the selection criteria are ascription or achievement based. 
Therefore, this section analyses whether governors are appointed according to ascription 
or achievement based criteria. 
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England  
The entry schemes for governors in HMPS have been constantly changing since the 
prison service reforms of the 1980s (Coyle, 2005). In general, there are two career paths 
for governors: 1. internal promotion based on length of service; and 2. direct or 
fast-track promotion (PSO 8100; and Leech, 2010).  
Some HMPS governors are appointed in light of their experiences of working 
inside the prison service. Most of these governors entered the prison service as 
non-graded officers. Candidates for the role of governor must pass the relevant tests at 
the Senior Operational Manager Job Simulation Assessment Centre (SOMJSAC) 
(Leech, 2010) before they can be appointed. In these circumstances, promotion to a 
governorship is based on around 20 years of service. For example, Gov. Mick Bell 
joined HMPS as a non-graded officer in 1977 and was promoted as governor of HMP 
Aylesbury in 2001 (Leech, 2010).  
Meanwhile, the direct or fast-track route allows for governors to be promoted 
from among experienced professionals outside of the prison service, including 
university graduates who may be potential candidates for governorships (HMPS, 2011). 
This career path is currently called the Intensive Development Scheme (IDS), having 
thus replaced Accessorized Promotion (APS), Direct Entry (DE), and Cross 
Hierarchical Move (CHM) (Leeach 2010; and PSO 8100). A good example of 
somebody who has benefited from this entry scheme is Gov. Peter Wright who is 
currently governor of HMP Nottingham. He joined HMPS in 1992 after working as a 
civil servant in the Home Office, whereat he was directly promoted to a senior 
management post in HMP YOI Glen Parva and later appointed governor of HMP 
Stafford in 1998 (Leech 2010).  
In terms of the merits of promoting governors in this way, one governor whom 
I interviewed explained that length of service in HMPS does not necessarily correlate 
with the potential to be a good governor. Less experienced candidates often prove to be 
better at managing prisons than more experienced officers.  
 
Recruiting good candidates who are natural leaders is more important than 
promoting experienced officers as governors. In my experience longer 
experience does not necessarily correlate with higher capability as governors. It 
is commonly observed that officers, who have just joined HMPS perform much 
better than officers who have been working in prisons for more than 10 years.  
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Accordingly, the two types of promotion scheme maintained by HMPS (i.e. 1. 
internal promotion based on length of service; 2. direct entry or fast-track promotion) 
show that governors can be promoted in regard to both their achievements and 
ascription values. However, governors cannot be appointed only on the basis of 
ascription values (e.g. age, qualifications, or experiences). Instead, in order to be 
promoted governors also need to perform well in the prison service.  
 According to the specialisation rank and scores table (see Appendix 3), the 
system that HMPS has in place for appointing governors can be ranked at the second 
highest grid level (promotion of governors is based on ascription and achievement) and 
a score of +2 can be assigned to HMPS for this sub-code. 
 
Japan 
Unlike HMPS, the Japanese prison service does not directly promote governors from 
outside of the prison service among external professionals. The current system for 
appointing governors only considers existing staff with long records of service as 
suitable candidates.  
 Thus, in order to become governors, all candidates need to rise up through the 
ranks after joining the prison service as prison officers: there are no exceptions. 
Applicants to join the Japanese service need be aged between 18 and 35 (JMOJ, 2003d). 
Furthermore, applicants are classified depending on their educational backgrounds: 1. 
high school graduates who have passed the prison officer entry selection exam; 2. 
university graduates who have passed the civil servant exam (type B) set by the 
National Personnel Authority [Jinji-in:人事院]; and 3. university graduates who have 
passed the high-ranking civil servant exam (type A) also set by the NPA (ibid.).  
 Applicants’ entry grades depend on the level of the entry exams they have 
taken. There are a total of 11 grades within the Japanese prison service. Applicants who 
pass the basic prison officer entry exam start their careers from the first grade 
(non-graded prison officer). Applicants who pass the type B civil servant exam start 
from the second grade (junior officer). Lastly, applicants who pass the high-ranking 
civil servant exam (type A) start from the third grade (operational manager) (ibid). In all 
cases, appointed prison staff must rise up through the officer graded ranks to the top: i.e. 
to become serving governors at grades 10 and 11 (see Table 6.3). 
 The promotion of governors within the Japanese prison service is tightly 
connected with the ages of applicants. For example, the official literature of the 
Japanese prison service states that although the eligibility of candidates for promotion 
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depends on their ability, most officers can take the middle level training at around 29 
years old (JMOJ 2003c). Table 6.3 which follows illustrates the typical career path 
followed by Japanese prison governors as reported by the Correction Bureau (JMOJ, 
2003d). This chart shows the case of a prison officer who joined the service at 18 years 
old and rose up through ranks until he retired.  
 
 
Table 6.3: Career development sample in the Japanese prison service: the case of a prison officer 
who joined the service at 18 years old  
 
[Table 2.8, p.13 in  JMOJ  (2003d) HR of prison staff in Japan (keimukan no jinji kanri ni tsuite:刑務官の人事管理について)] 
 
When asked about the system for appointing governors, a retired governor 
whom I interviewed explained that, if provided candidates for governorships are not 
obviously unsuitable for the role, they are considered to be good candidates. He stressed 
that the career system is based on seniority, in which respect the performance of 
Officer Ranks 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Non
grade
officers
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60 Retirement
Junior
managers Middle managers Senior managers
Governing
 Governors
ages
 Grades
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governors in local establishments is not of utmost concern to the Japanese prison service. 
Thus, alongside the sample of career development in the Japanese prison service 
illustrated by Table 6.3, his views suggest that the promotion criteria for governors are 
deeply connect to the age of candidates. As he stated: 
  
If you are ordinarily capable, you can be a governor because the career system 
is seniority based in the Japanese prison service…if they [governors] are not 
stupid, they should be able to maintain prison operation. 
  
Thus, the data concerning the usual career paths taken by Japanese prison staff 
shows that the promotion criteria for governors largely rely on the age and length of 
service of applicants. In this case, age and length of service are typical examples of an 
ascription based criteria. Evidently, the Japanese prison service promotes governors 
based on such criteria. According to the specialisation rank and scores table (see 
Appendix 3), the career system maintained by the Japanese prison service can be ranked 
at the highest grid level (promotion of governors is based on ascription) and a score of 
+3 can be assigned to the Japanese prison service for this sub-code. 
 
 
6.3: Interpersonal roles 
 
The third sub-code concerns the interpersonal roles of governors. This code is analysed 
here in terms of three activities which governors are supposed to perform: figurehead, 
leaders, and liaison (Mintzberg, 1973; and see p.97). Each activity is judged according 
to whether governors are supposed to perform them weakly or strongly as part of their 
suicide and violence risk control strategies.  
The first interpersonal role, as mentioned above, is figurehead. As I explained 
in chapter 3, figurehead involves performing a number of routine socio-legal duties in 
the capacity of head of an organization (Mintzberg, 1973). This kind of activity can be 
analysed here in terms of the duties linked to suicide and violence control assigned to 
governors by prison rules. The second interpersonal role, leader, refers to the activity of 
heads of organizations for motivating and activating their subordinates (ibid.). 
Accordingly, this section analyses the extent to which governors are required to fulfil 
this role in relation to suicide and violence control strategies in local establishments. 
The third role, liaison, refers to the activity of leaders for maintaining and developing 
self-developed networks of external contacts that can provide them with favours and 
211 
information. In regard to the English and Japanese prison services, I will analyse 
whether governors are required to maintain networks outside of their local 
establishments which impinge upon suicide and violence control at a local level. 
 
6.3.1: Suicide 
England 
In regard to the figurehead role, HMPS assigns several duties to governors as part of 
local suicide control procedures, in which respect governors are required to be active 
figureheads. PSO 2700 assigns several duties to governors in their capacity as strategic 
heads of local establishments. In particular, it states that governors must take overall 
responsibility for local suicide prevention strategies (Sec.1.7.4, PSO 2700).  
Firstly, governors must be responsible for fully staffing the SCT team and 
appointing staff members for the specialised jobs defined in PSO 2700 (Annex 1D: PSO 
2700): that is, SPCs and ACCT trainers. Furthermore, if governors do not appoint 
particular SCT leaders, they are assumed to be in charge of this position themselves 
(PSO 2700). Secondly, in the process of implementing local suicide control strategies 
which follow the overall suicide control guidelines defined in PSO 2700, governors 
must publish a local policy statement which also follows the guidelines set out in PSO 
2700. This policy statement must include specific references to suicide prevention, 
self-harm management, and any other arrangements relating to safer custody and 
safeguarding (Sec. 1.7.7, PSO 2700).  
 Thirdly, governors are in charge of authorizing several procedures in their local 
suicide control strategies: transferring prisoners at risk to protection cells or other 
establishments (PSO 1810), placing prisoners at risk in segregation units (PSOs 2700 
and 1700), and overseeing post-incident investigations (PSO 2700). PSO 1810 states 
that governors must develop local strategies for appropriately transferring prisoners at 
risk to other establishments. Meanwhile, PSOs 1700 and 2700 declare that governors 
are responsible for authorizing the segregation of prisoners at risk of suicide following 
the ACCT guidelines. Furthermore, governors are in charge of building flexible 
post-incident action plans explaining what actions must be taken and by whom in the 
event of an apparent death in custody (Chap. 2, PSO 2700) or serious self-harm. 
 In terms of the leader role, PSO 8480 (Performance Recognition) is intended 
to recognise the performance and achievements of staff members in local establishments 
in ways that motivate them. It outlines several prize-giving bodies and awards which 
may be given to individual prison staff: these include the Queen’s Birthday and New 
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Year’s Honours, the Imperial Service Medal (ISM) Nominations, the Director General’s 
Prison Officer of the Year Awards, and the Butler Trust Award Scheme (PSO 8480). 
PSO 8480 asks governors to plan and manage local performance recognition schemes in 
their local establishments whereby appropriate candidates may be selected for the 
awards mentioned above. Governors need to appoint performance recognition 
coordinators and consult the Prison Officers Trade unions about how the awards are 
arranged (1.2: PSO 8480). Thus, governors are required to take leading roles in the 
construction of local performance recognition plans in order to effectively motivate staff 
members in local establishments.  
 In regard to the impact of PSO 8480 on suicide performance control, some 
awards raised above includes commends for the prison staff members who performed 
well in managing suicide in prisons. To illustrate, candidates for the Director General’s 
Prison Officer of the Year Award in 2008 were selected according to the five following 
nomination categories: 1. working with young people; 2. suicide prevention; 3. reducing 
re-offending; 4. managing difficult prisoners; 4. security; 5. diversity; and 6. staff 
support (CJP, 2007). Evidently, governors are required to motivate staff members in all 
of these areas of local performance and to recognise outstanding staff accordingly. This 
indicates that governors are expected to active assume the role of leader.  
In regard to the third role, liaison, HMPS outlines how important it is that 
prison governors are able to act as effective leaders in the official recruitment web pages 
(HMPS, 2010). Particular attention is drawn to two types of leadership: 1. leaders value 
achievement and are motivated by hope of success or fear of failure; and 2. leaders 
value harmony and are motivated by hope of affiliation or fear of rejection (HMPS, 
2010). HMPS describes the first type of leader in terms of personalities as 
action-oriented, rational, directive, assertive, efficient, and expedient. It is further 
explained that these leaders are good at controlling and planning the activities of their 
organizations and competing with others (ibid.). Meanwhile, the second type of leader is 
described as more relationship-oriented, in which respect their personalities are more 
emotional, consultative, receptive, effective, and qualitative (ibid.). In terms of 
personalities, this type of leader is said to be good at negotiating, networking, tackling 
diplomacy, supporting, facilitating, developing, and team-building. MPS has concluded 
that governors must have both types of personality in order to be suitable for the role 
(ibid.). Given that the second type of personality is concerned with maintaining personal 
networks with others, it can be concluded here that HMPS governors are required to act 
out the liaison role.   
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This discussion has focused on rather general criteria concerning the ideal 
leadership traits of HMPS governors. Thus, it should be noted that personal networks 
can play major roles in some suicide control strategies. To illustrate, PSO 2700 states 
that if other local establishments are able to provide more appropriate environments for 
prisoners at risk of suicide, governors can arrange for those prisoners to be transferred 
to the other local establishments. Such decisions may be based on factors like whether 
the receiving establishments are situated closer to the prisoners’ hometowns or are able 
to provide better care and support (PSOs 2700, 1700, and 1810). Transfers are usually 
arranged between the two establishments involved and sometimes, if necessary, with the 
approval of Area Managers (PSO 1700). Thus, personal networks between governors, 
and occasionally area managers, can play an important role in transferring prisoners 
who are at risk to themselves. 
To conclude, HMPS governors are expected to be actively engaged in all three 
of the interpersonal roles outlined above for the purposes of operating their local suicide 
control strategies: that is, figurehead, leaders, and liaison. Therefore, according to the 
specialization ranks and scores table (see Appendix 3), HMPS can be ranked at the 
highest grid level and assigned a score of +4 for this sub-code.   
 
Japan 
In regard to the figurehead role, Japanese prison governors are not formally in charge of 
strategic responsibilities because the Japanese prison service does not have formally 
targeted national strategic guidelines for suicide control (see Sec. 4.4.1). However, they 
are in charge of relevant legal sources which are assigned to them as part of suicide and 
self-harm control procedures.  
 Firstly, governor authorises segregation and the use of protection of at risk of 
suicide and self-harm when it is considered that the prisoner harms communal order and 
discipline according Article 76 and 79 of The Penal Institutions Acts. Governors must 
grant their approval in any cases in which prisoners are confined to protection cells 
because they are likely to harm themselves (ibid.). Furthermore, governors can decide 
when and for how long such prisoners should be in confinement, and if they should be 
placed back in confinement (ibid.).As part of post-incident control in local 
establishments, Article 150 of The Penal Institutions Act states that governors must 
authorise punishments issued against prisoners who have harmed themselves. 
Furthermore, governors are responsible for investigating cases where prisoners have 
killed themselves by Ordinance [kunrei] 3379. Thus, in spite of the lack of national 
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written strategic guidelines, certain rules within the Japanese prison provide the 
figurehead in the process of local suicide control strategies.  
In regard to the leader role, the Japanese prison service has never officially 
clarified whether governors are responsible for actively motivating subordinate staff in 
their establishments. However, Professor Koichi Hamai, who retired from the Japanese 
prison service as a governor grade officer in 2004 and is now a professor of Law at 
Ryukoku University, has suggested that governors are moderately and informally 
required to motivate staff within local establishments (Hamai, 2005). Hamai has 
outlined the abilities expected of Japanese prison governors as follows: 1. 
kikubari—being aware of the emotional states of prisoners and staff; 2. 
mekubari—being generally aware of what is going on in their prison; and 3. 
kokorokubari—being considerate of other staff. According to his view, kikubari and 
kokorokubari can be considered ways of motivating prison staff in local establishments. 
Nevertheless, the available data do not particularly show that governors are required to 
motivate staff members in local suicide control processes. Thus, it is unclear to what 
extent governors are expected to assume a leader role in local suicide control strategies. 
In regard to the liaison role, formal written rules or instructions do not state 
that governors are required to maintain or develop their own external networks. 
However, data gathered for this study suggest that in practice governors do need to 
develop and maintain external networks in order to effectively run their local 
establishment. For example, a retired governor grade officer whom I interviewed 
claimed that having informal networks can affect the capability of governors to carry 
out their duties. Unlike in HMPS, such networks are inherited through family ties. Thus, 
some governors develop vertical and horizontal networks. As the aforesaid interviewee 
explained:   
 
Having informal networks is very profitable for governors [in the Japanese 
prison service]...As far as I knew, many governors had fathers who had worked 
as governors [of prisons in Japan]. Due to their family backgrounds, they 
already have informal networks with other governors who have similar 
backgrounds. They also have networks with senior staff in HQs or area offices 
who had worked under their fathers. Needless to say, the promotion of staff and 
governors is based on meritocracy; however, those informal networks strongly 
affect the ability of governors to operate prisons.     
 
According to this view, maintaining informal networks outside of local establishments 
is important for Japanese prison governors. Nevertheless, it is not clear how far these 
networks influence local suicide and self-harm control strategies. Relevant procedures 
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used for local suicide control procedures (see Sec. 4.4.1) did not actively indicate that 
governors are required to motivate staff members. Hence it can be concluded here that 
the liaison role of Japanese prison governors is uncertain.  
Therefore, it can be seen that Japanese prison governors are actively in charge 
of the figurehead role in local suicide control strategies. By contrast, the informational 
and liaison roles are weaker or uncertain as far as they apply to suicide control in local 
establishments. Thus, according to the specialization ranks and scores table (see 
Appendix 3), the Japanese prison service can be ranked at the third lowest grid level and 
assigned a score of +2 for this sub-code.  
 
6.3.2: Violence 
England 
In regard to the figurehead role, PSO 2750 assigns several duties concerning violence 
control to governors in their capacity as leaders of local establishments. These duties 
include taking overall responsibility for the implementation and development of local 
violence reduction strategies (2.1, PSO 2750).  
In regard to pre-incident control, governors need to ensure that the SCT is fully 
staffed and that staff members are appointed to specialised jobs defined by PSO 2750. 
Governors must publish a local violence reduction policy statement following 
guidelines set out in PSO 2750. Additionally, governors are in charge of authorizing 
several procedures within local suicide control strategies: transferring prisoners whose 
behaviour is particularly difficult to segregation units or special protection cells (Rule 
45, The Prison Rules 1999; PSOs 1700 and 2750), transferring prisoners who are being 
bullied or difficult to other establishments (PSO 2750), authorizing and monitoring 
punishments issued against violent behaviour and rewards issued for good behaviour 
(Rule 55, The Prison Rules 1999; and PSO 4000 ).  
PSO 1700 states that local establishments can use segregation units or special 
cells to hold violent prisoners for short periods of time in order to prevent them from 
injuring other prisoners or staff. The segregation system was originally based on Rule 
45 of The Prison Rules 1999. This rule states that governors can authorise the 
segregation of violent prisoners at their discretion. Meanwhile, PSO 2750 stresses that 
prisoners who are permanently transferred to other establishments due to violence or 
bullying must benefit from the move. For their part, governors are in charge of 
determining the local standards by which transfers are authorised. In regard to 
punishment and reward as measures against violent behaviour, first, Rule 55 of The 
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Prison Rules 1999 places the responsibility for authorising punishments issued to 
violent prisoners in the hands of governors. Second, PSO 4000 states that governors 
must ensure that the IEP system is used fairly. Overall, governors have many legal 
duties which they must fulfill within local violence control strategies throughout 
pre-post- risk control process. Hence they are required to be in charge of the figurehead 
role.  
 Meanwhile, HMPS does not formally define the leader role of governors in 
terms of violence control. However, as with suicide control, PSO 8480 requests that 
governors take a leading role in their local performance recognition schemes (see Sec. 
6.3.1). Specifically in regard to local violence control, prison officers are awarded the 
Prison Officer of The Year Award in the Safety in Custody category, according to their 
efforts for violence reduction in local establishments (HMPS 2009). Thus, in relation to 
violence control, governors are required to motivate staff members throughout the local 
performance recognition arrangements. This evidence suggests that they are expected to 
assume an active leader role as part of local violence control strategies.  
 Similarly, HMPS does not formally discuss the liaison role in regard to 
governors and violence control. However, governors are required to maintain and 
develop informal networks outside of their own local establishments in order to 
facilitate prisoner transfers. Furthermore, in addition to suicide control, PSO 2750 states 
that transfers of difficult or bullied prisoners should be arranged between the two 
establishments concerned and, if necessary, with the agreement of the Area Manager 
(7.4, PSO 2750). Hence in this respect HMPS governors are expected to actively 
assume the liaison role for the purposes of controlling violence in their local 
establishments. 
 Therefore, in regard to violence control, the above discussion shows that 
HMPS governors are to some extent required to assume all three interpersonal roles: 
figurehead, leader, and liaison. According to the specialization rank and scores table 
(see Appendix 3), HMPS governors may be assigned the highest specialization rank in 
regard to the extent to which they assume the three interpersonal roles discussed above 
and HMPS can be given a score of +4 for this sub-code.  
 
Japan 
First, in regard to the figurehead role, Japanese prison governors are assigned several 
duties within the violence control procedures operated in their local establishments. 
These duties mainly involve granting approval for the segregation of violent prisoners, 
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transferring prisoners to protection cells, issuing punishments, and various other pre- 
and post-incident procedures.  
Governors are assigned the duty of giving approval for the segregation of 
prisoners who are likely to harm other prisoners and staff members (Art. 76, The Penal 
Institutions Act). The beginning, end, and renewal of periods of segregation must be 
authorised by local governors (ibid.). Similarly, governors are able to order prison 
officers to use special protection cells in cases where prisoners are likely to inflict 
injuries upon others (ii-b, Art. 79, The Penal Institutions Act). Second, governors should 
authorise punishments issued to violent prisoners based on decisions made by the 
relevant local adjudication committees (Art. 150, The Penal Institutions Act). Governors 
should also grant permission for transfers of prisoners belonging to Japanese gangs to 
other establishments for security reasons stated in Instruction 3316 [imei tsutatsu: 依命
通達 3316]. These legal duties show that Japanese prison governors are expected to 
actively assume the figurehead role in relation to local violence control procedures.   
 In regard to the leader role, the Japanese prison service does not officially 
discuss the responsibilities of governors for motivating local prison staff. Interview data 
and relevant academic studies do not indicate very much in this regard either. However, 
as I mentioned earlier in this section, Hamai (2005) has stated that governors are 
generally required to motivate their staff members in order to control the risk of suicide 
(see Sec. 6.3.1). Even so, the extent to which governors are required to assume the 
leader role as part of local violence control strategies is unclear from the available data. 
Accordingly, as with suicide control, it can only be concluded here that it is uncertain 
whether governors actively assume the leader role in local violence control strategies. 
Lastly, in regard to the liaison role, the interview with retired prison officers 
shows that some Japanese prison governors develop and maintain their own networks 
with other governors and staff in area offices, often thanks to their family backgrounds 
(see Sec. 6.3.1). Although it is not clear to what extent these networks are required for 
the purposes of suicide control, they certainly have some role to play in local violence 
control procedures. For example, Instruction 3316 [imei-tsutatsu 3316] states that local 
establishments can transfer prisoners, who are members of Japanese gangs to other local 
establishments, in order to avoid conflicts with other prisoners, who belong to other 
gangs. Such transfers are arranged between the governors of the establishments 
involved and, if necessary, the relevant area managers (Sections 4 and 5, tsutasu 3316). 
These arrangements suggest that informal networks between governors can help to 
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make the process of transferring prisons between local establishments smoother. Hence, 
in this respect, governors are required to actively take on the liaison role as part of local 
violence control strategies.  
To conclude, Japanese prison governors are required to assume two out of three 
of the interpersonal roles discussed above: that is, the figurehead and liaison roles. Thus, 
according to the specialization rank and scores table (see Appendix 3), the extent to 
which Japanese prison governors assume interpersonal roles for the purposes of 
violence control can be ranked at the second highest grid level and a score of  +3 can 
be assigned to the Japanese prison service for this sub-code. 
 
 
6.4: Informational roles 
 
The fourth sub-code concerns the informational roles of leaders, as defined by 
Mintzberg (1973): namely, monitor, disseminator, and spokesperson roles (ibid.; also 
see p. 97). The first role, monitor, means activities of leaders to seek and receive a wide 
variety of special information from which they can develop a thorough understanding of 
their organization. The second role, disseminator, refers to activities of leaders to 
transmit information they have received from outsiders or subordinates to other 
members of their organization. The third role, spokesperson, describes activities of 
leaders to transmit information about their organisation’s plans, policies, activities, and 
achievements to outsiders, in which respect they must act as experts on the industries in 
which their organization is involved. Accordingly, this section analyses whether 
governors are required to take charge of these roles in their capacity as leaders of local 
prison establishments specifically for the benefit of local suicide and violence control 
strategies. 
 
6.4.1: Suicide  
England 
In regard to the monitor role, PSO 2700 indicates that governors are responsible for 
gathering significant information about suicide control strategies in their local 
establishments. PSO 2700 specifically states that governors must monitor and annually 
review the implementation of local suicide control policies and procedures (1.4.2, PSO 
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2700). It can thus be inferred from these rules that HMPS governors are formally 
required to be in charge of the monitor role in relation to suicide control strategies. 
In regard to the disseminator role, governors are usually required to transmit 
information from outside and inside of their local establishments. Having interviewed 
42 HMPS governors, Bryans, himself a retired governor, found that his interviewees 
generally considered themselves to have a distinctive role as governors in the 
interpretation of information coming from both inside and outside of their local 
establishments for the benefit of staff and prisoners (Bryans 2007: p. 125). In terms of 
suicide and self-harm control, governors need to effectively transmit detailed 
information and policy criteria, as defined in PSO 2700, to staff members within local 
establishments. In this way, they must ensure that staff members have an adequate 
understanding of their local suicide risk control strategies (Chap.1, PSO 2700). PSO 
2700 is in this respect considered external information since it is determined within 
national HQs. Governors are in charge of interpreting this information for their staff as 
part of suicide control.   
 Furthermore, in regard to transmitting information to external bodies, 
governors must publish local policy statements outlining their multi-disciplinary and 
multi-agency approaches to safer custody, including specific references to suicide 
prevention, self-harm management, and any other safer custody and safeguarding 
arrangements in their establishments (Chap. 1, PSO 2700). These local policies 
published by governors are referred to by HM Inspectorate of Prisons for England and 
Wales as part of their inspections (ibid.). HMIP is an external of local establishments, 
and (HMIP, 2009) and thus considered an external body. HMPS governors are also 
required to act out the disseminator role in response to the requirements and 
information issued by this body on local suicide control strategies.  
 Lastly, in regard to the spokesperson role, Bryans has also found from his 
interviews with HMPS governors that they are expected to act as the public faces of 
their respective prisons (Bryan, 2007). That is, they represent their establishments to 
the general public, the media, and at official functions with local dignitaries. As one of 
the governors whom Bryans interviewed explains: 
 
I think the Governor’s job is to represent the prison to the world,… speaking on 
what goes on in the prison to public meetings and to groups and associations 
and virtually anybody that will invite you, any non-political group that will 
invite you, and generally be the persona of the establishment, the embodiment of 
the establishment. 
(Bryans, 2007: p.124).  
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 In regard to suicide and self-harm control, governors need to represent or make 
reports on the performance of their local establishments. If the performance level is 
good, governors are required to publicize this fact through the media. For example, 
governors often published comments for an article in a newspaper in response to a 
positive HMCIP reports on suicide and self-harm control in their local establishment 
(Pegden, 2008). Furthermore, in cases where local establishments or their staff members 
receive awards in recognition of good performance (the relevant awards being defined 
in PSO 8410 (Performance Recognition), the governors of those establishments or staff 
are required to pass comment in their capacity as representatives of their prisons and 
staff members (HMPS, 2002, 2002a and 2009). Likewise, governors also need to be 
spokespeople or representatives of their prisons in response to weak performance 
assessments. For example, if a prisoner dies as a result of committing suicide, it is 
strongly recommended that the governor of the relevant establishment attends their 
funeral as its representative (HMIP, 1999). Hence in this respect also HMPS governors 
are expected to act out the spokesperson role for their local establishments. 
 Thus, HMPS governors are required to be actively responsible for all three 
types of informational role discussed above: that is, monitor, disseminator, and 
spokesperson. According to the rank and scores table (see Appendix 3), HMPS can be 
ranked at the highest grid level and assigned a score of +2 for this sub-code.  
 
Japan 
As I discussed above in regard to the figurehead in interpersonal role, Japanese prison 
governors have the power to authorise main relevant procedures for controlling suicide: 
segregation, the use of protection cells and adjudication (see Sec. 6.3.1 above). In this 
sense, governors seem to be responsible for monitoring formal suicide-prevention 
procedures. Nevertheless, their substantial monitor role is weakened in relation to the 
tanto system.  
 As I explained in section 6.1.1 above, tanto officers are principally in charge of 
any issues concerning communal life in prisons. As a result, they are widely recognised 
as the best-informed staff members about the conditions affecting prisoners in the 
Japanese prison service (Hamai 2006; and Ozawa 2007, and JMOJ 2003a). Accordingly, 
higher ranking officers, including governors, tend to leave major decisions affecting 
prisoners to tanto officers (JMOJ2003a). This aspect of the Japanese prison system has 
been frequently discussed among Japanese criminologists. Although this system has 
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some problems, it continues to be used because it is an effective and efficient way of 
controlling large prison populations with only a small number of prison officers (JMOJ, 
2003). As just noted, tanto officers are considered to have a substantial role in 
monitoring the risk of suicide. 
The formal regulation, which concerns with suicide control, premises this 
substantial monitor role of tanto officers. For example, Although Article 79 of the Penal 
Institutions Act defines governors has power to authorise the use of protection cells, 
section 2 of Article 79 also states that prison officers can confine prisoners at risk of 
suicide and self-harm to protection cells without the permission of their governors in 
urgent cases where there is not enough time to wait for permission (Sec. 2 of Art. 79, 
The Penal Institutions Act). Such decisions are approved by governors retrospectively 
according to reports filed by the prison officers involved. Hence this rule grants 
discretion to prison officers for confining prisoners to protection cells, and is more 
effective for prison officers based on the tanto system. Article 79 substantially allows 
tanto officers to send prisoners at risk of suicide to protection cells without the 
permissions of their governors. In light of the exceptional role in suicide prevention 
granted to tanto officers, the extent to which governors assume the monitor role for the 
purposes of suicide prevention is considered here to be weak. 
In regard to the disseminator role, Japanese prison governors need to act as 
conduits of information moving in and out of their local establishments as part of the 
general process of day-to-day prison operation. Although the Japanese prison service 
does not formally state that governors should act as disseminators of information to and 
from their local establishments, the national prison structure and relevant statutory 
codes suggest that they need to assume this role for the purposes of local suicide control. 
To illustrate, when new statutory codes are issued by the national HQ offices, governors 
need to interpret and disseminate the relevant information to their staff members. As I 
explained in chapter 4, the Japanese prison service defines several operational 
procedures through statutory codes (see Sec. 4.4.1). Those codes are provided from the 
national HQs to local establishments at any time. As leaders of local establishments, 
governors need to transmit information to the relevant divisions within them. 
Governors also need to transmit information about what is going on inside their 
local establishments to external bodies. Ordinance 518 (Guidelines for Periodical 
Correctional Operational Reports) requires governors to report trends of local prison 
operation within their local establishments to their area managers. Details of the suicide 
control procedures in place in local establishments should be reported as follows: the 
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number of cases of suicide and self-harm and punishments issued thereof, records of the 
use of protection cells and force used to restrain prisoners. In these respects, governors 
are in charge of the disseminator role as part of local suicide control strategies.  
Lastly, in regard to the spokesmen role, Japanese prison governors are required 
to act as public spokespeople for their prisons, but normally only in cases where the 
performance of their establishment has been poor. For example, if a self-inflicted death 
occurs in a local establishment, the governor of that establishment must report the case 
to the public through the media according to the procedures set out in Instruction 210. 
Governors often issue apologies and comments as representatives of their local 
establishments (@Nifty Search 2011). Hence, unlike HMPS governors, Japanese prison 
governors must only assume the spokesperson role in cases where they must report 
negative events or poor performance in their local establishments to the public media. It 
should thus be understood that the spokesperson role is moderated in the Japanese 
prison service as far as it applies to governors. 
 Overall, it can be seen that Japanese prison governors are actively in charge of 
one informational role in local suicide control structures: that is, disseminator. As a 
result, according to the roles of governors rank and table (see Appendix 3), the Japanese 
prison service can be assigned the third highest grid rank and given a score of +2 for 
this sub-code. 
 
6.4.2: Violence 
England 
In regard to the monitor role, PSO 2750 states that governors must monitor the 
implementation and development of their local violence reduction strategies (2.1, PSO 
2750). Thus, governors are formally expected to assume the monitor role for the 
purposes of overseeing the operation of risk control procedures in their local 
establishments.  
 In regard to the disseminator role, PSO 2750 outlines the national violence 
reduction guidelines which governors, as leaders of local establishments, must transmit 
to their subordinate staff appropriately (8.2, PSO 2750). Furthermore, governors must 
ensure that their staff members recognise any comments or recommendations relevant 
to their duties made in external reports about local violence control strategies: the 
relevant external bodies making such reports include the PPO, IMB, and HMIP (2.6, 
PSO 2750). Meanwhile, governors must also regularly transmit information about the 
implementation of local violence control strategies to their area managers for the 
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purposes of reviewing and developing them (2.9, PSO 2750). These duties indicate 
that HMPS governors are in charge of the disseminator role as part of local violence 
control strategies.  
 Finally, in regard to the spokesperson role, as discussed in suicide control, 
governors consider themselves as the spokesperson and representative of prisons 
(Bryans 2007: see Sec. 6.4.1). In relation to local violence control, governors need to 
represent or make reports on the performance of their local establishments. If the 
performance level is good, governors are required to publicize this fact through the 
media. For example, in cases where local establishments or their staff members receive 
awards in recognition of good performance (the relevant awards being defined in PSO 
8410 (Performance Recognition), the governors of those establishments or staff are 
required to pass comment in their capacity as representatives of their prisons and staff 
members (HMPS, 2002, 2002a and 2009). Likewise, governors also need to be 
spokespeople or representatives of their prisons in response to weak performance 
assessments. For example, governors often provide comments or statements in response 
to the negative reports by HM Inspectorate of Prisons throughout the media; such as 
inappropriate violence management strategies or ineffectiveness of those in local 
establishments (Wilkinson 2008; and McKeegan 2011). Hence in this respect also 
HMPS governors are expected to act out the spokesperson role as part of local violence 
control.  
  Therefore, it can be seen that HMPS governors are required to actively assume 
all three of the informational roles discussed above for the purposes of local violence 
control: that is, monitor, disseminator, and spokesman. According to the roles of 
governors rank and scores table (see Appendix 3), HMPS governors can be ranked at 
the highest grid level and a score of +4 can be assigned to HMPS for this sub-code.  
 
Japan 
In regard to the monitor role, as I discussed earlier, the extent to which governors can 
assume the monitor role for the purposes of suicide control is undermined by the tanto 
system (see Sec. 6.4.1 above). As well as suicide control, substantial operation of 
confining violent prisoners is relying on the tanto officers, and relevant violence control 
procedures formally involve these substantial roles of tanto officers; such as segregation 
and the use of protection cells (Article 76 and 79 of The Penal Institutions Act) 
Particularly concerning violence control, the use of force defined by Articles 77 
and 80 of The Penal Institutions Act also grant tanto officers the discretion to use force 
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and defence tools to subdue violent prisoners in urgent situations. Governors ultimately 
need to retrospectively authorise any cases where tanto officers have, at their own 
discretion, subdued prisoners with force. However, as I explained above, tanto officers 
are usually recognised as the best-informed staff members with regard to the conditions 
affecting prisoners. Governors tend to rely on the decisions made by tanto officers 
about prisoners. Therefore, the monitor role assumed by Japanese prison governors in 
terms of local violence control is weak in comparison with that of HMPS governors.  
Meanwhile, concerning the disseminator role, Japanese prison governors need 
to actively take on the disseminator role as part of local violence control as with suicide 
control. When relevant regulatory codes are newly issued from the National HQs, these 
information should be transmitted to local staff members through governors in local 
establishments. Additionally, as stated by Ordinance 518, governors need to relay 
information about trends of local violence control from their local establishments to 
externals (i.e. area managers). In these respects, Japanese prison governors assume the 
disseminator role for the purposes of violence control. 
Lastly, concerning the spokesperson role, Japanese prison governors are not 
required to comment about good performance in their local establishments to the public 
media. However, they do need to make appropriate announcements in response to poor 
performance within their local establishments. Specifically, Instruction [tsutatsu] 3178 
states that local establishments must report serious security incidents to the public 
through the media. Examples of incidents that should be reported in this way include 
severe injuries sustained through serious assaults, escapes, and riots (Instruction 3178). 
It is noteworthy that no local establishments have reported cases of severe injury 
through the public media in the past 10 years. Meanwhile, the case of a prisoner who 
nearly escaped from Kurobane [黒羽] prison was announced in 2005 (Osaka Regional 
Office, 2005). This announcement was officially made by the governor of the prison to 
the media. Hence it is considered that governors need to represent the prison when they 
announce serious assault incidents to the public according to Instruction 3178. Thus, 
Japanese prison governors are in charge of the spokesperson role, but unlike HMPS 
governors they only represent their local establishments when negative events occur 
within them. It should again be understood that the spokesperson role assumed by 
Japanese prison governors is moderated in the Japanese prison service.  
In conclusion, Japanese prison governors are actively in charge of one 
informational role in regard to violence control: that is, disseminator. According to the 
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role of governor rank and table (see Appendix 3), the Japanese prison service can be 
assigned the third highest grid rank and given a score of +2 for this sub-code. 
 
 
6.5: Decisional roles 
 
The fifth sub-code concerns the decisional roles of leaders as defined by Mintzberg 
(1973): namely, entrepreneur, disturbance handler, resource allocator, and negotiator 
(see p.98). Firstly, the entrepreneur role means activities of leaders for searching within 
organizations and their environments for opportunities and to initiate “improvement 
projects” which bring about changes: this role also involves supervising the design of 
certain projects. Secondly, the disturbance handler role refers to activities of leaders for 
taking corrective actions when their organizations face important or unexpected 
disturbances. Thirdly, the resource allocator role refers to activities of leaders for 
allocating, or giving approval for the allocation of, any kind of significant 
organizational resources. Fourthly, the negotiator role means activities of leaders for 
representing their organizations in major negotiations with external bodies (Mintzberg, 
1973). This section analyses whether governors are required to be actively in charge of 
these roles in local suicide and violence control strategies. 
 
6.5.1: Suicide 
England 
In regard to the entrepreneur role, HMPS governors need to build local suicide and 
self-harm prevention strategies (1.7, PSO 2700). The structure of these strategies 
includes organizational and environmental changes deemed necessary for improving 
how the risks of suicide and self-harm are managed (ibid.). Moreover, Bryans (2007) 
has found that governors are in charge of creating strategic visions for their local 
establishments. This duty may be considered a further aspect of the entrepreneur role 
assumed by governors. Hence it is considered here that governors are required to be 
actively in charge of the entrepreneur role for the purposes of local suicide control 
strategies.  
In regard to the disturbance handler role, Bryans (2007) has mentioned that 
governors need to take command of incidents in their local establishments. As Bryans 
has pointed out, incidents in Prisons are often characterised by ambiguous and 
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conflicting information, shifting goals, time pressures, dynamic conditions, complex 
operational team structures, and poor communication. His interviews with governors 
show that most of them accept they should take control of the command role in response 
to complex situations in their areas of responsibility (ibid.) Specifically in regard to 
death results of suicide among prisoners, governors are expected to take command of 
providing care for the affected families and staff and for investigating any such 
incidents (PSO 2710, Follow up to death in custody; and PSO 8150, Prison Service Post 
Incident Care for Staff). Therefore, it can be concluded here that governors are required 
to be actively in charge of the disturbance handler role as part of local suicide control 
strategies.  
In regard to the resource allocator role, PSO 2700 states that the allocation of 
resources should change appropriately to facilitate the implementation local suicide 
control strategies based on the guidelines also set out in PSO 2700. In this respect, 
governors should ensure that necessary staff members are available and that the relevant 
facilities are properly maintained: for example, Suicide Prevention Coordinators need to 
be appointed and protection cells and segregation units need to be refurbished as 
necessary. Thus, it is clear that governors are required to be actively in charge of the 
resource allocator role as part of local suicide control strategies.  
In regard to the negotiator role, firstly, as I explained in section 6.3.1 above, 
when governors transfer prisoners at risk of suicide or self-harm to other more 
appropriate establishments, they need to make arrangements with the governors of the 
receiving establishments and Area Managers (PSO 2700 and 1700). Hence, in addition 
to having networks with other governors, individual governors also need to have good 
negotiation skills in order to make prisoner transfers successful. Secondly, it is 
important that governors can assume the negotiator role in their dealings with prison 
officers’ trade unions (Bryans, 2007). In terms of suicide and self-harm control, that 
trade union have taken action against HMPS and relevant managers in response to poor 
security performance in prisons, including weak performance on suicide reduction 
(Leech, 1990; also see Sec. 7.3.1). Thus, governors need to negotiate with the trade 
union on matters such as poor performance in suicide control.   
 Thus, HMPS governors are actively in charge of four decisional roles in local 
suicide control. According to the roles of governors rank and scores table (see Appendix 
3), the extent to which HMPS governors assume the decisional roles can be ranked at 
the highest grid level and a score of +5 can be assigned to HMPS for this sub-code. 
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Japan 
The Japanese prison service does not actively assign the entrepreneur role to governors. 
Indeed, this role is considered an unwelcome personality trait among governors in the 
Japanese prison service. According to Hamai (2005), the role of governors is to preserve 
the existing control structures of local establishments. Hence any behaviour which may 
change local establishments is considered inappropriate for governors: this includes 
governors pursuing active reforms of local operational structures. Similar views were 
expressed by staff working at the national HQ whom I interviewed. In general, they 
thought that the main responsibility of governors is to keep local establishments as they 
are. By contrast, they felt that entrepreneur activities should be driven by lower grade 
officers such as middle level managers. The available data on suicide control 
corroborates the views expressed by Hamai and my interviewees. Therefore, it can be 
concluded that there is active opposition within the Japanese prison service to governors 
assuming the entrepreneur role.  
 In regard to the disturbance handler role, governors have a comparatively 
weak role to play in managing non-fatal cases of self-harm including suicide attempts. 
As I explained above, tanto officers are in charge of handling day-to-day security issues 
in local establishments. Governors only get information from tanto officers through 
routine reports after incidents have been dealt with. On the other hand, governors often 
make apologies through the public media in response to cases of self-harm which have 
proven fatal (see Sec. 6.4.1 above). Thus, it can be seen that there is a discrepancy 
between the levels of practical and official responsibility accepted by Japanese prison 
governors for managing cases of self-harm and suicide in local establishment. This 
makes it difficult to explain the role played by governors in handling disturbances 
linked to self-harm and suicide. Although the meaning of apologies in Japanese society 
was not often discussed in academic research, it is widely accepted in Japanese society 
that if an organization faces important or unexpected disturbances, the leader of that 
organization should be the first to apologize to the public in order to avoid further blame 
being placed upon the organization from external sources. During and after the apology, 
they should investigate cases inside of the organisation. If this custom applies to the 
Japanese prison service, it can be concluded that Japanese prison governors are in 
charge of the disturbance handler role, but in a distinctly Japanese way.  
In regard to the resource allocator role, Japanese prison governors are assigned 
a partial role in the allocation of staff members for local suicide control duties. To 
illustrate, Instruction 3351 states that governors can appoint members of local 
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Adjudication Committees according to their discretion. In the process for selecting 
members of these committees that issue punishments in local establishments, governors 
have the role of resource allocator. By contrast, governors do not have substantial 
powers to allocate appropriate tanto officers to the prisoners’ group as part of suicide 
and self-harm control in local establishments. My interviews with Japanese prison 
managers suggest that middle ranking managers have more power in this respect.  
 
The allocation of appropriate tanto officers in the proper place, considering 
their personalities, was the most important job for the operational managers. 
Prisoners know who are the most powerful and respectful officers to them, and 
who are not.  Some officers were not good to be slotted in the night shift 
because their personalities are not strong enough to maintain the proper tension 
of the prison unit. (Interview with a former middle-ranking manager in a local 
establishment)  
 
Hence the most important decisions about the allocation of tanto officers are made by 
middle-ranking managers who are more familiar with the personalities of individual 
staff members working in local establishments. Thus, it is considered here that although 
governors do assume the role of resource allocator, they have limited powers in this 
regard over the tanto system.  
 In regard to the negotiator role, firstly, as was noted in sec. 6.4.1 above, the 
Japanese prison service does not transfer prisoners at risk of suicide or self-harm to 
other establishments. Accordingly, governors are not required to act as negotiators in 
prisoner transfers. Secondly, unlike HMPS, the Japanese prison service does not need to 
negotiate with a prison officers’ trade union because unionisation is prohibited among 
prison officers by the Civil Servant Law (Act. 108-2; also see Sec.7.3.1). Therefore, 
Japanese prison governors have very little need to assume the negotiator role for the 
purposes of suicide and self-harm control. 
 Japanese prison governors are actively in charge of one decisional role in 
regard to suicide and violence control in manners of Japanese society: disturbance 
handler. Thus, according to the specialization rank and scores table (see Appendix 3), 
the extent to which Japanese prison governors assume the decisional roles can be ranked 
at the third lowest grid level and a score of +2 can be given to the Japanese prison 
service for this sub-code.  
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6.5.2: Violence 
England  
In regard to the entrepreneur role, governors need to build local violence reduction 
strategies (PSO 2750; also see Sec. 4.4.2). These strategies should promote safe and 
healthy prison environments and foster a culture of non-violence (9.2, PSO 2750). This 
suggests that governors are expected to make positive changes to prison culture as part 
of local violence control strategies, in which respect they need to assume the 
entrepreneur role.  
With regard to the disturbance handler role, governors are assigned the 
command role for the post-incident control procedures following violent incidents in 
their areas of responsibility: care for the families of prisoners and staff affected by 
violence and investigation of violent incidents (1.6, PSI 08/2010 Post Incident Care). 
Thus, governors are in charge of the disturbance handler role in local violence control 
strategies. In regard to the resource allocator role, PSO 2750 mentions that the 
implementation of local violence control strategies leads to the reallocation of resources.  
According to the national guidelines, governors are in charge of allocating several kinds 
of resources in local establishments for the purposes of violence control: staff, including 
a Violence Reduction Co-ordinator (VRC) and Safer Custody Team (SCT) members, and a 
budget for maintaining the quality of segregation units and other security equipment.  
Thus, it can be seen from these duties that governors must assume the resource 
allocater role as part of local violence control strategies.   
In regard to the negotiator role, firstly, governors need to negotiate with other 
governors and area mangers as part of the process of transferring prisoners whose 
behaviour is particularly difficult between local establishments (as I discussed in Sec. 
6.4.1 above). As well as maintaining personal networks outside of their local 
establishments, governors must also have good negotiation skills in order to effectively 
move difficult prisoners away from their local establishments as part of their local 
suicide control strategies. Secondly, governors are required to act as negotiators when 
dealing with the prison officers’ trade unions as I mentioned above in regard to suicide 
control. In regard to violence control, the security of the work environment in prisons is 
directly affected by their performance in managing violence and serious assault. In 
cases where prison officers have suffered injuries as a result of being assaulted by 
prisoners, the trade union has taken action against HMPS and the governors of the 
prisons involved (Meredith, 1998). Hence governors also need to assume the role of 
negotiator in relation to trade unions in order to avoid conflicts with them. 
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 In conclusion, governors are required to be actively in charge of four decisional 
roles for the purposes violence control: entrepreneur, disturbance handler, resource 
allocator, and negotiator. According to the specialization rank and scores table (see 
Appendix 3), the extent to which HMPS governors assume the decisional roles can be 
ranked at the highest grid level and a score of +5 can be assigned to HMPS for this 
sub-code.  
 
Japan 
The Japanese prison service does not actively assign the entrepreneur role to governors 
as part of violence control. As I explained above in regard to suicide control (see Sec. 
6.5.1), Japanese prison governors are mainly expected to maintain the status quo within 
local establishments. Hamai (2005) has explained that governors are ideal examples of 
Japanese prison staff in the respect that they fully fit the Japanese prison service 
organization: they neither deviate from the existing order of the organization nor back 
away from dealing with problems. Hence Japanese prison governors are not required to 
actively assume the entrepreneur role for purposes of local violence control.  
In regard to the disturbance handler role, the role played by governors in 
handling cases of violence and serious assault is very weak when compared to that of 
tanto officers. As I explained above (see Sec. 6.5.1), tanto officers are in charge of 
handling day-to-day security issues. Governors only get information from these officers 
through routine reports after incidents have been dealt with. In terms of serious assault, 
as I explained in Section 6.4.2, Instruction3178 states that local establishments must 
report serious security incidents to the public through the media. In the media report 
concerning the attempted escape from Kurobane (黒羽) prison in 2005, the governor 
only apologised for the incident without giving any details of how the escape came 
about and how it was prevented in the report (Osaka Regional Office, 2005; also see 
p.223 above). This case suggests that the serious incident report, as set out by tsutasu 
3178, informally obliges governors to apologise for any security disturbances, including 
violence, in their areas of responsibility. Hence it can be concluded that governors are in 
charge of the disturbance handler role as part of violence control strategies.  
In regard to the resource allocator role, governors can appoint members of 
Adjudication Committees at their discretion as I mentioned above in sec. 6.5.1. 
Meanwhile, the staffing of tanto officers is the responsibility of middle ranking 
managers in local establishments (this system was also explained in sec. 6.5.1 above).  
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Therefore, it can be concluded again that although governors have a role to play as 
resource allocators, it is limited by the tanto system.  
Lastly, in regard to the negotiator role, the Japanese prison service has strict 
procedures for transferring prisoners who are members of Japanese gangs between local 
establishments in order to avoid conflicts among prisoners (tsutasu 3316). Such 
transfers are arranged between the governors of the establishments involved and the 
relevant area managers if necessary. Thus, governors must have good negotiation skills 
as well as networks with other governors in order to effectively transfer prisoners away 
from their establishments. In this respect, they need to assume the negotiator role as 
part of their local violence control strategies. 
 Overall, Japanese prison governors are required to be actively in charge of two 
decisional roles in relation to violence control: disturbance handler and negotiator. 
According to the roles of governors’ ranks and scores table (see Appendix 3), the extent 
to which Japanese governors assume decisional roles can be ranked at the third highest 
grid level and a score of +3 can be assigned to the Japanese prison service for this 
sub-code. Table 6.4 provides a summary of the roles assumed by governors as leaders 
of local establishments discussed in Section 3, 4, and 5 in this chapter. The results show 
that HMPS governors assume strong leadership roles both in regard to suicide and 
violence control while Japanese prison governors generally assume more moderate 
leadership roles for the same purposes.  
 
Table 6.4: Summary of leadership roles of governors based on Mintzberg’s definitions of leaders 
(Mintzberg, 1973) 
 
 
  
Suicide Violence
3 types of roles Roles England Japan England Japan
Interpersonal roles Figurehead ○ ○ ○ ○
Leaders ○ - ○ -
Liaison ○ - ○ ○
Monitor ○ × ○ ×
Informational roles Disseminator ○ ○ ○ ○
Spokesman ○ △ ○ △
Entrepreneur ○ × ○ ×
Disturbance Handler ○ ○ ○ ○
Decisional roles Resource Allocator ○ △ ○ △
 Negotiator ○ × ○ ○
○: active, △: moderate, ×：weak, －：uncertain.
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6.6: Conclusion  
 
This chapter has analysed the extent to which governors are assigned specialised roles 
in local suicide and violence control strategies as part of the overall prison service risk 
control structures. The first finding is that HMPS assigns specialised suicide and 
violence control roles to staff members in local establishments. By contrast, the 
Japanese prison service does not assign specialised roles to local staff members 
specifically for the purposes of controlling suicide and violence in local establishments. 
The Japanese prison service does assign a key role to tanto officers who are in charge of 
the day-to-day management of prisoners in local establishments. However, tanto 
officers tend to be more focused on controlling the risks of violence and conflict among 
prisoners than self-harm and suicide. Hence it has been concluded in this chapter that 
tanto officers mainly specialise in violence control.   
 Secondly, concerning the promotion criteria for governors, the career path to 
becoming a governor in the Japanese prison service is strictly ascription-based. 
Specifically, the level at which staff entered the prison service and their length of 
service are considered to be the most important factors for selecting governors. 
Meanwhile, HMPS takes account of achievement- and ascription-based criteria when 
selecting governors.  
Thirdly, in regard to the interpersonal roles, HMPS requires governors to be 
actively responsible for all three of the interpersonal roles discussed in this chapter as 
part of local suicide and violence control strategies. Meanwhile, the Japanese prison 
service certainly assigns the role of figurehead to its governors for the purposes of 
suicide and violence control: it is less clear from the available evidence whether this is 
also the case for the leader role. Furthermore, my interview data shows that the 
capability of Japanese prison governors in assuming the liaison role is linked to the 
external networks they keep. Although it is not clear how these networks affect suicide 
control, it is certainly the case that they play an important role for Japanese prison 
governors in managing violence by aiding the process of transferring especially difficult 
prisoners to other establishments.  
 Fourthly, in regard to informational roles, HMPS governors are required to be 
actively engaged in all three of the informational roles discussed above as part of their 
local violence and suicide control strategies. By contrast, Japanese prison governors 
have only a weak role to play in monitoring suicide and violence control: as discussed 
above, tanto officers have much more influence in this respect. In terms of the 
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disseminator role, the Japanese prison service assigns active duties to its governors for 
transmitting information between local establishments and external bodies such as the 
public media. Lastly, Japanese prison governors only assume the spokesman role in a 
weak form both for the purposes of suicide and violence control because they are only 
required to represent their local establishments if the latter have performed poorly.  
 Finally, in regard to the decisional roles, HMPS governors are required to be in 
charge of all four of these roles for both violence and suicide control. Meanwhile, the 
Japanese prison service does not assign the entrepreneur role to its governors for the 
purposes of either suicide or violence control. Unlike in HMPS, it is not considered the 
place of Japanese prison governors to initiate changes within the organizations for 
which they are responsible. In terms of the role of the disturbance handle, the Japanese 
prison service informally assigns governors the role of apologizing to the public for 
serious incidents which have occurred in their areas of responsibility. In this respect, the 
apologies issued by governors are a manner of diverting blame away from the 
organization where they are leaders (as explained above in Sec. 6.5.1). Accordingly, 
Japanese prison governors can be seen to assume the disturbance handler role when they 
make public apologies for poor performance in their local establishments. Finally, 
Japanese prison governors are assigned an active negotiator role for the purposes of 
controlling violence in the sense that they must liaise with other governors to transfer 
prisoners belonging to Japanese gangs away from their establishments. 
Overall, governors in the Japanese prison service are assigned weaker leader 
roles those of governors in HMPS. It should be stressed that the extent to which 
Japanese prison governors can assume these roles is moderated by the tanto system. For 
their part, tanto officers play a general-purpose role in managing security issues. They 
are in charge of substantial roles for controlling overall risks related to prisoners in local 
establishments, including violence and suicide. These findings demonstrate the 
relatively limited use that the Japanese prison service makes of specialized staff 
members for the purposes of controlling the risk of suicide and violence. This in turn 
reflects the relatively weak leadership roles assumed by governors in the Japanese 
prison service. Meanwhile, HMPS governors were formally assigned several leading 
roles in the national risk control structures. Moreover, my interviews show that it is 
widely believed within HMPS that governors are leaders of local establishments.  
Based on these findings, numerical scores have been assigned for suicide and violence 
control in the English and Japanese prison services. Tables 6.5 and 6.6 display the 
results for all of the specialization ranks and scores assigned for the sub-codes discussed 
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in this chapter. Table 6.5 shows a visual map of the results for the leadership roles (Y2) 
scores. Yet again, the five columns represent the sub-codes discussed in this chapter. 
The positions of the shaded blocks reflect the grid level of the English and Japanese 
prison services for each sub-code, and “S” represents suicide risk control while “V” 
represents violence risk control. Meanwhile, Table 6.6 shows the leadership roles (Y2) 
score results as numbers. The five sub-codes are once again listed twice in the left-hand 
column and two sets of figures are given for each: the first are raw scores and the 
second are standardized scores as discussed in chapter 3 (see Table 3.5, p. 118). In 
regard to the number of leadership roles defined by Mintzberg (1973), I have only 
counted roles when they are considered to be active (see Table 6.4). 
 
 
Table 6.5: Leadership Roles of Governors (Y2) ranks and grid scores for all sub-codes 
 
(S): suicide, and (V): violence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 3 4 5
selection
criteria
to be
Governors
Interpersonal
roles
Informational
roles
Decisional
roles
Highest 5 England(S) and (V)
4 England
 (S) and ( V)
England
(S) and (V)
3 Japan Japan (V) Japan(V)
2 England(S)&(V)
Japan
(V) England Japan  (S) 
Japan
 (S) and( V) Japan (S)
1
Lowest 0
Japan
(S)
1
Roles of
Governors
ranks
Grid
Scores
Sub-codes
Specialization
of staff members
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Table 6.6: Raw and standardized leadership role scores for governors 
 
  
 
In summary, the outcomes show that with the exception of the promotion 
criteria for selecting governors, HMPS generally has higher grid levels for the high 
specialization of governors as leaders of local establishments than the Japanese prison 
service. Meanwhile, the Japanese prison service was generally given lower grid ranks 
than HMPS with the exception of the sub-code concerning promotion criteria in regard 
to which the Japanese prison service was ranked higher. The reason for this discrepancy 
is that Japanese prison governors are promoted in accordance with a seniority system. 
Otherwise, the general pattern held that HMPS governors showed stronger leadership 
roles than Japanese prison governors. 
England Japan England Japan
2 1 2 2
2 3 2 3
4 2 4 3
4 2 4 2
5 2 5 3
10.0 5.0 10.0 10.0
6.7 10.0 6.7 10.0
10.0 5.0 10.0 7.5
10.0 5.0 10.0 5.0
10.0 4.0 10.0 6.0
Prison services
Standardized scores
Raw scores
Specialization of staff members
Suicide ViolenceRisks
Interpersonal roles
Informational roles
Decisional roles
Selection criteria to be  governors
Interpersonal roles
Informational roles
Decisional roles
Specialization of staff members
Selection criteria to be  governors
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Chapter 7 
Leadership2: 
Autonomy of Local Risk Control Strategies (Group2) 
 
 
This chapter analyses the autonomy (X2) of local establishments in relation to national 
prison service risk control structures. Whereas the previous chapter discussed the roles 
of governors, this chapter considers the extent to which governors exercise discretion 
and autonomy in local risk control strategies. As a group predicate, the autonomy level 
is measured in terms of the diversity of local risk control strategies. It was noted in 
chapter 3 that this diversity can be analysed according to their openness to outsiders and 
what influences this has on their risk control, and the national risk control structures 
which allows variation of local risk strategies. Five sub-codes were outlined in chapter 3 
to reflect this concept of diversity. Section one of this chapter analyses the proportion of 
insider and outsider governors; section two analyses the participation of external 
performance assessment bodies; section three analyses the existence and influence of 
trade unions; section four analyses the internal performance competition indicators; and 
section five analyses the diversity of local risk control strategies for violence and 
suicide. 
 
 
7.1: The proportion of insider and outsider governors 
 
The first sub-code concerns the proportion of insider and outsider governors in the 
English and Japanese prison services. The criteria for selecting governors in both prison 
services were discussed in the last chapter as a grid variable. For the purposes of this 
chapter, these selection criteria are analysed as a group variable according to the 
proportions of insider and outsider governors in the relevant prison services. 
  
England 
It was noted in chapter 6 that HMPS has two career paths for appointing governors: 1. 
prison staff may rise up through the ranks over a long period of service; or 2. 
experienced professionals outside of the prison service may be fast-tracked to 
governorships (see Sec.6.2). It was found in chapter 6 that external candidates need to 
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spend a few years within HMPS before they can be promoted to governorships. Strictly 
speaking, there are no pure outsider candidates for governorships in HMPS. However, 
relatively speaking, governors promoted via fast-track entry schemes may be considered 
outsiders to a greater extent than governors who have risen up through the ranks within 
the prison service. Thus, this section analyses the extent to which these relative 
outsiders are given opportunities to become governors within HMPS and what 
proportion of governors they make up. 
 Table 7.1 places governors into two categories according to how many years 
they spent in the prison service before they were promoted to governorships for the first 
time: 1. more than 10 years; and 2. between 3 and 9 years. This table reflects the 
information given about 87 current HMPS governors in The Prison Hand Book 2010 
(Leech, 2010: pp. 372-382). The categories are based on the criteria for fast-track entry.  
HMPS states that current staff must have served a minimum of three years within the 
prison service before they become eligible to be promoted to governorships (PSO 8100). 
It can be seen from Table 7.1 that more than 70% of governors spent more than 10 years 
in HMPS before they were first promoted to governorships. This figure indicates that a 
majority of HMPS governors are insiders.  
 
Table 7.1: Time spent by governors in years in HMPS before gaining their first promotions to  
governorships 
 
 
Next, Table 7.2 places the aforementioned 87 governors into two categories which 
reflect the two possible career paths stated above: rising up through the ranks and fast-
track entry. Although the entry statuses of some governors are unknown, the table 
shows that more than half of them rose up through the ranks before they were appointed 
to their first governorships. By contrast, only 15% of them were appointed to their first 
governorships through the fast-track entry scheme. Again, this indicates that a majority 
of HMPS governors are insiders.  
 
 
Years spent in HMPS
by the first promotion
N of Governors Percentage
more than 10 years 66 75.9%
from 3 to 9 years 7 8.0%
Unknown 14 16.1%
Total 87 100.0%
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Table 7.2: The percentages of governors who gained their positions through conventional and 
fast-tack entry schemes 
 
*fast-track entry includes the Direct Entry, Fast Track, and Accessorized Promotion schemes. 
 
 Thus, although the opportunity to become an HMPS governor is open to 
outsiders, a majority of current governors are insiders who have risen up through the 
ranks. According to the autonomy rank and scores table (see Appendix 4), the 
proportion of insider to outsider governors in HMPS can be ranked at the second 
highest group level (governorship is open to outsiders but a majority of governors are 
insiders) and HMPS can be assigned a score of +3 for this sub-code.  
 
Japan 
As I explained in chapter 6, prison governors can only be promoted from among 
existing staff within in the Japanese prison service (see Sec. 6.2). All governors are 
expected to rise up through ranks after joining the service between the ages of 18 and 35. 
I also explained that grades are assigned to prison officers when they initially join the 
prison service. These grades differ depending on which type of entry exam they have 
taken: 1 basic prison officer selection exam; 2. type B civil servant selection exam; and 
3. type A high-ranking civil servant selection exam.  Prison staff who take the basic 
prison officer selection exam must rise up through the ranks from the lowest grade.  
  Table 7.3 shows a breakdown of prison officers who entered the Japanese prison 
service in 2003. It can be seen from this table that the number of officers who took the 
types A and B civil servant selection exams is less than 1%.  Meanwhile, the remaining 
staff members took the basic prison officer selection exam (see Table 7.3). Thus, 
although there are three points of entry into the Japanese prison service, nearly all staff 
members enter at the lowest level.  
 
 
 
 
Types of
 Promotion
N of
Governors
Percentage
Risen up
through ranks
59 67.8%
Short-cut entries
13 14.9%
Unknown 15 17.2%
Total 87 100.0%
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Table 7.3: Paths of entry into the Japanese prison service in 2003 
 
*JMOJ (2003d) Keimukan no Jinji Kanri ni Tuite, p. 6.  
 
These figures indicate that most governors rise up through the ranks from the lowest 
prison officer grade after joining the Japanese prison service. According to the 
autonomy rank and scores table (see Appendix 4), the ratio of insider to outsider 
governors in the Japanese prison service can be ranked at the highest group level (all 
governors are insiders and promotion is closed to outsiders) and the Japanese prison 
service can be scored +4 for this sub-code. 
 
 
7.2: Participation of external performance assessment bodies 
 
The second sub-code concerns the participation of external performance bodies in the 
management of suicide and violence control structures at a local level.  As I mentioned 
in chapter 3, Hood (1998) has discussed types of audit or performance inspection in 
terms of whether the people conducting the assessments are insiders or outsiders of the 
organizations they are assessing.  Following this method, this section analyses how far 
the performance of local establishments on suicide and violence control is monitored by 
external performance assessment bodies. 
 
7.2.1: Suicide 
England 
In HMPS the performance of local establishments is mainly assessed by three official 
independent organizations: the Prison and Probation Ombudsman (PPO), the 
Independent Monitoring Boards (IMBs), and the HM Inspectorate of Prisons (HMIP).  
In addition to these bodies, there are many voluntary groups which monitor HM prisons.  
However, this study focuses only on how the three main external performance 
assessment bodies influence suicide and violence control in local establishments.  
The first independent auditing body, the PPO, investigates complaints from 
prisoners and any deaths among prisoners (PPO, 2011). PPO officers are appointed by 
Types of entry exam N of staff Percentage
Prison Officers Selection 467 99.2%
Typ.A High class civil servant 4 0.8%
Type.B Civil Servant 0 0.0%
Total Staff joined the service in 2003 471 100.0%
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the Secretary of State for Justice and fully independent of the prison service (ibid.).  In 
terms of suicide control, the fatal incidents team of the PPO investigates every kind of 
death in local establishments: that is, deaths from natural causes, self-inflicted deaths, 
homicides, and accidental deaths (PPO, 2011a). Investigations are conducted by named 
investigators in order to clarify as far as possible the circumstances in which deaths 
have occurred. 
 HMPS does not any have legal obligations to take action in response to reports 
or advice given by PPOs (Harding, 2007; and Shaw, 2008). Liebling (2004) has 
explained that although the activities of PPO officers are an important mechanism for 
investigating any errors in the treatment of prisoners and complaints made by prisoners 
against the prison service, it lacks the power to force prisons to act on its findings and 
accept responsibility. Coyle (2005) has also argued that the PPO lacks authority in 
prisons. I could not find strong evidence to support the claims of either author. However, 
it is noteworthy that during the period between 2009 and 2010, the PPO received 4050 
complaints from prisoners, of which only 48% were accepted as “eligible complaints” 
(PPO, 2010). These figures suggest that the function of the PPO is limited in terms of 
the resources available to follow up complaints. This may indicate that the PPO is, as 
Liebling and Coyle claim, weak. 
The second independent body, the IMBs, was formerly known as the Boards of 
Visitors (BoVs). The BoVs was re-launched as the IMBs in April 2003 since the former 
body did not fit with the modern performance-driven prison service (Liebling, 2004). 
The IMBs currently consists of lay representatives from the local community who are 
appointed to specific prisons for three years by the Home Secretary (Haines, 2008).  
Members of the IMBs are independent, unpaid, and work an average of 2-3 days per 
month (Liebling, 2005; IMB, 2010). The current role of the IMBs is to monitor daily 
life in prisons, particularly to check that prisoners are being treated decently and 
humanely (ibid.).  
The IMBs do not have any formal powers to monitor local suicide control. 
Annual IMBs reports mention the number of self-inflicted deaths or the suicide control 
structures based on the ACCT approach in the prisons they monitor. However, the 
quality of the reports and the information they contain varies depending on which 
establishments they cover. Additionally, the independence of the IMBs is not consistent 
across all local establishments. A governor whom I interviewed stated that the distance 
between governors and IMBs members varies in different areas. Some IMBs members 
have closer relationships with the governors of the establishments they monitor than 
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others. Coyle (2005) has also noted some instances in which IMBs members have been 
too close to the prisons they were supposed to monitor. Based on his experiences as an 
HMPS governor, he has suggested that IMBs should be understood as an “expression of 
the British tradition of people volunteering for the public service without a committed 
and dispassionate manner” (Coyle, 2005: p. 75). Thus, although the IMBs are assigned 
the function of monitoring prisons, their influence over local suicide control may be 
considered to be low. 
The third auditing body, HMIP, is an independent inspectorate which reports on 
conditions and the treatment of prisoners in prisons. The post of HM Chief Inspector of 
Prisons (HMCIP) is appointed by the Justice Secretary from outside HMPS for a term 
of five years (HMIP, 2009). The appointment of the Chief Inspector in this way also 
shows the involvement of voluntary organizations representing the human rights of 
prisoners in monitoring local establishments. For example, the former HMCIP of 
prisons, Dame Anne Owers, was formerly director of JUSTICE, a UK-based human 
rights and law reform organization (BBC, 2001). The HMIIP has six inspection teams 
working under a Deputy Chief Inspector. Each team specializes in inspecting specific 
types of custodial establishment such as young offender institutions (YOIs), 
immigration removal centres, and adult women's or men's prisons (HMIP, 2009b). The 
frequency of inspections is determined by the resources available to HMIP teams. 
However, full inspections of adult prisons and YOIs have traditionally been conducted 
every five years (Newcomen, 2008). According to an official statement, HMIP aims “to 
provide independent scrutiny of the conditions for and treatment of prisoners and other 
detainees, promoting the concept of 'healthy prisons' in which staff work effectively to 
support prisoners and detainees to reduce reoffending or achieve other agreed outcomes” 
(HMIP, 2009a).  
 In comparison with the other performance auditing bodies discussed above, the 
work carried out by HMIP is generally recognised to be of high quality (Liebling, 2004; 
and Newcomen, 2008).  HMIP has the right to visit any part of any prison at any time 
regardless of whether notice has been given in advance.  The reports made by HMIP are 
authorised by the Chief Inspector whereat they become HMCIP reports. Governors take 
the findings of HMCIP reports seriously as evaluations of the performance of their local 
establishments (ibid.). Moreover, HMCIP reports are used as indicators for the prison 
service performance benchmarking system (PIAG, 2010). HMIP have defined 
expectations for prisons which are essentially performance criteria based on the UN 
standards for “healthy prisons” (HMIP, 2009a).  These expectations focus on four key 
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areas of prison activity: 1. safety; 2. respect; 3. purposeful activity; and 4. resettlement.  
Each of these areas of prison activity is then tested in terms of nine aspects of prison 
life: 1. arrival in custody; 2. environment and relationship with staff in the prison; 3. 
duty of care (including violence and suicide control); 4. health service; 5. activities; 6. 
good order; 7. services; 8 resettlement; and 9. special units (HMIP 2009a). HMIP also 
specifies what kinds of evidence are suitable for assessing these criteria: for example, 
relevant documentation (e.g. Adjudication records or SIRs), interviews with staff and 
prisoners, and observation inside local establishments. Local establishments are given 
one of four ratings reflecting their level of performance: level four indicates the highest 
performance level while level one indicates the worst performance level. 
HMIP tests local suicide control performance in terms of “duty of care”. HMIP 
defines 10 expectations for local suicide control strategies (see Appendix 5). Those 
expectations asses the implementation of the ACCT approach, the adequateness of local 
suicide control strategies, and the appropriateness of any other relevant suicide 
prevention techniques as defined in PSO 2700 (HMIP, 2009a: see Appendix 5). 
Evidence considered suitable for assessing suicide control includes relevant 
documentation kept by prison staff (i.e. ACCT documents), interviews with prison staff, 
observation records of suicide reduction meetings, and prisoner surveys (HMIP, 2009a). 
Hence HMIP uses standardized and well-established auditing criteria to monitor local 
suicide control strategies. 
Thus, the performance of HMPS prisons in regard to suicide control is assessed 
by several independent auditing bodies, of which HMIP has the strongest influence over 
local establishments. According to the autonomy rank and scores table (see Appendix 4), 
the diversity of the system in place for monitoring HMPS prisons can be ranked at the 
third highest group level (there are multiple officially selected external auditing bodies 
some of whose activities are influential for local establishments) and HMPS can be 
assigned a score of +2 for this sub-code. 
 
Japan 
External monitoring bodies have traditionally had very little influence over the Japanese 
prison service. Although there have long been several administrative overseers of 
prisons outside of the Ministry of Justice, they have never been authorised by the prison 
service and their influence over the day-to-day running of local establishments is very 
limited (Nishio, 2004). In response to this lack of external performance control, the 
Penal Institution Visiting Committees (PIVCs) were established as part of the 2003 
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Penal Reforms led by the CARC. PIVCs began functioning as the official monitoring 
committees for local establishments in 2006. Each committee consists of between 4 and 
10 members and covers one local establishment. Committee members are selected from 
among externals professionals and citizens (JMOJ, 2007a). Their reports are published 
annually by the Ministry of Justice.  
PIVC reports and activities do not particularly focus on suicide prevention in 
local establishments. Although the committees have made reports on problems in each 
prison since 2006, as of yet problems with suicide control have not been identified in 
any prisons (JMOJ, 2010: see Sec. 5.3.1). In fact, the authority of PIVCs over the prison 
service and the amount of access they should have to local establishments are still 
unclear. Furthermore, local establishments do not have any formal duties to improve 
their performance in response to PIVC reports. For my research I interviewed one 
member of the Japanese prison service’s internal auditing staff. He explained that since 
the PIVC system had only recently been launched in 2006, the prison service was still 
unsure how to understand its role in the prison service control structure.  
Other than the PIVCs, officially-approved independent auditing bodies do not 
exist in the Japanese prison service. There are a few unofficial human rights activist 
groups which monitor how appropriately prisoners are treated in local establishments: 
these include AIJ and the CPR. These groups have repeatedly criticised the poor 
conditions in which prisoners are kept in Japanese prisons.  Nevertheless, they have not 
highlighted suicide as a serious issue (AIJ, 1998; and CPR 2011). In my interviews I 
asked a staff member at the national HQ about the types of claims that external interest 
groups make about suicide control in local prisons. He explained that most of the 
criticisms the Japanese prison service received in this regard came from activist groups 
which were concerned that prisoners were not allowed to commit suicide rather than the 
management of suicide control.  
Overall, although there are a few external bodies which monitor suicide control 
in the Japanese prison service, their influence is generally weak. According to the 
autonomy rank and scores table (see Appendix 4), the influence of external auditing 
bodies over the Japanese prison service can be ranked at the second highest group level 
(there are a few external performance assessment bodies, but these lack influence over 
local establishments.) and the Japanese prison service can be assigned a score of +3 for 
this sub-code. 
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7.2.2: Violence 
England 
In regard to monitoring violence control in prisons, the PPO, IMB, and HMIP are 
authorised as independent auditing bodies as mentioned above in Sec.7.2.1.  Firstly, the 
PPO investigates complaints from prisoners who claim to have been inappropriately 
restrained as part of violence control procedures (PPO, 2010). In this respect, the main 
purpose of the PPO is to respond to prisoners’ complaints rather than to influence how 
violence is controlled in local establishments.  HMPS is not obliged to follow the advice 
and recommendations of the PPO as was also explained above in Section 7.2.1 above. 
Thus, the influence of the PPO over local violence control should also be considered 
weak.  
 Secondly, the IMBs are more involved in the implementation local violence 
control strategies.  In particular, board members monitor how segregation units are used 
in local establishments (PSO 1700) and attend violence reduction meetings in prisons as 
part of local violence reduction strategies (PSO 2750). Board members represent 
prisoners and their concerns, monitor whether force and segregation units are used 
appropriately, and provide support to both the victims and perpetrators of violence and 
bullying (ibid.). Nevertheless, in spite of the high level of involvement of IMB members 
in local violence control strategies, a lack of knowledge of who they are and what they 
do has been identified among prisoners. According to HMIP reports, in some prisons 
more than 30% of prisoners do not know who their local IMB members are (see Table 
7.4). These reports cover some remand prisons where it may not be so important for 
prisoners to understand the IMB system. However, this lack of awareness of the IMB 
system was also found in prisons where inmates serve long custodial sentences such as 
HMPs Liverpool and Wandsworth. Thus, it can be concluded that the influence of IMBs 
over local violence control varies between different local establishments. 
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Table 7.4: Awareness of IMBs among prisoners according to HMIP full inspections  
 
*survey data collected from local establishments by HMIP between 2009 and 2010 (N= number of 
samples in establishment) 
  
Thirdly, as noted above in regard to suicide control, HM Prison Inspection 
reports are taken very seriously by governors of local establishments. HMIP monitors 
the quality and efficiency of local violence control strategies in terms of nine 
“expectation” criteria (see Appendix 6). The types of evidence used to evaluate local 
violence control strategies in this way include interviews with prisoners and staff 
members, observation of violence reduction meetings, and relevant internal 
documentation (HMIP, 2009 and 2009a). The findings of HMIP reports are used as 
indicators for the prison service performance benchmarking system (PIAG, 2010). Thus, 
governors of local establishments need to seriously take account of HMIP reports. 
 HMPS has authorised several independent auditing bodies, some of which are 
more influential than others, to monitor violence control in local establishments.  
According to the autonomy rank and scores table (see Appendix 4), these circumstances 
can be ranked at the third highest group level (there are multiple external performance 
assessment bodies. Some of those have substantial influences), and HMPS can be 
assigned a score of +2 for this sub-code. 
 
 
Prisons
don’t
know
who they
are (%)
very
easy
easy neither difficult 
very
difficult
HMP Acklington (2009) N=133 24 10 25 25 13 3
HMP Bedford (2009) N=237 37 4 14 24 13 9
HMP Bristol (2010) N=129 30 5 20 21 14 10
HMP Doncaster ( 2010) N= 219 32 10 29 38 18 15
HMP Exeter (2009) N=127 40 4 12 23 15 6
HMP Ford (2010) N=218 17 5 34 31 10 3
HMP Haverigg (2009) N=135 37 4 12 23 14 10
HMP Holloway ( 2010) N=196 26 9 23 17 18 9
HMP Isle of Wight ( 2010) N=190 20 5 14 35 16 10
HMP Kirkham (2009) N=138 38 8 19 26 6 3
HMP Liverpool (2009)  N=140 40 6 16 15 10 13
HMP North Sea Camp ( 2009) N=114 15 14 43 21 5 3
HMP Pentonville ( 2009) N=190 44 2 13 15 17 9
HMP Portland (2009) N=143 35 8 23 21 6 6
HMP Preston ( 2009) N=137 41 5 19 21 10 4
HMP Stoke Heath ( 2010) N=1668 29 4 20 26 15 6
HMP Stoken ( 2010) N=208 22 5 21 31 13 7
HMP The Mount ( 2009) N=126 14 9 27 27 16 7
HMP Wandsworth (2009) N=145 36 7 21 20 12 4
HMP YOI (2010) Feltham N=115 33 5 17 26 8 10
How easy or difficult is it for you to see the Independent Monitoring Board (IMB)?
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Japan 
The involvement of external performance assessment bodies in monitoring local 
violence control strategies is weak in the Japanese prison service by comparison with 
HMPS. As I mentioned in regard to suicide control (see sec. 7.2.1), the Japanese prison 
service has authorised the activities of the PIVCs. Nevertheless, over the past four years 
the reports made by the PIVCs have had very little to say about local violence control 
strategies. In this respect, it seems that they do not have much influence over local 
violence control strategies.   
Meanwhile, unlike in the case of suicide control, voluntary groups representing 
the rights of prisoners have shown a high level of interest in the perceived overuse of 
force by prison staff to control violence in local establishments. AIJ (1998) has reported 
that segregation is overused in local establishments to prevent conflicts between 
prisoners.  As I explained in chapter 5, segregation is often used not just as a way of 
punishing violent prisoners, but also of making examples of prisoners who have 
committed minor offences (see, p.175). This issue has been reported by other major 
voluntary groups as well as AIJ.  According to Emi Akiyama, a director of the CPR, her 
organization has also repeatedly reported cases in which excessive control measures 
have been used to restrain prisoners such as body belts (Akiyama, 2010).  
The activities of these interest groups have not been taken seriously by the 
Japanese prison service and local establishments for a long time.  However, their 
involvement in publicizing the deaths of two prisoners in Nagoya (名古屋) prison in 
2001 and 2002 was a factor which led to the establishment of the CARC in 2003. The 
prisoners in question both died as a result of excessive force being used to restrain them 
by prison officers (Akiyama, 2010).  These incidents were heavily criticised in public 
due to the out-dated methods which were still being used to subdue unruly prisoners. In 
response, in 2002 the Public Prosecutors’ Office announced an investigation into these 
cases in Nagoya prison. Furthermore, as just stated, the CARC was established in 2003. 
The findings of this committee ultimately led to major reforms in how force is used to 
restrain prisoners in Japanese prisons (JMOJ, 2008). Hence the series of events which 
led to the establishment of CARC in 2003 suggests that voluntary groups can have some 
influence over how violence is controlled in the Japanese prison service. However, it 
should also be stressed that reform was brought about through the combined influences 
of public opinion, the Public Prosecutors’ Office, and the aforementioned voluntary 
groups.  It may thus be concluded that although voluntary groups can have some 
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influence over local violence control strategies, this influence is not in itself enough to 
bring about serious change. 
Overall, there are one official and several unofficial external performance 
assessment bodies monitoring violence control in Japanese prisons.  However, the 
influence of all of these bodies is limited. According to the autonomy rank and scores 
table (see Appendix 4), these circumstances can be ranked at the second highest group 
level (there are a few external performance assessment bodies, but lack influence over 
local establishments.) and the Japanese prison service can be assigned a score of +3 for 
this sub-code.  
 
 
7.3: The existence and influence of trade unions 
 
The activities of trade unions affect the autonomy of governors in local establishments 
and the overall group unity of prison service institutions.  This section analyses whether 
the prison services in question authorise unionisation among their staff, especially 
prison officers, and how trade unions influence local suicide and violence control 
strategies.  
 
7.3.1: Suicide 
England 
Unionisation among prison officers has been authorised by HMPS since 1938 (Coyle, 
2005). The largest trade union is the Prison Officers’ Association (POA) which 
represents 96 per cent of all prison officers across HM prisons (Bennett, 2008). The 
relationship between the POA and local governors and the national prison service is 
often difficult.  Since it was authorised, the activities of the POA have regularly been 
blamed for disruptions to the day-to-day operation of local prisons (Bennett, 2008).  The 
approaches taken to local branches of the POA vary according to the discretion of each 
governor. The governors whom I interviewed explained that some governors try to 
oppose the actions of their local POA branches while others take a more cooperative 
stanch towards them. Additionally, one of my interviewees noted that the quality of the 
relationships between local governors and POA branches often depends on the histories 
of different local establishments.  Some establishments have very active POA branches 
which regularly oppose the actions or policies of their local governors.  
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If governors of local establishments ask certain staff members to take on 
additional responsibilities as part of local suicide control strategies, this can lead to 
conflicts between the governor and the POA. For example, in one case HMIP reported 
that security officers in HMP Lindholm were not properly patrolling cells during the 
night in order to check on prisoners at risk of suicide or self-harm (HMCIP, 2000). The 
reason for this problem was that the local branch of the POA had insisted that asking 
prison officers to patrol cells for the purposes of suicide control meant demanding extra 
work from them which was considered to be in breach of their working agreements with 
HMP Lindholm (ibid.). This case shows how the activities of the POA can affect local 
suicide control strategies and also that governors need to consider the impact of the 
POA when designing such strategies.  
 Thus, HMPS authorises unionisation among its prison officers and other staff 
and that staff unions such as the POA can have a major impact on suicide control 
strategies at a local level. According to the autonomy rank and scores table (see 
Appendix 4), this situation can be ranked at the third highest group level (trade unions 
influences operation of risk control strategies in some local establishments) and HMPS 
can be assigned a score of +2 for this sub-code. 
  
Japan 
As discussed earlier in chapter 6, unionisation is not permitted among Japanese prison 
governors and officers. More specifically, unionisation among national security 
professionals, including prison officers, is prohibited by Article 108-2 of The National 
Civil Servant Act [kokkakomuin ho: 国家公務員法]. This rule was criticized by the 
2003 CARC which suggested that the existence of a prison officers’ trade union could 
improve the work environment in prisons (JMOJ, 2003). Nevertheless, this article has 
not been amended and there are no signs that it will be anytime soon.  
When asked about this situation, the Japanese prison staff whom I interviewed 
did not express any clear dissatisfaction with the lack of a trade union for their 
profession. One retired governor-graded officer stated that even if a trade union was 
authorised, not many officers would participate in it because of the history of trade 
unions in Japanese society. According to him, Japanese trade unions are traditionally 
yellow unions meaning that companies have a substantial degree of control over them. 
Accordingly, they rarely cause any disruptions. The lack of a prison officers’ trade 
union probably reflects the historical weakness of Japanese trade unions in general.  
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 Thus, according to the autonomy rank and scores table (see Appendix 4), the 
lack any approved trade unions for Japanese prison officers’ can be ranked at the 
highest group level (trade unions do not exist) and a score of +4 can be applied to the 
Japanese prison service for this sub-code. 
 
7.3.2: Violence 
England 
As with suicide control, the POA has a major interest in local violence control strategies 
which can affect the security and safety of its members. Local violence control policies 
are often a major cause of conflict between the POA and HMPS and have occasionally 
led to strikes by POA members. There are usually two main causes of conflict in this 
regard: national or local violence control policies and specific incidents which have 
occurred in local establishments.  
The first course of action taken by the POA is to raise issues with national or 
local violence control strategies through policy statements which are often announced in 
the media. For example, PSO 1600 (Use of Force) places tight restrictions on which 
kinds of defence tools can be used against prisoners who are under 18 years old in YOIs.  
In response to PSO 1600, the POA has insisted that prison officers need more protection 
against attacks from young offenders referring to the number of their members who 
were attacked and injured while working in YOIs in 2007 (Slack, 2007). Again, this 
kind of action suggests that the activities of the POA can influence national violence 
control policies in HMPS. The second course of action taken by the POA, the POA has 
criticized weak performance in local violence control in the media. For example, a 
severe riot occurred on the 1st of January 2011 in HMP Ford. In response to this incident, 
the POA publically criticized understaffing and a drinking culture among prisoners in 
the prison as well as recent budget cuts within HMPS (Bowcott, 2011).  
 Thus, the activities of the POA can influence local violence control strategies 
and performance. According to the autonomy rank and scores table (see Appendix 4), 
the influence of the POA in this regard can be ranked at the third highest group level 
(trade unions exists, and influences operation of risk control strategies in some local 
establishments) and HMPS can be assigned a score of + 2 for this sub-code.  
 
Japan 
As discussed above, the Japanese prison service does not authorise unionisation among 
prison officers hence there are no unions to intervene in national or local violence 
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control strategies and policies. Therefore, as with suicide control, the Japanese prison 
service is ranked at the highest group level and assigned a score of +4 for this sub-code.   
 
 
7.4: Internal performance competition and the main indicators thereof 
 
The fourth sub-code concerns internal performance competition and the main indicators 
for measuring it. This sub-code firstly analyses whether the English and Japanese prison 
services use internal competition as a means of encouraging local establishments to 
improve their handling of violence and suicide control. Secondly, where relevant this 
section measures the autonomy of local suicide and violence control strategies in 
relation to the overall prison service structures by analysing what kinds of internal 
performance indicators are used by either prison service.  
 
7.4.1: Suicide 
England 
HMPS has been assessing the performance of local establishments since the 1990s. The 
names of the performance assessment systems and indicators used by HMPS have 
changed regularly over the past 20 years. The indicators for suicide control in particular 
have not been consistent during this period.  Therefore, for the purposes of this study I 
refer only to the indicators defined by the Prison Service Performance Rating System 
(PRS) which was used between 2004 and 2010 (PIAG, 2010). The PRS was a 
benchmarking system used to evaluate the overall performance of local establishments 
on a quarterly basis (PIAG, 2010). According to this system, local establishments were 
given ratings on a scale of one to four: level 4 being the best and level 1 being the worst 
performance ratings. The PRS indicators changed constantly over the six year period 
that the system was used. The performance of local establishments in terms of suicide 
and self-harm control was measured according to the results of internal self-harm 
performance audits and HMIP healthy prison tests (PIAG, 2010).  
Local establishments were obliged by national rules to conduct self-harm 
performance audits to assess their own processes for preventing suicide and self-harm 
among prisoners (HMPS, 2007). This performance standard mainly assessed whether 
local establishments were following the procedural guidelines defined in the ACCT plan 
and PSO 2700. The suicide and self-harm performance indicators defined by 
Performance Standard 60 are as follows:  
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Suicide and self-harm performance indicators 
• Audit compliance 
• Assessment, Care in Custody and Teamwork (ACCT) CAREMAPs specify how 
each individual at-risk prisoner will be kept safe and what support they will be 
provided with. 
• Actions specified in the ACCT CAREMAPs are carried out by named members 
of staff within required timescales. 
• Staff are trained and supported to meet the requirements of PSO 2700. 
• A F213SH is completed for every incident of self-harm and all required details 
are entered onto the Incident Reporting System (IRS). 
• Every initial case review is held no later than 24 hours after the ACCT has 
been opened. 
• Local data on suicide and self-harm incidents are analysed monthly and the 
continuous improvement plan is updated. 
(HMPS 2007 Performance Standard 60: Suicide and Self-harm Management) 
 
This list shows that most internal performance audit indicators used while the 
PRS system was in place measured the extents to which local establishments 
appropriately implemented the suicide and self-harm prevention procedures defined by 
PSO 2700 and the ACCT plan. Similarly, the HMIP test for suicide and self-harm 
prevention assessed local suicide control processes. As I explained in sec. 7.2.1 of this 
chapter, HMIP monitors whether local establishments implement the ACCT approach 
and national suicide control guidelines properly (HMIP, 2009a). Thus, it can be seen 
that HMPS measures local suicide control performance in terms of process-oriented 
indicators rather than outcome-oriented indicators such as suicide and self-harm rates in 
local establishments. 
In conclusion, HMPS uses internal competition to encourage local 
establishments to improve their suicide control performance. Furthermore, the 
indicators used by HMPS to measure internal performance are mainly process-oriented.  
According to the autonomy rank and scores table (see Appendix 4), the extent to which 
HMPS makes use of internal competition can be ranked at the second highest group 
level (internal performance competition Exists and performance is measured by process-
oriented indicators) and a score of + 2 can be given for this sub-code.  
 
Japan 
The Japanese prison service does not make use of internal performance competition to 
encourage local establishments to improve their suicide control performance. A director 
of the Japanese prison service whom I interviewed commented that although the prison 
service has been considering introducing a performance assessment system for some 
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time, it is highly unlikely to happen in his view.  He stressed that internal competition is 
not a good way of controlling the performance of local establishments because it 
highlights differences in the quality of the service delivered by different prisons and 
reduces overall unity within the prison service. Additionally, he forcefully stated that 
performance assessments based on statistical data and numerical scales do not reflect 
the reality of prisons in any way.  
Although the Japanese prison service does not use competition between local 
establishments, the national auditing unit must inspect the overall performance of local 
establishments at least once a year (Article 5 of The Penal Institutions Act). Auditors are 
appointed by the Minister of Justice from staff members at the national HQs (ibid.). 
Unlike in HMPS, auditors do not have formal written performance standards for 
monitoring local suicide control strategies.  Staff members in the national HQs whom I 
interviewed explained that most auditors have worked as prison officers in local 
establishments before being moved to the national HQ offices. Accordingly, they 
conduct inspections of local establishments based on their experiences as prison officers.  
I interviewed one of these auditors for this study. He explained that in his view all local 
establishments have some problems and that he audits prisons by observing the customs 
and patterns of behaviour of governors and managers. In comparison with the 
assessment standards maintained by HMPS, the auditing system used in the Japanese 
prison service is rather general and no clearly defined standards have been set for 
checking local performance. 
Thus, the Japanese prison service does not use internal performance competition 
to control suicide prevention strategies in local establishments. According to the 
autonomy rank and scores table (see Appendix 4), the lack of internal performance 
competition in the Japanese prison service can be ranked at the highest group level 
(internal performance competition does not exist) and the prison service itself can be 
assigned a score of +3 for this sub-code. 
 
7.4.2: Violence 
England 
In contrast to the case of suicide control, HMPS has been using relatively well-
established performance competition indicators for controlling violence. Since the 
1990s HMPS has introduced Key Performance Indicators and Targets (KPIs and KPTs) 
(Bennett, 2008).  KPIs are national indicators for measuring the quality of service in 
prisons and KPTs are local performance targets for each establishment.  
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In terms of violence control, KPTs set serious assault targets relative to the size 
of the prisoner populations in different local establishments. These targets are also 
defined locally and renewed every year in consideration of local violence incident 
records. Achievement is measured according to the relationship between targeted 
assault rates and the actual performance of local establishments. For example, the 
serious assault KPT for HMP Exeter in 2010 was set at 1.28 cases per prisoner (PIAG, 
2010). In response, HMP Exeter recorded 0.77 cases of serious assault per prisoner in 
the first quarter of 2010 (ibid.).  In this way, HMP Exeter performed 160% better than 
the target set for it: in other words, it achieved its target for that quarter.   
Thus, it can be seen that HMPS measures performance on violence and serious 
assault in terms of outcome- rather than process-oriented indicators.  According to the 
autonomy rank and scores table (see Appendix 4), the system used by HMPS to 
measure performance on violence and serious assault can be ranked at the second lowest 
group level (internal performance competition exists for controlling violence, and the 
indicators are outcome-oriented) and a score of +1 can be assigned for this sub-code.  
 
Japan 
As with suicide control, the Japanese prison service does not have any performance 
assessment methods for monitoring violence control in local establishments.  Also, the 
national audit does not have a specific agenda or criteria concerning violence control 
performance levels in local establishments. According to national HQ staff members, 
auditing is based on the experiences of the auditors as explained in suicide control (see 
Sec. 7.4.1 above). In any case, the Japanese prison service does not use competition 
between local establishments to control violence hence it is ranked at the highest group 
level and assigned a score of + 3 for this sub-code.   
 
 
7.5: Diversity of key local strategies 
 
The final sub-code concerns the diversity of key local strategies. Previous sections 
analysed how much discretion local establishments and their governors have in setting 
local risk control strategies and to what extent this process is open to external influence.  
Following this course, this section analyses how far key suicide and violence control 
strategies indicate diversity among local establishments. 
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7.5.1: Suicide 
England 
It was found in chapter 6 that HMPS governors are assigned several leadership roles in 
local establishments as part of local suicide control strategies. Nevertheless, there is not 
much diversity between local suicide control strategies across HMPS because they all 
based on the national suicide control structure.  
The first key strategy for controlling suicide is operating the ACCT process for 
prisoners at risk.  PSO 2700 states that local suicide control procedures should be based 
on the ACCT scheme as discussed in chapter 4. Accordingly, ACCT is one of the key 
strategies for controlling the risk of suicide in local establishments.  There are external 
and internal performance indicators for assessing the compliance level of local 
establishments in regard to ACCT. As discussed in sec. 7.2.1, HMIP reviews the 
appropriateness of how ACCT is operated in different local establishments.  Moreover, 
as explained in sec. 7.4.1, HMPS uses process-oriented indicators to measure local 
suicide control performance. These checks constrain local autonomy in establishing 
more varied strategies for controlling suicide. Governors need to concentrate on 
implementing the ACCT scheme in their areas of responsibility as stated in PSO 2700.  
The second key strategy for preventing suicide is confining prisoners at risk to 
special cells or segregation units as was already explained in chapter 4 (PSOs 2700 and 
1700). Any decisions to confine prisoners due to these risks require the authorisation of 
the relevant governor (Rule 45 of The Prison Rules 1999; PSOs 2700 and 1700). 
Governors may also place prisoners at risk in confinement according to their own 
discretion. Nevertheless, the discretion of governors in this regard is restricted by PSOs 
2700 and 1700. PSO 1700 emphasises that 12% of self-inflicted deaths in prison 
custody over the period 2001-2006 occurred while the prisoners involved were being 
held in confinement (PSO 1700). Based on this data, PSOs 2700 and 1700 stated that 
governors should only place prisoners at risk of suicide in confinement if there are no 
other effective means of dealing with them in line with the ACCT scheme.  
Following these rules, HMIP tends to strictly evaluate the use of segregation 
units in HM prisons for the purposes of preventing suicide and self-harm. 
Establishments where relatively high numbers of prisoners at risk in the aforesaid ways 
are confined to segregation units are required to prove that this form of treatment is 
necessary according to the ACCT scheme. In any case, it seems that segregation is not 
favoured by HMIP as a way of controlling the said risks. This can be seen from the 
following cases reported of HMPs Brixton and Parc:  
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Twelve ACCTs had been opened in recent months on prisoners held in the 
segregation unit… The prison argued that segregation had been the only viable 
option at the time, and some prisoners had been involved in acts of indiscipline 
before the self-harm.  
(HMCIP 2008b HMP Brixton) 
 
Five prisoners a month subject to ACCT procedures were held in the 
segregation unit. ACCT procedures were implemented quickly when risks were 
identified but there was no routine consideration of the suitability of remaining 
in segregation and no evidence that mental health assessments were completed 
promptly.  
(HMCIP 2009l HMP Parc) 
 
 
These reports show that the discretion of governors for segregating prisoners at risk of 
suicide or self-harm is limited by PSO 2700 and HMIP. 
 The third key approach is transferring prisoners at risk to other establishments. 
As with segregation, PSOs 2700 and PSO 1810 state that local establishments can 
transfer prisoners to other establishments if the transfers are considered to be beneficial 
to the prisoners at risk. Chapter 6 discussed how transfers are arranged between the 
governors of local establishments. It was noted that governors are in charge of deciding 
and negotiating prisoner transfers. Nevertheless, HMIP strictly monitors prisoner 
transfers: particularly of prisoners at risk of suicide or self-harm. A report made by 
HMIP to HMPS concerning a loop transfer of prisoners at risk of suicide and self-harm 
between HMPs Wandsworth and Pentonville is enlightening in this regard.   
 In May 2009 six prisoners were moved from HMP Pentonville to HMP 
Wandsworth immediately prior to an HMIP inspection of Pentonville. Then in June five 
of the same prisoners were transferred back to Pentonville immediately prior to an 
HMIP inspection of Wandsworth (MOJ, 2010c). This system of transferring prisoners 
between the two establishments, evidently to avoid HMIP criticizing their treatment, 
was found by HMIP and reported to HMPS and the MOJ. In this case, firstly HMIP 
stated that the two establishments had abused the transfer system. Secondly, they 
specifically focused on two prisoners out of six prisoners who had been transferred 
between the two prisons. These two were found to be at serious risk of self-harm or 
suicide, and HMIP particularly criticised that the transfers had increased self-harming 
and suicide risk of those prisoners (HMCIP, 2009m and 2009q). These reports 
subsequently led to an investigation of loop transfers between local establishments by 
the MOJ (MOJ, 2010c). This case shows that although governors are formally assigned 
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leadership roles in transferring prisoners at risk of suicide or self-harm, such transfers 
are in fact constrained by the national suicide control guidelines and strictly monitored 
by HMIP. Thus, it is difficult for governors to exercise discretion in using prisoner 
transfers and confinement to control the risks of suicide and self-harm. Instead, they are 
expected to generally follow key national guidelines.  
Overall, main key local suicide control strategies (i.e. segregation and 
transfers) where governors can exercise their discretion were highly intervened by the 
national HQs and HMIP. Those interventions are intended to unify local suicide control 
strategies under the national suicide control policies. According to the autonomy rank 
and scores table (see Appendix 4), these circumstances can be ranked at the second 
highest group level (there are common key strategies followed by a majority of local 
establishments for controlling the risks of suicide and self-harm) and HMPS can be 
assigned a score of +3 for this sub-code. 
 
Japan 
It was noted in chapter 4 that the Japanese prison service generally does not have formal 
risk control guidelines. Additionally, chapter 6 showed that the strategic leadership roles 
played by governors in controlling risk in local establishments are weakened by the 
tanto system. Hence this section discusses whether tanto officers share common key 
strategies for controlling suicide and, if so, how far any such approaches vary between 
tanto officers in different local establishments.  
According the Japanese prison staff whom I interviewed, when they were 
working as tanto officers in local establishments they did not follow any significant 
common strategies along with their colleagues for controlling the risk of suicide. One of 
these interviewees explained that he was fully responsible for all general duties required 
of him as a tanto officer: for example, patrolling cells at night and consulting prisoners 
who had problems. He concluded that, in these circumstances, if a prisoner successfully 
committed suicide, the case would be considered unavoidable because the supervising 
officer had conducted all of his assigned duties. Similarly, another interviewee 
explained that prison officers generally do not consider suicide among prisoners to be 
an active control target. He emphasized that even if a suicide occurred, the tanto officers 
and duty managers involved would not be reprimanded unless they had clearly failed to 
perform their assigned duties. 
Thus, the prison staff whom I interviewed did not think that suicide should be an 
active control target. This view corresponds to the findings of chapter 5 on how risk is 
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identified by local establishments in Japan. Specifically, sec. 5.2.1 showed that local 
establishments do not have particular ways of identifying the risks of suicide and self-
harm. Therefore, it can be concluded that there are no formal or informal strategies 
within Japanese prisons for controlling the risks of suicide and self-harm. According to 
the autonomy rank and scores table (see Appendix 4), this situation can be ranked at the 
lowest group level (risk control strategies cannot be observed at either local or national 
levels) and a score of 0 can be assigned to the Japanese prison service for this sub-code. 
 
7.5.2: Violence  
England 
Chapter 6 showed that governors are assigned several roles as leaders of local 
establishments as part of local violence control strategies. Additionally, in comparison 
with suicide control, local establishments are allowed to maintain a variety of 
approaches to segregating prisoners for the purposes of preventing violence, in which 
regard governors can exercise their discretion. 
Firstly, PSO 2750, referring to PSO 1700, requests that governors establish 
effective ways of segregating prisoners as part of their overall violence control 
strategies. Unlike with suicide control, there are no strong conditional requirements 
preventing governors from segregating prisoners where there is danger of violence.  
Providing governors follow the appropriate procedures set out in Rule 45 of The Prison 
Rules 1999 and their purpose is to prevent violence, they can separate prisoners at their 
discretion. Thus, it can be seen that PSO 2750 assigns greater discretion to governors 
for segregating prisoners than PSO 2700.  
Secondly, HMPS uses outcome-oriented indicators to measure violence 
performance in local establishments as I explained in sec. 7.4.2. This suggests that local 
violence reduction processes are not strictly assessed or constrained by internal 
performance competition. So, unlike with suicide control, local establishments are 
allowed to try various ways of reducing violence in order to achieve KPTs. Thirdly, as 
was explained in sec. 7.2.2 above, HMIP monitors local violence control strategies. 
However, in terms of using segregation for the purposes of controlling violence, 
HMCIP reports mainly focus on the appropriateness of segregation procedures and 
conditions in segregation cells rather than reviewing whether decisions to send prisoners 
to segregation units were appropriate. Again, unlike suicide control, decisions to use 
segregation units in response to the risk of violence rely heavily on the discretion of 
governors in local establishments.  
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In reality, segregation units are used in different ways by different local 
establishments. To illustrate, some local establishments, such as HMPs Ashfield, 
Buckley Hall, and Wayland (HMCIP, 2010a, 2007b, and 2006g respectively), use 
segregation to protect prisoners who are being bullied.  Other local establishments, such 
as HMPs Castington and Liverpool (HMCIP, 2009c and 2009j respectively), mainly use 
segregation to punish prisoners who have assaulted others. Yet others, such as HMPs 
Wandsworth and Dartmoor (HMCIP 2009p and 2008c respectively), use segregation 
units at the request of individual prisoners as a form of protection. Interview data with 
governors also indicate that they have a high level of discretion over how segregation 
should be used as part of local violence control strategies. One retired governor 
confirmed that the segregation of prisoners is essential to local violence control 
strategies and that governors have a lot of discretion over how it should be used. In 
contrast, another governor stated that although segregation can be helpful in reducing 
violence, it is better to let prisoners live life as normally as possible within prisons 
rather than using segregation units to control them. Hence the discretion of governors 
can affect how segregation is used in local establishments as part of their violence 
control strategies. 
In conclusion, in comparison with suicide control, there is greater diversity in 
how segregation is used as part of violence control strategies in HMPS prisons.  
According to the autonomy rank and scores table (see Appendix 4), these circumstances 
can be ranked at the third highest group level (there are common key strategies for 
controlling violence, but approaches in those strategies vary among local 
establishments) and HMPS can be assigned a score of + 2 for this sub-code. 
 
Japan 
It was noted in chapter 6 that Japanese prison governors are not assigned strong 
leadership roles in local violence control strategies. Instead, substantial strategic roles in 
this regard are assigned to tanto officers and middle ranking managers. Accordingly, 
this section analyses the diversity of local violence control strategies operated by tanto 
officers.   
A number of salient points have been made over the course of this study which 
should be recounted here. First, as discussed in chapter 4, the Japanese prison service 
does not have any formal national guidelines concerning violence control in local 
establishments. Second, it was pointed out in chapter 6 that prison officers have a 
substantial amount of discretion in how segregation units are operated at a local level 
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(Art. 76, The Penal Institutions Act). Third, sec. 7.2.2 of this chapter showed that, 
unlike in HMPS, external auditing of violence control in Japanese prisons is weak.  And 
fourth, sec. 7.4.2 showed that the Japanese prion service does not use internal 
performance competition to control violence and even the internal auditing system does 
not have any established performance standards for monitoring local violence control 
procedures. Therefore, it can be concluded here that there is very little external or 
internal interference in how local establishments control violence.  
 Nevertheless, in practice tanto officers working in different establishments tend 
to deal with violence in similar ways. Hamai, who interviewed tanto officers for his 
2006 book, asked them about the basic approaches to violence control they were 
instructed to follow when they first entered the Japanese prison service (Hamai, 2006). 
He has summarised their views in this regard as follows: 
 
If you are newly appointed as a tanto officer to a group of prisoners, these 
prisoners will not want you to change how they have been controlled previously. 
If you try something new soon after you are appointed, your prisoners will feel 
that you are looking down on them. If you have a subordinate officer, he will not 
like it if you change the existing regime maintained by the previous officer…You 
could try to make changes to how you control the prisoners once you understand 
them as a group; such as the place of yakuza prisoners in relation to the whole 
group.  
(Hamai, 2006: p. 211; my translation)   
 
According to this summary, although there is no formal restriction or external 
interventions about how violence among prisoners should be controlled, tanto officers 
should not try to change the systems put in place by their more senior colleagues. 
Additionally, this pressure comes not only from staff members, but also from prisoners. 
In regard to the latter point, one member of prison staff whom I interviewed explained 
that local security control is based on informal mutual expectations about violence 
control shared by prisoners and tanto officers. Tanto officers make prisoners aware in 
an informal manner about where the boundaries sit between soft and hard controls: for 
example, in what circumstances prisoners will be constrained by physical force or just 
receive verbal warnings. In order to maintain this kind of mutual recognition, tanto 
officers should not make major changes to the status quo.  
Thus, although tanto officers are possible to examine various ways of local 
violence control strategies within formal risk control structures in theory; there is very 
little variation between local violence control strategies due to informal pressures 
between staff members and prisoners. One informal strategy seems to be commonly 
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shared among prison officers throughout Japan: do NOT modify existing strategies 
taken by previous tanto officers. According to the autonomy rank and scores table (see 
Appendix 4), these circumstances can be ranked at the second highest group level (there 
are common key strategies followed by a majority of local establishments for 
controlling the risk of violence) and the Japanese prison service can be assigned a score 
of +3 for this sub-code. 
 
 
7.6: Conclusion 
 
This chapter has discussed the autonomy of governors and local establishments in 
relation to local violence and suicide control strategies.  Several conclusions can now be 
drawn from the above discussions. Firstly, in regard to the ratio of insider to outsider 
governors, although HMPS provides some opportunities for outsiders to become prison 
governors, a majority of HMPS governors are insiders who have risen up through the 
ranks. By contrast, there are no possibilities for outsiders to become prison governors in 
the Japanese prison service because governors are only appointed from among insiders 
who have risen up through the ranks. 
 Secondly, in regard to external monitoring, HMPS has authorised several 
independent external performance assessment bodies: the PPO, IMB, and HMIP.  Of 
these bodies, HMIP has the strongest influence over local suicide and violence control 
strategies because it has well-defined assessment systems. Meanwhile, the Japanese 
prison service has authorised one external performance assessment body, namely the 
PIVC. However, it does not have a substantial impact on violence and suicide control 
strategies in local establishments. In addition to the PIVC, there are also some 
unauthorised voluntary groups which monitor local suicide and violence control 
strategies in the Japanese prison service. As was noted above, these groups have very 
little impact on the management of Japan prisons. 
 Thirdly, in regard to trade unions, in England the POA is able to intervene in the 
implementation of suicide and violence risk control strategies at a local level. Governors 
can exercise discretion in how they approach local branches of the POA. By contrast, 
the Japanese prison service does not authorise unionisation among prison officers and 
the level interest in unions shown by the prison staff whom I interviewed was low. 
Accordingly, the daily management of Japanese prisons is not disrupted by the activities 
of trade unions. 
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 Fourthly, HMPS currently uses internal performance competition to control the 
quality of local suicide and violence control strategies.  The indicators for measuring 
suicide control performance are mainly process-oriented. On the other hand, the 
indicators for measuring local violence control performance are outcome-oriented.  In 
comparison, the Japanese prison service does not use internal performance competition 
in order to manage suicide and violence control strategies in local establishments.   
Finally, in regard to the diversity of local suicide and violence control strategies, 
very little evidence of variation was found between local suicide control strategies in 
HMPS. This is because all HMPS prisons must base their suicide control strategies on 
national guidelines and take account of performance monitoring systems which check 
whether they are following these guidelines.  Therefore, individual governors have very 
little influence over the design of suicide control strategies in their areas of 
responsibility. By contrast, there is more variation between local violence control 
strategies, particularly in regard to the use of segregation. The national violence control 
guidelines and HMIP inspection criteria allow governors to establish local ways of 
using segregation for the purposes of violence control. Moreover, HMPS internal 
performance monitoring criteria are outcome-oriented so they do not particularly check 
how segregation is used in this regard.  
Meanwhile, local violence and suicide control strategies in Japanese prisons 
largely rely on the tanto system. Tanto officers generally do not show much interest in 
local suicide control strategies.  Interview data show that Japanese prison staff members 
do not consider suicide to be something that they should actively try to control as part of 
the overall prison service risk control structure. On the other hand, the formal violence 
control structure allows tanto officers a large amount of discretion in how they deal 
with violence because of low intervention from outsides and national HQs. However, in 
practice there is very little variation between the violence control methods used by tanto 
officers. As discussed above, this is because there is a large amount of informal pressure 
on individual tanto officers to maintain existing violence control strategies in their local 
establishments. 
 Numerical scores have been assigned to each sub-code discussed above 
according to the autonomy ranks and scores table (see Appendix 4).  The outcomes of 
this process can be seen in Tables 7.5 and 7.6. Table 7.5 gives a visual map of the 
results for the autonomy (X2) scores. As previously, the five columns represent the sub-
codes discussed in this chapter and the positions of the shaded blocks reflect the group 
levels of the English and Japanese prison services in the case of each sub-code.  The 
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letter “S” represents suicide risk control and “V” represents violence risk control. 
Meanwhile, Table 7.6 shows the autonomy (X2) score results as numbers, with the five 
sub-codes listed twice in the left-hand column and two sets of figures given for each: 
the first being raw scores and the second standardized scores as discussed in chapter 3 
(see Table 3.5, p. 118).  
As I explained in chapter 3, there is an inverse relationship between the 
autonomy of local establishments and the overall group control of the national prison 
services. Thus, if more autonomy is given to local establishments, the overall group 
level of national prison services decreases. The results displayed below show that the 
Japanese prison service has been ranked at a higher group level than HMPS for the five 
sub-codes for violence control and the four sub-codes for suicide control. This is 
because the Japanese prison service is generally closed to outsiders and does not use 
internal performance competition. In regard to the fifth sub-code, local suicide control 
strategies were not actively observed in the Japanese prison service hence the score 
given was 0. Meanwhile, the diversity of violence control strategies was ranked at a 
higher group unity level in consideration of the influence of informal group pressures 
from both colleagues and prisoners on individual officers.   
 
 
Table 7.5: Summary of autonomy (X2) in suicide and violence control strategies and group scores 
 
(S): suicide, (V): violence. 
1 2 3 4
Insiders/
Outsiders
 
(governors)
external
performance
assessment
bodies
Existence and
influence of
trade union
performance
competition
and
indicators
Smallest 4 Japan
Japan
(S)&(V)
3 England
Japan
 (S) & (V)
Japan
(S) & (V)
England
(S)
Japan
 (V)
2
England
 (S)& (V)
England
 (S)& (V)
England
(S)
1
England
(V)
Largest 0
Sub-codes
England
 (V)
Japan (S)
Diversity of
local key
strategies
5
Autonomy
of
establishments
Group
Scores
(national)
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Table 7.6: Summary of raw and standardized autonomy (X2) scores  
 
  
 In summary, HMPS showed less group unity and more autonomy in local 
suicide and violence control strategies in comparison with the Japanese prison service. 
Local risk control structures in HMPS are relatively open to the scrutiny of outsiders.  
As a result, the diversity of participants in risk control increases and the group unity of 
the national prison service decreases. Higher group levels for the fourth and fifth sub-
codes were given to HMPS for suicide control than for violence control. The reason for 
this difference is that local suicide control strategies are highly constrained by internal 
and external performance assessments which monitor whether local establishments are 
complying with the national suicide control guidelines. In conclusion, the autonomy of 
local establishments in HMPS was generally higher than that of local establishments in 
the Japanese prison service. This finding in turn indicates that the national group unity 
of HMPS is lower than that of the Japanese prison service.  
England Japan England Japan
3 4 3 4
2 3 2 3
2 4 2 4
2 3 1 3
3 0 2 3
7.5 10.0 7.5 10.0
5.0 7.5 5.0 7.5
5.0 10.0 5.0 10.0
6.7 10.0 3.3 10.0
7.5 0.0 5.0 7.5
Internal performance competition and indicators
Diversity of local strategies
suicide Violence
Standardize scores
Raw scores
Risks
Prison Services
Insiders and  outsiders
External performance assessment bodies
Existence and influence of trade unions
Internal performance competition and indicators
Diversity of local strategies
Insiders and  outsiders
External performance assessment bodies
Existence and influence of trade unions
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Chapter 8  
Analysis: 
How Can Prison Risk Control Culture Be Demonstrated Using 
the Grid and Group Theory?  
 
 
This chapter provides a summary and further analysis of the findings of chapters 4, 5, 6, 
and 7 showing how it can be used to apply the g/g theory in two distinct ways based on 
the approach discussed in chapter 3. The g/g theory has been used in previous empirical 
chapters to measure the risk control cultures of the English and Japanese prison services 
by analysing the organizational structures of these institutions aimed at controlling the 
risks of suicide and violence. Four grid and group aspects along with a further twenty 
sub-codes have been used for the purposes of this study. The findings of chapters 4-7 
are analysed in this chapter according to the three demonstration techniques outlined in 
chapter 3. The first section of this chapter provides a qualitative summary of the grid 
and group levels assigned to the English and Japanese prison services over the course of 
this study. The second section offers a quantitative summary of the numerical scores 
assigned for the 20 sub-codes which is developed further in the third section through a 
further quantitative summary. The fourth section offers yet another quantitative 
demonstration of the suicide and violence control cultures of the English and Japanese 
prison services. Lastly, the final section evaluates the results and method used in this 
study.   
 
 
8.1: Qualitative summary: g/g analysis of the risk control cultures of the 
English and Japanese prison services 
 
It was noted in chapter 1 that culture can be defined in two ways: individual values and 
collective patterns of behaviour. I concluded in chapter 2 that the g/g theory focuses on 
the latter definition of culture. Accordingly, in chapter 3 I outlined a method for using 
the g/g theory to identify culture as collective patterns of behaviour in relation to 
specific risks. Firstly, I asserted that prison risk control cultures can be measured in 
terms of four g/g aspects: formalization (Y1), specialization (Y2), compliance (X1) and 
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autonomy (X2).  However, I also noted that the results of these four g/g aspects tend to 
differ depending on the unit of observation. Accordingly, I decided that this study 
should measure the g/g levels of the national risk control structures of the English and 
Japanese prison services, thereby taking account of the characteristics of each prison 
service as total institutions.  
Therefore, the grid aspects were measured according to the formality of the 
rules defining risk control systems (formalization) and the leadership roles assigned to 
governors within them (specialization or roles of governors). The formality level was 
measured in terms of how easily prison staff can change the rules that bind them in 
relation to the overall penal legal structures. More formal rules indicate higher grid level 
for the prison service institutions. The group aspects were measured according to the 
diversity and behaviour of prison service staff at a local level, first, in regard to the 
implementation of the rules defined by risk control systems (compliance) and, second, 
in regard to how much discretion they have in exercising their assigned leadership roles 
within the overall risk control structures (autonomy). Overall, this method measures two 
key aspects of the suicide and violence risk control structures of the English and 
Japanese prison services: 1. the risk control system as a whole (Y1 and X1); and 2. the 
leadership of governors (Y2 and X2). 
 
8.1.1: Risk control systems; formalization (Y1) and compliance (X1)  
Chapter 4 discussed formalization (Y1) as a grid aspect of risk control systems.  
HMPS formally defines all of the issues covered by the 5 formalization sub-codes in 
written rules: order, definitions of risk, punishment and reward, national guidelines, and 
information recording and documentation systems. HMPS rules specifically stated that 
punishment and reward should not be used to control the risk of suicide. Moreover, the 
risk control systems used by HMPS to control suicide and violence are clearly defined 
by statutory instruments, which is to say secondary legislation: The Prison Rules 1999 
and PSOs. By contrast, the Japanese prison service generally does not have a formal 
risk control system set out in written laws. Most rules are instead agreed informally 
between staff members in local establishments often with the tacit agreement of 
prisoners. However, there are two important exceptions, punishment and order, which 
are defined by the most formal rules within the Japanese legal system, namely 
parliamentary acts. Thus, the rules defining suicide and violence control systems 
maintained by the Japanese prison service are generally less formal than those 
maintained for the same purposes by HMPS. 
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Next, chapter 5 analysed the compliance level of local establishments in 
response to the same rules discussed in chapter 4. A major problem was encountered in 
this chapter in the respect that very little information about the local compliance level of 
local establishments is available for the Japanese prison service. Furthermore, the 
Japanese prison service and HMPS provide very different types of information about 
local establishments which are not easy to compare. In response to this difficulty, I 
assumed that local establishments appropriately comply with relevant rules in cases 
where the national prison service officially insists that local establishments generally 
comply with the relevant rules, and if no reliable data is available indicating that local 
establishments implement rules inappropriately. Five sub-codes were set to analyse the 
extent of compliance within local establishments.  
The first sub-code analysed how far local establishments enforce order and 
discipline among prisoners. HMPS generally allows prisoners a lot of individual 
freedoms. Accordingly, order and discipline are maintained through a balance between 
collective security and the well-being of individual prisoners. Meanwhile, the Japanese 
prison service tends to restrict the individual behaviour of prisoners in order to maintain 
order and discipline. That is, the individual interests of prisoners are constrained by the 
demands of strict communal discipline.  
The second sub-code focused on how the risks of suicide and violence are 
identified. In spite of having relatively formal definitions of suicide and violence, there 
is wide variation in the methods, and their quality, used by local establishments in 
HMPS to identify the aforesaid risks. My case studies showed that many local 
establishments have issues with identifying these risks. These findings suggest that the 
definitions of risk provided by HMPS have not led to a uniform system for identifying 
them in local risk control processes. On the other hand, the significant differences were 
observed between how the risks of suicide and violence are identified in local 
establishments in Japan. In particular, it was found that local establishments do not have 
well-defined ways of identifying the risk of suicide. The limited data available on this 
matter shows that information and knowledge which can help to identify prisoners at 
risk of suicide are not shared across local establishments. By contrast, local prison staff 
members do share informal knowledge about how the risk of violence can be identified.   
The third sub-code focused on the appropriateness of punishment and reward 
systems. HMPS does not use punishment or reward to control the risk of suicide hence a 
score of 0 was given for this sub-code. Meanwhile, it was found that a majority of local 
establishments in HMPS make appropriate use of punishment as part of their local 
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violence control measures. By contrast, greater variation was observed in how reward is 
used in local establishments to control violence hence a lower compliance level was 
given. In regard to the punishment and reward systems, no substantial evidence could be 
found to show whether local establishments in Japan use punishment and reward 
systems appropriately or not for controlling the risk of suicide. Accordingly, as stated 
above, I assumed that a majority of local establishments generally followed the 
punishment and reward systems for controlling suicide set out in the relevant statutory 
codes. Conversely, on the one hand the available data suggest that local establishments 
overuse punishment in order to control violence. On the other hand, the data concerning 
the reward system for controlling violence were inconclusive. Therefore, I assumed that 
the compliance level was generally good in this respect.  
The fourth sub-code analysed the compliance level of local establishments in 
response to the national risk control guidelines. In regard to HMPS, it was found that 
although all local establishments primarily follow the relevant guidelines on designing 
local suicide and violence control strategies, the quality of the actual strategies they 
developed varies widely. Indeed, staff members in some local establishments openly 
expressed doubts about the efficacy of the ACCT scheme for reducing suicide thus 
suggesting low group unity in its implementation at a local level. Meanwhile, in terms 
of violence control, the case of HMP Pentonville shows that it is difficult to control 
violence through formal national strategic guidelines because violence-related issues are 
often intimately linked to the specific histories and characteristics of local 
establishments. Cases such as this show the limitations of formal violence risk control 
guidelines. In comparison, the Japanese prison service does not have any formal 
national strategic guidelines concerning suicide and violence control in local 
establishments. Therefore, I analysed the compliance level in terms of how far the 
relevant statutory codes defining violence and suicide control procedures and techniques 
are followed in local establishments. My findings in this regard show that the 
compliance level varies from rule to rule: that is, some rules are followed more 
diligently than others in local establishments.  
Lastly, the fifth sub-code analysed the accountability of incident information 
recording systems. A high level of accountability for documenting incidences of both 
suicide and violence control was found in a majority of local establishments in HMPS.  
By contrast, the 2003 CARC highlighted a general lack of accountability in local 
information recording systems. In light of this evidence, as well as a lack of more recent 
data suggesting that the situation has improved, I have concluded here that the 
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accountability of procedures for recording information about cases of violence and 
suicide varies between local establishments. 
 In conclusion, the findings of chapters 4 and 5 show, first, that although HMPS 
provides very formal guidelines on the design of local suicide and violence risk control 
systems, the compliance level for these guidelines varies between local establishments.  
Second, it was found that with the exceptions of order and punishment, the 
formalization and compliance levels of the Japanese prison service were generally low. 
Thus, it can be concluded that the main risk control system in place in Japanese prisons 
involves tight and wide-reaching restrictions being placed on prisoners with the 
intention of maintaining order and discipline as defined in Japanese parliamentary law. 
 
8.1.2: Leadership; the roles of governors (Y2) and autonomy (X2) in local 
establishments 
The second set of g/g aspects measured the risk control cultures of the English and 
Japanese prison services in regard to the leadership of governors: specifically, they 
represented the roles of governors (grid) and autonomy in local establishments (group).  
Accordingly, the specializations of governors as leaders of local risk control strategies 
were discussed in chapter 6 and the level of autonomy and discretion of governors in 
local establishments were discussed in chapter 7.  
Chapter 6 shows that HMPS maintains a common approach to suicide and 
violence in regard to the specialization of its staff members and governors. Specialised 
roles are assigned to staff members in order to control specific risks. In comparison with 
HMPS, the Japanese prison service does not assign specialized roles to staff members in 
suicide and risk control strategies. Instead, Japanese prisoner officers assume a 
general-purpose role in maintaining order among prisoners as part of the tanto system.   
The leadership roles of Japanese prison governors in managing suicide and 
violence control are moderated by this system. Furthermore, Japanese prison officers 
commonly understand that governors are in a senior position of authority and are thus 
not concerned with gaining any more performance-related promotions. By comparison, 
HMPS governors are assigned highly specialised roles as leaders of local risk control 
strategies. It is formally and informally recognised within HMPS that governors are 
leaders of prisons both in name and in practice. Relevant local risk control procedures 
discussed in chapter 4 are designed, premising strong strategic leadership roles of 
governors in local establishments. Prison staff members generally take the view that the 
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capability and performance of governors is very important to the effectiveness of 
violence and suicide control in local establishments.   
Chapter 7 discussed the autonomy of local establishments in regard to the areas 
in which governors exercise their leadership roles. The autonomy level in this respect 
was measured according to the diversity of staff members in local establishments, 
specifically in terms of whether they are insiders or outsiders and what effect the ratio 
of insiders to outsiders has on local risk control strategies. My findings show, firstly, 
that HMPS allows outsiders a greater degree of influence over local risk control 
strategies than the Japanese prison service. Moreover, HMPS appoints a small 
proportion of governors from among outsiders whereas the Japanese prison service does 
not appoint any outsider governors. Secondly, in regard to external monitoring, this 
study has shown that HMPS has authorised several independent external assessments 
bodies to monitor local violence and suicide control strategies, of which HMIP has a 
particularly strong influence over governors in local establishments. Moreover, the 
prison officers’ trade union, the POA, can have a major impact on the management of 
local suicide and violence control strategies. Meanwhile, the Japanese prison service is 
generally closed to outsiders. As just stated, governors are only promoted from among 
insiders and the influence of external monitoring bodies is generally weak: this is 
including the one officially authorised monitoring body, the PIVC. Additionally, the 
Civil Servant Act prohibits unionisation among prison officers hence there are no trade 
unions of which to take account. Thus, the day-to-day running of local suicide and 
violence control strategies in Japanese prisons is rarely interrupted by the activities of 
external bodies. 
 Next, chapter 7 considered whether the English and Japanese prison services 
use internal competition between local establishments to manage local violence and 
suicide control strategies and performance. The Japanese prison service does not use 
any form of internal performance competition for the aforesaid purposes hence the 
highest group score was given for group unity. On the other hand, HMPS does use 
internal performance competition to manage local suicide and violence control 
strategies. The main indicator used by HMPS to measure local performance in suicide 
control concerns the extent to which local establishments follow national suicide control 
guidelines. Thus, HMPS uses process-oriented indicators to monitor local suicide 
control strategies. Conversely, HMPS measures local violence control performance 
through serious assault rates in local establishments, in which regard performance is 
measured in terms of outcome-oriented indicators. 
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This difference between the types of performance indicators used by HMPS 
affects the diversity of local suicide and violence control strategies. First, the suicide 
control performance indicator measures how far local establishments implement the 
national suicide control guidelines. Furthermore, the external performance assessment 
body, HMIP, strictly monitors whether local establishments are following the said 
national guidelines. This kind of control structure limits the local authority of governors 
because it places checks on processes over which they nominally have discretion such 
as placing prisoners at risk of suicide in segregation units. As a result, the autonomy of 
local establishments in setting their own suicide control strategies is restricted by 
national guidelines and HMIP.  Thus, the diversity of local suicide control strategies is 
small and the group level is high for HMPS in this respect. 
Meanwhile, the national violence control guidelines maintained by HMPS 
grant local establishments a greater degree of autonomy over the design of their local 
violence control strategies. As stated above, HMPS uses outcome-oriented indicators to 
monitor internal performance in violence control. Although HMIP monitors the 
implementation national violence control guidelines, the guidelines themselves allow 
governors to establish their own ways of using segregation units to prevent violence in 
their areas of responsibility. Thus, the violence control strategies operated by local 
establishments in HMPS are more diverse than the corresponding suicide control 
strategies. As a result, the group level for HMPS is lower in this respect than for suicide 
control. 
As stated in chapter 6, in this study I have focused on the autonomy and 
discretion of tanto officers in local suicide and violence control strategies because the 
authority of governors is weak. Chapter 7 showed that local establishments are closed to 
outsiders. External intervention to the local risk control process is extremely low. 
Additionally, the Japanese prison service does not use internal performance competition 
to manage local suicide and violence control strategies, and internal audit systems do 
not have standardised manuals or methods for auditing local establishments. Thus, in 
theory, it has been concluded here that tanto officers are allowed to take various ways of 
controlling risk in local establishments. Nevertheless, in terms of suicide control, it was 
found that tanto officers do not have specific strategies for managing suicide and 
self-harm among prisoners. Indeed, many of them take the view that suicide and 
self-harm are not active control targets within the context of local prison operation. By 
contrast, tanto officers consider violence control to be an essential part of their duties.  
However, local violence control strategies are very similar across the Japanese prison 
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service due to informal group pressures which exist between tanto officers working in 
local establishments. Prison officers informally choose not to develop their own 
violence control strategies in response to the expectations both of their colleagues and 
the prisoners under their supervision. Thus, the autonomy of local violence control 
strategies is limited by group pressures in local establishments, in respect of which the 
Japanese prison service was ranked at a high group level. 
Therefore, in conclusion it can be stated that HMPS places strong leadership 
roles on governors in order to control the risks of suicide and violence. However, there 
is a discrepancy in the respect that HMPS governors have much more autonomy over 
violence control strategies than they do over suicide control strategies. This is because 
HMPS uses different internal performance indicators to monitor local suicide and 
violence control strategies. Moreover, HMIP intervenes in local suicide control 
strategies to a much greater extent than it does in local violence control strategies. By 
contrast, the Japanese prison service assigns the key roles in suicide and violence 
control to tanto officers rather than governors. For this reason, the leadership roles 
assumed by Japanese prison governors are fairly weak in both suicide and violence 
control. The autonomy of tanto officers is potentially high due to a lack of external 
intervention in their everyday duties. However, they do not seem to take much interest 
in controlling suicide beyond fulfilling immediately necessary tasks. There are no 
obvious uniform strategies for preventing suicide and self-harm hence I scored the 
Japanese prison service 0 in this respect. Meanwhile, local violence control strategies 
are not very diverse due to the informal pressures mentioned above, in regard to which 
the Japanese prison service was ranked at a high group level.  
 
 
8.2: Quantitative summary 1; grid-group score table  
 
This section summarises the institutional numerical scores assigned throughout this 
study to the grid (Y) and group (X) sub-codes. Chapter 3 discussed the scoring criteria 
for the formalization (Y1), compliance (X1), roles of governors (Y2), and autonomy 
(X2) aspects and the sub-codes for each of them. Scores tables were also provided for 
each aspect of the g/g dimensions (see chapter 3 and Appendices, 1, 2, 3, and 4). 
It should be emphasised that the sub-code scores were assigned on the ordinal 
scale of measurement and scored on different scales to reflect variations in the ranks 
representing the g/g levels. Therefore, the units of distance between the variables are not 
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equal for all 20 sub-codes. Ranking orders were assigned to reflect the conclusions 
drawn in chapter 2 about what g/g represent in relation to organizations. Sub-codes were 
generally scored above 0 (X, Y > 0). Additionally, for the purposes of this study 0 
represents situations where there was either no evidence indicating the relevant grid or 
group characteristics, the sub-code was not applicable, or the g/g levels were absolutely 
minimized (i.e. there are no rules whatsoever or there is a total absence of group 
pressure). Table 8.1 displays the overall results of the g/g scores for all 20 sub-codes.  
 
Table 8.1: Scores assigned to the 20 sub-codes for each g/g aspect  
 
 
 It can be seen from this table that HMPS was given a score of 0 score for the 
suicide control codes y3 and x3 because punishment and reward are not used in local 
establishments for controlling suicide. Meanwhile, the Japanese prison service was 
given scores of 0 for the suicide control codes x2 and x10 because there was no 
evidence to suggest how the risks of suicide and self-harm are identified or controlled in 
local establishments (x2), and what kinds of local suicide control strategies are taken by 
local staff members (x10). 
  
 
England Japan England Japan
y1 Order 6 7 6 7
y2 Definition of risk 5 1 5 1
y3 Use of punishment and reward 0 12 11 12
y4 Key national guidelines 5 1 5 1
y5  Information record and documentation system 5 5 5 5
x1 Order 2 3 2 3
x2 Identifying risk 1 0 1 2
x3 Punishment and Reward 0 4 3 3
x4 National guideline 2 1 2 1
x5 Information record 2 1 2 1
y6 Specialization of staff members 2 1 2 2
y7 Promotion criteria for governors 2 3 2 3
y8 Interpersonal roles 4 2 4 3
y9 Informational roles 4 2 4 2
y10 Decisional roles 5 2 5 3
x6 Insiders/outsiders governors 3 4 3 4
x7 Participation of external performance bodies 2 3 2 3
x8 Existence and influence of trade unions 2 4 2 4
x9 Internal performance assessment and main indicators 2 3 1 3
x10 Diversity of local strategies 3 0 2 3
Group.2 Autonomy
Grid.1 Formalization
Group.1 Compliance
Grid.2 Roles
of Governors
Violence
Grid/group Aspects No. Sub-codes.
Suicide
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8.3: Quantitative summary 2; standardized scores and radar charts 
 
The second quantitative summary standardises the raw scores outlined above by 
multiplying their loads.  As chapter 3 explained, the scores assigned to each sub-code 
are standardized on a scale of 1 to 10 (see Table 3.5: loads for each sub-code for 
standardization). Table 8.2 displays the results of this process. Figures 8.1-8.4 display 
radar charts of these standardized scores representing the g/g levels of the suicide and 
violence risk control structures maintained by the English and Japanese prison services. 
Furthermore, Figure 8.5 displays model radar charts of absolute hierarchist, egalitarian, 
fatalist and individualist cultures. Bearing in mind the model radar charts (Figure 8.5; 
also see p.119 in Chapter 3), several conclusions can now be drawn from the process of 
standardizing the scores for each sub-code.  
 
 
Table 8.2: Standardized scores assigned to the 20 sub-codes for each g/g aspect 
 
 
  
 
 
 
England Japan England Japan
y1 Order 8.6 10.0 8.6 10.0
y2 Definition of risk 7.1 1.4 7.1 1.4
y3 Use of punishment and reward 0.0 8.6 7.9 8.6
y4 Key national guidelines 7.1 1.4 7.1 1.4
y5  Information record and documentation system 7.1 7.1 7.1 7.1
x1 Order 6.7 10.0 6.7 10.0
x2 Identifying risk 3.3 0.0 3.3 6.7
x3 Punishment and reward 0.0 6.7 5.0 5.0
x4 National guideline 5.0 2.5 5.0 2.5
x5 Information record 6.7 3.3 6.7 3.3
y6 Specialization of staff members 10.0 5.0 10.0 10.0
y7 Promotion criteria for governors 6.7 10.0 6.7 10.0
y8 Interpersonal roles 10.0 5.0 10.0 7.5
y9 Informational roles 10.0 5.0 10.0 5.0
y10 Decisional roles 10.0 4.0 10.0 6.0
x6 Proportion of insiders/outsider governors 7.5 10.0 7.5 10.0
x7 Participation of external performance bodies 5.0 7.5 5.0 7.5
x8 Existence and influence of trade unions 5.0 10.0 5.0 10.0
x9 Internal performance assessment and main indicators 6.7 10.0 3.3 10.0
x10 Diversity of local strategies 7.5 0.0 5.0 7.5
G/G
Grid.1
Group.1
Grid.2
Group.2 Autonomy
Suicide Violence
Aspects No. Sub-codes
Formalization
Compliance
Roles
 of Governors
274
Figure 8.1: Suicide control in HMPS 

 
 
Figure 8.2: Suicide control in the Japanese prison service 

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Figure 8.3: Violence control in HMPS 
 
Figure 8.4: Violence control in the Japanese prison service 

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Figure 8.5: Models of radar charts corresponding to the four cultural types 
 
      
 
       
 
 Firstly, in regard to the radar chart for suicide control in HMPS, scores of 0 
were given to HMPS for the suicide control codes y3 (“punishment and reward”) and x3 
(“appropriateness of punishment and reward”) because HMPS does not use punishment 
and reward to control suicide. (Figure 8.1). In comparison with the four model radar 
charts (Figure 8.5), the chart generally shows the form of radar, which represent the 
hierarchist cultural type (x = 10, y = 10), but skewed towards the fatalist (x = 0, y = 10 
positions) (Figure 8.1). Hence the suicide control structure operated by HMPS can be 
considered a hybrid of the hierarchist and fatalist cultural types. Accordingly, HMPS’ 
suicide risk control structure generally has a high grid level (from variables y1 to y10) 
while the group level is more moderate (from variables x1 to x10).  
Secondly, the radar chart for suicide control in the Japanese prison service 
(Figure 8.2) displays more fractured results than the one for HMPS. In comparison with 
the model radar charts (Figure 8.5), this chart shows some extreme hierarchist 
characteristics for a few sets of variables: 1. y1 and x1 (“order and discipline” and 
compliance of those rules); 2. y3 and x3 (“punishment and reward” and compliance of 
those rules); and 3. y7 (“promotion criteria for governors)” and x6 (“proportion of 
Pure fatalist  Pure hierarchist 
Pure individualist Pure egalitarian 
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insider/outsider governors”) (see Figures 8.2). The same chart also shows egalitarian 
characteristics for x8 (“trade unions”) and x9 (“internal performance competition”), and 
slight tendency of fatalist in y5 and x5 (information record system and its compliance). 
Conversely, the remaining x and y variables are close to 0 which indicates strong 
individualist characteristics: that is, y2, y4, y6, y8, y9, x2, x3, x4, and x10. This is 
because there is a lack of formal rules and standardised organized behaviour among 
staff members in local establishments aimed at controlling the risks of suicide and 
self-harm. Therefore, the radar chart for suicide control in the Japanese prison service 
displays largely the hybrid of hierarchist and individualist, but with a slight mixing with 
features of other two cultural types.   
 Thirdly, the radar chart for violence control in HMPS (Figure 8.3) displays a 
slightly more balanced mix of the different cultural types than was found for suicide 
control. While high scores were generally given for the grid (y) variables (see the 
right-hand side of Figure 8.3), comparatively lower scores were given for the group (x) 
variables (see the left-hand side). HMPs showed significantly low scores in two group 
variables, x2 (“identifying risk”) and x10 (“diversity of local strategies”). Thus, in 
comparison with the model radar charts (Figures 8.5), the results displayed by Figure 
8.3 can be considered to reflect a hybrid of the hierarchist and fatalist cultural types.  
That is, whereas grid control is strong, group control is only moderate in the violence 
control structure operated by HMPS.  
 Finally, the radar chart for violence control in the Japanese prison service 
(Figure 8.4) also displays mixed results. Specifically, there is a mixture of high grid and 
high group (hierarchist) cores in a majority of x and y variables: grid (y1, y5, y6, y7, 
and y8) and group (x1, x2, x6, x7, x8, x9, and x10) (see Figure 8.4). There is a slight tilt 
towards the group variables hence this chart indicates moderate egalitarian 
characteristics, but mixed with hierarchist features. There are also some middling scores 
for a mixture x and y variables: y2 (“definitions of risk”), y4 (“national violence control 
guidelines”), x4 (“compliance with national guidelines”), and x5 (“compliance level for 
information recording”). Overall, the results for the violence control structures 
maintained by the Japanese prison service indicate moderate egalitarian and hierarchist 
characteristics combined with slight individualist features (see Figures 8.4 and 8.5). 
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8.4: Quantitative summary 3; demonstration technique 3, the grid-group 
map 
 
The third quantitative summary involves charting the g/g scores on the original g/g map. 
According to measurement theory, the numerical scores for the 20 sub-codes should not 
be added up because they are based on the ordinal scales meaning the units of distance 
between them are normally not equal. Nevertheless, the scores are added up here so that 
they can be plotted on the g/g map. This process is based on the assumption that the 
scales have been equalized as a result of the standardization process. This section 
demonstrates the mapping results in three ways: 1. the risk control system scores are 
represented by the formalization (Y1) and compliance (X1) scores; 2. the leadership 
scores are represented by the roles of governors (Y2) and autonomy (X2) scores; and 3. 
the overall risk control scores are represented by the addition of the X1 and X2 scores, 
and the Y1 and Y2 scores.  
 
8.4.1: Prison risk control system; formalization (Y1) and compliance (X1) 
The formalization (Y1) and compliance (X1) scores are calculated here by adding up 
the scores for the 10 sub-codes assigned to these two aspects. The resulting scores have 
been plotted onto the g/g map as the risk control system scores (see Figure 8.6). The 
calculation methods used for these purposes, which were outlined in chapter 3, are cited 
below in more detail.  
 
1. Risk control system scores: F(Ai) 
1.1) Formalization scores (Y1ai) 
Y1ai= Formalization score for risk (a) control in the prison service (i) 
y'nai= standardised formalization score for sub-code (n) in terms of risk (a) in the 
prison service (i) (n=1, 2, 3, 4, 5) 
 
Y1ai=y'1ai+y'2ai+y'3ai+ y'4ai+ y5ai 
0 <Y1ai<50 
 
1.2) Compliance scores (X1ai) 
X1ai= Compliance (X1) score for risk (a) in the prison service (i) 
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x'nai= standardized compliance score for sub-code (n) in terms of risk (a) in the prison 
service (i). 
 
X1ai=x'1ai+ x'2ai+x'3ai+ x'4ai+ x'5ai 
0<X1ai<50 
 
1.3) Risk control system scores for suicide and violence 
Suicide control scores:  F (Si)= (X1si, Y1si) 
England: F (Se) = (21.7, 30.0) 
Japan: F (Sj) =(22.5, 28.6 ) 
 
Violence control scores: F(Vi)= (X1vi, Y1vi). 
England: F (Ve)= (26.7, 37.8)   
Japan: F (Vj) = (27.5, 28.6) 
 
Figure 8.6: Scores for the suicide and violence control systems operated by the English and Japanese 
prison services 
 
 
The results displayed in Figure 8.6 indicate high grid levels for both the English and 
Japanese prison services in regard to suicide and violence control. All of the scores for 
risk control on the formalization scale (Y1) were above 25.0. The relatively weak group 
Fo
rm
al
iz
a
tio
n
 
(Y
1) 
;
<
Hierarchist 
Egalitarian 
Fatalist 
Individualism 
280
level for suicide control assigned to HMPS indicates weak fatalist characteristics. 
However, since the results are situated around the centre of the map, the fatalistic 
characteristics are diluted by aspects of the other cultural types: especially the 
individualist type. Meanwhile, the violence control score for HMPS shows a higher grid 
and group level than is the case for suicide control. Accordingly, violence control in 
HMPS can be considered mainly hierarchist, but with a slightly fatalistic character. So, 
in brief, the risk control culture of HMPS for both suicide and violence control is 
broadly high grid.   
The Japanese prison service was given relatively low grid and group levels for 
suicide control thus indicating weak fatalistic characters with a slight tilt towards 
individualistic characteristics. As with HMPS, the results for the Japanese prison service 
in regard to suicide control are concentrated around the centre of the map which 
indicates that its individualistic characteristics are offset by aspects of the other cultural 
types. Meanwhile, a low grid and high group level was given for violence control thus 
indicating mainly egalitarian characteristics. Overall, the Japanese prison service was 
generally given lower grid levels than HMPS for the control of both risks. On the other 
hand, the group levels for both prison services varied according to the type of risk.  
 
8.4.2: Leadership scores; the roles of governors (Y2) and autonomy (X2) 
The second grid and group mapping concerns the leadership scores represented by the 
codes for the roles of governors (Y2) and the autonomy of local establishments (X2).  
The X2 scores measure the group level of the national prison services in regard to their 
risk control strategies. Therefore, a set of high autonomy scores indicate a high level of 
group unity within a given national prison service and, conversely, a low level of 
autonomy within its local establishments.  The results of the Y2 and X2 scores for 
suicide and violence control in the English and Japanese prison services are plotted on 
the g/g map as the risk control system scores (see Figure 8.7). The calculation methods 
for the leadership scores, which were originally outlined in chapter 3, are cited below in 
more detail.  
 
2) Leadership scores: L(Ai)  
2.1) Roles of governors scores 
Y2ai= Roles of governors (Y2) for risk (a) in the prison service (i)  
y'nai=standardised score for sub-code (n) of roles of governors for risk (a) in the prison 
service(i) (n=6,7,8,9,10) 
281
 
Y2ai=y'6ai+ y'7ai+ y'8ai+ y'9ai+ y'10ai 
0<Y2ai<50 
 
2.2) Autonomy scores 
X2ai= Autonomy (X2) for risk (a) in the prison service (i)  
x'nai=standardised score for sub-code (n) of autonomy for risk (a) in the prison service 
(i) (n=6, 7, 8, 9, 10) 
 
X2ai=x'6ai+x'7ai+x'8ai+x'9ai+x'10ai 
0<X2ai<50 
 
2.3) Leadership scores: L (Ai) = (X2ai, Y2ai)  
Leadership scores for suicide control 
England: L (Se)= (31.7, 46.7)  
Japan: L(Sj)= (37.5, 29.0) 
 
Figure 8.7: Leadership scores for suicide and violence control in the English and Japanese prison 
services 
 
 
 
The results show that both the English and Japanese prison services fall within the 
hierarchist quadrant of the g/g map. Furthermore, all scores are plotted above 25.0 on 
both axes. HMPS was given significantly high grid levels and slightly lower group 
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levels for both suicide and violence control. Thus, in comparison with the Japanese 
prison service, HMPS showed weak fatalist characteristics for suicide control and more 
so for violence control. The suicide control score for the Japanese prison service is 
plotted at the lowest grid level of all of the four scores. This result reflects the weak 
leadership roles of governors in local risk control strategies and thus suggests that 
suicide control has slight individualist characteristics in the Japanese prison service.  
By contrast, the violence control score for the Japanese prison service indicates that 
there is greater group pressure and little autonomy in this area of risk control.  
Accordingly, in comparison with the results for HMPS, the results for the Japanese 
prison service indicate lower grid and higher group levels in which respect it is more 
egalitarian.  
 
8.4.3: Total grid (Y) and group (X) scores for suicide and violence risk control 
Based on the risk control system scores [F(Ai)] and leadership scores [L(Ai)], this 
section demonstrates the total suicide and violence risk control scores for the English 
and Japanese prison services.  As chapter 3 discussed, the total prison service risk 
control scores are expressed as T(Ai ).  When T(Ai) scores are expressed in terms of the 
group (X) and grid (Y) scores, they become T(Ai)= (Xai, Yai). The method for 
calculating T(Ai) scores is explained as follows (Figure 8.8 is a map of the plotted 
results).  
 
3. Total risk control scores for the prison service 
3.1) Total risk control scores for the prison service: T (Ai)= (Xai, Yai) 
A=risk (suicide or violence) 
i=the prison service (England or Japan) 
Xai= X1ai+X2ai 
Yai=Y1ai+Y2ai 
0<Xai<100 
0<Yai<100 
 
3.2) Total suicide and violence risk control scores for the English and Japanese prison 
services 
Suicide Control 
England: T(Se)= (Xse, Yse)=(53.3, 76.7) 
Japan: T(Sj)=(Xsj, Ysj) =(60.0, 57.6) 
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Violence Control: 
England: T(Ve)= (Xve, Yve)= (52.5, 84.5) 
Japan: T(Vj)=(Xvj, Yvj) =(73.5, 67.1)  
 
Figure 8.8: Total risk control scores for suicide and violence control in the English and Japanese 
prison services 
 
 
 
Again, the total risk control scores for the English and Japanese prison services 
all fall within the hierarchist quadrant of the map. In comparison with the Japanese 
prison service, HMPS was given higher grid levels and lower group levels for both 
suicide and violence control. These results indicate weak fatalist characteristics for 
HMPS in both respects. Meanwhile, the suicide control score for the Japanese prison 
service is placed at the lowest grid level (with a middling group level) of the four results 
plotted above. Hence this result indicates that suicide control within the Japanese prison 
service has the slight tilt towards individualistic characteristics based on hierarchist 
control. The violence control score for the Japanese prison service has the highest group 
level of the four results plotted above and a moderate grid level. Therefore, the result for 
violence control in the Japanese prison service sits most squarely within the hierarchist 
quadrant, but the group level is the highest among those four results.  
Overall, the English and Japanese prison services both show generally 
hierarchical characteristics for suicide and violence control. Nevertheless, every result 
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indicates hybrid tendencies of one type or another. The suicide and violence control 
scores for HMPS clearly lean towards the fatalist quadrant. On the other hand, the 
suicide control score for the Japanese prison service tends towards the individualist 
quadrant and the violence control score has the strongest hierarchist result (but with a 
very slight tilt towards the egalitarian quadrant). Therefore, it can be seen from these 
findings that the g/g framework can used to effectively represent key differences 
between the suicide and violence risk control structures maintained by the English and 
Japanese prison services. 
 
 
8.5: Conclusion 
 
My method has made use of the g/g theory to measure the risk control cultures of the 
English and Japanese prison services. Furthermore, over the course of this study I have 
demonstrated the value of several techniques for presenting the results of research based 
on the g/g theory. This section provides a final evaluation of the findings of this study 
and raises some issues which need to be solved in future research.  
 
8.5.1: Evaluation of qualitative results 
This chapter has analysed the qualitative and quantitative results gathered for this study 
following the g/g theory. The qualitative summary highlighted differences between the 
ways in which the risks of suicide and violence are controlled in the English and 
Japanese prison services. The results for HMPS indicate a high level of grid control and 
a moderate level of group unity for the national prison service in terms of both violence 
and suicide control. HMPS mainly controls the risks of suicide and violence through 
written guidelines and by assigning strong leadership roles to governors. There were 
some slight differences between the g/g levels for suicide and violence control. In 
particular, a higher grid level and lower group unity were indicated for violence control, 
which reflect the greater autonomy of local establishments in setting their own violence 
control strategies.  
In comparison, the grid results for the Japanese prison service are lower than 
those for HMPS thus reflecting the less formal rules and weaker leadership roles of 
governors in Japan.  Meanwhile, the group results for the Japanese prison service show 
a high autonomy score for local establishments and a moderate compliance level.  
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Analysis of the scores for each sub-code suggests that the Japanese prison service 
mainly controls suicide and violence by means of tight discipline and punishment.   
The suicide control scores show that the Japanese prison service generally 
lacks a formal system for controlling the risk of suicide. This finding is supported by 
interview data which show that staff members in local establishments tend not to 
recognise suicide as an active control target.  In stark contrast, the violence control 
scores indicate that there are clear strategic rules shared among local staff members for 
controlling violence.  My further research supports these findings by showing that 
although there is a lack of written rules in this regard, informal group pressures between 
prison staff and prisoners ensure that broadly uniform violence control strategies are 
followed in local establishments. 
 
8.5.2: Evaluation of quantitative results 
In order to give a quantitative evaluation of the qualitative results discussed in the 
previous section, numerical scores were assigned to the sub-codes for each g/g aspect 
based on the ranking orders discussed in chapter 3. This chapter has used three 
demonstration techniques to quantify the qualitative data.   
Firstly, the table of raw scores provides an overview of all 20 sub-codes 
assigned to the four g/g risk control aspects: formalization (Y1), compliance (X1), roles 
of governors (Y2), and autonomy of local establishments (X2). However, this 
demonstration technique does not provide a clear understanding of the differences 
between suicide and violence control in the English and Japanese prison services. 
Secondly, the radar charts, which are based on the g/g method, offer a much 
clearer view of the relevant differences between the English and Japanese prison 
services. The four model radar charts (see Figure 8.5) help us to understand how the 
actual results gained for the English and Japanese prison services relate to the four 
model cultural types and different variations of hybridity between them. The results for 
HMPS show that suicide and violence control are largely based on hierarchical forms 
control with slight fatalistic characteristics. It suggests that group level of the English 
prison service is relatively weak in both suicide and violence control structures. The 
results for the Japanese prison service show that whereas suicide control is mostly based 
on individualism with elements of hierarchism and fatalism, violence control is mainly 
based on hierarchism with some features of egalitarianism. Overall, the Japanese prison 
service shows relatively high group pressures with low grid level in both suicide and 
violence control.  
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Thirdly, I generated results which can be plotted onto the g/g map by adding up 
the scores for each sub-code with the assumption that the units of distance between 
them all are equal. The results of this demonstration technique show that the English 
and Japanese prison services generally control suicide and violence in hierarchical ways, 
but each having slight tendencies towards different parts of the hierarchist quadrant.  
These results generally support those shown by the corresponding radar charts. This 
outcome suggests that the process of adding up the sub-code scores on the assumption 
that the units of distance between them all are equal does not distort the overall results.  
Moreover, the third demonstration technique provides more detail about the main and 
subordinate forms of control than the radar charts which only show hybridity. For 
example, whereas the radar chart for violence control in Japan shows a hybrid of 
hierarchism and egalitarianism, the g/g map shows that this form of control is mainly 
hierarchist with only a very slight tilt towards egalitarianism. Hence, as far as the g/g 
scales ensure equal units of distance across all sub-codes, plotting the added up g/g 
scores on the g/g map is the most effective way of identifying types of organizational 
risk control culture.  
 
8.5.3: Overall contribution of this study 
Thus, my method for measuring risk control culture has provided a comparative 
analysis and coherent overview of the institutional structures of the relevant aspects of 
the English and Japanese prison services. The g/g theory offers a clear framework for 
analysing the structural characteristics of risk control cultures in prison services 
including formal and informal control mechanisms. Moreover, those findings in this 
study demonstrated by the g/g theory contribute to shed light on their weakness and 
strengths of the English and Japanese prison services, which are embedded in their 
patterns of risk patterns of risk control management, and frequently overlooked by their 
staff members. 
 For example, qualitative and quantitative analysis in this chapter showed that 
HMPS generally controls violence with high grid control measures such as formal risk 
control regulations and strong leadership roles of governors. By contrast the group unity 
of HMPS is generally moderate. These results reflect two competing facets of risk 
control in HMPS: strong national rules and relatively large local autonomy. This 
outcome may be considered a weakness of HMPS’ violence control methods as well as 
a characteristic of its national risk control structure. In order to improve the violence 
performances, it will be helpful to consider the effect of group pressures which are 
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tended to be neglected in the current risk control structures.  
Meanwhile, the results for the Japanese prison service show that the formal 
grid control concerning suicide and violence control are weak. In the case of violence 
control, these rules are supported by informal customs and group pressures shared 
among local staff members. This tendency suggests the prison service should focus on 
developing the formalized violence control structures when they need to improve prison 
performances. On the contrary, suicide control in the Japanese prison service shows that 
prison staff members do not consider suicide is the active target of control. Paying 
attention this existing risk perception shared among staff members will help the prison 
service to improve suicide control performance as well as developing the formal suicide 
control structures. In this way, my research method can help the prison service 
institutions to draw attention to their peculiar problems and potential failures embedded 
in their patterns of risk control behaviour measured by the g/g framework. These 
organizational tendencies of both the English and Japanese prison services highlight 
problems in their risk control structures and also suggest possible ways of improving 
them. 
 
 
288 
Conclusion 
 
 
This study has developed a method based on the g/g theory for analysing the risk 
control cultures of the English and Japanese prison services. Four key research 
questions were identified and addressed by this study: 1. what is culture?; 2. why is the 
g/g theory better than other cultural theories?; 3. how can organizational culture in the 
English and Japanese prison services be observed in reality and how can the g/g theory 
be used to identify this kind of culture?; and 4. why should culture be analysed in the 
study of public administration? This chapter now reviews each one of these questions in 
light of the findings of this study and concludes by suggesting some possible directions 
for future research. 
 
1. What is culture?  
Chapter 1 showed that culture can be defined in two ways: 1. the values of individuals 
in social groups; and 2. collective behavioural patterns commonly shared in social group 
units. Previous studies have mixed these two definitions. To this end, they tried to 
identify culture as collective behavioural patterns according to the sum of the individual 
values of members of social groups. Hofstede and Inglehart have conducted large 
surveys of individual values, added up all the results, and then taken the aggregate of 
those results to be representative of the cultures of the social groups to which the 
individuals they surveyed belong.  
However, as pointed out in chapter 1, those surveys to measure individual 
values tend to interpret subjective scale units differently depending on backgrounds of 
respondents. According to measurement theory, those answers from respondents based 
on unequal scale units should not be added up, because results do not show any 
comparable values. This outcome shows that culture as collective behavioural patterns 
cannot necessarily be identified by adding up the individual values of members of social 
groups. Accordingly, for the purposes of this study I made a clear distinction between 
the two definitions of culture cited above and then specifically chose to focus on only 
the second one (i.e. collective behavioural patterns commonly shared in social group 
units).  
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2. Why is the g/g theory better than other cultural theories? 
This study showed that the g/g theory has great advantages than other cultural theories. 
Firstly, in response to culture defined as above, chapter 2 showed that Mary Douglas 
originally defined culture as the collectively shared patterns of behaviour within social 
group unit in her g/g theory. Hence, unlike other cultural theories, the g/g theory can 
avoid possible errors to analyse culture by mixing up with individual values discussed 
in the first research question above. Furthermore, Douglas and Wildavsky developed the 
g/g theory in relation to risk for the social group units. As a result, the g/g theory can 
more tightly discuss culture in relation to risk, which provides specific situations where 
the social group unit show particular patterns of collective behaviour, than other cultural 
theories.  
Thirdly, the g/g theory has methodological advantages in relation to level of 
measurement according to measurement theory. It was noted in chapter 1 that previous 
studies have tried to establish clear typologies of culture in order to analyse culture in 
reality. According to measurement theory, these typologies represent the nominal level 
of measurement because there are not any comparable scales between the types of 
culture they identify. Meanwhile, it was pointed out in chapter 2 that the g/g theory has 
the advantage over other cultural theories of allowing researchers to apply abstract 
concepts such as cultural types to the ordinal level of measurement. This advantage was 
actively reflected in the choice of variables chosen for this study.   
Chapter 2 discussed that the variables for measuring culture should be based on 
the g/g dimensions rather than the four cultural types in order to preserve the advantages 
offered by the ordinal scales. Chapters 4-7 used the g/g theory in this way to analyse 
how the risks of suicide and violence are controlled in the English and Japanese prison 
services. Accordingly, all of the qualitative information gathered for those chapters was 
examined along the ordinal scales. Additionally, discussions in chapters above showed 
that the g/g dimensions are able to involve not only formal but also informal aspects of 
risk control structures by degrees of grid and group levels. For example, chapter 5 
showed that the English prison staff members had negative views against the national 
suicide control guidelines. This fact was involved as an indicator of the low group level 
for the prison service. Meanwhile, the Japanese prison service showed that informal 
tanto system and unwritten rules (i.e. common sense) are key risk control factors. These 
informal systems were also involved by the high group level and low grid level for the 
prison service.   
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Furthermore, chapter 8 showed that the g/g theory is useful to quantitatively 
summarise all of those detailed information into simple but coherent visual images. 
Radar charts and g/g maps in this chapter showed visual understanding of risk control 
culture in the English and Japanese prison services. Thus, the method developed in this 
study for measuring the risk control cultures of the English and Japanese prison services 
has demonstrated, more generally, that the g/g theory provides a valid comparative 
framework, based on the ordinal scales, for analysing formal and informal structures 
within organizational cultures. In this respect, the g/g theory may be considered better 
than other cultural theories.  
 
3. How can organizational culture in the English and Japanese prison services be 
observed in reality and how can the g/g theory be used to identify this kind of 
culture? 
Chapter 1 discussed that culture is observed at any level of social group units, and it is 
important to the social group unit which is best to effectively identify the existence of 
culture. Social group units are multi-layered and encompass various other discrete 
groups. Previous studies about national culture have shown that it is more difficult to 
identify culture in large social group units because they present more variables than 
smaller units. Therefore, I chose to focus on public service institutions rather than 
national cultures.  
Chapter 1 and 2 discussed that public service institutions are appropriate 
subjects for testing the g/g theory because they have formally established organizational 
structures described in written rules and clearly defined membership criteria. The 
specific subjects selected for this study were the English and Japanese prison services. 
Furthermore, previous studies have shown that in order to identify culture using the g/g 
theory, it is important to set fixed units of observation. This is because g/g levels may 
differ depending on the levels at which organizations are being observed. Hence the unit 
of observation for this study was set at the level of national prison service institutions, 
including the relationships between local establishments and central HQs. 
It was noted in chapters 1 and 2 that it is ineffective to analyse culture in 
abstract situations because unlimited numbers of variables can be identified. As I 
discussed in the previous research question above, Douglas and Wildavsky have argued 
that the ways in which organizations try to control certain risks present good 
opportunities to identify their organizational cultures. Following Douglas and 
Wildavsky’s suggestions, chapter 2 discussed how the g/g dimensions are revealed in 
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organizational risk control structures. Previous studies of the g/g theory, public 
administration, and organizational and institutional theories have shown that the grid 
dimension is reflected by the rules defining risk control systems and the roles assigned 
to staff members in risk control structures. On the other hand, the group dimension is 
defined by the diversity of subordinate units in relation to the time and space they share 
together within organizations.  
Based on the general understanding of the g/g dimensions outlined in chapter 2, 
chapter 3 presented four aspects representing each of the g/g dimensions specifically in 
regard to the relevant prison service risk control structures: 1. risk control systems 
consisted of formalization (Y1) and compliance (X1), and 2. leadership of governors in 
risk control consisted of the roles of governors (Y2), and the autonomy of local 
establishments in setting their own risk control strategies (X2). A total of 20 subordinate 
sub-codes were assigned to Y1, X1, Y2, and X2.  
In regard to scales of measuring those aspects of g/g risk control structures, it 
was asserted in chapter 3 that grid levels are measured by the formality of rules defining 
risk control systems (Y1), and the number and selection criteria of leadership roles 
assigned to prison governors (Y2) in local risk control structures. The formality of rules 
was measured according to how easily prison staff can change the rules that bind them 
in relation to the overall penal legal structures. Higher grid ranks and scores were given 
to greater formality in the rules defining risk control systems. In terms of roles of 
governors (Y2), the grid level was measured the number of specialised roles assigned to 
governors and the flexibility of criteria for gaining governorship. If more roles are 
assigned to governors, or the governorship is gained according to more inflexible 
criteria for candidates (i.e. ages and lengths of joining the service), it indicates higher 
grid level for the prison service.  
Meanwhile, the group level (X1 and X2) was measured according to the 
diversity of risk control behaviour in local establishments that are considered as 
subordinate units in the national prison service institutions. Thus, lower group ranks and 
scores were given to larger variations of local risk control behaviour. In order to 
measure this variation, the compliance level (X1) measured to what extent the 
implementation of local establishments varies in response to risk control rules discussed 
in formalization (Y1). Meanwhile, the autonomy of local establishments (X2) measured 
the diversity of local risk control strategies according to the intervention of externals to 
local risk control strategies in the prison service risk control structures.  
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The suicide and violence risk control cultures of the English and Japanese 
prison services were measured according to the method above. The results demonstrate 
that both prison services show particular patterns of behaviour in relation to specific 
types of risk control. To illustrate, in terms of the risk control system consisted of 
formalization (Y1) and compliance (X1), the English and Japanese prison services 
maintain very different approaches towards rules for risk control systems. HMPS tends 
to use formal national rules to control specific risks whereas the Japanese prison service 
tends to use more informal rules shared among local establishments for the same 
purposes.  
The English prison service formally defines terms suicide and violence, which 
are peculiarly used only inside the prison service, for the purpose of identifying risk. 
Additionally, the service provides overall risk control guidelines, which formally define 
details of local risk control procedures (i.e. PSO 2700 and 2750). On the contrary, the 
Japanese prison service does not have these original definitions of risk in formal forms. 
Moreover, unlike HMPS, the Japanese prison service does not define any of those in 
written forms. Staff members in the Japanese prison service used the words of common 
sense [joshiki] in regard to these overall risk control procedures; it suggested that the 
Japanese prison service informally defines those guidelines. Furthermore, those levels 
of formalization (Y1) and compliance (X1) showed differences not only by the prison 
services but also by risk. The English prison service showed that suicide is controlled by 
lower grid and group levels of risk control system than those of violence control. This 
result reflected that the English prison service did not use punishment and reward 
systems for controlling suicide, and the national suicide control guideline was 
sceptically accepted by staff members in local establishments.  
In terms of leadership measured by roles of governors (Y2) and autonomy of 
local risk control strategies in local establishments (X2), the English prison service 
showed that governors are formally assigned significantly strong leader roles for local 
risk control strategies. In comparison, leader roles of governors are significantly weak in 
the Japanese prison service. This weak leader roles of governors are due to the 
ascription based career systems and the tanto system, which assigns substantial risk 
control roles to non-graded prison officers in local establishments. In response to the 
active leader roles of governors, the English prison service showed that the violence 
control structure allows local establishments and governors to exercise more discretion 
than that of suicide control. This difference was significant concerning local 
performance assessment indicators and the use of segregation units. Local performance 
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of violence control is measured by outcome oriented performance indicators, and 
governors are allowed to examine various ways for hitting targets. Additionally, ways of 
using segregation units are largely relied on discretion of governors as parts of local 
violence control strategies. Both discussions showed that the level of intervention from 
externals to local violence control strategies is lower than that of suicide control.  
Meanwhile, the Japanese prison service showed that local establishments are 
unified under the central prison service control. Internal and external performance 
controls over local establishments were significantly weak, and the prison service is 
generally closed from outsiders. In addition to the structural unification of local 
establishments, violence control of the Japanese prison service showed that local 
violence strategies tend to be unified in existing ways taken by previous officers, due to 
informal pressures between staff members and prisoners in prisons. It indicated high 
group pressure in the Japanese prison service for violence control. Meanwhile, suicide 
control showed that local establishments generally lack visible local suicide control 
strategies due to significantly low interest of local and national staff members and 
outside society. It suggested that the Japanese prison service generally considers suicide 
is not target to be actively controlled. Overall, the English prison service was assigned 
lower group scores than the group scores for the Japanese prison service due to the 
larger autonomy of local establishments observed in HMPS.  
Thus, this study shows that culture as patterns of organizational behaviour can 
be more effectively observed in relatively small and discrete social group units, such as 
prison services, by focusing on specific risk-related issues (e.g. suicide and violence). 
Moreover, the relative prison services showed that these risk control culture is slightly 
different depending on types of risk in the same institution. Considering those different 
results depending on units of observation and risk, this study insists that culture should 
not be analysed in non-fixed units of organizations in regard to abstract situations of the 
organization, but in the fixed and limited unit of organizations in regard to specific risk 
for them.      
 
4. Why should culture be analysed in the study of public administration? 
Chapter 1 showed that there is an indefinite number of contingent factors in any given 
culture hence it is difficult to explain specific outcomes within that culture in terms of 
independent variables. In response, it was pointed out in chapter 2 that studies of the g/g 
theory insist that cultural analysis needs to identify the characteristics of organizations 
in order to study them effectively. G/g theorists have argued that instead of identifying 
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the causality of specific outcomes, cultural analysis draws attention to the strengths and 
weaknesses of organizations in their members’ patterns of behaviour.  Bearing this 
argument in mind, this study has analysed risk control culture in terms of the 
organizational patterns of risk control behaviour within the English and Japanese prison 
services.  
The empirical chapters of this study (i.e. 4-7) showed that there are particular 
patterns of organizational behaviour within the English and Japanese prison services 
which can be identified with risk control culture. Furthermore, qualitative summary of 
empirical chapters in chapter 8 showed that peculiar organizational strengths and 
weaknesses can be observed in these patterns of behaviour. For example, the English 
prison service tends to show relatively weak group unity in response to high grid levels 
of the risk control structures. This weak group pressures suggest a possible cause of 
failures in suicide and violence risk control. Meanwhile, the Japanese service largely 
relies on the high group unity between members in local establishments, however, the 
grid level, including leader roles of governors and rules for controlling risk, was 
significantly weak in both suicide and violence control. This weak grid level is 
considered as potential weakness of the Japanese prison service in the risk control 
structures. Chapter 8 concluded that the prison service institutions can improve or solve 
their institutional problems by focussing on those weaknesses embedded in their 
patterns of risk control.  
 Thus, the case studies covered here show that although the g/g theory cannot 
reveal culture through the causation of specific outcomes, it can enable researchers to 
effectively identify collective patterns of risk control behaviour in public service 
domains. This method for identifying organizational culture may in turn help public 
service institutions, such as prison services, to recognise and address problems within 
their own organizational structures and which are embodied by the behaviour of their 
members. Hence the g/g theory presents a strong case for analysing culture in terms of 
collective patterns of organizational behaviour. 
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For further research  
 
This study discussed the method to measure culture, using the g/g theory. The method 
was developed based on not only the g/g theory, but also previous cultural studies, 
measurement theory, institutional and organizational theories, and showed quantitative 
ways of operating the g/g theory in order to analysed suicide and violence risk control 
culture of the English and Japanese prison services. The results discussed in this study 
show that the g/g theory can provide a coherent comparative framework for identifying 
organizational patterns of risk control in the English and Japanese prison service. 
However, it also involved some unsolved issues in the method I used for this study. In 
this section I will now highlight some issues that this study has raised about how the g/g 
theory can be used to measure organizational culture and make some suggestions about 
how these issues might be solved in further research.  
The first issue is coders’ bias. For present purposes, coders’ bias relates to how 
the g/g rankings can be determined in light of the relevant data. The same data could 
potentially be ranked different by different coders depending on their research 
objectives or interests. Although I could not completely rule out the possibility of coders’ 
bias in this study, I tried to assign ranks to the 20 sub-codes based on facts which are not 
affected by my subjective values such as the ratio between insider and outsider 
governors. Even so, the rankings assigned to some sub-codes were necessarily based on 
subjective judgements such as the compliance level of local establishments discussed in 
chapter 5. In future research, I recommend that g/g ranks and orders are assigned and 
measured by multiple coders in order to offset the possibility of individual biases. 
The second issue concerns the selection of sub-codes. Although I assigned 20 
sub-codes in response to the four risk control aspects represented by the g/g dimensions, 
more or less sub-codes could potentially be identified in similar research projects. It is 
possible to vary the number of sub-codes because culture is highly contingent on all 
levels. Consequently, the results of g/g analysis can differ depending on the number and 
type of sub-codes set. In any case, the 20 sub-codes I set for this study effectively reflect 
the organizational structures of the relevant prison services. The 20 sub-codes set for 
this study are based on the general risk-related factors representing the g/g dimensions 
discussed in chapter 2: that is, the formalization of rules and the roles of staff members 
represent the grid aspects of risk control culture, and the diversity of subordinate units 
in relation to organizational time and space represent the group aspects of risk control 
culture. Once the general factors representing the g/g dimensions are established, it is 
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acceptable to some extent to vary the details of the sub-codes. Moreover, the general 
factors should be applicable to other public service institutions (that is, not just prison 
services). Thus, in future research it will be useful to examine other sets of sub-codes 
which follow these general factors. 
The third issue concerns the quality and reliability of data. Although I tried to 
collect data from reliable sources on both the English and Japanese prison services, the 
quality of available information was not equal between the two of them. This issue is 
particularly significant in regard to my analysis of the compliance level of local 
establishments in chapter 5. Whereas HMPS discloses a good amount of information 
about local establishments through HMIP, the Japanese prison service discloses almost 
no information about its local establishments. In this study, I had assigned the 
provisional scores for some codes for the compliance level of the Japanese prison 
service based on available data. As a result, the overall standards for assigning group 
ranks and scores were not fully equal between the English and Japanese prison services. 
Accordingly, it would be beneficial for future research to explore ways of offsetting 
unavoidable imbalances in the quality of the information gathered about different 
organizations.  
The fourth issue concerns overlapping information. The empirical chapters 
showed that some facts about the English and Japanese prison services relate to more 
than one of the 20 sub-codes. For example, I analysed the formality of the risk control 
system in chapter 4 and the leadership roles of governors in chapter 6. However, most of 
the roles of governors described in chapter 6 were revealed in the formal rules of the 
risk control systems discussed in chapter 4. This means that in some cases I analysed the 
same information more than once in different sub-codes. This issue does not have a 
major impact on the qualitative analysis of the results of this study. Moreover, it does 
not affect the results of the radar charts, which are quantitative, because they treat each 
sub-code independently. On the other hand, if the quantitative scores are added up as 
total g/g scores, the overlapping information becomes a problem because information 
that is counted more than once has a greater impact on the overall result. This problem 
again illustrates the contingency of culture by showing that different facets of culture 
overlap with each other in unpredictable ways. Accordingly, future studies will need to 
consider how such information imbalances can be avoided or offset. 
The fifth issue concerns the appropriateness of standardizing scores. As I 
explained in chapter 3 and this chapter, the loads for the raw standardized scores for 
each sub-code did not have a significant impact on the overall results for each prison 
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service. All scores were adjusted so that they could be placed on a scale of 0-10. The 
results in this respect do not reflect the substantial impact of each sub-code on the 
organizational culture in question. This weakness in my method may cast some doubt 
over the accuracy of the total cumulative scores demonstrated in this chapter.  
The latter issue also relates to the sixth issue concerning the limitations of the 
ordinal level of measurement. Although my method measured culture in terms of the g/g 
theory and using the ordinal scales, it also highlighted some statistical limitations in 
how the kind of data it produces can be analysed. Most pressingly, it is not possible to 
use several statistical techniques such as mean variables, z scores, and standard 
deviation. If I can develop the g/g score scales at the interval level of measurement, the 
accuracy of the g/g theory may dramatically increase. Therefore, in order to achieve this 
goal, the units of distance between scales should be equalled across all sub-codes for 
each g/g dimension. The contingency of culture, as explained above, poses a major 
challenge to the development of such a method. However, the g/g theory has some 
strengths which make this goal achievable: most significantly, it already includes the 
ordinal scale in the g/g dimensions unlike other cultural theories. 
As such, this study has raised several issues with the g/g theory which can be 
tackled in future research. Some of these issues reflect the essential difficulties with 
measuring something as contingent as culture. Nevertheless, the findings of this study 
sheds light on patterns of risk control management in the English and Japanese prison 
services which are frequently overlooked by their staff members. Based on the g/g 
theory, organizational tendencies of both the English and Japanese prison services 
highlight weakness and strengths in their risk control structures and also suggest 
possible ways of improving them. Thus, although there are several issues with my 
method that need to be addressed, it can be concluded for now that the g/g theory is able 
to effectively highlight patterns of risk control within organizations and problems 
embedded within those patterns. In this way, the g/g theory can be a valuable tool for 
assessing the characteristics of organizational risk control cultures and highlighting 
areas in which they can be improved.  
Finally, as the potential to measure risk control culture by the g/g theory, my 
method is not only applicable to the English and Japanese prison services, but also to a 
wide range of other public service institutions. For example, Hood et al (2004) have 
used the g/g theory to analyse the prison services of several OECD countries including 
France and Germany. However, unlike this study, they focused on the general control 
structures in each prison service rather than structures tailored to deal with specific 
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types of risk. In this way, Hood et al were able to identify basic cultural types for each 
institution (e.g. the French prison service is hybrid of hierarchist and egalitarian, and the 
German prison service is also hybrid of those), but not to highlight more subtle 
tendencies such as this study has been able to do (e.g. the English prison service is 
predominantly hierarchist but with a strong tendency towards fatalism). Therefore, it 
can be seen that my method for using the g/g theory provides more detail about different 
types of culture than previous attempts to use it. 
Hood et al (2004) have also used the g/g theory to analyse the control 
structures of higher education institutions in various OECD countries. Again, they 
focused on general control structures and provided basic definitions of the cultural types 
of each institution. My method can be used to develop this approach to higher education 
institutions further, but some modifications to the sub-codes based on the g/g aspects 
would be essential for any such future research. Furthermore, specific types of risk 
relevant to higher education institutions would need to be identified. This kind of further 
research would benefit the institutions involved in the respect that it would highlight 
problems with their organizational structures and also help to develop my method by 
adapting it to deal with different types of organization.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Summary of formalization (Y1) ranks and grid scores for the 
prison service 
 
Penal Institutional legal
sources
Formality
ranks
Grid
Scores
England Japan
Parliamentary Legislation 1 7
Human Right Act 1998
Prison Act 1952
 The Act of Penal
 Institutions and
 the Treatment of
Sentenced Inmates
 (Statutory Instruments)
Secondary Legislation 2 6
Prison Rules
YOI rules
The Rules of Penal Institutions
and the treatment of Sentenced
Inmates.
The Rules of
Organizational Structures in Prison,
Juvenile Prison and Remand Centre.
Ordinance
3 5
Prison Service Orders
(by 2009)
Ministerial
Ordinance (Kunrei )
Instruction 4 4
Prison Service
 Instructions (PSIs)
Agency Instructions (
AIs)
Ministerial
 Instructions:
Tsutatsu,
Imei-tsutatsu,
and Tsuchi
Written Advice and Manuals 5 3
Prison performance
Manuals
(nationally edited
)Prisoner's Information
book
Ministerial Advice
Local written rules and manuals 6 2 rules set by local establishmentsrules et by local establishments
Informal unwritten rituals, habits, and contract7 1
Informal unwritten belief
or guidelines shared
among prison staff
members
Local informal manuals
Informal unwritten belief or
guidelines shared among prison staff
members
Local informal manuals
No rules  def ine  the re levant
subject of risk control.
8 0
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Appendix 2: Summary of compliance (X1) ranks and group scores for the 
prison service 
1 3 2 4 5
Order
Def in ition
of Risk
Punishment
Reward
Implementati
on
 of
key national
 gu ide lines
Accountability
of
risk re lated
information
record
High 4
All local
establishments
fully implement
key national
guidelines
3
 Acceptable
behaviour of
individual
prisoners
among
prisoners is
generally
minimised
ways of
identifying risk
are uniformly
standardised
among all local
establishments.
All local
establishments
appropriately
conduct
punishment
All local
establishments
appropriately
conduct reward
a majority
of local
establishments
fully implement
key national
guidelines
All local
establishments
keep
accountable
records and
documentation
about risk
2
acceptable
behaviour
among
prisoners is
constrained
 but
restrictions
are imposed
on a case-
by-case basis
ways of
identifying risk
are commonly
shared among a
majority of local
establishments
Majority of
local
establishments
 appropriately
conduct
punishment
Majority of local
establishments
 appropriately
conduct reward
a majority
of local
establishments
implement
key national
guidelines.
But the quality
varies
between them
accountable
records
 and
documentation
about
risk are kept
by a majority of
local
establishments
1
acceptable
individual
behaviour is
maximised
and group
stability is
minimised
ways of
identifying risk
vary widely
among local
establishments
The
appropriatenes
s of
punishment
vary by local
establishments
The
appropriateness
of reward vary
by local
establishments
the
implementation
of
key national
guidelines
varies widely
among local
establishments
the quality of
accountable
records and
documentation
about risk varies
widely among
local
establishments
Low 0
No
restrictions
on prisoners’
behaviour
with regard to
group
stability.
ways of
identifying risk
do not exist
at all local
establishments
No
establishment
appropriately
conduct
punishment.
Or the
punishment
system is not
used for
controlling the
risk
No
establishment
inappropriately
conduct reward.
Or the reward
system is not
used for
controlling the
risk
No
local
establishments
implement
key national
guidelines
No local
establishments
keep records
and
documentation
about risk.
Sub-codes
Compliance
ranks
Group
Scores
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Appendix 3: Summary of roles of governors (Y2) ranks and grid scores 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5
Specialization
of  staff
members
selection
criteria
Interpersonal
roles
:1.Figurehead
2. Leader
3.Liaison
Informational
roles:
1.Monitor
2.Disseminator
3.Spokesman
Decisional
roles:
1.Entrepreneur
2.Disturbance
Handler,
3.Resource
Allocator,
 4. Negotiator
high 5
Governors
are required to
be in charge
of
4 roles
4
Governors are
required to be
 in charge of
 3 roles
Governors
are required to
be
in charge of
3roles
Active
 in 3 roles
3 Ascription Active in 2roles Active in 2roles
Active
in 2roles
2
the prison
service
allocates
special roles
prison staff for
controlling the
risks of suicide
and violence in
local
establishments
Achievement
 and
Ascription
Active in 1 role Active in 1 role
Active
in 1 role
1
they are
assigned
specific roles
for more
general
purposes
Achievement
Governors
plays some of
those roles but
very weak
Governors
plays some of
those roles but
very weak
Governors
plays some of
those roles but
very weak
Low 0
the prison
service does
not allocate any
positions or
entitlements for
prison staff.
None of
these
Governors are
in charge of
none of
those
Governors are
in charge of
none of
those
Governors are
in charge of
none of
those
Sub-codes
Roles
of
governors
ranks
Grid
Scores
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Appendix 4: Summary of autonomy (X2) ranks and group scores for the 
prison service 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5
Proportion
 of
 outsider
leaders
(governors)
external
performance
assessment
 bodies
Existence and
inf luence of
trade union
performance
competition
and
main
indicators
Diversity of
local key
strategies
Smallest
autonomy
at
local
levels
4
all governors
are insiders
external
performance
assessment
bodies
do not exist
 Trade unions
do not exist
Key local
strategies
to risk control
are
identical.
3
governorships
 are open to
outsiders.
But a
majority
 of governors
are insiders
A few external
performance
assessment
bodies.
Lack influence
over local
establishments.
trade unions
exist .
But
their activities
do not hold
much influence
Internal
performance
competition
does not exist
Common
key strategies
followed
by
a major ity of
local
establishments
2
Opened
and
 the
proportion of
outsiders and
insiders are
close to equal
there are
multiple
external
performance
assessment
bodies.
Some of those
have substantial
influences.
trade unions
influences
operation of risk
control
strategies in
some local
establishments
Exist.
Performance is
measured by
process-
oriented
indicators
There are
common key
strategies,
but
approaches
in those
strategies
vary.
1
Opened.
Majority of
governors are
outsider
A large
number of
highly influencial
external
performance
assessment
bodies.
Trade unions
exist.
Their activities
are
highly
influential on a
major ity of
local
establishments
Exist
And local
performances
are measured
by outcome
oriented
indicators
Common
key strategies
do not exist,
strategies
widely vary by
local
establishments
Largest
autonomy
at local
levels
0
All governors
are
promoted
from outside
of the prison
service.
Anybody from
outside the
prison service
can participate
in assessments
of local
performance
Trade unions
have total
control over
local
establishments
Pure market
competition
between local
establishments
is used to
assesses the
prison service
performance
Risk control
strategies
cannot be
observed at
either local or
national levels
Autonomy
ranks
Group
Scores
(national)
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Appendix 5 HMIP Expectations for Suicide and Self-harm Control 
(HMCIP 2009a: pp. 45-48) 
 
1. A safer custody strategy is in place that recognises the risks to prisoners, 
particularly in the early days in custody and sets out procedures which help to 
reduce the risk of self-harm. The specific needs of different prisoner groups are 
recognised, as are the levels of risk in different areas of the establishment. 
 
2. A multi-disciplinary committee effectively monitors the prison’s suicide  
prevention policy and procedures. The committee is chaired by a manager 
responsible for the policy and membership includes prisoners, staff representatives 
from a range of disciplines and a member of the local community mental health 
team. 
 
3. Prisoners’ families, friends and external agencies are encouraged, through local 
arrangements, to provide sources of information which may help identify and 
support those prisoners likely to be bullied or who have a history of self-harming 
behaviour. 
 
4. A detailed care and support plan is prepared with input from the prisoner, which 
identifies need as well as the individuals responsible including a key worker. 
Personal factors or significant events which may be a trigger to self-harm have been 
identified. Regular reviews take place involving staff from a range of disciplines and 
family and friends as appropriate, which provide good support and care for all 
prisoners at risk. Arrangements are in place for following up after a care and 
support plan has been closed. 
 
5. Prisoners at risk of suicide and self-harm are held in a supportive and caring 
environment with unhindered access to sources of help including peer supporters. A 
care suite is available to support the work of Listeners. 
 
6. Prisoners are encouraged to express any thoughts of suicide and/or self-harm, and 
are encouraged to take part in all purposeful activities as part of the support plan. 
 
7.  All staff, including night staff, are fully trained in suicide prevention and are clear 
what to do in an emergency. A programme of refresher training is in place. 
 
8. Incidents of self-harm are closely monitored and analysed at regular intervals to 
establish any trends and to implement preventive measures. Serious incidents are 
properly investigated to establish what lessons could be learnt and to promote good 
practice. Where appropriate family or friends of the prisoner are informed through a 
family liaison officer. 
 
9. An action plan is devised and acted upon promptly as a result of an investigation 
into an apparent self-inflicted death. This is reviewed following subsequent findings 
of an inquest jury. 
 
10. All information about prisoners at risk of self-harm or suicide is communicated to 
people who are able to offer support in the community. 
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Appendix 6 HMIP Expectations for Bullying and Violence Reduction 
(HMIP 2009a: pp. 41-44) 
 
1. The prison has developed an effective strategy to reduce violence and intimidation 
which has earned the commitment of the whole prison and has drawn on 
multi-disciplinary consultation including feedback from prisoners. 
 
2. Prisoners are consulted and involved in determining how their lives in the prison 
can be made safer, how bullying, verbal and physical abuse, racial abuse and 
threats of violence are confronted, how conflicts can be resolved and what sanctions 
are appropriate. 
 
3. Staff supervise and protect prisoners throughout the prison from bullying, verbal 
and physical abuse, racial abuse and threats of violence. Staff are consistent in 
challenging these behaviours. 
 
4.  Prisoners’ families and friends are encouraged to make suggestions about how the 
prison could better protect prisoners from victimisation and to provide information 
to help identify those prisoners likely to be at risk. 
 
5. An effective strategy is in place to deal with bullying which is based on an analysis 
of the pattern of bullying in the prison and is applied consistently throughout the 
prison. 
 
6. Allegations of bullying behaviour are treated consistently and fairly. They are 
investigated promptly. Outcomes of investigations are recorded and the prisoner 
who reported the bullying is supported. 
 
7. Prisoners are made aware of behaviour that is unacceptable through a well- 
publicised policy and are made aware of the consequences of bullying. 
Inappropriate behaviour is consistently challenged. 
 
8. Anti-bullying measures support the victim and take the victim’s views about their 
location into account. 
 
9. Appropriate interventions are in place to deal with bullies and support victims. 
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